GIFT   OF 


)/7/n/ 


f*r 


THE  NEW  SYSTEM  OF  THOUGHT 


Which  Dr.  Snider  has  been  specially  engaged 
upon  for  some  years,  now  embraces  the  following 
works : 


1.  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  THE  PSYCHOSIS 

2.  THE  WILL  AND  ITS  WORLD  .    .    . 

3.  SOCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 

4.  THE  STATE      ......... 

5.  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY 

6.  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY 


$1.50 
1.50 
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1.50 


It  is  hoped  that  the  latter  may  be  completed  in 
the  course  of  the  present  year  (1903).  As  far  as 
can  be  now  foreseen,  the  Aesthetic,  or  the  Psychol- 
ogy of  the  Fine  Arts  will  follow. 

SIGMA  PUBLISHING  Co. 


MODERN 

EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY 


The  History  of  Modern  Philosophy 
Psychologically  Treated. 


BY 
DENTON  J.  SNIDER. 


ST,  LOUIS,  MO. 

SIGMA  PUBLISHING  CO. 

210  PINE  ST. 


COPYRIGHT  BY 
D.  J.  SNIDE  B,  1904. 


NIXON-JONES  PTQ.  CO..   213    PINE  ST.,  ST.  LOUIS. 


PROF.  HOWARD  SANDISON 

of  tfvc 

State  Sto^wal 


ecc- 


/f  /i  r\ 


CONTENTS. 


PART  FIRST.  THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY  — 
RENASCENCE. 

PAGE. 
INTRODUCTION    .     .     .     ......     .     .       5 

1.  DESCARTES      .      ,     .     .     ...     .     28 

2.  SPINOZA     ...  ..'     ...   118 

3.  LEIBNIZ     .     .    -.     .    ,.     .     .     .     .   278 

PART  SECOND.  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  — 

REVOLUTION. 
INTRODUCTION    ...     .     .     .     .     .     .368 

1.  LOCKE       ..    ........  389 

2.  HUME  ....     .:     .     .      .     .      .  456 

3.  KANT    .     .     .     V    .     .     .     .     .     .  493 

PART  THIRD.    THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  — 

EVOLUTION.     .     .     ,     .     .     '.     .     .       4 
INTRODUCTION    .     .     .     .  "  .     .  .     .   595 

1.  HEGEL       .     .    <"  7  '  .     .   610 

2.  DARWIN     .     .  '..     .     .  .     .   820 

3.  PHYSIO-PSYCHIS3I     .     .     .     .     .     .824 

(3) 


J  art  Jfirst 


THE   SEVENTEENTH    CENTURY.— 
RENASCENCE. 

Modern  Philosophy,  emancipated  and  self- 
unfolding,  properly  begins  its  new  historic  career 
in  the  Seventeenth  Century.  Undoubtedly  men 
were  philosophizing  in  an  independent  Spirit 
during  the  preceding  Century.  We  cannot  deny 
to  Bruno,  Boehme,  and  Bacon  the  name  of  phi- 
losophers. But  their  works  are  more  in  the 
nature  of  protests  against  the  past,  irregular 
excursions  into  the  future,  prophetic  intimations 
of  the  coming  science.  In  the  Seventeenth  Cen- 
tury, however,  the  philosophic  Norm  itself  is 
re-born  and  is  made  to  hold  the  new  thought  of 
the  age  which  is  thus  the  true  Renascence  of 
Philosophy. 


*       * 

,  «•  «     « 
I  «  •  •    * 


6  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

With  this  Century,  then,  we  begin  our  his- 
toric account  of  Modern  European  Philosophy, 
and  embrace  in  it  three  supreme  men,  Descartes, 
Spinoza  and  Leibniz.  Looked  at  through  the 
intervening  Centuries,  these  three  are  seen  to  be 
the  loftiest  peaks  f>f  thought,  though  between 
them  and  around  them  lie  lesser  heights  which 
are  likewise  mountainous.  The  latter,  however, 
we  shall  have  to  pass  by  in  the  present  survey, 
and  concentrate  our  attention  upon  those  who 
express  the  three  distinctive  phases  of  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  Seventeenth  Century,  and  show  its 
process  not  only  in  their  systems  of  thought  but 
also  in  their  lives  and  characters. 

I.  The  great  historical  fact  of  this  Century 
was  the  terrific  struggle  between  Southern  and 
Northern  Europe,  between  the  Latin  and  Teutonic 
Peoples,  between  the  old  Mediterranean  civiliza- 
tion with  its  stress  upon  authority  and  the  new- 
born civilization  beyond  the  Alps  with  its  stress 
upon  freedom.  The  German  tribes  and  the  Ger- 
man emperors  during  the  Middle  Ages  had  a 
tendency  to  go  South,  to  become  fused  with 
Latin  Peoples  and  permeated  with  Latin  culture. 
But  now  the  situation  is  changed.  Something 
has  departed  or  is  departing  from  the  Latin  or 
Latinized  Peoples  which  they  are  desperately 
seeking  to  recover  and  retain.  In  the  preceding 
Fifteenth  Century  the  shifting  had  already  be- 
gun to  take  place  with  the  Reformation.  Teu- 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  7 

tonia  had  previously  sought  her  center  outside  of 
herself,  in  the  South ;  but  now  she  has  found 
her  center  within  herself.  The  result  is,  the 
Latin  world,  both  in  Church  and  State,  conies 
North  and  tries  to  recapture  the  fugitive,  and 
to  subject  her  to  a  fresh  domination.  But  such 
was  not  to  be  the  outcome  of  their  effort.  The 
separation  had  taken  place  forever.  And  that 
was  not  all.  The  Spirit  of  the  Ages,  Civiliza- 
tion, the  World-Spirit,  or  whatever  else  it  may 
be  called,  having  hovered  around  the  Mediter- 
ranean shores  from  East  to  West  for  thousands 
of  years,  breaks  the  course  of  its  flight,  and, 
wheeling  Northward  and  crossing  the  lofty 
Alpine  watershed  of  Europe,  finds  its  new  home. 

Now  the  grand  object  of  the  Latin  Peoples 
during  the  Seventeenth  Century  was  in  some  way 
to  bring  back  to  its  former  abode  or  to  control 
in  its  new  abode  the  Spirit  which  had  distinctly 
chosen  the  Teutonic  world  as  its  supporter  and 
representative.  The  Latin  Church  will  use  all 
its  spiritual  power  with  unparalleled  skill  and  per- 
sistency ;  the  Latin  States,  Spain  and  France,  and 
even  the  German  Emperor,  will  employ  all  their 
political  forces  in  wars  which  last  generations ; 
but'  it  is  to  no  purpose,  or  rather  their  mighty 
endeavors  deepen  the  rift  and  establish  the  more 
firmly  the  new  seat  of  Civilization. 

II.  We  naturally  ask:  What  was  the  principle 
at  stake  in  this  desperate  conflict?  It  is  indeed 


8  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

just  the  function  of  Philosophy  to  grasp  such 
a  principle  and  to  formulate  it  in  categories- 
Philosophy,  if  it  be  worth  anything,  reflects  the 
deepest  fact  of  its  age  in  the  most  universal  form. 
The  man  as  such  has  come  to  the  front  in  the 
North  and  is  asserting  the  supreme  human  value 
of  himself  against  the  crushing  might  of  exter- 
nal dominion  in  Church  and  State.  The  indi- 
vidual has  arisen  and  demands  that,  if  he  is  to 
live  an  institutional  life,  he  must  have  a  part  at 
least  in  establishing  the  institutions  which  he 
obeys.  The  Ego,  the  selfhood  of  man,  having 
become  aware  of  itself  and  its  worth,  will  not  be 
put  down  till  its  right  be  recognized.  When 
Descartes  in  Holland  says :  1  think  therefore  I 
am,  he  speaks  of  the  thinking,  self-conscious 
Ego  affirming  its  existence,  affirming  that  it  now 
truly  is,  but  before  was  not,  at  least  not  in  its 
present  significance.  The  European  man  has 
come  to  know  himself,  yea  to  know  his  Self,  and 
with  it  the  meaning  of  all  Selfhood.  With  such 
knowledge  the  Church,  the  State,  all  Institutions 
as  well  the  moral  life  are  to  be  transformed, 
gradually  but  surely.  Such  a  transformation 
unrolls  the  modern  world  and  carries  it  down 
through  the  later  centuries  till  the  present.  Sci- 
ence also  is  to  undergo  a  marvelous  metamorpho- 
sis, and  Philosophy  begins  a  new  independent 
career,  quite  parallel  to  her  ancient  movement, 
no  longer  a  handmaiden,  but  a  free  discipline 


TEE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  9 

unfolding  in  her  own  right.  Thus  she  becomes 
young  again,  fresh  and  interesting. 

The  free  man  in  the  North  is  to  make  a  free 
world,  or  at  least  relatively  free,  both  theoreti- 
cally and  practically,  both  in  the  realm  of  thought 
and  of  action.  The  liberated  Ego,  having  become 
aware  internally  of  its  own  enfranchisement  starts 
about  its  task  which  is  to  produce  a  correspond- 
ing outer  enfranchisement.  This  is  the  all-domi- 
nating task  of  the  Seventeenth  Century,  begetting 
a  wrestle  not  only  of  contending  nations  but  also 
of  contending  civilizations.  Now  it  is  the  func- 
tion of  Philosophy  to  give  the  pure  reflection  of 
this  mightiest  struggle  of  its  age  in  the  trans- 
parent forms  of  Thought,  impersonal,  unim- 
passioned,  universal. 

But  this  vast  strivirig  for  freedom  calls  up  the 
enemy,  who  is  thereby  deprived  of  his  accus- 
tomed domination.  Already  we  have  designated 
the  organized  Latin  world  to  be  the  possessors 
and  upholders  of  the  ancient  order.  With  it, 
therefore,  begins  the  fight  which  has  three  lead- 
ing phases,  political,  religious  and  maritime,  each 
of  which  we  may  briefly  note. 

III.  Already  in  the  Fifteenth  Century  a  small 
Teutonic  country  in  North-Western  Europe  had 
made  itself  the  political  center  of  the  new  epoch. 
The  Netherlands  declared  their  independence  of 
Spain,  a  Latin  country,  and  formed  the  Dutch 
Kepublic.  Eighty  years  the  conflict  lasted,  ex- 


10  MODERN  E  UR  OPE  AN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tending  into  the  Sixteenth  Century  and  only 
ending  with  the  Peace  of  Westphalia.  In  this 
long  war  terminating  in  the  freedom  of  the 
Dutch,  Latin  domination,  both  in  Church  and 
State,  received  its  hardest  blow.  The  small  self- 
determined  State  showed  on  all  sides  the  re_ 
newed  worth  of  the  free  man :  Commerce  flour- 
ished, Science  advanced,  a  mighty  forward 
movement  of  the  Spirit  took  place.  In  fact  it 
may  be  said  that  the  Dutch  Republic  at  this 
time  stood  in  the  very  front  of  the  new  epoch 
and  bore  the  chief  burden  of  the  rising  Civiliza- 
tion. 

Thus  she  drove  out  one  Latin  assailant,  but  it 
was  only  to  call  up  another  and  nearer.  In  the 
person  of  Louis  XIV,  France  assumed  the  task 
of  vindicating  the  Latin  heritage  in  State  and 
Church,  and  with  right  instinct  aimed  its 
blows  at  the  Republic  in  the  North.  But  again 
the  outcome  was  failure  for  the  assailant,  the 
Latin  nation  had  to  fall  back  into  its  boundaries, 
and  to  suffer  the  small  Teutonic  State  to  pursue 
its  own  inner  free  development  in  its  own  way. 
Even  strong,  large  France  could  not  turn  the 
World-Spirit,  and  the  absolute  Monarch  had  to 
give  up  his  ambition  to  put  himself  in  the  place 
of  Civilization. 

Now  it  was  this  region  of  Dutch  liberty  to 
which  Philosophy  took  her  flight  in  the  Seven- 
teenth Century .  Descartes ,  the  greatest  French- 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  11 

man  of  his  age,  left  his  native  country  and  all 
the  charms  of  its  fair  capital  to  dwell  in  the 
Netherlands,  foggy  but  free.  In  fact  he  could 
not  philosophize  in  France ;  if  he  was  to  utter 
the  oracle  of  the  Spirit  of  the  Age,  he  had  to  go 
to  its  shrine.  His  flight  from  the  Latin  world 
to  the  Teutonic  Republic  was  in  deep  correspond- 
ence with  what  Civilization  itself  was  doing.  Thus 
he  showed  himself  a  typical  man,  performing  the 
typical  act  of  his  epoch  in  making  with  it  his 
deepest  spiritual  transition. 

In  the  same  general  locality  rose  and  wrought 
the  next  philosopher,  Spinoza,  being  one  step  re- 
moved in  descent  from  the  Spanish  Peninsula. 
Born  in  Holland  of  Jewish  parents  who  had  fled 
from  the  Inquisition  of  the  South,  and  witness- 
ing in  his  mature  manhood  the  attack  of  France 
upon  his  native  land,  he  took  up  into  his  spiritthe 
Latin  and  Teutonic  dualism  as  no  other  thinker 
of  his  time,  reproducing  it  in  all  its  depth  and  in- 
tensity, we  may  say  in  all  its  ferocity,  since  that 
God  of  his  is  the  Absolute  One  devouring  every 
form  of  individuality,  which,  however,  rises  up 
and  asserts  itself,  even  to  the  point  of  re-con- 
structing God  Himself  in  and  through  intellec- 
tual love.  Finally  Leibniz,  the  third  supreme 
philosopher  of  the  Century,  is  a  born  Teuton, 
living  most  of  his  life  not  far  from  the  Low 
Countries  and  representing  in  many  ways  the 
Teutonic  Spirit  seeking  to  free  itself  from  its 


12  MODERN  E  UHOPEAN  PHIL OSOPH T. 

Latin  tutelage,  yet  never  fully  succeeding  in  the 
attempt  during  the  present  Century. 

IV.  The  name  of  Leibniz  recalls  the  fact  that 
he  was  born  two  years  preceding  the  Peace 
of  Westphalia  and  so  passed  his  active  life  in  the 
Germany  which  resulted  from  the  Thirty  Ye*ars' 
War.  The  motive  of  this  war  was  chiefly  re- 
ligious, though  political  ends  also  played  in. 
The  Emperor  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  in 
obedience  to  the  Latin  Church,  sought  to  ex- 
tirpate all  heresy,  that  is,  all  difference  of 
opinion  in  religious  matters.  The  outcome  of 
the  War  gave  equality  to  the  Protestant  de- 
nominations, and  the  Old  Church  was  forced  to 
acknowledge  that  the  new  religion  had  come 
to  stay.  Luther's  doctrine  of  justification  by 
faith  had  borne  its  fruit :  the  individual  was  to 
work  out  his  own  salvation. 

Thus  the  chief  Latin  authority  in  Europe  was 
broken  in  twain,  after  a  final  attempt  to  overcome 
the  Spirit  of  the  Age.  The  individual  in  re- 
ligion had  asserted  his  claim  in  the  North.  But 
the  Latin  Church  did  not  propose  to  give  up ;  it 
still  had  much  work  to  do  in  stamping  out  heresy 
within  its  own  territory.  The  Order  of  Jesuits 
and  the  Inquisition  took  up  the  cause,  but  could 
not  reach  the  Spirit  which  was  cherished  and 
protected  in  the  Teutonic  countries.  What  could 
not  be  done  by  force  was  sought  to  be  accom- 
plished by  cunning,  by  secret  intimidation,  and 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  13 

even  by  education.  But  in  spite  of  all  changes, 
the  division  remained,  and  the  individualistic 
character  of  the  Protestant  religion  has  been  left 

O 

free  to  bear  its  fruits,  good  and  bad. 

But  one  result  is  certain :  Philosophy  as  an 
independent  discipline  has  remained  a  Protestant, 
and  has  unfolded  to  its  full  bloom  in  Teutonic 
lands.  Ever  since  Descartes  fled  from  his  own 
Latin  France  and  philosophized  in  a  Northern 
country,  thus  indicating  the  great  transition  of 
the  Seventeenth  Century,  Philosophy  has  stayed 
where  he  brought  it,  and  has  developed  in  its  own 
free  way  through  the  succeeding  Centuries.  This 
does  not  mean  that  Philosophy  was  not  studied 
in  the  Catholic  Schools  but  that  it  was  essentially 
determined  in  its  purpose  from  the  outside,  es- 
pecially through  Theology.  It  was  not  free  in 
its  development,  and  hence  could  not  adequately 
reflect  the  new  Spirit.  It  would  almost  seem  as 
if  the  Latin  Church  burned  Philosophy  herself 
at  the  stake  along  with  Bruno  at  Rome  in  the 
opening  year  of  the  Seventeenth  Century.  At 
any  rate  the  Latin  peoples  have  produced  no  su- 
preme philosopher  after  him,  perhaps  none  equal 
to  him  in  originality.  Bruno's  influence  also 
crossed  the  Alps,  and  left  his  impress  upon  the 
systems  of  Spinoza  and  Leibniz,  not  to  speak  of 
lesser  philosophers. 

V.  Another  great  sphere  in  which  the  struggle 
between  the  Latin  and  Teutonic  peoples  mani- 


14  MODERN  EUROPEAN'  PHILOSOPHY. 

f  ested  itself  in  the  Seventeenth  Century  was  the 
maritime.  It  was  the  Mediterranean  navigators 
who  first  broke  into  the  unknown  seas  and  made 
the  great  discovery  of  a  new,  extra-European 
world,  which  was  to  be  possessed  by  Europe. 
In  particular  to  America  was  brought  the  two- 
fold division  of  Europe  into  North  and  South, 
each  with  its  corresponding  character.  The  re- 
sult was  that  Teutonic  and  Latin  separation,  with 
the  accompanying  political  and  religious  institu- 
tions, appeared  in  North  and  South  America. 
The  ships  of  the  Spanish  and  English  mariners 
did  not  simply  carry  merchandise  and  human 
bodies,  but  the  two  conflicting  ideas  of  their 
peoples,  yea,  of  their  respective  races.  It  was 
not  long  before  their  two  ideas  began  clashing 
on  the  seas,  the  question  being,  Which  of  them 
is  to  rule  the  boundless  billowy  element  encom- 
passing the  globe.  Spain  made  one  herculean 
effort  to  reach  the  seat  of  this  new  naval  Spirit, 
which  was  only  another  form  of  that  Spirit 
of  the  Ages  or  of  Civilization  which  had  come  to 
the  North  and  was  incarnating  itself  in  various 
shapes  among  the  different  Teutonic  peoples. 
But  the  Spanish  Armada  dashed  itself  to  pieces 
against  England  who  then  sallied  forth  in  her 
turn  and  ended  the  Spanish  absolutism  on  the 
Ocean.  Holland  also  took  part  in  limiting  the 
maritime  domination  of  the  Latins,  and  her 
greatest  jurist,  if  not  the  greatest  genius  she 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTUEY.  15 

ever  produced,  Hugo  Grotius,  first  proclaimed 
the  Freedom  of  the  Sea  (mare  liberum)  as  a  part 
of  the  Law  of  Nations,  and  as  a  necessary 
correlate  of  the  Freedom  of  the  Land. 

This  principle  of  marine  Freedom,  however, 
lay  deep  in  the  past  of  the  two  peoples,  and  in 
their  long  primitive  training  through  elemental 
Nature.  For  the  Teutonic  peoples  (Scandina- 
vian, North  German,  Dutch  and  English)  lived 
around  the  Open  Sea,  and  thus  had  the  perpetual 
outlook  upon  the  unlimited  Ocean,  with  which 
they  had  to  grapple  when  they  left  their  immedi- 
ate shores.  But  the  Mediterranean  peoples  clus- 
tered for  thousands  of  years  around  a  Closed 
Sea,  whose  limits  they  soon  came  to  know  and 
to  follow  in  outline  upon  their  voyages.  For 
the  early  navigators  clung  to  the  shore,  which 
they  seldom  lost  from  view.  Thus  they  were 
trained  to  a  prescribed  line  laid  down  by  Nature, 
or  as  they  thought,  by  the  Gods.  The  sea  itself 
trained  them  to  prescription,  to  a  path  in  which 
they  were  to  go,  and  made  them  directly 
obedient  to  what  was  established  from  without. 
Quite  the  opposite  was  the  sea's  discipline  for 
the  Northern  peoples,  since  the  sea  also  keeps  a 
school  for  those  who  dwell  on  its  borders  —  and 
a  stern  school  it  is,  in  which  corporeal  punish- 
ment is  not  abolished.  The  Northern  sailor  was 
slowly  trained  to  drawing  his  own  lines  upon  the 
unlimited  main,  and  became  in  the  end  the  more 


16  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

daring  navigator.  The  result  has  been  that  no 
Latin  navy  has  been  able  to  hold  its  own  against 
the  English. 

Thus  we  behold  the  mighty  struggle  of  the 
Seventeenth  Century  on  land  carried  out  into  the 
Ocean  and  re-enacting  itself  there  with  the  same 
general  results.  This  struggle,  we  repeat,  is 
what  the  Philosophy  of  the  time  is  seeking  to 
express  and  does  express  in  abstract  categories  of 
thought.  Philosophy  utters  the  Spirit  of  the 
Age  in  its  purest  form,  giving  the  innermost 
process  thereof,  and  its  profoundest  conflict. 
The  conflict  shows  many  forms  of  manifestation 
in  the  world  of  reality,  but  Philosophy  beholds 
in  all  these  varied  forms  the  one  underlying  prin- 
ciple. Naturally  Spain  is  the  pivot  of  the  great 
turn  from  South  to  North.  Spain,  being  located 
doubly,  both  upon  the  closed  and  the  open  sea, 
strives  to  transfer  the  old  Mediterranean  limits 
to  the  unlimited  Ocean,  and  thence  to  the  North. 
But  she  fails,  and  with  her  failure  she  loses  her 
prestige  and  even  her  power,  of  inner  develop- 
ment, which  indeed  she  has  sought  to  destroy. 

VI.  Philosophy  in  the  Seventeenth  Century 
still  speaks  Latin  chiefly,  but  it  has  also  begun 
to  employ  the  Latinized  tongues,  as  French, 
English  and  Italian.  Any  native  Teutonic  dia- 
lect it  is  very  chary  of  using,  though  some  phil- 
osophic writing  may  be  found  in  Dutch  and  in 
German.  The  significant  fact  then  is  that  the 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  17 

Teutonic  idea  clothes  itself  in  a  Latin  garb. 
Categories  of  thought  coming  from  the  past 
are  taken  and  filled  with  the  spirit  of  the  present. 
Thus  the  utterance  of  Philosophy  in  the  Seven- 
teenth Century  is  a  case  of  putting  new  wine 
into  old  bottles.  The  thought  of  the  North, 
born  naked,  has  at  first  to  borrow  its  clothes 
from  the  South  in  spite  of  their  age.  This  state 
of  things  will  of  course  change  with  time.  Thus 
the  conflict  between  the  Latin  and  the  Teuton  is 
carried  over  into  the  very  expression  of  Philoso- 
phy, and  becomes  a  struggle  between  its  Form 
and  its  Content.  The  Greco-Koman  world,  even 
in  Jurisprudence,  furnishes  the  Law  and  the 
outer  forms,  into  which,  however,  the  new  spirit 
is  to  pour  itself.  Thus  the  German  tongue  is 
put  under  the  discipline  of  service  for  hundreds 
of  years,  till  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  it  be- 
comes the  great  implement  of  Teutonic  thought, 
a?nd  in  power  and  subtlety  of  philosophic  expres- 
sion is  only  paralleled  by  the  Greek. 

The  intermediate  link  in  this  transition  from 
old  Latin  to  modern  German  is  the  northern 
Latinized  tongues,  notably  French  and  English, 
which  are  mainly,  though  not  wholly,  the  prod- 
uct of  Teutons  trying  to  talk  Latin.  The  result 
is  a  transformation  of  speech  which  becomes  a 
mediating  principle  between  the  two  extremes. 
In  the  Seventeenth  Century  this  mediating  speech 
breaks  forth  into  a  literary  splendor  which  it  has 

2 


18  MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

hardly  since  attained,  in  England  represented  by 
Shakespeare,  in  France:  by  Corneille  and  Moliere. 
Philosophy  also  began  talking  this  speech  in  both 
countries,  and  produced  writings  of  a  popular 
cast,  and  more  or  less  free  of  the  philosophic 
trammels  transmitted  from  the  old  tongue  of  the 
Past  and  of  the  South.  But  a  new  difficulty 
also  showed  itself  in  these  writings :  in  throwing 
off  the  ancient  form,  they  had  a  tendency  to 
become  formless,  not  yet  having  the  new  form. 
VII.  But  something  far  deeper  than  the  old 
language  with  its  old  categories  was  inherited  by 
the  philosophers  of  the  Seventeenth  Century 
from  the  Past  and  the  South.  This  was  the 
philosophic  Norm,  which  was  transmitted  by 
Latin  culture  through  the  ages  from  the  Greek 
world  where  it  originated.  All  three — Des- 
cartes, Spinoza,  and  Leibniz  —  were  learned 
men,  profoundly  versed  in  the  thought  of 
the  Past,  and  fundamentally  influenced  by  it, 
even  if  Descartes  affected  to  despise  it.  All 
three  wrote  in  Latin  and  thought  in  Latin, 
especially  Spinoza,  whose  tongue  it  became, 
he  having  properly  no  mother-tongue.  They 
could  not  study  deeply  the  transmitted  Phi- 
losophy of  the  Middle  Ages  or  of  Antiquity 
without  penetrating  to  the  Norm,  or  to  the  basic 
procedure  which  makes  Philosophy.  They  could 
only  be  philosophers  through  their  thought  un- 
folding not  irregularly,  or  even  artistically,  but 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  19 

philosophically,  that  is,  after  the  inherent  pre- 
established  Norm  of  Philosophy.  They  did  not 
found  a  Eeligion  (which  has  its  own  distinct 
Norm)  but  a  Philosophy;  still  less  did  they 
reach  the  Norm  of  Psychology,  though  they 
were  on  the  way  thereto,  being  in  the  supreme 
outlook  stages  in  the  evolution  of  this  last  Dis- 
cipline. 

Accordingly  the  philosophers  of  the  Seven- 
teenth Century  will  follow,  in  fact  cannot  help 
following,  the  philosophic  Norm  which  comes 
down  to  them  quite  from  the  beginning  of  their 
Science.  On  this  side,  accordingly,  there  is 
something  pre-formed,  pre-deter mined  in  their 
work,  something  which  upholds  it  and  prescribes 
its  deepest  process.  But  on  the  other  hand  this 
far-descended  Norm  is  completely  transfused 
with  a  new  content  furnished  by  a  new  world  of 
thought,  which  makes  the  old  trunk  bud  and 
blossom  afresh  with  thousandfold  flowers  and 
fruits,  in  which  it  is  quite  hidden.  Still  the 
Norm  is  there  underneath  and  is  supporting  the 
whole  harvest.  And  it  is  the  duty  of  the  ex- 
positor to  bring  it  out  to  the  surface  and  to  show 
it  performing  its  function,  which  is  to  give  philo- 
sophic structure  to  thought  and  to  conjoin  the 
same  with  all  its  previous  manifestations. 

It  is  this  new  content  which  creates  Modern 
Philosophy  as  distinct  from  Ancient  and  Me- 
dieval, the  last  two  having  essentially  same 


20          MODERN'  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

philosophic  Norm  as  the  first.  We  repeat,  it  is 
the  Norm  which  makes  each  and  all  of  them 
Philosophy. 

VIII.  We  have  already  stated  in  a  very  gen- 
eral way  what  we  hold  to  be  the  principle  of  the 
Seventeenth  Century  and  its  Philosophy.  It 
places  its  stress  upon  the  free  internal  self,  the 
individual,  the  Ego,  which  Descartes  picks  up 
immediately  and  then  starts.  When  the  move- 
ment has  reached  Leibniz  we  see  that  he  has 
found  the  process  of  the  Ego,  and  puts  it  into 
his  primary  metaphysical  form,  the  Monad. 
Such  is,  in  our  judgment,  the  distinctive,  most 
original  fact  of  this  Century's  Philosophy:  be- 
ginning with  the  Ego  as  immediate,  it  unfolded 
in  the  same  the  process,  and  formulated  this 
process  metaphysically  (not  psychologically). 

The  next  step  is  also  of  great  significance. 
This  Ego  having  found  itself,  is  now  to  find  the 
world,  and  to  be  reconciled  with  it,  is  to  discover 
in  Nature  a  corresponding  harmony  with  itself. 
Hence  arises  the  love  of  Nature,  and  the  marvel- 
ous progress  of  Natural  Science.  The  medieval 
damnation  of  the  world  is  set  aside  or  rather  is 
overcome ;  man  finds  in  Nature  not  the  Destroyer 
but  a  friend  who  on  good  acquaintance  will  as- 
sist him  in  surprising  ways.  The  Philosophy  of 
the  Seventeenth  Century  will  seek  to  bring  man 
to  the  knowledge  of  the  world,  while  the  previ- 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  21 

ous  Medieval  Philosophy  sought  to  turn  man 
away  from  the  world  in  order  that  he  might 
know  God. 

This  brings  us  to  the  part  which  the  Seven- 
teenth Century  assigns  to  God,  for  He  is  present 
in  all  its  manifestations.  Its  Philosophy  declares 
that  through  God  Man  is  to  know  the  World,  and 
to  be  organically  connected  with  it  in  the  process 
of  the  All.  Really  God  has  become  the  means 
for  Man's  knowing  the  object.  Thus  the  grand 
medieval  separation  and  antagonism  between 
Man  and  the  World  is  now  overcome  by  the  act 
of  God  Himself,  to  be  sure  somewhat  externally 
and  mechanically. 

Here  we  must  note  the  fact  that  the  Seven- 
teenth Century  regards  the  universe  on  the  whole 
as  a  mechanism.  It  is  the  age  of  mechanics,  of 
great  mechanical  discoveries,  celestial  and  ter- 
restrial .  Mathematics,  which  is  the  ideal  machine 
governing  the  real  one,  made  the  greatest  progress 
and  occupied  the  deepest  minds  of  the  Century. 
When  Kepler  mathematically  showed  mechani- 
cal laws  controlling  the  heavenly  bodies,  the 
idea  lay  near  that  God's  thought  was  mathemat- 
ical. Philosophy  showed  the  tendency  to  pro- 
ceed after  the  method  of  Mathematics,  and  God 
moved  the  Ego  as  if  this  were  a  machine.  The 
philosophic  Norm  was  a  kind  of  Pan-Mechanism ; 
God,  World  and  Man  were  the  parts  of  the  ma- 


22          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

chine  of  the  Universe.  We  may  say  that  the 
Pampsychosis,  or  the  psychical  process  of  the  All, 
attained  and  formulated  its  pan-mechanical  stage 
in  the  Seventeenth  Century. 

IX.  The  movement  of  the  Philosophy  of  the 
Seventeenth  Century  will  show  three  stages, 
which  taken  together  form  a  psychical  process 
(Psychosis),  constituting  the  very  essence  of  its 
thought.  But  each  of  these  stages  is  represented 
by  a  supreme  philosopher,  who  has  likewise  his 
own  psychical  process,  and  indeed  many  of  them. 
Three  great  philosophic  Egos,  asserting  the  val- 
idity of  the  Ego,  form  the  innermost  movement 
of  the  Century.  The  personal  triad  of  philoso- 
phers making  a  school  of  thought  was  the  start- 
ing-point of  Philosophy  at  ancient  Miletus,  and 
continued  through  the  entire  history  of  thought 
till  in  modern  Philosophy  it  becomes  emphatically 
explicit.  Here  we  may  take  a  brief  survey  of 
the  supreme  philosophic  triad  of  the  Seventeenth 
Century. 

1.  Descartes.  The  self -knowing  Ego  is  on 
One  side  as  Thought,  and  the  World  is  on  the 
other  side  as  Extension.  God  unites  the  two  in 
the  act  of  knowledge  by  his  direct  fiat. 

Descartes  takes  the  Universe  at  first  as  given 
with  three  elements  or  substances  —  God,  World, 
Man — which  he  unites  in  a  process.  It  is, 
therefore,  a  mistake  to  call  Descartes  the  dual- 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  23 

1st  of  the  Seventeenth  Century.  Undoubtedly 
he  separates  profoundly  Thought  and  Extension, 
but  his  very  principle  is  to  bring  them  together 
again,  even  if  externally.  The  same  is  true  of 
the  other  great  Cartesian  dualism,  that  between 
Soul  and  Body.  These  indeed  he  divides  deeply, 
but  for  the  very  purpose  of  bringing  them 
together  again.  Some  readers  have  thought  and 
may  still  think  that  he  has  made  these  divisions 
so  deep  that  he  has  been  unable  to  bring  them 
back  into  unity,  but  that  was  certainly  not  his 
opinion,  and  it  is  not  the  object  of  his  Philoso- 
phy as  he  understands  it.  A  true  exposition 
ought  not  to  put  the  stress  upon  the  dualism  of 
the  philosopher,  but  upon  the  overcoming  of  it 
according  to  his  method. 

In  Descartes,  then,  God  is  the  supreme  rec- 
onciler of  dualism,  even  if  He  has  created  it. 
The  chief  function  of  God  is  to  make  me  know 
the  world,  which  is  my  opposite,  my  other.  The 
medieval  idea  is  that  the  chief  function  of  the 
world  is  to  make  me  know  God,  who  is  the  sole 
object,  not  the  means,  of  knowledge.  Herein 
too  we  may  see  why  Descartes  had  no  use  for 
Final  Causes  (Teleology),  God  being  means,  not 
end. 

Such  we  deem  to  be  the  first  or  immediate 
stage  of  the  philosophic  movement  of  the 
Seventeenth  Century.  God  immediately,  arbi- 


24          MODERN  E  UBOPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

trarily,  by  fiat,  solves  the  problem  of  man's 
knowing  truth.  But  this  is  just  what  begets 
more  deeply  in  the  soul  the  grand  dualism  be- 
tween God  on  the  one  side  and  man  on  the  other, 
which  dualism  expresses  itself  in  the  next 
supreme  philosopher  of  the  period. 

2.  Spinoza.  The  self-knowing  Ego  as 
Thought  and  the  World  as  Extension  are  at  first 
posited  as  one  and  the  same  with  God ;  all  differ- 
ence vanishes  in  God,  the  three  Substances  of 
Descartes  become  one  all-embracing,  yea  all-con- 
suming Substance,  who  is  God,  the  One  and  the 
only  One.  This  is  the  metaphysical,  monistic, 
pantheistic  side  of  Spinoza. 

But  he  has  just  the  opposite  side  in  equal  if 
not  greater  strength,  namely  the  ethical,  individ- 
ualistic, even  theistic.  Spinoza  has,  therefore, 
two  movements  completely  contradictory:  the 
descending  one  we  may  call  it,  which  begins  with 
God  and  moves  down  to  the  vanishing  individual 
(modus)  ;  the  ascending  one  which  begins  with 
the  individual  and  rises  not  only  to  unity  with 
God,  but  perpetually  re-creates  through  Intellec- 
tual Love  the  divine  source  of  itself,  instead  of 
being  absorbed  and  lost  in  the  same. 

Here,  then,  lies  the  real  dualism  of  the  Seven- 
teenth Century,  expressed  in  what  many  consider 
its  greatest  Philosophy.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  Spinoza  has  both  these  movements,  and  that 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  25 

they  are  in  direct  contradiction,  each  with  the 
other.  But  just  this  is  what  makes  him  the  true 
representative  of  the  Century,  especially  in  its 
seconder  separative  stage.  The  conflict  between 
North  and  South,  between  Mediterranean  and 
Teutonic  Spirit  reflects  itself  directly  in  the 
cleavage  of  his  system.  It  is  the  wide-open 
Philosophy,  split  from  top  to  bottom,  yet  very 
distinctly  showing  the  philosophic  Norm  in  its 
cleft  structure.  Thus  it  reveals  in  its  deepest 
form  the  modern  spiritual  dualism,  which  we 
shall  find  reaching  out  far  beyond  the  Seven- 
teenth Century. 

Such,  then,  is  the  second  or  separative  stage 
of  the  present  period,  which  is  to  be  followed  by 
the  third  or  returning  stage  of  the  complete  psy- 
chical process  of  this  Century. 

3.  Leibniz.  The  self -knowing  Ego  as  Monad 
and  the  World  as  Monad  (though  unconscious) 
are  united  by  God  in  a  pre-established  Harmony. 
The  starting-point  of  Leibniz  is  the  Monad  or  the 
individual  representing  the  universe,  and  the 
Monad  is  the  essence  of  all  being.  The  move- 
ment is  from  the  Monad  back  to  the  One,  or 
Monad  of  Monads,  God,  who  creates  and  sets  in 
order  this  monadal  world. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  fundamental  fact  of  the 
Philosophy  of  Leibniz  is  the  return  of  the  indi- 
vidual as  Monad  to  the  One,  not  the  descent  from 


26  MODERN'  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  One  (so  in  Spinoza)  to  the  individual  as  a 
seeming  something  or  mode.  The  whole  is  a 
grand  flight  of  the  Monads  toward  God  in  whom 
they  do  not  vanish,  but  who  sends  them  forth  in 
harmonious  order.  Hence  the  present  is  the 
third  or  returning  stage  in  the  total  thought  of 
the  Seventeenth  Century.  Really  Leibniz  shows 
the  desperate  struggle  to  overcome,  not  the  Car- 
tesian, but  the  Spinozan  dualism  which  lies  be- 
tween the  two  movements  already  set  forth,  the 
descending  and  the  ascending,  or  the  metaphy- 
sical and  the  ethical.  In  what  way  Leibniz  pro- 
ceeds in  order  to  accomplish  his  purpose,  will  be 
told  more  fully  later  on.  Here,  however,  we 
may  say  in  advance  that  he  puts  the  process  of 
the  Ego  into  his  metaphysical  movement,  thus 
making  the  latter  ascending  and  thereby  rescuing 
the  Ego  from  the  all-devouring  maw  of  Spinoza's 
metaphysical  Substance.  A  great  step  was  this, 
in  our  judgment  the  greatest  Leibniz  ever  took, 
prophetic  indeed,  even  if  from  afar,  of  the  new 
Psychology. 

Accordingly  Leibniz  has  reached,  affirmed, 
and  formulated  Substance  as  the  self-conscious 
Ego,  yet  still  as  Substance.  So  his  form  re- 
mains metaphysical,  but  his  content  is  psycho- 
logical, showing  the  movement  of  the  Self  in 
Feeling,  Will  and  Intellect,  though  this  move- 
ment be  conceived  vaguely  and  scatteringly,  in 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  27 

Leibiiizian  fashion.  But  it  is  a  very  high  point 
to  reach,  and  the  disguised  Ego  is  made  ready 
to  burst  forth  into  its  own  shape  with  its  own 
right —  all  of  which  we  shall  find  taking  place  in 
the  next  Century. 

With  this  brief  outline  of  our  future  task  in 
mind,  suggesting  the  ever-present  inner  process 
of  the  age,  we  may  begin  the  grapple  with  the 
details. 


MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 


l.  Descartes. 

There  were  philosophers  of  the  Kenascence 
before  Descartes,  but  with  him  properly  begins 
the  movement  of  modern  Philosophy  in  its  dis- 
tinctive, consciously  expressed  purpose.  He 
starts  with  the  Ego,  and  proceeds  through  in- 
trospection to  unfold  its  nature  before  trying 
to  solve  its  problem  of  knowing  the  object. 
It  is  Descartes  looking  at  the  Self  of  Descartes 
and  ascertaining  its  existence  first  of  all. 
/  think,  therefore,^  I  am  seems  now  a  rather 
trivial  statement,  but  in  it  lies  imbedded  the  whole 
movement  of  modern  philosophic  thought.  The 
thinking  Ego  grasps  itself  and  affirms  its  own 
reality  as  the  center  from  which  the  universe  is 
to  be  constructed.  No  such  point  of  view  can 
we  find  in  the  Greek  or  Medieval  systems  of 
Philosophy. 

We  shall  regard  Descartes  under  three  dif- 
ferent aspects  —  his  Life,  his  Writings,  and  his 
Philosophy.  These  may  be  considered  three 
different  forms  of  utterance  of  the  man  and 
through  him  of  his  age,  moving  as  it  were  from 
the  outside  acts  of  the  individual  in  his  setting 
of  time,  to  his  inmost  principle  which  is  the 
eternal  and  universal  element  of  him.  Our  phi- 
losopher lived,  wrote,  and  thought;  in  this  triple 


DESCARTES.  —  LIFE.  29 

relation   we    are   to  comprenend  him.  as  far  as 

possible. 

I.  THE  LIFE    OF   DESCARTES.      It   has    been 

already  noticed  in  the  lives  of  certain  ancient 
philosophers  that  they  seem  to  have  had  a  period 
of  instruction  and  preparation  (Lehrjahre), 
then  a  period  of  travel  and  of  wandering 
(  Wander j  ahre) ,  finally  a  period  of  fulfillment 
and  mastery  (Meisterjalire).  This  fact  we  may 
observe  most  fully  in  the  biographies  of  Plato, 
Aristotle  and  Plotinus,  the  three  greatest 
philosophic  writers  of  antiquity  (see  our  account 
of  them  in  the  previous  volume,  Ancient 
European  Philosophy).  The  foregoing  periods 
are  the  three  stages  in  the  life  and  development  of 
every  workman,  high  and  humble;  moreover 
they  have  been  suggested  by  one  of  the  greatest 
literary  books  that  Europe  has  produced,  Goethe's 
Wilhelm  Meister.  Descartes  in  his  career  has 
all  three  distinctly  developed,  as  one  of  his  biog- 
raphers, Kuno  Fischer,  has  indicated.  But  Des- 
cartes himself  has  suggested  these  three  periods 
of  his  life  in  his  Discourse  on  Method  (premiere 
parti e),  where  he  first  gives  a  somewhat  extended 
account  of  his  years  of  study,  in  which  "  I  had  an 
extreme  desire  of  appropriating  knowledge." 
But  he  became  disgusted  with  mere  erudition,  and 
"  as  soon  as  my  years  permitted  me  to  pass  from 
under  the  control  of  my  preceptors,  I  abandoned 
wholly  the  study  of  letters,  and  resolved  to  seek 


30  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

no  other  science  but  that  which  could  be  found 
in  myself  and  in  the  great  book  of  the  world 
(le  grand  livre  du  monde).  Accordingly  I  spent 
the  rest  of  my  youth  in  traveling,  in  seeing  courts 
and  armies,  in  conversing  with  people  of  differ- 
ent characters  and  ranks,"  etc.  Still  we  must 
not  "  pass  too  much  time  in  traveling,"  else  the 
estrangement  from  our  own  land  and  from  our- 
selves may  become  too  great.  Hence,  "  after  I 
had  spent  some  years  in  studying  the  book  of  the 
world  aforesaid,  and  in  acquiring  some  experi- 
ence, I  resolved  to  study  my  self  ( the  book  of 
my  Self  ) ,  and  to  employ  all  the  energies  of  my 
mind  in  choosing  the  paths  which  I  ought  to 
follow :  which  has  succeeded  much  better,  it  seems 
to  me,  than  if  I  had  never  separated  myself  from 
my  books  or  my  country." 

So  our  philosopher,  looking  back  at  the  past 
in  his  forty-first  year  or  thereabouts,  distinguishes 
its  three  epochs  which  at  once  we  see  to  bear  the 
lineaments  of  a  typical  life,  or  of  the  biographical 
norm  common  to  many  careers  lofty  and  Iow0 
Accordingly  we  shall  briefly  follow  out  on  these 
leading  lines  the  main  occurrences  in  the  life 
of  Rene  Descartes  from  his  birth  in  1596  till  his 
death  in  1650. 

1.  First  Period  (1596-1617).  He  was  born 
in  La  Haye,  France,  where  his  family  belonged 
to  the  old  nobility,  and  had  held  distinguished 
positions  in  Church  and  State.  His  grandfather 


DESCAETES.—LIFE.  81 

had  fought  against  the  Huguenots,  and  Descartes 
himself  was  present  at  the  surrender  of  their  last 
stronghold,  La  Rochelle.  These  traditions  of 
his  family  he  never  openly  violated ;  to  the  end 
of  his  -days,  he  would  go  out  of  his  way  to  de- 
clare his  submission  to  the  old  Church  and  State. 
Yet  he  took  an  early  opportunity  to  get  beyond 
the  reach  of  both ;  he  preferred  to  spend  his 
fruitful  years  away  from  France  and  from  her 
religion.  He  protested  his  devotion,  but  at  a 
distance.  This  is  one  of  the  striking  discrep- 
ancies which  run  through  his  whole  career. 
Theologically  he  was  determined  not  to  break 
with  Catholicism,  though  philosophically  he  was 
the  most  Protestant  of  all  Protestants. 

So  his  French  birth-mark  stayed  upon  his 
features  through  the  greatest  mutations  of  his 
spirit.  His  early  education  by  the  Jesuits  proba- 
bly accentuated  this  double  element  in  his  char- 
acter. Externally  submissive  to  established 
institutions,  but  internally  a  daring  innovator; 
his  freedom  of  thought  he  maintained  along  with 
an  almost  servile  obedience  to  authority  in  spir- 
itual matters.  The  same  twofoldness  seemed  to 
lie  in  the  gifts  of  nature  to  this  man :  bodily  he 
was  weak,  inheriting  a  tendency  to  consumption 
from  his  mother,  who  died  a  few  days  after  his 
birth,  he  being  kept  alive  during  infancy  only 
by  the  skill  and  care  of  his  nurse ;  mentally  he 
was  endowed  with  a  strength  at  which  the  world 


32  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

still  marvels.  We  shall  find  him  timidly  shrink- 
ing from  any  grapple  with  the  actual  conditions 
of  his  age;  but  in  the  minds  of  men  he  will 
plant  the  seeds  of  a  mighty  revolution. 

Descartes  at  school  took  the  ordinary  course 
in  languages  and  in  literature,  showing  aptitude 
in  both.  But  there  were  two  studies  particu- 
larly upon  which  his  future  turned.  The  first  of 
these  was  Mathematics,  which  gave  him  his 
supreme  intellectual  satisfaction  all  the  rest  of 
his  life.  "  I  was  specially  pleased  with  Mathe- 
matics on  account  of  their  certainty,"  and  he 
compares  this  science  with  the  writings  of  the 
old  pagans,  which  seemed  like  "  magnificent 
palaces  built  on  sand  and  mud."  Deeply  dissat- 
isfied he  is  with  ancient  learning  in  spite  of  its 
eloquence,  its  beauty,  and  its  poetry ;  the  human- 
ities of  the  "Renascence  are  to  him  a  kind  of 
plaything,  lacking  the  severeness  and  precision 
of  Mathematics.  Here  is  a  mental  strand  which 
accompanies  his  entire  life. 

Another  branch,  whose  rudiments  he  learned 
from  the  Jesuits,  was  Philosophy,  embracing 
Logic,  Metaphysics  and  Ethics,  to  which  we  may 
add  Physics,  taught  probably  after  the  medieval 
Aristotelian  fashion.  In  this  sphere  (that  of 
Philosophy)  the  many  diverse  opinions  among 
its  greatest  masters  made  him  question  the  truth 
of  the  whole  science.  Here,  then,  is  the  begin- 
ning of  the  Cartesian  doubt :  de  omnibus  dubi- 


DE8CAR  TES.  —  LIFE.  33 

tandum.  At  the  same  time  the  bright  pupil  laid 
just  at  this  point  the  foundation  of  his  future 
greatest  work.  He  acquired  the  philosophical 
Norm  as  transmitted  from  the  ancient  and*  per- 
petuated through  the  medieval  thinkers  :  Meta- 
physics, Physics,  and  Ethics.  How  his  whole 
spiritual  striving  and  accomplishment  hovered 
around  these  three  grand  disciplines,  especially 
the  first  two,  will  be  shown  hereafter. 

After  staying  with  the  Jesuits  eight  years,  he 
leaves  their  school  at  the  age  of  sixteen,  with 
two  main  acquisitions:  faith  in  the  certainty  of 
Mathematics,  and  doubt  in  regard  to  pretty 
much  everything  else,  specially  Philosophy. 
Herein  also  we  can  see  the  problem  of  his  life 
dawning  upon  him,  which  runs  somehow  thus  : 
Can  I  transfer  this  mathematical  certainty  into 
philosophic  doubt  and  make  Philosophy  as  clear 
and  consequent  as  a  proposition  in  geometry? 

With  such  a  struggle  fermenting  in  him  the 
youth  goes  to  Paris  in  order  to  see  the  court  and 
the  society  of  the  capital,  following  herein  the 
custom  of  the  French  nobleman.  But  again 
that  double  nature  of  his  asserted  itself.  For  a 
time  he  indulged  in  the  fashionable  dissipations 
of  the  city,  and  then  suddenly  disappeared.  He 
went  to  a  secluded  house  in  the  suburbs,  and 
gave  himself  up  entirely  to  his  mathematical 
passion.  Finally  he  was  discovered  in  his 
retreat  and  had  to  return  to  society.  But  he 

3 


54          MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

was  sated  with  that  Parisian  world  and  soon  quit 
Paris  and  France,  which  separation  was  far 
deeper  than  he  was  himself  aware  of.  Thus 
ends  his  First  Period,  in  the  year  1617  at  the 
age  of  21.  He  will  now  see  the  European  world 
outside  of  his  own  nation,  and  so  he  enters  upon 
a  prolonged  time  of  travel  and  foreign  expe- 
riences. 

2.  Second  Period  (1617-29).  There  is  little 
doubt  that  Descartes  quit  his  native  land  in  a 
state  of  deep  inner  scission.  He  had  seen  the 
French  court  at  one  of  its  weakest  and  most 
disgraceful  epochs.  A  feeble  king  was  on  the 
throne,  the  royal  palace  was  a  continued  scene 
of  debauchery,  intrigue  and  assassination.  Des- 
cartes had  been  already  at  school  disgusted  with 
books  and  all  learning ;  now  he  is  disgusted  with 
his  country,  and  particularly  with  its  capital. 
He  is  not  the  only  philosopher^who  has  felt 
an  incompatibility  of  temper  with  the  fair  city 
on  the  Seine,  declaring  it  to  be  the  very  con- 
centration of  all  earthly  vanities.  Our  Emerson 
puts  his  gentle  damnation  upon  it.  One  may  toy 
with  the  question:  what  would  ancient  Plato,  if 
he  could  be  set  down  for  a  while  in  modern 
Paris,  say  to  the  spectacle?  A  grand  phantas- 
magory  of  bewitching  appearances  without  any 
reality  or  truth  he  would  be  apt  to  deem  it,  a 
gorgeous  empty  show  appealing  merely  to  the 
wicked  senses  and  gotten  up  by  the  demons  for 


DESCARTES.  —  LIFE.  35 

the  bewilderment  of  humanity.  Little  of  the 
Divine  would  he  find  in  it,  and  he  might  hear 
a  word  from  some  of  the  Parisians  themselves 
who  have  not  hesitated  to  proclaim  their  city  to 
be  the  gay  attractive  courtesan  for  all  Europe. 
Away  from  such  witchery  of  Appearance  we 
imagine  Plato  taking  rapid  flight  to  his  realm 
of  Ideas,  without  even  once  looking  back. 

Descartes,  our  modern  philosopher,  did  some- 
thing similar.  He  quit  the  charming  capital  of 
his  country,  and,  though  a  born  Frenchman,  he 
was  never  afterwards  restored  in  heart  to 
France.  Though  he  came  back  again  and  again, 
apparently  with  the  design  of  staying  at  home, 
he  soon  felt  himself  not  at  home,  and  fled  over 
the  border.  What  is  the  meaning  of  it?  Some 
deep  and  lasting  estrangement  from  his  people 
and  from  the  French  spirit  we  have  to  read  in 
these  repeated  returns  and  flights,  even  if  he 
never  openly  broke  with  his  nation  and  its  re- 
ligion. He  declares  that  the  atmosphere  of  Paris 
breeds  in  his  mind  chimeras  rather  than  truth. 
He  seems  to  have  regarded  self-deception  as  a 
veritable  disease  in  the  French  capital.  He  con- 
fesses that  he  became  a  prey  to  delusions  along 
with  the  rest  of  the  population  if  he  stayed 
there.  So  he  had  to  run  away  from  the  mental 
epidemic  of  his  own  people,  who  would  take  the 
false  for  the  true  and  irresistibly  impart  the 
contagion. 


36  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Accordingly  Descartes  resolves  to  go  forth  and 
"  read  the  great  book  of  the  world"  outside  of 
Paris  and  France.  He  enters  the  service  of  Hol- 
land, enlisting  as  a  cadet  under  the  Stadtholder, 
a  Protestant.  In  progress  and  in  cultivation  of 
the  sciences  Holland  was  at  that  time  the  first 
country  of  Europe.  A  freedom  of  thought  had 
arisen  there  which  made  the  country  very  con- 
genial to  young  Descartes,  full  of  doubts  and 
inner  protests.  He  must  have  felt  a  great  relief 
when  he  found  the  iron  hand  of  authority  re- 
laxed, if  not  altogether  prevented,  from  stran- 
gling thought  in  its  birth.  The  result  was  Hol- 
land became  his  true  home,  the  dwelling-place  of 
his  free  spirit,  where  it  was  creatively  at  its  best. 
This  fact  he  must  now  have  discovered,  though 
he  is  not  yet  ready  to  settle  down  in  the  land  of 
his  genius. 

After  staying  two  years  in  Holland  { 1617-19) 
he  goes  to  Germany  and  takes  service  with  the 
imperial  army.  The  Thirty  Years'  War  had 
broken  out,  the  great  struggle  between  Catholi- 
cism and  Protestantism  had  opened.  Descartes 
now  draws  his  sword  for  the  Catholic  cause,  and 
takes  part  in  several  campaigns.  Another  two 
years  (1619-21)  pass,  when  he  quits  the  service 
of  the  Emperor.  During  this  time  he  is  reported 
to  have  had  a  great  inner  experience,  nothing 
less  than  the  discovery  of  his  true  vocation  in 
life.  He  is  to  renovate  Philosophy  by  bringing 


DESCARTES.  —  LIFE.  37 

into  it  the  same  certainty  which  he  has  found  in 
Mathematics.  The  same  general  method  which 
he  employed  in  his  analytical  Geometry  he  will 
apply  to  mind.  A  certain  exaltation  seems  to 
have  taken  possession  of  him ;  under  such  in- 
fluence he  made  a  vow  to  go  on  a  pilgrimage  to 
the  shrine  of  Loretto,  which  vow  he  fulfilled  five 
years  later.  He  became  subject  to  dreams,  in 
one  of  which  he  read  the  words :  Quod  vitce  sec- 
tabor  Her?  indicating  that  he  had  come  to  the 
Parting  of  the  Ways  in  the  journey  of  life.  He 
also  tampered  with  that  great  mystification  of  the 
time,  the  Rosicrucians.  For  a  while  he  seems 
to  have  surrendered  himself  to  that  self-decep- 
tion from  which  he  proposed  to  free  mankind, 
and  from  which  he  had  fled  out  of  Paris. 

Having  given  up  his  military  career  abroad, 
he  resolves  to  see  the  rest  of  Europe.  He 
traverses  Northern  Germany  from  East  to  West, 
reaches  Holland  and  thence  returns  to  France, 
But  there  he  could  not  stay.  He  had  not  yet 
seen  Italy  and  Rome.  Accordingly  he  goes 
thither,  and  after  another  two  years  (1623-5) 
he  is  back  again  in  Paris.  Once  more  he  tries 
to  isolate  himself  in  a  retired  suburb,  but  does 
not  succeed.  During  this  period  he  witnesses  the 
final  conflict  with  the  Huguenots,  being  present 
at  the  surrender  of  their  last  fortress,  La 
Rochelle  (1628).  By  this  blow  the  absolutism 
of  the  French  Monarchy  was  made  complete. 


38          MODERN"  EUROPEAN'  PHILOSOPHY. 

Already  during  his  youthful  sojourn  at  Paris, 
Descartes  saw  the  assembling  and  the  dissolv- 
ing of  the  States  General  (1614-15)  which  did 
not  meet  again  till  1789,  on  the  eve  of  another 
and  greater  Revolution  in  the  opposite  direc- 
tion. The  strong  arm  of  Richelieu  had  extin- 
guished the  last  spark  of  French  liberty ;  the 
powers  of  Church  and  State  dominated  soul 
and  body  in  France.  Such  a  condition  could 
not  possibly  have  been  congenial  to  Descartes, 
although  he  said  nothing.  Quietly  he  makes 
his  preparations,  and  bidding  good-bye  only  to 
a  few  intimate  friends,  he  slips  out  of  Paris 
and  France  in  the  spring  of  1629,  turning  his 
face  again  toward  his  beloved  Holland,  the 
home  of  his  genius. 

Thus  the  period  of  his  travels  is  brought  to  a 
conclusion.  What  had  he  seen?  He  had  come 
into  direct  personal  contact  with  the  great  strug- 
gles of  his  age,  chiefly  religious.  He  had  wit- 
nessed a  triumphant  Protestantism  in  the  Neth- 
erlands, and  even  served  in  its  cause;  he  had 
also  witnessed  a  defeated  Protestantism  in  France, 
and  had  helped  to  defeat  it;  thus  he  shows  the 
deep  rent  of  his  time  to  be  present  in  his  own 
soul  by  this  double  service,  sincere  in  both  cases. 
Then  he  beholds  the  desperate  conflict  between 
the  old  and  new  forms  of  faith  in  his  German 
campaigns.  In  fact  the  Thirty  Years'  War 
stands  in  the  background  of  his  entire  mature 


DESCARTES.— LIFE.  39 

life.  That  mighty  struggle  which  lay  essentially 
between  the  right  of  the  Self  and  absolutism  was 
reflected  in  his  thoughts  as  he  gazed  at  the  con- 
tending parties  from  his  distant  perch  in  the 
North.  But  he  held  aloof  from  the  religious 
controversy,  his  utterance  was  philosophic. 
When  he  claimed  the  right  of  his  Ego  to  call  into 
question  everything,  all  the  past,  present,  and 
even  future,  and  when  he  declared  that  his 
thinking  was  the  very  ground  of  his  being,  he 
was  in  his  way  fighting  a  Thirty  Years'  War 
against  the  children  of  darkness.  In  Theology 
he  was  still  medieval,  a  timid,  shrinking,  unhe- 
roic  figure ;  but  in  Philosophy  he  was  supremely 
modern,  the  daring  innovator  and  the  hero  of  a 
new  epoch. 

3.  Third  Period  (1629-50).  Descartes  has 
stated  a  number  of  reasons  why  he  preferred 
Holland.  He  could  there  be  rid  of  all  social 
demands  upon  him,  and  give  himself  up  unre- 
servedly to .  his  inner  call ;  the  climate  was  more 
congenial  than  the  Southern ;  he  enjoyed  con- 
templating the  busy  commercial  life  of  the 
people  though  he  took  no  part  in  it.  But 
chiefly  he  saw  there  a  greater  realization  of 
freedom  than  elsewhere  on  the  continent  of 
Europe.  In  one  of  his  letters  written  in  1631 
he  says  that  there  is  "  no  country  which  has 
a  higher  degree  of  civil  freedom,"  showing  that 
he  was  not  wholly  indifferent  to  the  political 


40  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

condition  of  the  time,  though  he  kept  silent 
about  it.  Then  there  was  just  at  this  period 
great  intellectual  activity  in  Holland,  the  greatest 
in  Europe.  Descartes  put  himself  into  the  center 
of  it  and  felt  its  strongest  pulsations  everywhere 
about  him.  The  Spirit  of  the  Age  selects  some 
nation  as  its  chief  supporter  and  represent- 
ative. This,  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  Seven- 
teenth Century,  was  Holland.  The  insight,  or 
possibly  ;the  instinct,  of  the  philosopher,  who 
rightly  belongs  to  an  epoch  rather  than  to  a 
nation,  chose  that  spot  where  the  Thought  of 
the  Time  was  most  manifestly  present  and  at 
work.  For  it  is  this  Thought  of  the  Time  which 
the  philosopher  has  at  last  to  express,  not 
merely  his  own  individual  thoughts,  opinions,  and 
reflections. 

Holland  had  substantially  settled  the  mighty 
religious  controversy,  that  between  Catholicism 
and  Protestantism,  in  favor  of  the  latter,  though 
this  conflict  was  still  being  fought  out  in  Ger- 
many. But  in  the  form  of  Protestantism  itself 
a  new  struggle  arose,  that  between  Free-Will 
and  Determinism,  which  was  hotly  carried  on  in 
Holland  between  the  Armenians  and  the  Gomar- 
ists  (Calvinists).  This  conflict  had  an  influence 
upon  Descartes,  who,  however,  transferred  it 
from  the  sphere  of  the  Will  into  that  of  Intel- 
lect. The  outcome  was  that  he  too  became  in- 
volved in  the  religious  disputes  of  the  land,  and 


DESCARTES.— LIFE.  41 

at  last,  after  a  residence  of  twenty  years,  quit  it 
and  went  to  Sweden,  whither  he  had  been  invited 
by  the  Queen,  Christina. 

There  he  died  in  1650.  It  is  remarkable  that 
Descartes  who  wandered  all  over  Europe,  never 
seems  to  have  visited  England,  or  to  have  taken 
any  interest  in  her  history.  England's  function 
in  Europe  has  chiefly  been  to  work  out  the  polit- 
ical problem,  to  which  Descartes  never  showed 
much  inclination.  Just  over  the  channel  from 
Holland  the  struggle  for  constitutional  liberty 
had  begun,  culminating  in  a  civil  war  between 
Parliament  and  the  House  of  Stuart.  With 
certain  members  of  this  royal  House  Descartes 
stood  on  intimate  terms,  especially  with  the  prin- 
cess Elizabeth,  to  whom  he  dedicated  his  most 
complete  work,  The  Principles  of  Philosophy 
(Principia). 

The  supreme  fact  of  Descartes'  stay  in  Hol- 
land was  that  he  wrote  books.  It  may  be 
doubted  if  he  -  would  have  taken  to  author- 
ship in  France,  where  he  had  to  maintain  the 
dignity  of  a  French  nobleman.  His  own  brother 
deemed  him  to  have  disgraced  his  family  by  writ- 
ing books.  As  it  was,  he  frequently  declared  his 
aversion  to  such  an  occupation,  and  he  left 
school  disgusted  with  all  literature.  Still,  Des- 
cartes felt  supremely  the  need  of  expression  and 
he  came  to  Holland  that  he  might  be  free  to 
utter  what  was  in  him.  No  sooner  had  he  set- 


42  MODERN'  E UBOPEAN  PHIL 0  SOPHY. 

tied  down  than  he  was  laboring  at  his  great 
work  on  the  Cosmos.  It  was  almost  finished  in 
the  year  1633,  when  its  publication  was  stopped 
by  a  peculiar  incident. 

Descartes  had  in  his  book  defended  the  Coper- 
nican  system,  which  had  been  supported  by 
Galileo  in  a  famous  dialogue  published  in  1622. 
Galileo  had  been  condemned  for  this  view  at 
Kome  in  1633.  This  was  the  thunderbolt  which 
also  knocked  the  life  out  of  Descartes'  Cosmos. 
As  a  submissive  son  of  the  Church,  he  bowed  to 
her  decision;  yet  he  could  write  to  his  friend, 
that  "  if  this  doctrine  (Copernican)  is  false,  all 
the  principles  of  my  philosophy  are  wrong." 
Here  we  see  the  character  of  our  philosopher. 
He  sought  no  reformation  of  institutions  through 
his  thinking.  He  maintains  repeatedly  that  his 
work  was  chiefly  to  satisfy  his  own  mind  and  to 
develop  his  own  Ego.  Nevertheless  Descartes 
sought  for  disciples  and  formed  a  Cartesian 
School  during  his  lifetime.  It  is  true  that  he 
was  not  a  professor  in  a  University  or  a  teacher 
by  vocation ;  he  claimed  always  to  be  the  French 
nobleman,  above  any  such  menial  callings. 
Still  the  form  of  his  Principia  and  especially 
the  introductory  letter  to  his  translators  show 
that  his  mind  was  dwelling  upon  the  Schools  of 
the  ancient  philosophers  when  he  composed  that 
work. 

Four  years  after  the   ecclesiastical  ban    upon 


DESCAE  TES.  —  LIFE.  43 

Galileo,  Descartes  ventures  to  send  forth  a  small 
treatise  in  French  called  a  Discourse  on  Method 
which  is  the  beginning  of  his  philosophical  emi- 
nence. During  the  next  seven  years  his  main 
works  were  published,  though  he  kept  up  his 
writing  till  the  close  of  his  life.  His  produc- 
tions belong  substantially  to  one  Period  of  his 
life,  the  last;  in  fact  his  greatest  books,  the 
three  by  which  he  is  best  known,  belong  to  one 
phase  of  his  last  Period.  This  fact  brings  us 
to  observe  that  his  long  third  Period,  extend- 
ing through  twenty-one  years  of  his  not  very 
long  life  (1629-1650),  may  well  be  divided  into 
three  sub-periods  or  stages  which  can  be  dis- 
tinctly marked  off  by  his  writings  about  as 
follows :  — 

First  is  his  work  on  the  Cosmos  (Le  Monde) 
which  came  to  an  unhappy  end  as  already 
narrated. 

Second  are  his  two  brief  treatises  which  bear  a 
strong  personal  stamp  —  Discourse  on  Method 
and  the  Meditations.  These  are  subjective  in 
character  and  form,  leaning  more  toward  the 
psychological  procedure. 

The  third  stage  tends  more  to  the  metaphysi- 
cal procedure.  It  opens  with  the  Principia, 
and  shows  a  decided  return  to  formal  Phi- 
losophy, especially  of  the  Aristotelian  pattern. 
More  will  be  said  upon  these  works  later. 

Parallel  to  this  literary  activity   of   the   last 


44          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Period  runs  a  line  of  external  events,  made  up  of 
personal  experiences,  changes  of  abode,  multi- 
plied vexations,  and  chiefly  a  great  deal  of  con- 
troversy. Into  this  side  of  Descartes'  life  we 
cannot  enter ;  the  curious  reader  can  find  in  the 
detailed  biographies  how  the  theologians,  both 
Catholic  and  Protestant,  kept  troubling  him  and 
his  disciples,  while  the  latter  in  their  turn  often 
caused  chagrin  to  the  Master.  Him  we  shall 
pass  to  consider  where  he  is  at  his  best  and  pre- 
sents to  us  the  true  fruits  of  his  genius,  namely 
as  a  writer  of  books. 

II.  THE  WRITINGS  OF  DESCARTES.  There  is  no 
intention  here  of  giving  an  account  of  all  that 
Descartes  has  written.  Only  the  important 
works  can  be  considered,  first  according  to  their 
order  in  time,  secondly  by  groupings  which  show 
their  development.  It  has  been  already  indi- 
cated that  the  main  works  of  Descartes,  though 
they  all  belong  to  his  last  Period,  reveal  a  pro- 
cess going  on  within  that  Period.  This  process 
we  shall  try  to  unfold  in  a  general  way,  seeking 
it  in  those  books  of  his  which  Time  has  selected 
as  the  best. 

.1.  The  Discourse  on  Method.  This  is  a  part 
of  a  larger  work  called  JEssais  Philosophiques, 
printed  in  1637,  and  containing  in  addition  to 
the  Discourse  three  other  treatises,  on  Geometry, 
Dioptrics,  and  Meteors.  Thus  we  may  infer  that 
Descartes  included  in  his  idea  of  Philosophy  the 


DE8CAE  TES.  —  WRITINGS.  45 

sciences  of  Mathematics  and  Physics.  These, 
however,  have  in  the  present  case  been  over- 
shadowed by  the  Discourse,  which  gives  the  first 
and  simplest  statement  of  his  pure  Philosophy. 
It  seeks  to  be  easy  and  popular,  and  shows  a 
decided  didactic  vein,  being  written  in  French 
by  the  author  himself  instead  of  Latin,  which 
was  at  that  time  the  language  of  the  learned, 
and  being  addressed  to  the  people  "  who  use 
their  pure  natural  reason,"  and  who,  therefore, 
c '  will  be  better  judges  of  my  opinions  than 
those  who  believe  only  in  old  books."  This  is 
a  great,  far-sounding  note.  It  appeals,  even  in 
the  matter  of  Philosophy,  to  the  people  in  de- 
fiance of  the  erudite  professors  and  clergymen ; 
it  proclaims,  too,  that  Philosophy  must  begin 
to  talk  a  modern  and  popular  tongue  —  a  re- 
quirement which  Descartes  himself  did  not 
always  follow.  Furthermore,  the  treatise 
proposes  (in  its  title)  to  teach  people  «'  the 
right  conduct  of  their  reasons,"  as  well  as  how 
to  "  seek  for  truth  in  the  sciences."  Thus 
our  philosopher  attempts  to  break  down  the 
learned  barrier  which  shuts  out  the  people 
from  the  cultivation  of  their  mind  and  from 
the  pursuit  of  truth. 

The  form  of  the  Discourse  is  unique.  It  may 
be  called  the  spiritual  autobiography  of  a  philos- 
opher. It  speaks  in  the  first  person :  I,  Kene 
Descartes,  have  flung  aside  all  my  books,  have 


46  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY, 

freed  myself  of  all  my  preconceived  opinions, 
and  now  I  am  going  forth  in  search  of  pure 
truth  as  certainty.  Such  is  the  supreme  as- 
piration of  my  nature,  and  this  truth  is  what 
God  is  to  give  me,  if  He  is  at  all.  I  doubted 
everything;  "  but  as  soon  as  I  observed  that  I, 
while  doubting,  had  to  be  somewhat  (namely  the 
doubter),  I  came  upon  this  truth :  I  think,  there- 
fore I  am,  and  I  concluded  that  I  could  without 
scruple  take  it  as  the  first  principle  of  my  Phil- 
losophy  "  (Discourse,  Part  4). 

It  is  important  to  note  the  empirical  procedure 
of  Descartes  in  this  account.  He  is  purely  in- 
trospective, seeking  his  first  principle  within; 
he  examines  his  Ego,  and  from  its  activity  in 
thought  he  infers  its  existence.  Here  too  we 
see  the  distinct  psychological  strain  which  char- 
acterizes the  whole  course  of  modern  Philoso- 
phy, in  contrast  with  the  ancient.  Descartes 
does  not  say  that  Thinking  is  Being  —  already 
some  of  the  old  Greeks  had  said  that  —  but  he 
does  affirm  my  Ego's  Thinking  is  my  Ego's 
Being  —  a  very  different  matter.  Such  maybe 
fairly  deemed  the  opening  sentence  of  modern 
Philosophy:  /  think,  therefore,  I  am.  Much, 
however,  lies  implicit  in  it  which  time  will  make 
explicit,  and  which  we  are  to  see  unfolding  in 
this  book  of  ours.  Hegel  has  called  it  "  the  most 
interesting  idea  of  recent  times,"  and  he  might 


DESCARTES.  —  WRITINGS.  47 

have  added,  the  most  fruitful,  being  such  a  germ 
of  future  thought. 

Amid  numerous  personal  reminiscences,  Des- 
cartes comes  to  the  second  great  fact  of  his 
Philosophy:  the  proof  of  the  existence  of  God. 
He  also  relates  that  Mathematics  gave  him  that 
certainty  which  he  wished  to  transfer  to  philo- 
sophical truth.  The  function  of  God  in  human 
cognition  is  also  set  forth.  Nor  is  a  brief  treat- 
ise upon  Physics  omitted.  In  fact  we  have  in 
this  Discourse  an  outline  of  Descartes'  Philoso- 
ophy,  though  this  outline  is  skillfully  overlaid 
with  personal  experiences  and  events  of  his  inner 
history,  It  is  the  philosopher's  Ego  telling  of 
itself  and  hew  it  came  really  to  know  itself. 
The  subjective  form  is,  therefore,  deeply  conso- 
nant with  the  theme.  This  gives  to  the  treatise 
an  artistic  character  which  has  caused  it  to  be 
read  by  many  who  are  not  philosophers.  We 
must  not,  therefore,  regard  the  present  book  as 
a  dry,  abstract  disquisition  upon  philosophic 
method,  as  its  general  title  might  suggest.  A 
fundamental  trait  of  the  character  of  Descartes 
is  indicated  in  the  following:  "  My  first  maxim 
was  to  obey  the  laws  and  customs  of  my  country  " 
(Discourse,  Part  3)  ;  he  was  careful  to  shun  the 
reputation  of  apolitical  innovator.  "Adhering 
faithfully  t®  the  religion  'in  which  I  had  been 
educated  from  my  infancy,  I  followed  in  all 
things  the  moderate  course.'"  So  he  declared 


48          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

himself  hostile  to  any  change  in  Church  or  State, 
he  would  not  touch  institutions.  Little  aware 
does  he  seem  that  thought,  once  possessing  the 
minds  of  men,  must  affect  also  the  established 
order,  political  and  religious. 

2.  The  Meditations.  This  work  was  published 
in*  1641  at  Paris  (the  Discourse  appeared  in 
Leyden,  Holland),  written  in  Latin  by  Descartes 
himself.  It  was  called  Meditationes  de  prima 
philosophia;  this  last  term,  First  Philosophy, 
goes  back  to  Aristotle,  who  thus  designated  his 
metaphysical  doctrines,  in  contrast  with  his  physi- 
cal, which  he  called  Second  Philosophy.  We 
soon  observe  that  this  is  a  far  more  ambitious 
book  than  the  Discourse;  it  proposes  to  compete 
with  the  Stagirite  in  his  greatest  work.  Now 
Descartes  appeals  to  the  learned  and  writes  in 
Latin,  with  a  dedication  to  the  theologians  of 
the  Sorbonne.  The  content  of  this  Philosophy 
is  stated  in  the  title  of  the  second  edition  (some- 
what changed  from  the  first  edition  .herein)  as 
consisting  of  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God  and 
of  the  distinction  of  the  soul  from  the  body. 

So  Descartes  writes  a  book  in  spite  of  his 
repeatedly  expressed  dislike  of  books  and  of 
writing  books.  As  there  was  no  external  neces- 
sity upon  him  to  do  so,  we  must  suppose  that  he 
h#d  an  inner  need  of '  utterance  deeper  than  any 
repugnance.  Amusing  it  is  to  see  him  twist  and 
squirm  about  in  making  excuses  for  doing  what 


DESCAE  TE8.  —  WETTING  8.  49 

he  did  not  want  to  do  and  did  not  need  to  do. 
In  this  he  is  somewhat  like  Plato  who  pretended 
to  despise  the  written  word,  yet  wrote  all  his  life, 
and  became  great  through  his  books  for  all  time. 
Both  philosophers  were  aristocrats  by  birth,  and 
could  not  help  showing  their  aristocratic  disdain 
by  making  wry  faces  at  their  own  genius. 

The  Meditations  have  an  inner  movement  and 
content  similar  to  the  Discourse,  of  which  they 
are  a  new  and  improved  edition.  The  peculiar 
Cartesian  norm  of  philosophizing  shows  itself : 
the  negative  start  with  doubt ;  the  first  positive 
truth  attained  in  the  self-conscious  Ego  (I  think 
therefore  I  am);  the  second  positive  truth 
reached  in  the  existence  of  God;  the  employ- 
ment of  clear  and  distinct  ideas;  the  Ego's 
cognition  of  the  object  through  God ;  the  sepa- 
ration between  soul  and  body,  as  well  some 
observations  on  Physics;  all  these  show  the 
sweep  as  well  as  the  subject-matter  of  the  Medi- 
tations. We  see  how  completely  this  metaphy- 
sical movement  has  taken  possession  of  the  mind 
of  the  philosopher.  For  four  years,  ever  since 
the  publication  of  the  first  sketch  in  the  Dis- 
course he  has  been  turning  over  these  germinal 
thoughts,  unfolding  and  purifying  them  from 
everything  extraneous. 

Yet  the  form  of  exposition  is  essentially  the 
same  as  in  the  Discourse,  being  still  largely 
autobiographical.  Descartes  could  not  get  rid 

4 


50          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  his  own  Self  in  treating  of  the  Self,  which  is 
his  fundamental  fact  and  positive  starting-point. 
Yet  there  are  fewer  outer  events  of  life  recorded, 
the  procedure  is  more  completely  the  Ego's 
account  of  itself  than  in  the  Discourse.  The 
discussion  is  about  Man,  God  and  the  World, 
but  it  is  in  the  form  of  the  Self,  indeed  of  my 
Self.  The  tone  is  subjective;  the  reader  is 
turned  back  into  his  own  Ego,  where  he  is  made 
to  see  himself  going  through  a  like  process  with 
the  author.  Thus  the  manner  and  spirit  are 
modern,  and  show  a  new  dawning  world  of  sub- 
jectivity, very  different  from  the  objective  way 
of  the  old  Greeks.  On  the  other  hand  Descartes 
is  much  more  abstract  and  metaphysical  in  this 
work  than  in  the  Discourse.  We  may  see  that 
he  is  struggling  with  his  subjective  form  while 
at  the  same  time  intensifying  it.  Such  are  the 
two  tendencies  in  these  Meditations;  one  he  is 
leaving  behind,  while  into  the  other  he  is  advanc- 
ing. The  latter  tendency  will  next  show  itself 
in  a  new  book,  which  decidedly  suggests  that 
Descartes  is  turning  away  from  his  popular  audi- 
ence to  the  trained  student,  and  is  seeking  to 
form  a  School  of  Philosophy  after  the  manner 
of  the  ancients. 

3.  The  Principles  (Principia)  of  Philosophy . 
Printed  in  Latin  at  Amsterdam  in  1644.  It  is 
ostensibly  divided  into  four  parts,  but  in  fact  it 
has  only  two  subjects,  Metaphysics  and  Physics; 


DESCAK  TES.  —  WRITINGS.  5 1 

to  the   former  the  first  part  is  devoted,  to  the 
latter,  the  three  other  parts. 

The  author  now  proceeds  abstractly,  or,  as  he 
would  say,  synthetically;  whereas  in  the  two  fore- 
going works  his  method  he  has  called  analytic. 
The  autobiographic  manner  is  dropped,  and  the 
principles  of  his  Philosophy  are  stated  directly ; 
hence  the  title  of  the  work.  In  other  words,  his 
writing  is  now  objective  and  leaves  out  the  per- 
sonal subjective  element  which  we  have  noticed 
both  in  the  Discourse  and  the  Meditations.  The 
style  is  no  longer  in  the  form  of  an  individual 
experience  outer  and  inner,  but  runs  rather  to 
universal  propositions  stated  more  or  less  dog- 
matically. Though  he  often  uses  here  the  pro-, 
noun  we  (in  place  of  the  former  /),  his  word  has 
the  tone  of  an  authoritative  command  and  not 
that  of  tentative  experience.  It  is  a  decided 
change  in  form  and  spirit;  he  has  become  more 
certain  of  himself  within,  and  less  fearful  of  the 
outer  powers.  He  dedicates  the  book  to  Prin- 
cess Elizabeth,  a  profound  admirer  of  his  Philos- 
ophy, as  well  as  a  royal  patroness  of  it ;  with 
her  favor  he  seems  to  defy  the  rest  of  the  world. 

Still  this  change  of  manner  and  of  exposition 
we  can  well  deem  an  inner  evolution  of  the 
philosopher  himself.  He,  as  philosopher,  must 
naturally  rise  out  of  the  particular  to  the  uni- 
versal both  in  thought  and  in  statement.  More- 
over he  has  been  studying  the  ancient  thinkers  of 


52  MODERN  E  UROPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

Greece  whose  special  characteristic  is  to  proceed 
objectively.  A  letter  of  Descartes  to  the  French 
translator  of  the  Principia  is  prefixed  to  the 
French  edition  (Paris,  1647).  In  that  letter  the 
author  cites  Plato  and  Aristotle,  specially  dis- 
paraging the  latter,  and  assailing  the  Logic  of 
the  Schools.  Still  Descartes  shows  that  he  has 
before  himself  the  philosophic  Norm  —  Meta- 
physics, Physics,  and  Ethics  —  though  he  is  a 
good  deal  confused  over  the  last.  He  has  a 
scheme  of  "  giving  to  the  world  a  complete  body 
of  Philosophy."  It  is  evident  such  a  scheme 
floated  before  .his  mind  in  writing  this  book  on 
The  Principles  of  Philosophy. 

So  we  put  together  the  philosophical  books  of 
Descartes,  in  which  we  see  a  decided  evolution 
of  one  fundamental  process  of  thought.  This 
starts  as  a  germ  in  the  Discourse,  develops  to  its 
full  meaning  in  the  Meditations,  and  finally  as- 
sumes its  philosophic  form  in  the  Principles. 
Through  all  these  stages,  which  we  may  name 
bud,  flower,  fruit,  runs  the  one  idea  in  a  three- 
fold process:  the  Ego's  consciousness  of  Self, 
the  Ego's  consciousness  of  God,  and  the  Ego's 
consciousness  of  the  non-Ego  or  the  World. 
Into  and  around  these  central  themes  entwine 
many  other  important  doctrines  with  much  ar- 
gumentation and  reflection.  Still  just  here  lies 
the  genetic  thought  of  Descartes  and  of  modern 
Philosophy. 


DESCARTES.— WHITINGS.  53 

An  unconscious  evolution  (destined  to  .become 
conscious  in  a  later  century)  we  find  in  these 
three  books  of  the  philosopher.  But  into  what 
does  he  unfold?  We  have  noted  that  his  third 
book,  the  Principles,  moves  essentially  upon  the 
lines  of  the  philosophic  Norm,  which  we  have 
already  found  lurking  in  every  system  of  thought 
from  the  ancients  down,  that  is,  whenever 
thought  develops  into  a  system.  In  fact  the 
title  Principles  (Principia  in  Latin,  archai  in 
Greek)  has  been  rightly  regarded  as  a  direct 
translation  from  Aristotle. 

4.  To  these  three  central  works  of  Descartes  we 
may  add  a  fourth,  the  treatise  on  The  Passions 
of  the  Soul,  printed  in  French  at  Amsterdam  in 
1650,  the  year  of  Descartes'  death.  This  work 
helps  us  supply  the  stage  of  Ethics,  which  is 
very  defective  in  Descartes.  It  treats  of  the 
Soul  and  Body  in  its  first  part,  and  so  makes  a 
connection  with  Cartesian  Physics,  in  fact  it  dis- 
tinctly joins  on  to  the  last  sections  of  the  Prin- 
cipia and  also  to  the  Sixth  Meditation,  which 
latter  likewise  discusses  toward  its  close  the  dis- 
tinction between  Soul  and  Body. 

Moreover  this  treatise  shows  the  same  change 
in  style  and  manner  of  philosophizing,  which  we 
have  already  noted  in  the  Principia.  Aristotle 
is  certainly  the  pattern,  though  Descartes  takes 
special  pains  to  reject  and  scoff  at  the  old  Greek 
philosopher,  affirming  his  own  originality.  In 


54  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

general,  Descartes  deemed  himself  the  most 
original  soul  that  had  ever  been  born ;  he  was  his 
own  God  who  first  gave  to  mankind  "  clear  and 
distinct  ideas  "  for  knowing  the  world.  In  spite 
of  some  professions  of  modesty,  which  always 
have  a  peculiar  hollow  sound,  he  had  no  question 
about  his  own  primacy  and  infallibility.  He 
considered  himself  to  stand  alone,  he  had  no 
notion  of  his  own  evolution  in  the  History  of 
Philosophy,  no  glimmer  that  he  was  but  a  link 
in  the  great  philosophical  development  which 
had  been  going  on  long  before  him,  and  which 
was  to  go  on  long  after  him.  Undoubtedly,  he 
was  a  very  important  link,  still  he  was  but  a 
link.  It  is  true  that  the  History  of  Philosophy, 
which  is  the  grand  training  out  of  such  egotism 
as  that  of  Descartes,  was  substantially  unknown 
to  his  age,  as  it  is  now  known,  namely  as  one  of 
the  most  important  evolutionary  disciplines  of 
the  Nineteenth  Century. 

Descartes  had  then  in  mind  the  Metaphysics 
and  the  Physics  of  Aristotle  in  writing  his 
Principia;  in  like  manner  he  takes  his  cue  from 
Aristotle's  Ethics  in  writing  his  Passions  of  the 
Soul. 

Already  we  have  commented  on  this  change  of 
philosophic  style  and  of  method  from  that  which 
we  see  in  the  earlier  Discourse  and  Meditations. 
The  philosopher  is  passing  into  the  transmitted 
philosophic  Norm;  he  is  going  from  his  first 


DESCARTES.  —  WETTINGS.  55 

subjective,  experimental,  inductive  manner  to 
his  second  deductive,  synthetic,  objective  pro- 
cedure. He  has  both  ways  in  his  career,  yet  not 
both  at  the  same  time.  Between  1641  (when 
the  Meditations  were  published),  and  1644 
(when  the  Principia  were  published)  we  may 
consider  this  change  to  have  culminated  though 
it  had  been  a  good  while  before  fermenting  in 
him.  In  fact,  we  may  take  this  change  as  the 
return  to  his  earlier  studies  with  the  Jesuits  at 
La  Fleche,  from  which  he  had  so  long  and  so 
powerfully  re-acted.  He  has  come  to  feel  the 
need  of  system  which  is  not  merely  a  method  of 
philosophizing  (this  he  has  already  employed) 
but  is  the  ordered  Whole  of  Philosophy.  Hence 
it  is  that  he  is  thrown  back  upon  Aristotle  in 
whom  the  philosophical  Norm  had  its  first  ex- 
plicit and  complete  manifestation  (see  our 
Ancient  European  Philosophy,  pp.  374-5,  495, 
614,  etc.)  Moreover  it  runs  through  all  Medie- 
val Philosophy.  Descartes,  therefore,  falls  into 
line  with  the  philosophical  movement  of  the 
ages,  in  spite  of  his  protest  to  the  contrary,  and 
works  over  his  earlier  productions  in  the  same 
spirit  (seethe  First  Part  of  the  Principia). 

5.  In  the  philosophical  series  we  must-not  omit 
to  mention  two  other  works,  which  have  their 
significance  in  relation  to  the  total  philosophy  of 
Descartes.  The  first  is  JRules  for  the  Direction 
of  the  Mind,  which  shows  Descartes  in  the  process 


56  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  his  own  self -training  for  his  work,  and  has 
many  a  connecting  link  with  his  first  two  books 
above  mentioned.  The  second  is  the  Investiga- 
tion of  Truth  by  the  Light  of  Nature  (la  himiere 
naturelle),  originally  written  in  French  and  first 
published  over  fifty  years  after  Descartes'  death 
(1701).  The  whole  title  is  suggestive:  "The 
Investigation  of  Truth  by  the  Light  of  Nature, 
which  of  itself  and  without  the  help  of  religion 
and  philosophy  determines  the  opinions  which  a 
gentleman  ought  to  have  on  all  things  which 
should  be  the  object  of  his  thoughts,  and  which 
penetrates  the  most  abstract  sciences."  The 
work  is  incomplete  and  is  in  the  form  of  a 
dialogue,  in  which  fact  as  well  as  in  its  Greek 
names  one  cannot  help  being  reminded  of  Plato, 
though  Descartes,  as  usual,  disclaims  the  idea  of 
his  having  borrowed  anything  from  the  books 
of  the  ancients.  The  content  is,  of  course,  Car- 
tesian. The  emphatic  point  is  that  the  philoso- 
pher is  now  going  to  dismiss  "  the  help  of 
philosophy  and  religion,"  and  employ  only  "the 
natural  light  "  of  human  reason.  The  interfer- 
ence of  God  is  left  away,  it  would  seem  that  man 
is  by  his  own  mental  power  "  to  penetrate  the 
most  abstract  sciences,"  or  to  know  the  world. 
It  may  in  general  be  said  that  Descartes,  as  he 
advances  in  years,  has  a  tendency  to  put  into 
the  background  the  divine  element,  or  the  part 
of  God,  in  his  Philosophy.  Already  the  deity 


DE8CAE  TES.  —  WRITINGS.  57 

appears  less  in  the  Principia  than  before,  though 
he  appears  often  enough.  The  difficulties  con- 
nected with  the  mechanical  view  of  God  seem  to 
have  become  more  and  more  apparent  to  Descar- 
tes. At  least  in  this  last  book  he  deems  that 
knowledge  can  be  acquired  <;  by  the  natural 
light "  alone,  without  "  the  divine  concourse." 
All  this  looks  as  if  Descartes  himself  were  on 
the  way  toward  Spinoza  who  is  to  give  a  new 
construction  of  the  Cartesian  divinity. 

III.  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  DESCARTES.  We 
are  now  to  concentrate  the  philosophic  doctrines 
of  Descartes,  which  are  set  forth  with  varying 
degrees  of  maturity  and  completeness  in  his  dif- 
ferent works.  But  in  them  all  is  a  common 
body  of  principles,  even  the  same  general  move- 
ment in  exposition.  They  pertain  to  Man,  God, 
and  Nature,  which  are  treated  separately  and  in 
connection.  Hence,  Descartes  will  have  the  phi- 
losophic Norm  embracing  the  sciences  of  these 
three  themes  which  constitute  the  Universe  — 
Metaphysics,  Physics,  and  a  somewhat  uncertain 
and  incomplete  third  science  which  may  still  be 
called  Ethics. 

This  threefold  Norm,  after  being  thrown  away 
by  Descartes  in  his  Period  of  reaction,  was 
slowly  returning  to  him  with  the  deepening  of 
life  and  thought  during  his  third  Period,  which 
revealed  to  him  the  profundity  of  its  meaning. 
We  have  already  noted  evidence  of  this  return 


58  MODERN'  E  UROPEAN  PHIL O SOPHY. 

to  Philosophy  as  such  in  the  Meditations,  we 
have  also  seen  that  the  Principia  is  consciously 
based  upon  the  philosophic  Norm.  This  is  plain 
from  the  introductory  letter  in  which  Descartes 
lays  down  a  kind  of  curriculum  for  the  student 
who,  after  a  stated  preparation,  "should  com- 
mence to  apply  himself  to  true  Philosophy,  of 
which  the  first  part  is  Metaphysics."  Then  "  the 
second  part  is  Physics,"  but  the  third  part 
seems  to  be  composed,  in  the  scheme  of  Des- 
cartes, of  three  "principal  branches,  Medicine, 
Mechanics,  Ethies."  Here  is  some  confusion; 
still,  he  adds:  "  By  the  science  of  Ethics  I  un- 
derstand the  highest  and  most  perfect  science, 
being  the  final  degree  of  wisdom,  and  presup- 
posing an  entire  knowledge  of  the  other  sciences." 
This  last  statement  puts  Ethics  where  it  belongs 
in  the  Norm,  though  there  is  certainly  fluctua- 
tion in  other  statements.  He  also  speaks  of  "a 
complete  body  of  Philosophy"  already  outlined 
in  his  mind  after  the  above-mentioned  Norm. 
This  Norm  is,  accordingly,  what  an  exposition  of 
the  Cartesian  Philosophy  must  follow. 

A.  METAPHYSICS. 

This  is,  by  all  means,  the  epoch-making  por- 
tion of  Descartes'  doctrine.  It  deals  with  ontology 
or  the  science  of  Being,  like  all  Metaphysics;  it 
takes  up  Being  as  immediate,  or  as  Nature  (the 


DESCAR  TES.  —  ME  TAPE  YSICS.  59 

subject  of  the  Greek  philosopher)  ;  it  has  much  to 
say  of  the  Being  of  God  (the  subject  of  the  Medie- 
val thinker)  ;  but  it  also  grapples  with  the  Being  of 
the  Ego,  which  is  the  new  point  in  modern  Phi- 
losophy. So  the  Metaphysics  of  Descartes  has 
for  its  content  the  three  Beings  or  Substances  — 
Man,  God,  and  the  World  —  opening  with  the 
first  in  the  famous  declaration,  /  think,  there- 
fore, JAM. 

This  Ego  (or  /)  is,  accordingly,  the  starting- 
point  of  Descartes  and  the  moderns,  consciously 
so,  wherein  lies  his  difference  from  the  previous 
thinkers  who  also  started  with  the  Ego  (had  to 
do. so  in  fact),  though  unconscious  of  their  own 
Self  in  their  procedure.  But  in  Descartes  the 
Ego  turns  back  upon  itself  and  knows  itself  as 
the  primal  philosophic  act,  and  takes  up  its 
new  position  from  which  to  move  the  Uni- 
verse, knowing  itself  to  be  self-knowing,  hence, 
existent. 

But  the  Ego  now  turns  back,  not  only  upon 
itself,  but  also  upon  former  Philosophies  and 
wheels  them  into  line  with  its  own  process.  The 
Being  of  the  Ego  is  to  be  not  simply  self-con- 
scious within  itself  or  subjectively,  but  it  has  to 
return  and  take  up  Pure  or  Immediate  Being 
(Greek),  and  God's  Being  (Medieval)  into  its 
movement.  Thus  we  see  that  Descartes  is  a  re- 
turn to  the  very  beginning  of  Philosophy  in  or- 
der to  bring  its  total  sweep  into  the  new  advance. 


60          MODEEN  EUEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

In  this  sense  we  observe  that  Descartes  still  be- 
longs to  the  Eenascence,  going  back,  indeed,  to 
ancient  thought  but  integrating  it  vitally  with  the 
modern. 

Accordingly  we  shall  have  to  look  at  this  met- 
aphysical stage  of  Descartes'  Philosophy  under 
three  heads:  the  Ego's  knowing  itself  as  exist- 
ent, the  Ego's  knowing  God  as  existent,  the 
Ego's  knowing  the  world  (objective)  as  existent. 
These  are  the  three  elements  of  the  philosophic 
Norm  unfolding  in  Cartesian  order. 

I.  The  first  thing  that  Descartes  as  a  philoso- 
pher sets  himself  about  doing  is  to  come  into 
clearness  concerning  his  own  Ego.  After  his  first 
period  embracing  his  years  of  study,  he  had  cast 
away  his  books  as  the  source  of  error.  And 
after  his  second  period  of  travel  in  which  he  read 
for  a  number  of  years  "  the  great  book  of  the 
world,"  he  has  to  throw  this  book  also  aside  as 
unable  to  give  him  truth,  the  object  of  his  soul's 
search.  "  Then  I  resolved  to  make  myself  (my 
Ego)  an  object  of  study  "  which  last  undertak- 
ing he  thinks  has  been  crowned  with  success. 
Introspection  is  thus  the  fundamental  fact  of 
his  procedure  in  spite  of  all  that  he  says  about 
his  mathematical  method. 

But  with  his  Ego  he  was,  on  close  examination, 
not  satisfied.  For  he  finds  its  knowledge  so 
called  a  commingled  mass  of  truth  and  false- 
hood. It  is  largely  composed  of  things  given  by 


DESCAB  TES.  —  ME  TAPBYSICS.  6 1 

the  senses,  whose  report  of  objects  is  often  not 
correct.  Then  he  may  be  dreaming  instead  of 
actually  seeing;  since  for  him  "  there  are  no 
certain  marks  by  which  the  state  of  waking  can 
ever  be  distinguished  from  sleep."  What  a 
world  of  illusion!  "I  almost  persuade  myself 
that  I, am  dreaming  just  now  "in  writing  this 
book.  Something  must  be  done  at  once  and  in 
a  heroic  fashion ;  so  Descartes  reaches  his  first 
grand  mental  maxim  in  a  fit  of.  defiance  :  Doubt 
everything  and  everybody ;  de  omnibus  dubitan- 
dum. 

(1)  This  we  may  name  his  negative  Ego, 
since  it  is  his  Ego  which  now  turns  upon  its  own 
content  or  knowledge  with  a  universal  negation. 
It  finds  within  itself  an  entire  world  of  beliefs, 
accepted  doctrines,  preconceptions.  Is  it  not 
evident  that  all  of  them  must  be  overhauled  and 
questioned  as  to  their  right  of  being  true  knowl- 
edge? It  is  indeed  a  big  job,  that  of  "  ridding 
myself  of  all  the  opinions  I  had  adopted  and 
of  commencing  afresh  the  work  of  building  from 
the  foundation,"  the  edifice  of  a  true  Ego. 

But  hold!  while  the  philosopher's  Ego  is  lay- 
ing about  itself  within  its  own  domain  and  chal- 
lenging every  opinion,  a  reflection  comes:  I 
cannot  doubt  the  doubter;  this  doubting  Ego 
must  be  in  order  that  I  may  doubt,  or  indeed 
perform  any  act  of  thought.  I  may  and  do  deceive 
myself;  but  in  order  to  deceive  myself  there 


62  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

must  be  a  Self  (or  Ego)  to  be  deceived.  It  is  I 
who  doubt,  but  without  this  /,  there  is  no  doubt. 

(2)  This  we  may  name  the  positive  Ego, 
whose  existence  is  posited  even  by  the  negative 
doubt.  Thus  in  the  ocean  of  uncertainty  and 
dubitation,  Descartes  has  reached  one  certain, 
indubitable  point,  his  own  Self.  From  this  point 
he  is  to  ray  out  and  illumine  the  universe- 
Through  the  Ego's  doubting  and  thinking,  it  is; 
thus  comes  before  us  the  famous  Cartesian  say- 
ing, /  think,  therefore  I  am.  Here  is  a  twofold- 
ness,  to  think  and  to  be,  both  of  which  are 
united  through  and  in  the  Ego.  Its  form  has 
doubted  all  its  content,  till  finally  it  takes  its  own 
form  as  content,  which  it  has  to  affirm  even  in 
order  to  doubt. 

There  has  been  a  good  deal  of  discussion  about 
the  meaning  of  /  think,  therefore  I  am.  This 
resolution  of  all  doubt  has  been  itself  much 
doubted.  It  has  been  charged  with  being  an  empty 
tautology,  inasmuch  as  /  think  already  means  / 
am  thinking.  Is  Descartes  trying  to  prove  per- 
sonal existence  by  a  syllogism?  The  form  seems 
to  indicate  such,  as  we  may  see  by  the  following: 
All  that  thinks  is,  I  think,  therefore  I  am.  But 
this  is  not  what  Descartes  means ;  his  apparent 
inference  is  an  intuition  rather  than  a  deduction, 
immediate  insight  rather  than  mediate  reasoning ; 
he  intends  to  say  that  my  personal  existence  is 
implicitly  contained  in  my  thinking,  though  not 


DE8CAE  TES.  —  ME  TAPHYSICS.  63 

explicitly,  till  I  make  it  explicit  by  a  special  act 
of  my  thought.  Gassendi's  objection  lay  in  the 
fact  that  a  major  premise  was  implied,  and  hence 
that  there  was  apetitio  principii  in  the  statement. 
Thus  the  thing  to  be  proved  is  tacitly  assumed. 
Descartes  answered  this  objection  by  affirming 
that  "there  is  no  major  premise  implied,  it  is 
a  particular  truth  which  enters  the  mind  without 
logical  deduction,  a  natural  truth  which  strikes 
at  once  and  irresistibly  the  intelligence."  In  an- 
other reply  he  says:  "The  notion  of  existence  is 
a  primitive  notion,  not  obtained  by  any  syllogism ; 
it  is  evident  of  itself,  and  our  mind  discovers  it 
by  intuition."  (See  Cousin's  comment  on  this 
topic.) 

This  would  seem  decisive  of  Descartes'  purpose. 
Still  the  form  is  unquestionably  deductive,  while 
the  meaning  is  intuitive ;  it  is  an  immediate  insight 
expressed  in  mediated  reasoning.  Hence  the  am- 
biguity of  I  think,  therefore  lam;  no  Delphic 
oracle  was  ever  more  two-edged.  Though  Des- 
cartes deems  it  the  one  certain  fact  in  the  uni- 
verse and  indeed  the  foundation  of  all  certitude 
which  has  rescued  the  Ego  from  its  sea  of  doubts, 
it  has  nevertheless  caused  in  many  of  his  readers 
more  doubts  than  they  had  ever  had  before  they 
were  thus  rescued.  Still  this  sentence  is  said  to 
have  dominated  the  best  minds  for  a  century  after 
Descartes  (the  seventeenth) ;  then  it  begins  to 
be  denied  and  even  covered  with  ridicule  in 


64          MODERN  E  UROPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

the  next  century  (the  critical  eighteenth); 
during  the  present  century  (the  nineteenth)  it 
has  again  come  into  estimation,  at  least  as  an 
epoch-making  historic  fact  in  Philosophy.  In 
this  statement  Descartes  has  turned  the  Ego  back 
into  itself  and  made  it  affirm  its  own  existence 
through  thinking,  that  is,  through  self-knowing. 
(3).  Thus  we  come  to  the  self-conscious  Ego, 
whose  self-conscious  activity  is  its  being,  which 
may  be  regarded  as  the  true  interpretation  of  the 
Cartesian  maxim,  the  interpretation  given  by 
time.  In  Descartes  when  the  Ego  thinks  (cogito) 
it  turns  back  upon  itself  and  knows  itself,  and 
hence  is  (ergo  sum).  It  must  have  this  process 
within  itself  in  order  to  be.  In  other  words  we 
have  here  the  first  vague  statement  of  the 
Psychosis,  or  the  process  of  the  Ego  as  the  basis 
of  all  true  science.  We  may  trace  its  primal 
implicit  stage,  then  its  separation  into  subject 
and  object  which  correspond  to  Descartes'  think- 
ing and  being,  finally  the  return  to  unity  in  self- 
consciousness,  That  threefold  movement  (the 
Psychosis)  which  we  find  in  Greek  thought  as 
purely  ontological,  we  see  in  Descartes  commenc- 
ing to  be  psychological,  and  so  starting  the  great 
movement  of  modern  thinking  toward  its  end  in 
pure  Psychology.  Still  Descartes  cannot  give  up 
his  philosophical  standpoint,  which  is  indeed 
European,  so  he  projects  his  self -consciousness 
into  being,  his  cogitare  into  esse.  He  cannot  get 


x  DESCARTES.  — METAPHYSICS  65 

rid  of  the  ontological  substrate,  though  his  be  the 
Ego:s  ontology.  With  him  the  end  of  the  Ego's 
thinking  is  its  being,  but  time  is  destined  to  turn 
the  two  terms  around  and  show  that  the  Ego's 
being  is  its  thinking.  With  this  latter  conception 
fully  unfolded,  a  new  epoch  and  a  new  discipline 
of  thought  open  together. 

Very  characteristic  of  the  Seventeenth  Cen- 
tury is  the  fact  that  Descartes  designs  to  throw 
away  the  syllogism  in  his  /  think,  therefore  I  am, 
and  to  fall  back  upon  the  immediate  act  of  know- 
ing (intuition)  instead  of  the  mediated  one 
through  the  syllogism.  And  yet  he  does  not 
fully  succeed  Nothing  is  plainer  than  that  the 
syllogistic  form  underlies  his  famous  enthymeme 
Still  its  meaning  or  content  is  intuitive,  imme- 
diate, as  he  declares.  So  his  effort  to  free  him- 
self of  scholastic  trammels  is  but  half  a  success. 
The  old  transmitted  forms  he  has  to  use,  even  if 
he  pours  into  them  his  new  thought.  This  same 
fact  we  have  already  noted  as  true  of  all  the 
great  philosophers  of  the  Seventeenth  Century. 

Such  are  the  three  phases  or  activities  \)f  the 
Ego — negative,  positive,  and  self-conscious  — 
in  this  first  movement  of  Cartesian  Philosophy, 
which  is  the  movement  from  absolute  skepticism 
with  its  doubt  to  absolute  certainty  with  its  truth, 
namely  to  the  Ego  as  self-knowing.  Thus,  a 
criterion  of  truth  is  obtained :  it  must  be  known 
with  the  same  certainty  that  the  Ego  knows 

5 


66  MODERN'  EUROPEAN'  PHILOSOPHY. 

itself  in  self -consciousness.  Two  terms  are  used 
by  Descartes  to  express  such  knowledge  •  Clear- 
ness and  distinctness,  I  know  anything  clearly 
when  my  mind  grasps  it  immediately,  as  it  is  in  it- 
self;  I  know  anything  distinctly,  when  my  mind 
separates  it  from  all  that  is  alien  to  it.  Hence 
one  of  Descartes'  rules  for  the  direction  of  mind 
is  '«  to  accustom  ourselves  to  see  the  truth  clearly 
and  distinctly."  In  fact  «*  whatever  we  see 
clearly  and  distinctly  is  true,"  cannot  help  being 
true  without  upsetting  the  Ego,  and  still  more, 
without  upsetting  God  Himself. 

At  this  point  we  may  find  the  transition  to  the 
next  stage  of  Cartesian  thinking,  to  grasping  and 
grounding  the  existence  of  God.  Whence  comes 
this  clear  and  distinct  knowledge  of  things? 
Behind  it  must  be  a  cause,  such  a  cause,  accord- 
ing to  Descartes,  is  God. 

II.  The  second  truth  which  Descartes  in  his 
investigation  of  First  Philosophy  or  Metaphysics 
seeks  to  ascertain  is  the  existence  of  God  as  the 
necessary  counterpart  to  the  existence  of  the 
Ego.  As  he  picked  up  the  Ego  and  unfolded  its 
existence,  so  now  he  seems  to  pick  up  God  and 
to  set  about  the  problem  of  His  existence. 
Though  the  manner  is  empirical  and  apparently 
fortuitous,  we  shall  find  in  Descartes  a  profound 
connection  between  these  two  stages  of  the  ex- 
position, the  Ego's  being  and  God's  being.  In 
fact,  that  self-consciousness  cannot  be  without 


DESCAR  TES.~  ME  TAPHT8ICS.  67 

God-consciousness  is  one  of  Descartes'  deepest 
and  most  fruitful  thoughts.  Still  further,  man 
cannot  know  the  object  except  through  God, 
who  removes  the  grand  barrier  between  the 
Microcosm  and  the  Macrocosm.  According  to 
the  Cartesian  notion,  the  Ego  is  lying  helpless  in 
its  own  prison-house  till  God  comes  and  breaks 
down  the  door  from  the  outside,  letting  forth 
that  incarcerated  Self  into  the  world,  where  it  is 
to  attain  unto  true  knowledgec  Previously,  in 
the  Middle  Ages,  it  might  be  said  in  one  sense 
that  God  was  the  Ego's  jailer,  but  Descartes  has 
secretly  called  up  a  new  God,  or  at  least  a  new 
Divine  Spirit,  whose  function  now  is  to  set  that 
very  Ego  free  which  it  before  jailed  (often  with 
good  reason  let  it  be  added  in  passing). 

In  the  mind's  getting  hold  of  the  existence  of 
God,  there  is  a  movement  which  may  be  set 
forth  as  follows  :  — 

(1)  God's  existence  is  inborn  in  my  Ego;  or, 
as  Descartes  expresses  it,  the  idea  of  God  is 
innate.  It  comes  to  me  not  through  the  senses, 
nor  primarily  through  any  other  means  except 
God.  It  is  an  immediate  divine  gift  of  Himself 
to  man.  This  gift  is,  however,  no  external  one, 
but  the  gift  of  his  very  Self  to  his  creature.  He 
is  not  only  the  artist,  but  also  the  pattern  of  his 
own  work ,  he  is  the  archetype  producing  itself 
in  a  finite ^form.  "  From  the  fact  that  God  made 
me,  I  believe  that  He  made  me  in  his  image,  and 


68  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

that  I  am  like  Him.  *  *  *  I  know  the  idea  of 
God  just  as  I  know  myself."  Hence  this  idea  is 
innate,  it  is  immediately  one  with  my  Ego ;  from 
this  side  my  Ego  is  what  God's  Ego  is,  inborn 
yet  put  there  by  God  in  birth. 

On  the  other  hand  the  Ego,  contemplating 
itself,  finds  that  it  is  different  from  God,  being 
dependent,  imperfect,  finite.  I  therein  separate 
Him  from  myself,  hold  Him  up  before  myself  as 
the  ideal  of  perfection  and  as  the  goal  of  my  striv- 
ing. Now,  I  have  conceived  of  God,  and  from 
this  conception  of  Him  I  pass  to  His  existence, 
which  is  an  inference,  a  deduction,  and  is  no 
longer  an  immediate  insight.  Thus  I  attempt 
to  prove  the  existence  of  God  by  argument. 

(2)  The  two  sides  now  appear:  the  concep- 
tion or  idea  of  the  most  perfect  Being  on  the  one 
side  (subjective),  and  on  the  other  the  neces- 
sary reality  (objective)  of  such  a  being  inferred 
through  the  idea  of  Him.  I  have  a  clear  and 
distinct  idea  of  God,  therefore  He  is.  Such  an 
idea  is  a  fact  of  my  consciousness,  indeed  a  fund- 
amental fact  of  it,  which  cannot  originate  with 
me,  since  it  is  greater  and  more  perfect  than  I 
am.  Hence,  it  comes  from  God  who  must  exist 
in  order  to  impart  it  to  me.  This  is  the  so- 
called  ontological  proof  of  God's  existence, 
which  was  brought  into  medieval  Theology  by 
Anselm  and  which  made  it  conscious  of  its 
deepest  purpose.  For  as  Greek  thought  grap- 


DESCARTES.  —  METAPHYSICS.  69 

pled  with  Being  as  such,  so  Medieval  thought 
grappled  with  God's  Being,  making  it  an  element 
in  the  experience  of  every  individual  Ego  which 
had  the  idea  of  the  PerfectOne.  In  the  ontolog- 
ical  proof  God  is  first,  producing  in  me  the  idea 
of  the  Perfect,  through  which  idea  I  am  to  know 
His  existence.  Thus  I  am  in  a  manner  the  spirit 
of  God  who  puts  into  me  his  idea,  whereby  I  am 
to  return  and  recognize  Him. 

This  proof  was  not  altogether  acceptable  to 
Descartes.  From  my  conception  of  anything  I 
do  not  have  to  infer  that  it  exists.  Indeed  I  have 
many  conceptions  (or  ideas)  which  I  know  do 
not  exist.  Why  should  God  be  the  exception? 
That  is  just  the  matter  requiring  proof.  It  must 
therefore  be  shown  how  the  existence  of  God 
necessarily  follows  from  the  conception  of  Him, 
If  there  are  many  conceptions  which  have  no 
reality,  how  can  I  be  made  certain  that  the  con- 
ception of  God  is  not  one  of  that  sort?  So 
Descartes  will  proceed  to  make  an  addition  to 
the  ontological  proof  which  secures  its  necessity. 

Before  we  pass  to  that  subject,  it  may  be 
stated  that  Descartes  did  not  apparently  see  the 
full  validity  of  the  ontological  argument.  It  is 
true  that  this  argument  infers  reality  from  the 
idea,  and  that  such  inference  is  not  a  necessary 
one  in  general.  But  God  as  the  Perfect  One  is 
rightly  the  exception.  All  other  ideas  are  the 
imperfect,  finite,  and  hence  may  be  unreal.  But 


70  MODERN  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  idea  of  God  as  perfect  must  have  reality,  else 
he  would  be  conceived  as  imperfect,  finite,  unreal. 
The  idea  of  the  Perfect  without  reality  is  already 
imperfect,  and  hence  is  a  contradiction.  The 
vice  of  the  ontological  proof  is  not  its  lack  of 
necessity,  as  Descartes  supposes,  but  its  exclu- 
sion of  the  Ego's  participation,  which  Descartes 
will,  partly,  at  least,  supply.  For  without  the 
Ego  knowing  itself  there  cannot  be  its  knowing 
of  God  in  any  adequate  degree.  Self-conscious- 
ness and  God-consciousness  are  in  correspondence 
and  move  in  one  process.  This  fact  Descartes 
knows  and  will  set  forth. 

(3)  The  scholastic  ontological  proof  is  trans- 
formed by  Descartes  into  what  may  be  called  the 
modern  psychological  proof  of  God's  existence. 
There  is  still  the  idea  of  the  Perfect  One,  but 
now  the  stress  is  placed  upon  the  fact  that  I  the 
imperfect  one,  have  this  idea  of  the  Perfect 
Being.  The  Ego  is  to  know  itself  as  imperfect 
really,  yet  also  to  know  itself  as  having  the  idea 
of  perfection.  This  is  the  psychological  basis  of 
the  Cartesian  proof.  First  of  all,  the  Ego  must 
cognize  itself  in  its  double  character,  then  it  sees 
that  it,  the  imperfect,  cannot  produce  the  idea  of 
the  perfect  out  of  itself,  andfinally  that  this  idea 
in  it  can  only  spring  from  what  is  actually  per- 
fect. Thus  the  existence  of  God  necessarily  fol- 
lows from  the  idea  of  the  Perfect  Being  —  which 
necessary  consequence  Descartes  did  not  seem- 


DESCARTES.  —  ME  TAPHYSICS.  7 1 

ingly  attribute  to  the  ontological  proof.  The 
two  formulas  (ontological  and  psychological) 
might  run  according  to  Descartes :  The  idea 
of  Perfect  Being  may  have  reality  and  the  idea  of 
Perfect  Being  in  an  imperfect  Being  must  have 
reality.  Still  further,  the  ontological  proof 
knows  the  Ego  only  as  having  the  idea  of  perfec- 
tion, from  which  idea  divine  reality  is  inferred, 
but  the  psychological  proof  knows  the  Ego  as 
self -knowing,  as  conscious  of  itself  as  the  imper- 
fect one  with  the  idea  of  the  Perfect  One,  from 
which  divine  reality  necessarily  follows. 

Herewith  ends  the  Cartesian  movement  for 
the  mind's  getting  the  existence  of  God  from  the 
idea,  whereof  we  have  seen  three  stages  which  we 
may  summarily  call  the  innate,  the  ontological  and 
the  psychological  stages.  But  having  obtained, 
or  one  might  almost  say,  evolved  God,  what  is 
Descartes  going  to  do  with  Him?  This  question 
brings  us  to  the  next  phase  of  his  metaphysical 
scheme. 

III.  We  have  seen  man  (or  his  Ego)  getting 
to  know  itself  as  existent,  also  man  (or  his  Ego) 
getting  to  know  God  as  existent;  now  we  are 
to  behold  man  getting  to  know  the  World  as  ex- 
istent. Descartes  takes  the  World  for  granted 
as  something  which  he  is  to  know,  he  picks  it  up 
from  the  outside,  as  he  also  picked  up  the  Ego 
and  God,  who  are  now  to  be  seen  in  a  process 
with  the  World.  This  process  is  that  God  causes 


72  MODERN  E  UB  OPE  AN  PHIL  OS  OPE  Y. 

man  to  know  the  world  by  putting  into  his  mind 
clear  and  distinct  ideas  of  objects. 

Thus  Descartes  opens  up  this  great  problem 
of  all  modern  Philosophy,  the  problem  of 
cognition.  There  seems  to  be  an  impassable 
chasm  between  Man  and  the  World,  between  the 
realms  of  the  Ego  and  non-Ego.  How  can  they 
be  bridged?  The  answer  of  Descartes  is,  by  the 
act  of  God,  who  therein  finds  his  new  function  in 
the  universe.  He  imparts  to  the  Ego  clear  and 
distinct  Ideas  of  the  object,  which  must  have 
reality  unless  God  is  a  deceiver.  Yet  this  is  not 
the  only  way  God  moves  the  Ego  to  know  the 
object,  for  there  is  also  mathematical  knowl- 
edge. Finally  God  is  conceived  by  Descartes  as 
creating  both  Ego  and  object  (or  mind  and  mat- 
ter) and  thus  producing  the  very  difference  which 
it  is  his  great  function  to  overcome. 

God,  therefore,  makes  the  Ego  know  the  world 
by  his  immediate  act  (granting  clear  and  distinct 
Ideas)  ;  then  He  makes  the  Ego  know  the  world 
by  his  mediated  act  (through  Mathematics),  then 
he  makes  both  Ego  and  the  World  (the  one  infinite 
Substance  producing  the  two  finite  Substances). 
For  short,  we  may  call  these  three  stages,  God 
as  immediate,  God  as  mathematical,  and  God  as 
creative,  of  which  stages  the  following  account 
presents  the  leading  points:  — 

( 1 )  The  separation  between  Ego  and  non-Ego 
is  the  grand  rent  in  the  universe  which  God,  if  he 


DESCAR  TES.  —  ME  TAPHYSICS.  73 

have  any  function,  must  heal.  Not  by  a  direct  act 
of  power  but  by  giving  to  the  Ego  a  Reason, 
which  has  clear  and  distinct  ideas  of  things,  is  the 
Divine  activity  conceived  by  Descartes.  These 
ideas  of  Reason  are  really  the  creative  thought  of 
the  object,  by  which  the  Ego  re-thinks  the  gener- 
ative principle  of  the  World,  though  our  philoso- 
pher does  not  express  the  matter  in  this  way. 
For  he  conceives  these  Ideas  of  Reason  as  coming 
from  God  directly  and  as  giving  to  the  Ego  the 
capacity  to  grasp  the  objective  world  in  its  truth. 
Whatever  is  clear  and  distinct  to  me  is  of  Divine 
sending  and  authority ;  I  cannot  reject  it  without 
rejecting  God. 

Still  I  am  often  deceived,  am  indeed  very  fal- 
lible, whence  comes  my  errors?  From  myself; 
all  error  is  self-deception.  Descartes  assigns  to 
a  particular  faculty  or  mental  activity  the  ground 
of  error :  it  is  the  Will,  which  can  affirm  or  deny 
any  kind  of  conception  or  judgment.  It  is  pos- 
sible for  the  Will  to  choose  the  indistinct,  unclear, 
and  hence  undivine  conception — whereby  comes 
untruth ,  delusion ,  the  lie.  But  how  are  we  to  know 
that  such  untruth  may  not  be  from  a  supernal 
source,  that  God  Himself  may  not  will  at  times 
to  deceive  us,  as  He  does  will  at  all  times  to  let 
us  be  deceived.  Here  we  are  met  by  a  new 
Cartesian  assumption. 

This  is  the  inherent,  necessary  veracity  of 
God,  who  cannot  tell  a  lie  to  man.  After  im- 


74  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

parting  to  the  latter  a  clear  and  distinct  idea  of 
an  object,  He  cannot  employ  such  an  affirmation 
of  Himself  as  a  means  of  deception.  He  would 
then  be  God  and  Devil  in  one,  no  better  than 
that  lying  heathen  God  of  the  old  Greeks,  Zeus, 
who  sent  a  deceptive  dream  to  Agamemnon,  and 
otherwise  played  fast  and  loose  with  poor  mor- 
tals. Error,  then,  comes  from  man,  not  from 
God,  specially  from  man's  Will,  not  his  Intelli- 
gence, and  still  more  specially  from  man's  lower 
Will  affirming  undivine  unclearness  and  indis- 
tinctness of  Ideas,  not  from  his  higher  Will 
affirming  God-given  clear  and  distinct  Ideas. 
Really  this  choice  of  the  Will  is  man's  own  act 
of  destiny,  choosing  whether  he  will  be  the 
victim  of  delusion  knocked  about  by  lying  fiends 
or  the  successful  follower  of  truth. 

Undoubtedly  this  character  of  God,  which  ex- 
cludes the  negative,  gives  rise  to  great  difficul- 
ties. Is  He  not  then  made  limited  in  his  infinity, 
made  imperfect  through  His  very  perfection? 
These  and  similar  questions,  Theology,  and 
particularly  Protestant  Theology,  will  thresh 
over  with  enormous  heat,  which  will  sometimes 
become  the  literal  heat  of  the  burning  stake. 
This  part  we  may  drop,  and  turn  to  another 
rising  interrogation  which  is  more  relevant: 
What  manifestation  of  this  Divine  certainty  in 
human  science?  Perceived  subjectively  we  find 
it  in  clear  and  distinct  Ideas  ^  but  that  which 


DESCARTES.  —  METAPHYSICS.  75 

gives  us  objective  reality  ought  to  have  in  itself 
a  form  of  objective  reality,  Descartes  has  his 
answer  to  this  question  also :  Mathematics, 
especially  Geometry. 

This  is  a  new  stage  in  the  Cartesian  conception 
of  God.  The  first  stage  was  the  immediate  act 
of  God  in  granting  clear  and  distinct  Ideas  to 
man  for  knowing  the  object.  But  now  a  science 
for  man's  knowing  the  object  is  interjected  be- 
tween God  and  man,  the  latter  having  primarily 
to  learn  this  science  in  order  to  know  objective 
truth.  Such  a  science,  taken  by  itself,  is  truly 
God's  science,  being  the  divine  thought  ruling  m 
the  world. 

(2)  Mathematical  science,  then,  is  the  manifesta- 
tion of  God's  certainty  in  a  real  process  or  method. 
We  have  reached  the  great  scientific  purpose  of 
Descartes,  which  is  to  introduce  into  Metaphysics 
the  certainty  and  method  of  Mathematics.  This 
seems  to  have  been  a  faint  gleam  of  insight  while 
he  was  still  in  school  at  La  Fleche;  but  it  came 
upon  him  as  a  light  illuminating  his  whole  future 
in  his  spiritual  crisis  at  Neuburg.  We  have  al- 
ready noted  his  strong  reaction  against  the  meta- 
physical scholastic  philosophy  in  which  he  had 
been  instructed.  He  is  now  going  to  conceive  a 
machine  for  working  the  world  without  any  in- 
tervention of  caprice.  In  the  previous  (imme- 
diate) stage  the  individual  could  choose  the  un- 


76  MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

clear  and  indistinct  Ideas;  but  in  Mathematics 
there  is  no  such  choice. 

Thus  Descartes  makes  God  essentially  mathe- 
matical, and  gives  a  turn  to  the  whole  Seventeenth 
Century,  or  rather  expresses  the  essence  of  the 
science  of  that  Century.  This  science  sought  to 
formulate  the  mechanical  .Universe  mathemati- 
cally; it  was  the  age  of  Copernicus,  Kepler, 
Galileo.  Nature  has  a  mathematical  determinant 
which  man  must  find;  thereby  he  finds  God 
who  is  essentially  a  geometric  process  control- 
ling all  matter  ideally.  Philosophy  becomes  a 
kind  of  universal  Geometry  which  starts  with  its 
three  axioms  or  postulates,  Man,  God,  World. 
These  are  properly  abstractions  from  the  Uni- 
verse which  contains  all  these  in  its  process.  In 
like  manner  Geometry  abstracts  its  three  postu- 
lates, surface,  line,  and  point,  from  solid  matter, 
and  works  over  these  ideal  elements  into  geo- 
metric science.  God  utters  himself  geometrically, 
and  Philosophy,  as  the  supreme  science,  is  to 
follow  the  same  method.  This  thought  will  be 
taken  up  and  carried  out  by  Spinoza,  whose  chief 
work  will  have  the  formal  geometric  procedure. 
But  Descartes  did  not  realize  his  own  doctrine  as 
to  method. 

Mathematics  may  be  called  an  ideal  machine 
constructed  by  mind  for  controlling  matter.  The 
science  proceeds  mechanically,  by  determining 
its  object  from  without.  In  the  time  of  Des- 


DESCAE  TES.  —  ME  TAPE  Y8IC8.  77 

cartes  the  Universe  was  deemed  a  huge  machine, 
and  the  grand  object  was  to  find  its  ideal  princi- 
ple. Hence  it  comes  that  Descartes  was  both 
mathematician  and  philosopher,  being  equally 
great  in  both  fields  and  for  the  same  fundamental 
reason.  Or  we  may  say  that  in  Descartes  the  math- 
ematician and  the  philosopher  are  not  yet  differen- 
tiated. If  he  started  modern  Philosophy  by  his 
assertion  of  the  Being  of  the  Ego,  he  also  gave  a 
decided  bent  to  modern  mathematics  by  his  dis- 
covery of  Analytical  Geometry.  In  this  he  is  a 
return  to  ancient  Pythagoreanism  which  likewise 
saw  in  Mathematics  a  divine  principle. 

Here,  however,  the  difficulty  of  this  view 
appears.  The  machine  made  or  discovered  by 
mind  for  controlling  nature,  is  brought  to  turn 
about  and  to  control  that  mind  which  made  it. 
Descartes,  through  his  mathematical  God,  puts 
the  creature  over  the  creator,  the  mind-made 
over  the  mind  making  it.  Hence  mind  will  begin 
to  be  dissatisfied  with  such  a  conception  of  God. 
It  is  at  this  point  that  we  may  place  another  well- 
known  principle  of  Descartes,  his  hostility  to 
Final  Causes,  or  Design.  He  says  that  he  will 
not  "  examine  the  ends  which  God  proposed  to 
Himself  in  creating  the  world ; ' '  that  lies  beyond 
our  reach,  and  it  is  "  presumptuous  for  us  to 
think  that  God  has  taken  us  into  his  counsel  "  in 
such  a  far-reaching  transaction.  Hence  man 
ought  to  confine  himself  to  "  efficient  Causes," 


78  MODERN  E  UR  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

which  are  the  direct  laws  of  Nature  derived  from 
our  senses,  and  seen  by  us  as  "  clear  and  distinct 
Ideas/7  Thus  Descartes  rejects  the  teleologic 
principle  as  out  of  the  range  of  the  human  mind. 
The  mathematical  God  does  not  permit  teleology ; 
he  made  mathematics  as  nature-controlling ;  what 
ulterior  design  he  had  in  such  an  act  it  is  imper- 
tinent and  indeed  foolish  to  ask.  So  Descartes 
would  confine  us  to  knowing  God  as  machine- 
maker. 

But  it  is  soon  seen  that  this  narrow  view  con- 
tradicts both  God's  and  Man's  nature.  Whence 
comes  this  Ego  which  is  to  know  and  this 
object  which  is  to  be  known?  Is  God  simply 
reduced  to  a  means  for  uniting  in  knowledge 
these  two  opposite  elements,  Ego  and  World,  as 
given?  Of  necessity  Descartes  himself  is  pushed 
to  his  third  conception  of  God,  which  regards 
Him  as  creative. 

(3)  The  creative  God  must  go  back  and  create 
these  presuppositions  which  Descartes  has 
hitherto  taken  for  granted,  Ego  and  World,  or 
mind  and  matter.  Thus  the  Substances  hitherto 
three  become  of  two  kinds,  the  uncreated  (or 
self-created)  and  the  created.  This  thought 
makes  very  plainly  a  new  phase  in  the  Cartesian 
Philosophy.  God  primarily  was  the  cause  of 
Man's  knowing  the  object;  but  now  He  is 
the  cause  of  Man  and  Object,  and  hence  the 
cause  of  their  difference  and  opposition,  which 


DESCAE  TES.  —  ME  TAPHTSIC8.  79 

it  was  his  first  function  to  overcome,  according 
to  Descartes.  Thus  the  grand  separation  be- 
tween mind  and  matter  is  God's  own  work,  which 
separation  it  is  His  further  work  to  undo.  Herein 
we  have  God  conceived  as  the  process  of  the 
total  universe,  positing  and  canceling  its  differ 
ences,  whereby  all  division  and  multiplicity  is 
reduced  to  a  mere  play  or  appearance  in  God. 
This  is  the  side  of  Descartes  which  will  be  devel- 
oped through  Malebranche.into  Spinoza,  who  will 
make  the  one  creative  God  of  Descartes  just  the 
one  Substance  of  the  Universe,  of  which  the  two 
created  Substances  are  but  attributes  (Thought 
and  Extension),  which,  becoming  individualized, 
are  merely  transitory  modes.  Thus  Cartesian- 
ism  passes  over  into  Spinozisin  by  its  own  inner 
development. 

The  three  main  categories  of  Spinoza's  Meta- 
physics are  derived  from  Descartes  —  Substance, 
Attribute ,  Mode .  It  is  true  that  Spinoza  uses  them 
all  in  a  new  sense,  yet  in  a  sense  directly  evolved 
out  of  that  of  Descartes.  Both  of  these  created 
Substances  have  Attributes  —  that  of  matter  is 
Extension,  that  of  mind  is  Thought.  Thus 
Thought  and  Extension  are  not  yet  direct  At- 
tributes of  the  One  Substance,  as  in  Spinoza. 
Every  other  predicate  of  matter  presupposes 
Extension,  hence  is  a  Mode  of  it  according  to 
Descartes.  Everything  predicated  of  mind  pre- 
supposes Thought,  of  which  it  is,  therefore,  a 


80        ,  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Mode.  Thus  Descartes  furnishes  Spinoza  with 
his  main  categories  and  suggests  their  evolution. 
God  is  likewise  self-cause  (causa  sui)  according 
to  Descartes,  of  which  conception  Spinoza  will 
make  great  use,  beginning  with  it  his  Ethics. 

Such  are  the  three  Gods  of  Descartes,  or  his 
views  of  God,  the  immediate,  the  mathematical 
and  the  creative.  It  is  evident  that  Descartes 
falls  between  those  mighty  opposites,  the  Trans- 
cendence and  the  Immanence  of  God.  On  the 
one  hand  he  asserts  God  as  supremely  trans- 
cendent, as  creating  everything,  even  the  true 
and  the  false,  right  and  wrong,  by  an  act  of  his 
arbitrary  will  from  the  outside;  strictly  then  God 
must  be  also  the  intentional  author  of  evil,  of  the 
negative.  On  the  other  hand  Descartes  makes 
God  implicitly  immanent  in  the  total  process  of 
the  Universe  of  which  He  is  the  Creator  from 
the  inside,  including  Himself  (causa  sui). 
Such  is  the  deepest  contradiction  in  Descartes' 
view  of  God,  that  between  an  explicit  Trans- 
cendence and  an  implicit  Immanence,  the  latter 
becoming  explicit  in  the  next  great  philosopher 
of  the  Seventeenth  Century,  Spinoza. 

It  is  at  this  point  specially  that  we  catch  a 
glimpse  of  the  Pampsychosis  working  in  Descar- 
tes, of  which  he  takes  one  stage  or  member,  sep- 
arates the  same  from  the  total  process  and  makes 
it  completely  transcendent.  Thus  the  other  two 
members  (World  and  Man)  become  dependent, 


DESCARTES  —METAPHYSICS,  81 

unnecessary,  a  mere  appearance.  God  in  himself 
is  the  All ;  what  is  different  is  a  vanishing,  not  a 
necessary  part  of  the  process  of  the  All.  Thus 
the  Spiriozan  Pantheism  rises  to  the  surface,  and 
absolute  Transcendence  dialectically  begets  its 
antithesis,  absolute  Immanence. 

Such  is  the  first  or  metaphysical  stage  of  the 
philosophical  Norm  as  manifested  in  Descartes. 
We  observe  its  psychological  character,  which 
requires  the  presence  of  the  Ego  as  the  start- 
ing point.  First,  I  know  myself  as  existent, 
secondly,  I  know  God  as  existent,  thirdly,  I  know 
the  World  as  existent.  All  three  form  a  process 
which  may  be  seen  in  the  following  statement :  the 
self -knowing  Ego  (as  existent)  knows  the  World 
as  existent  through  God  (as  existent).  Thus 
the  total  process  of  the  Universe  —  God,  World, 
and  Man  —  interlinks  with  that  of  the  Ego  in 
order  that  the  latter  may  know  the  object  (or  the 
World).  The  Ego  is  explicitly  introduced  into 
the  process  of  the  All,  which  determines  it  to 
cognition.  On  the  one  hand  it  asserts  itself  as 
present  and  self-conscious  in  the  philosophical 
Norm,  yet  it  is  on  the  other  hand  still  determined 
by  that  Norm.  The  time  is  coming,  however, 
when  it  will  determine  its  Norm  and  thereby 
begin  a  new  Discipline.  The  greatness  of  the 
present  step  will  be  manifest  when  we  think  that 
in  the  Greek  and  Medieval  Periods  the  Ego  did 
not  appear  directly,  in  its  own  right.  Hence 

6 


82  MODERN  E  UROPEAN  PHIL  OSOPH  T. 

it  comes  that  Modern  Philosophy  is  a  Philosophy 
of  Psychology,  not  a  Psychology  of  Philosophy, 
which  is  something  very  different.  The  Being  of 
the  Ego  is  here  the  theme,  which  will  lead  up  to 
the  Ego  of  Being.  In  these  thoughts  we  may  see 
the  great  significance  of  Descartes,  and  under- 
stand what  a  new  epoch  he  began  in  the  History 
of  Philosophy. 

We  have  noted  that  the  outcome  of  the  fore- 
going metaphysical  stage  of  Descartes  is  that 
God  makes  Man  to  know  the  Object  or  the  World. 
But  the  next  stage  is  the  second  or  the  physical, 
which  seeks  to  tell  what  this  knowledge  is,  and 
so  carries  us  over  from  the  knowing  to  the  known. 
To  this,  then,  we  pass. 

B.  PHYSICS. 

Throughout  the  previous  stage  of  Metaphysics 
there  was  always  something  given :  the  World, 
Nature,  Object.  This  was  what  the  Ego  was  to 
know  and  the  process  of  such  knowledge  consti- 
tuted the  main  interest.  But  now  comes  the  sec- 
ond great  question :  what  is  this  knowledge  of  the 
Object  or  of  the  World?  Having- found  out  that 
we  can  know,  and  how  we  know,  we  wish  to  find 
out  the  content  of  such  knowledge.  This  must  be 
important,  indeed  the  real  purpose  of  the  whole 
discussion,  since  it  would  hardly  be  worth  while  to 
take  so  much  trouble  to  discover  the  How,  if  the 


DESCAR  TES.  —  PHYSICS.  83 

What  were  insignificant.  Descartes  has  intro- 
duced God  as  a  means  for  my  knowing  the  world ; 
the  philosopher  is  now  to  unfold  the  World  as 
known,  in  terms  or  categories  of  thought.  This 
will  give  Physics,  or  the  science  of  the  World  as 
natural . 

It  is  well  known  that  Descartes  was  occupied 
with  physical  science,  before  he  turned  specially 
to  Metaphysics,  Seven  yeacs  before  he  pub^ 
lished  the  Discourse  in  1637,  we  know  from  his 
letters  that  he  was  busy  with  a  work  which  he 
called  The  World  (Le  Monde).  Among  other 
matters  it  supported  the  theory  of  Copernicus  as 
to  the  motion  of  the  Earth,  He  was  preparing 
to  print  his  book,  when  the  news  reached  him 
that  the  Church  authorities  at  Rome  had  con- 
demned Galileo  for  supporting  the  Copernican 
doctrine.  At  once  he  gave  up  the  idea  of  pub- 
lication, and  even  thought  of  burning  his  papers. 
Many  years  afterwards  his  leading  physical 
doctrines  were  embodied  m  the  Pnncipia,  and 
printed,  Thus  Descartes  was  thrown  back  from 
the  object  to  the  subject,  from  the  World  out- 
side to  the  Self  inside,  from  the  product  of 
knowing  to  its  process.  Without  denying 
openly  the  authority  of  the  Church,  he  de- 
velops and  asserts  the  Ego,  and  so  he  passes 
from  the  physicist  to  being  the  philosopher  of 
Europe,  which  was  just  ready  to  make  this  turn 
inward  along  with  him.  For  Descartes  voiced  the 


84  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Spirit  of  his  Age  far  more  deeply  and  adequately 
in  his  ^Discourse  and  in  his  Meditations  than  he 
could  have  done  in  his  book  on  The  World.  Still 
his  Physics  is  properly  the  second  stage  of  the 
philosophical  Norm  which  was  working  within 
him,  even  if  Nature  occupied  him  first.  The 
physical  Universe  Descartes  summons  before 
himself,  seeking  to  grasp  and  to  categorize  its 
leading  manifestations,  and  to  order  them  ac- 
cording to  their  essential  principles.  He  will 
see  in  the  Cosmos  three  such  elementary 
principles,  which  form  in  themselves  the  total 
process  of  Physical  Science  as  he  conceived  it. 
They  are  Extension  (extended  Matter),  Motion, 
Body  (the  Human  Organism  with  the  Soul). 

These  three  stages  belong  to  Nature,  or  to  the 
objective  World,  whose  characteristic  is  external 
determination.  First,  the  World  as  externally 
determined  is  pure  continuity,  pure  Matter  (as 
Descartes  holds),  having  no  separation  within 
itself,  no  limit  inside,  no  void  outside,  the  primal 
potentiality  of  all  separation.  Second  is  the 
world  as  moving,  as  internally  separated  and  de- 
termined by  God;  yet  this  external  Motion  is 
circular  or  self -returning,  the  counterpart  of 
inner  self -returning  Mind  or  Ego.  Third  is  the 
World  as  Organic  Body  which  is  internally  self- 
moving  and  so  self -returning,  being  automatic 
temporarily  (during  life)  and  being  joined  to  the 


DESCAE  TES.  —  PHYSICS.  85 

Soul  which  is  self -moving  eternally,  and  hence 
immortal. 

In  these  three  stages  we  note  the  effort  of 
Nature  to  become  circular  or  self-returning  like 
the  Ego,  or  the  struggle  of  the  externally  de- 
termined in  its  rise  toward  the  completely  self- 
determined,  which  is  at  last  manifested  in  the 
life  of  the  Human  Organism. 

I.  Extension.  Already  we  have  seen  that 
Descartes  designated  Matter  along  with  Mind 
as  a  created  substance,  opposite  to  Mind  in 
essence.  For  if  Mind  be  essentially  the  self- 
conscious,  self-determined,  self-returning,  Matter 
on  the  contrary  is  the  externally  determined,  the 
outward  going,  the  separating.  Extended  sub- 
stance cannot  be  self -centered :  its  center  is  every- 
where, even  outside  of  itself,  pure  materiality. 

But  this  pure  materiality  of  the  Universe  must 
be,  according  to  Descartes,  a  material,  a  real 
object  yet  the  essence  of  all  objects.  It  is  not 
empty  space,  but  filled;  it  is  extended  Substance 
in  fact,  the  Body  in  all  Bodies.  It  is  not  a  mere 
thought,  or  pure  intuition  (as  Kant  held)  ;  it  is 
matter,  the  one  matter  opposite  to  all  thinking. 
"  The  nature  of  Body  consists  not  in  its  hardness, 
weight,  color,  or  in  any  other  sensible  property, 
but  in  its  extension  into  length,  breadth  and 
thickness."  (Principia  II.  4.)  Not  gravity, 
not  impenetrability  is  the  essential  fact  of  the 


86  MODERN  E UEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

corporeal  world  around  us,  but  Extension,  or 
Matter  as  universal. 

Thus  Descartes  asserts  a  single  ultimate  prin- 
ciple for  the  entire  material  Universe,  which  prin- 
ciple itself  must  be  material.  Earth,  Heaven, 
Sun  and  Planets  to  the  remotest  stars  are  mani- 
festations of  this  real  Extension,  which  also  fills 
the  seemingly  vacant  intermundane  spaces. 
Through  it  everything  touches  everything  else ; 
through  it  the  Sun  smites  me  in  the  face  and  the 
object  yonder  tickles  my  eye-ball.  It  is  the  uni- 
versal Matter  possessing  this  outer  universality 
as  Mind  has  the  inner. 

Accordingly  the  physical  Universe  is  ( 1 )  un- 
limited, can  have  no  bounds  in  Extension,  which 
is  always  outside  the  limit,  even  its  own  limit. 
Pure  Extension  can  suffer  no  limitation ;  it  is 
beyond  every  bounded  Body,  hence  beyond  itself 
when  bounded.  Herein  Descartes  differs  from 
the  chief  Greek  thinkers,  who  with  their  sense 
of  form  could  not  tolerate  an  unlimited  Cosmos, 
which  seemed  to  them  rather  Chaos.  Melissos 
the  Eleatic  was  a  notable  exception.  (2)  The 
physical  universe  is  full,  has  no  Void,  and  so  no 
atoms.  The  smallest  particle  is  still  divisible; 
there  is  no  limit  where  separation  ceases.  Ex- 
tension is  thus  boundless  in  both  directions: 
toward  the  infinitely  small  as  well  as  toward  the 
infinitely  large.  The  doctrine  of  Democritus 
(atomism),  to  which  modern  physical  science 


DESCAE  TES.  —  PHYSICS.  87 

tends  so  decidedly,  is  not  accepted  by  Descartes. 
Material  Extension  simply  fills  the  Universe,  al- 
lowing no  vacancy.  (3)  Hence  it  is  in  unbroken 
continuity,  a  continuum,  the  connecting  element 
in  and  through  all  things.  It  is  in  contact  with 
everything ;  it  is  outside  of  each  material  object 
of  which  it  is  also  the  inside  (or  the  essence). 
We  may  metaphorically  deem  it  the  connecting 
tissue  of  the  Universe — itself  a  tissue  connect- 
ing all  tissues. 

We  have  already  seen  that  this  Extension 
was  a  direct  creation  of  God  along  with  Mind. 
Moreover  we  can  see  God's  purpose  in  such  cre- 
ation: to  bring  together  into  connection  all  the 
separated  objects  in  the  Cosmos.  As  in  the  met- 
aphysical sphere  he  united  the  two  disparate 
substances,  Mind  and  Matter,  in  an  act  of  knowl- 
edge, so  he  now  interconnects  all  the  diverse 
forms  of  the  physical  Universe  in  a  common 
medium. 

But  Extension  by  its  very  name  and  nature 
cannot  stay  with  itself  and  be  at  rest ;  it  must  be 
active  and  get  outside  ;  it  must  extend  itself.  If 
it  were  merely  passive,  it  could  be  bounded.  So 
we  come  to  Motion  in  Descartes.  (It  is  at  this 
point,  however,  that  Leibniz  sees  Force  in  Ex- 
tension.) 

II.  Motion.  We  now  enter  the  physical  Uni- 
verse in  a  state  of  motion,  of  perpetual  change. 
Here  we  must  go  back  to  Extension  to  which 


88  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Descartes  gives  three  main  capacities :  forma- 
bility,  divisibility  and  mobility.  "I  recognize  no 
other  Matter  than  that  formable,  divisible  and 
movable  one  in  corporeal  things,"  and  hence 
the  subject  of  physical  science  can  only  be  '«  these 
Forms,  Divisions,  and  Movements,"  or  Extension 
formed,  divided  and  moved.  (Principia  II.  64.) 
But  as  bodies  are  formed  and  are  divided  by  means 
of  Motion,  these  three  elements  can  be  reduced 
to  one,  namely,  to  Motion,  which  is  thus  funda- 
mental with  Descartes. 

It  is  chiefly  of  Motion  that  Descartes  treats  in 
the  physical  portion  of  his  Principia  (2nd,  3rd 
and  4th  Books).  To  him  it  was  the  grand  fact 
of  the  Cosmos,  the  real  manifestation  of  Nature. 
Extension,  indeed,  lies  back  of  it,  is  the  one  of 
which  Motion  is  the  manifold,  is  the  essence  of 
which  Motion  is  the  appearance.  The  phenomena 
of  Nature  are  in  one  form  or  other  cases  of  Mo- 
tion which  is  itself  a  modification  or  attribute  of 
Extension.  We  are  not  to  forget  that  Extension 
is  invisible,  though  material;  it  is  the  invisible 
Universe  as  Matter,  which  becomes  visible  in 
Motion. 

We  shall  seek  to  follow  the  order  of  Descartes' 
treatment  of  Motion,  as  he  unfolds  it  in  his  Prin- 
cipia,  which  is  a  complete  Philosophy  of  Nature, 
one  of  the  greatest  and  most  influential  after 
Aristotle's.  It  deeply  worked  upon  Newton  and 
probably  suggested  the  title  to  his  most  important 


DESCAETES.  —PHYSICS.  89 

book.  Descartes  evidently  conceives  his  subject- 
matter  as  Motion  in  its  Principles  (General 
Physics),  Motion  in  the  Heavens  (Cosmical 
Physics),  Motion  on  Earth  (Terrestrial  Physics). 
A  brief  outline  of  each  of  these  portions  will 
give  a  survey  of  the  Cartesian  Cosmos. 

1.  Fundamentally,  all  manifestation,  all  what 
we  name  phenomena  in  the  physical  world  comes 
of  Motion;  "  all  multiplicity  of  Nature,  all  her 
forms  depend  on  Motion."  (Prin.  II.  23.) 
What  is  Motion?  Descartes  gives  two  defini- 
tions, a  simpler  and  a  more  exact.  The  first 
runs:  "Motion  is  an  activity  whereby  a  body 
passes  from  one  place  into  another."  (II.  24.) 
From -this  definition  which  gives  the  appearance, 
he  passes  to  the  true  definition.  "  Motion  is  a 
transportation  of  a  part  or  of  a  body  from  the 
neighborhood  of  bodies  which  are  in  immediate 
contact  with  it,  and  which  are  deemed  to  be  at 
rest,  into  the  neighborhood  of  other  bodies." 
(II.  25.)  Here  the  emphasis  is  upon  transport- 
ation (or  transference).  The  body  in  Motion  is 
carried  from  one  environment  into  another. 
Therewith  we  come  to  the  first  great  fact  of  all 
motion. 

(a)  All  the  changes  we  see  in  the  phenomena 
of  the  physical  Universe  spring  from  external 
causes.  A  body  remains  where  it  is,  unless 
moved  from  without.  This  is  usually  called  the 
law  of  inertia.  Descartes  insists  that  bodies  do 


90  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

not  strive  to  come  to  rest  of  themselves.  The 
motion  of  a  body  continues  till  some  external 
cause  stops  it  and  brings  it  to  rest.  In  like  man- 
ner when  it  is  at  rest  it  is  brought  to  move  by  an 
external  cause.  Motion  thus  is  determined  from 
without,  is  transferred  to  bodies,  and  so  can  be 
measured  on  account  of  its  mechanical  char- 
acter. The  physical  Universe  is  in  motion, 
is  one  whirl  of  the  finite  movements  of  bodies. 
Who  started  this  line  of  external  Motion?  The 
answer  of  Descartes  is,  God. 

(6)  The  quantity  of  Motion  in  the  physical 
Universe  is  always  the  same.  "  God  in  the  be- 
ginning created  Matter  with  motion  and  rest, 
and  preserves  the  same  amount  of  motion  and 
rest  that  He  created  in  the  beginning."  (II.  36.) 
But  the  distribution  of  this  motion  and  rest  is 
variable,  though  the  quantity  be  constant.  Sec- 
ondary causes  play  in  and  break  up  this  solid 
mass  of  motion  into  the  millionfold  phenomena 
we  witness  around  us,  which  are,  according  to 
Descartes,  modifications  of  Motion. 

(c)  The  physical  universe  is  a  vast  congeries 
of  motions,  which  intertwine  and  participate  in 
one  another.  The  watch  in  my  pocket  has  its 
motion  or  series  of  motions ;  still  it  moves  with 
rny  body,  which  also  has  a  great  complexity  of 
motions,  inner  and  outer;  my  body  with  all  its 
motions  along  with  my  watch  and  all  its  motions, 


DESCARTES.  —  PHYSICS.  91 

being  on  shipboard,  participates  in  the  motion  of 
the  ship  which  itself  moves  to  water  and  wind. 

Moreover  the  motion  of  a  body  has  a  tendency 
to  become  circular.  There  is  no  vacant  space 
and  so  no  vacant  place  in  the  Universe ;  all  are 
taken.  If  a  body  leaves  its  place,  another  body 
must  take  that  place,  while  the  first  body  moves 
into  another  place,  dispossessing  still  another 
body  which  in  its  turn  has  to  do  the  same. 
And  so  the  line  goes  on  till  it  returns  to  the  first 
moving  body,  forming  a  circle  of  Motion.  Says 
Descartes  :  "As  all  places  are  filled  with  bodies, 
so  every  body  must  be  moving  in  a  circle,  for  it 
must  expel  the  body  from  the  place  into  which 
it  moves,  which  expelled  body  must  expel  another 
body  out  of  its  place,  and  so  on  till  the  last  ex- 
pelled body  enters  the  place  abandoned  by  the 
first  body  at  the  very  moment  of  its  abandon- 
ment." (11.33.)  Thus  Descartes  tries  to  elimi- 
nate time  as  an  element  of  motion  in  order  to 
get  rid  of  any  Void  —  wherein  lies  a  tremendous 
difficulty  for  him.  Still  we  see  that  every  mov- 
ing body  is  in  a  cycle  of  motion,  wherein  we  may 
behold  the  beginning  of  his  vortices  which  are 
soon  to  be  witnessed  on  a  much  vaster  scale. 

The  principle  of  Motion  in  Descartes  is,  there- 
fore, circular;  every  fragment  of  Motion  is,  when 
seen  by  thought,  the  segment  of  a  circle,  and 
so  is  really  geometric.  Extension,  by  its  own 
inner  nature  extending  itself,  becomes  Motion, 


92          MODERN  E  UBOPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

I 

which  again  returns  into  itself  and  produces  the 
typical  phenomenon,  or  the  universal  principle  of 
Physics  in  the  realm  of  movement,  as  we  behold 
it  above  us  in  the  Heavens  and  around  us  on 
Earth. 

2.  Descartes  passes  to  the  application  of  the 
principles  of  Motion,  first  considering  the  celes- 
tial world  (called  by  him  the  visible  world). 
This  science  has  been  named  Cosmical  Physics, 
whose  treatment  we  find  in  the  Third  Part  of  his 
Principia.  It  is  an  attempt  to  account  for  the 
visible  Heavens  by  the  laws  of  Motion. 

The  first  thing  which  we  are  to  get  rid  of  in 
order  to  place  ourselves  upon  the  Cartesian 
standpoint,  is  the  idea  of  universal  gravitation, 
which  has  become  deeply  ingrown  with  the 
Anglo-Saxon  mental  fibre  through  the  influence 
of  Newton.  All  Motion  in  the  physical  Universe 
is  produced  by  immediate  contact  or  impact  of 
body  with  body ;  there  is  no  such  thing  as  the 
action  of  one  body  upon  another  at  a  distance. 
Hence  the  attraction  of  gravitation,  which  is  such 
an  actio  in  distans,  is  not  accepted  by  Descartes. 
Bodies  have  no  occult  qualities  or  hidden  powers 
by  which  they  can  work  upon  other  bodies  far 
away.  Herein  Descartes  is  different  from  both 
Galileo  and  Newton,  though  it  is  said  that  New- 
ton deliberated  a  good  while  before  giving  up  the 
Cartesian  view  which  he  thoroughly  studied. 


DESCAKTES.  —  PHYSICS.  93 

The  next  point  we  have  to  consider  is  that  the 
Universe  is  full  of  a  fluid  matter  in  which  are  the 
solids,  namely  planets,  sun,  stars,  and  all  the 
heavenly  bodies.  There  is  no  vacant  space; 
where  there  is  no  solid,  there  is  a  fluid.  Thus 
the  heavenly  bodies  are  floating  in  a  cosmic 
fluid,  which  may  well  be  the  material  extension 
already  described. 

Now  if  Motion  be  externally  imparted  to  the 
cosmic  fluid  in  which  the  celestial  spheres  are 
lying  at  rest,  a  current  will  be  started  which  will 
carry  them  forward.  All  those  which  are  in  the 
same  general  current  will  remain  in  the  same 
relative  position  toward  one  another.  The 
Motion  of  this  current  is  circular,  whirling 
around  a  center,  and  in  this  whirl  are  borne 
along  the  solid  objects  which  are  in  the  fluid. 
This  is  the  Cartesian  vortex,  or  whirlpool  of 
cosmic  fluid.  The  physical  Universe  is  full  of 
such  vortices;  indeed  we  have  seen  that  every 
motion  of  an  object  has  a  tendency  to  round 
itself  out  into  a  circle,  so  that  upon  the  earth 
there  is  an  infinite  complex  of  rings  of  Motion. 

Passing  by  the  more  distant  vortices,  we  may 
observe  the  one  which  is  of  most  interest  to  us, 
namely,  the  vortex  of  the  solar  system,  of  which 
the  Sun  is  the  center.  Round  this  center  the 
planets  (including  our  Earth)  are  spinning  in  the 
cosmic  fluid  which  bears  them  onward  in  their 
orbits,  while  they  are  at  rest.  (Prin.  III.  30.) 


94          MODERN  E UBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

It  is  an  external  cause  which  makes  them  rotate 
(ultimately  the  act  of  God),  and  thus  produces 
the  vortex  (or  tourbitton). 

Now  it  was  upon  this  cosmical  theater  that 
Descartes  played  a  comedy  with  the  theologians 
at  which  the  world  is  still  laughing.  As  already 
stated,  the  Church  had  condemned  the  doctrine 
of  Copernicus  that  the  Earth  moves  around  the 
Sun  instead  of  standing  still.  We  have  seen  that 
at  first  he  was  struck  dumb  by  the  sentence 
against  Galileo,  and  refused  to  print  his  book  on 
The  World.  But  after  many  years  (some  four- 
teen), he  gathers  courage  enough  to  publish  his 
views  in  a  new  book  (the  Principia),  in  which 
the  theory  of  the  vortex  appears  with  the  Earth 
at  rest  yet  at  the  same  time  moving  around  the 
Sun.  To  the  theologians  who  tried  to  catch  him 
he  could  say  and  did  actually  say,  Behold,  my 
theory  maintains  that  the  Earth  is  at  rest. 
But  to  the  scientists  he  could  also  say,  Behold, 
my  theory  maintains  the  Earth's  revolution 
around  the  Sun.  There  is  no  doubt  that  this 
last  view  was  his  real  conviction.  At  the  same 
time  he  did  not  openly  wish  to  break  with  the 
Church.  Moreover  his  theory  of  vortices  he 
honestly  held,  it  was  not  twisted  to  avoid  eccle- 
siastical censure.  Descartes  was  too  good  a  man 
to  pervert  scientific  truth,  but  he  was  not  too  good 
a  man  to  use  it,  when  honestly  found,  to  foil  his 
enemies.  The  theory  of  vortices  runs  through 


DESCARTES.  —  PHYSICS.  95 

his  whole  Philosophy  of  Nature,  it  was  not 
applied  merely  to  the  earth  and  the  solar  system. 
To  Descartes  it  was  the  honest  truth,  which, 
however,  he  used  dishonestly.  Nothing  else  can 
be  made  out  of  his  own  statement  in  a  letter  : 
"  You  see  that  in  terms  I  deny  the  motion  of  the 
Earth,  while  I  really  affirm  the  system  of 
Copernicus/* 

3.  In  the  Fourth  Part  of  his  Principia,  Des- 
cartes conies  to  the  phenomena  of  the  Earth, 
for  explaining  which  he  proposes  to  use  the 
hypothesis  already  set  forth.  So  we  have  here  a 
treatise  upon  Terrestrial  Physics,  which  em- 
braces a  great  variety  of  subjects  pertaining  to 
Natural  Science.  As  his  principle  has  been 
already  given,  we  need  not  go  into  these  details. 

In  the  last  section  (IV.  207)  he  says:  "I 
submit  everything  to  the  authority  of  the  Cath- 
olic Church,  as  well  as  to  the  judgment  of  those 
who  know."  But  suppose  this  authority  and 
this  judgment  should  conflict,  which  is  to  be 
followed?  Descartes  does  not  tell  us  in  words, 
but  in  action  he  stays  in  Holland  out  of  the  reach 
of  his  Church,  which  at  last  after  his  death  put 
his  philosophical  writings  upon  the  index  of 
books  forbidden  (in  1663).  This  prohibition 
was  brought  about  through  the  Jesuits,  who  had 
been  Descartes'  teachers,  and  whose  instruction 
probably  did  not  mend  the  inborn  duplicity 
which  runs  through  his  character,  particularly 


96          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

in  reference  to  religion,  even  if  he  be  deemed 
true  to  science.  But  faith  in  his  scientific 
fidelity  is  put  to  a  great  strain  when  he  expressly 
says  that  his  hypothesis  of  the  Universe  not 
simply  may  be,  but  actually  is  false,  in  certain 
respects.  Still  he  always  winds  up  his  submis- 
siveness  with  a  declaration  similar  to  the  one 
which  we  find  at  the  close  of  the  Principia: 
"  I  would  not  have  anybody  accept  anything  as 
true  but  what  he  is  convinced  of  by  clear  and 
irrefutable  grounds."  Here  lies  his  real  convic- 
tion round  which  plays  so  much  Jesuitry,  chiefly 
employed,  be  it  said,  in  wheedling  Jesuits,  'who 
never  could  put  their  grip  upon  their  foxy  pupil 
till  he  had  lain  thirteen  years  in  his  grave. 
Then  his  ashes  were  refused  interment  in  a 
French  Church,  a  monument  to  him  was  for- 
bidden, his  doctrines  were  not  allowed  to  be 
taught  in  the  Schools  of  France.  King  Louis 
XIV.,  the  absolutist,  could  not  tolerate  the  ref- 
erence of  truth  to  the  individual  Ego,  and  so 
he  sought  to  extirpate  Cartesianism  as  he  did 
Protestantism. 

Looking  back  upon  this  second  stage  of  Physics 
which  treats  of  the  Universe  in  Motion,  we  may 
recall  the  thought  which  unifies  it  with  the  Carte- 
sian Philosophy  as  a  whole.  It  is  God  who  sets 
this  vast  machine  in  motion,  "giving  to  its  parts 
all  their  varied  movements  at  the  creation  of 
Matter,  and  preserving  the  same  quantity  of 


DESCARTES  —  PHYSICS.  97 

motion  forever."  (II.  36.)  God  is  thus  the 
external  cause  of  the  external  causation  of  the 
Universe.  He  creates  the  mechanism  and  sets 
it  a-going  through  the  primitive  impact,  which 
reproduces  itself  in  all  the  variety  of  motion  ac- 
cording to  mechanical  laws.  God  is  thus  the 
means  of  movement  just  as  He  is  of  knowledge. 
In  this  sphere  specially  He  manifests  Himself 
mathematically,  since  all  these  motions,  celestial 
and  terrestrial,  are  not  capricious  acts  of  His 
will,  but  are  controlled  by  laws  which  it  is  the 
function  of  physical  science  to  discover.  Still 
it  is  God  who  establishes  and  works  through 
these  laws. 

But  now  the  Body  moving  in  a  circle  outside 
itself,  and  thus  manifesting  motion  externally, 
is  to  have  the  circular  motion  inside  itself  and 
thus  become  the  living  organism. 

III.  Body  (as  organic  and  connected  with  the 
Soul) .  The  circular  principle  (the  vortex) ,  which 
we  have  noticed  throughout  the  Cartesian  Phys- 
ics, is  now  internalized  in  Body,  and  constitutes 
the  vital  element  of  the  same,  which  thereby  has 
its  own  round  of  existence  within  itself.  Still 
the  motion  of  the  organic  Body  is  mechanical, 
though  internally  so ;  it  moves  its  own  mechanism, 
and  hence  is  called  an  automaton. 

With  the  bodily  organism  of  Man  is  joined 
another  principle,  the  Soul,  which  is  also  self- 
moved  and  has  its  own  separate  round  of  exist- 

7 


98          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ence.  Body  and  Soul  are  the  Siamese  twins, 
each  with  its  own  individual  life  and  movement, 
yet  indissolubly  bound  together.  To  Physics 
belongs  the  consideration  of  the  Soul,  in  so  far  as 
it  is  directly  connected  with  the  human  Body, 
specially  in  sensation.  Hence  Descartes. intro- 
duces a  discussion  of  the  Five  Senses  toward  the 
end  of  his  Principia. 

The  complete  separation  between  Soul  and 
Body  is  one  of  the  best  known  doctrines  of  Des- 
cartes. The  body  is  an  independent  machine, 
and  is  moved  within  itself  by  mechanical  causes 
like  the  rest  of  the  physical  Universe.  The  liv- 
ing Body  as  such  is  not  moved  by  the  Soul,  as 
is  the  common  opinion.  Life  is  not  a  result  of 
the  Soul,  but  the  condition  of  the  latter 's  enter- 
ing the  Body.  When  the  Body  is  dead  the  Soul 
leaves  it.  The  Body  is  an  automaton,  or  a 
mechanism  with  a  principle  of  temporary  self- 
movement  within  itself,  like  a  watch,  which  runs 
of  itself  while  it  is  wound  up.  Life  is  but  the 
manifestation  of  this  automatic  motion  of  the 
Body.  Very  different  is  the  Soul  which  simply 
dwells  in  the  Body  as  in  its  house.  An  animal 
has  no  Soul,  having  no  self-conscious  activity; 
it  is  simply  Body  with  life,  an  automaton. 

Still,  in  spite  of  this  separation,  Soul  and 
Body  are  intimately  connected  together,  and 
each  influences  the  other.  Descartes  insists  in 
the  first  place,  that  "  the  Soul  is  joined  to 


DESCAE  TES.  —  PHYSICS.  99 

the  whole  Body  in  every  member,"  but  that, 
in  the  second  place,  "there  is  in  the  Body  a 
part  in  which  the  Soul  exercises  its  functions 
more  particularly  than  in  all  the  rest  of  the 
parts."  (Passions  of  the  Soul,  Art.  30,31.) 
This  part  in  which  the  union  takes  place  is  "a 
very  small  gland  situated  in  the  middle  of  the 
brain,"  the  so-called  conarium  or  pineal  gland. 
This  is  Descartes'  famous  "seat  of  the  Soul," 
in  which  the  transfer  is  made,  from  the  extended 
to  the  non-extended,  from  the  material  to  the 
spiritual,  from  the  passive  (sensory)  to  the  ac- 
tive (motor)  principle  (and  vice  versa  in  each 
case).  Of  course,  Descartes  brings  us  no 
nearer  an  explanation  of  this  phenomenon. 
Though  he  confines  it  to  ' '  one  very  small  gland  ' ' 
in  which  seems  unified  the  doubleness  of  the 
body  (two  sides  of  the  brain,  two  eyes,  two 
hands,  etc.),  the  chasm  between  Soul  and  Body 
is  as  great  as  ever  just  there.  The  Soul  (or 
Ego)  cannot  be  moved  to  take  up  the  stimulating 
object  even  in  the  finest  recess  of  the  pineal 
gland  without  the  help  of  God,  who  is  the  ulti- 
mate power  bringing  me  to  know  the  world. 
Such  is  the  Cartesian  principle,  even  when  Des- 
cartes does  not  directly  introduce  it  into  his  ex- 
position, which  gets  to  be  the  case  more  and 
more,  as  he  advances  in  life. 

If  we  now  consider  the  process  of  Body  and 
Soul  in  its  physical  aspect,  we  observe  the  fol- 


100        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

lowing  stages :  (1)  The  Body  is  an  automatic 
totality  on  the  one  side,  and  on  the  other  side 
the  Soul  is  a  similar,  though  higher,  totality ; 
each  is  independent,  yet  Soul  is  joined  to  Body 
"  in  every  member,"  each  influencing  the  other. 
(2)  This  universal  relation  between  Body  and 
Soul  is  specialized,  localized,  materialized  in  one 
particular  organ,  the  pineal  gland,  which  can  be 
moved  "  by  the  animal  spirits  in  as  many  differ- 
ent ways  as  there  are  sensible  differences  in  ob- 
jects "  on  the  one  hand,  and  at  the  same  time  it 
"  can  be  moved  in  divers  ways  by  the  Soul," 
which  responds  in  its  impressions  according  to 
the  movement  of  the  gland,  and  thus  reacts, 
"  impelling  the  animal  spirits  outward,  through 
the  pores  of  the  brain,  and  thence  to  the  nerves 
and  the  muscles,"  which  cause  the  motions  of 
the  Body.  (3)  Thus  the  Soul  is  determined  by 
the  Body  through  the  gland.  It  is  to  be  noticed 
that  here  "  the  concourse  of  God"  is  omitted 
as  is  usual  in  the  Treatise  on  the  Passions,  which 
is  in  this  regard  distinguished  from  the  earlier 
Treatises. 

The  determination  of  the  Soul  through  the 
Body  is  the  first  stage  of  what  Descartes  calls 
Passion  of  the  Soul,  which,  however,  reacts  and 
determines  the  Body,  wherewith  the  stage  of 
Cartesian  Physics  is  brought  to  a  conclusion, 
since  Nature  as  an  external  principle  is  now  sub- 
ordinated to  an  internal  principle. 


DESCABTES.  —  PHYSIC'S. 

If  we  now  take  a  glance  back  at  the  three  stages 
of  Physics — Extension,  Motion,  Organic  Body — 
we  find  that  properly  God  is  employed  as  an  ex- 
ternal mechanical  means  for  determining  each  of 
them  to  activity.  He  is  not  only  the  machine- 
maker  of  the  Universe,  but  primarily  the  ma- 
chine-mover. Such  is  the  philosopher '  s  conception 
of  the  physical  world.  Yet  this  conception  tallies 
with  the  metaphysical  process  in  which  the  Ego 
gets  to  know  the  object  through  help  of  God. 
There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that  Descartes  in 
his  later  writings  showed  more  and  more  the 
tendency  to  leave  out  this  principle  of  divine 
interference,  particularly  between  Soul  and  Body. 

The  Soul  has  manifested  a  doubleness  within 
itself:  it  is  determined  from  without  by  the 
Body,  and  even  dwells  in  a  material  abode.  But 
it  is  also  determined  from  within,  it  reacts 
against  the  influence  of  the  Body  and  controls 
or  puts  down  the  corporeal  stimulations  which 
come  to  it  mechanically.  In  the  first  case  the 
Soul  is  still  a  portion  of  the  mechanical  Universe 
and  belongs  to  Physics.  But  in  the  second  case 
it  definitely  overcomes  its  own  mechanical  side 
and  so  reaches  beyond  Physics  into  a  new  realm. 
The  Soul  is  the  turning-point  over  into  the  fol- 
lowing sphere  which  is  Ethics.  Herein  the 
essentially  mechanical  genius  of  Descartes,  hav- 
ing performed  its  greatest  work,  has  reached  its 


102        MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHIL OSOPH Y. 

limit,    and    will    manifest   a   decline    of    native 
power. 

The  Organic  Body  in  its  circular  process  may 
be  deemed  to  be  Extension  realized;  what  lies 
implicit  in  Extension  is  made  explicit,  since  the 
extended  as  Body  is  turned  back  into  itself 
internally.  Thus  the  second  stage  of  the  philo- 
sophic Norm,  Physics,  rounds  itself  out  to  a 
completed  movement.  The  Soul  having  taken 
up  the  highest  physical  process,  that  ©f  the 
Body,  into  itself  and  determined  the  same,  has 
borne  us  forward  into  the  next  stage. 

C.  ETHICS. 

This  third  stage  of  the  philosophical  Norm  is 
not  very  strong  in  Descartes.  In  his  life  the 
ethical  element  (in  the  widest  and  deepest  sense 
of  the  word)  must  be  pronounced  to  be  deficient, 
and  the  same  lack  is  discoverable  in  his  system  of 
Philosophy  as  a  whole.  Still  this  element  is  not 
wholly  wanting.  Descartes  knew  of  Ethics  from 
the  ancient  moralists,  knew  that  this  science 
belonged  to  the  philosophic  totality  as  developed 
by  the  great  masters  of  antiquity.  He  has, 
therefore,  his  ethical  strand,  but  it  is  fragmen- 
tary. His  doctrine  of  morals  is  not  set  forth  in 
any  special  work,  but  is  given  cursorily  in  his 
various  books  and  essays,  and  specially  in  his 
letters  to  the  Princess  Elizabeth,  and  in  those 


DESCAKTES. —ETHICS.  103 

intended  for  the  Queen  of  Sweden.  These  letters 
in  both  cases  show  his  starting-point  to  be  the 
ancient  heathen  moralists,  whom  he  criticises, 
yet  in  a  manner  follows. 

The  ethical  return  to  God  or  to  the  First  Prin- 
ciple he  has  not  in  its  complete  sweep,  such  as 
we  see  it  already  in  Plato  and  Aristotle.  Des- 
cartes (as  before  observed)  has  little  sense  for  the 
meaning  of  institutions.  Their  ethical  purport 
and  position  he  quite  ignores.  This  deficiency 
we  may  trace  to  the  circumstances  of  his  life, 
to  his  separation  from  his  own  State  and  Church  ; 
still  such  a  separation  was  his  own  free  act,  and 
indicates  his  character.  At  this  point  there  is  a 
deep  gap  in  his  Philosophy  as  a  Whole ;  the 
ultimate  nexus  joining  the  last  to  the  first,  con- 
necting the  individual  and  the  universe,  is  not  dis- 
tinctly present,  though  not  altogether  absent. 
What  there  is  of  it,  we  shall  seek  to  give  in  brief 
outline. 

The  consideration  of  the  movement  of  Carte- 
sian Ethics  goes  back  to  his  doctrine  of  the  Soul, 
whose  activities  must  be  grasped  in  their  right 
relation,  and  in  their  subordination  of  the  higher 
to  the  lower,  for  instance  of  impulse  to  reason. 
Thus  the  psychical  furnishes  the  basis  for  the  ethi- 
cal, or  rather  the  pyschical  is  a  stage  of  the  ethi- 
cal. Then  there  is  a  distinct  moral  stage  in  con- 
trast with  the  institutional  stage,  the  one  giving  the 
subjective  behest,  the  other  giving  the  objective 


104          MODERN  E  UROPEAN  PHIL  OSOPH  Y. 

law.  That  is,  the  entire  range  of  Ethics,  as  the 
third  division  of  the  philosophical  Norm,  will 
show  three  stages,  the  psychical,  the  moral,  and 
the  institutional.  Descartes  is  to  be  considered 
in  his  relation  to  each  of  these  stages. 

I.  THE  PSYCHICAL  ELEMENT.  —  In  his  treatise 
called  The  Passions  of  the  Soul,  Descartes  gives 
the  psychical  principles  underlying  his  Ethics. 
Man  is  the  union  of  Soul  and  Body,  which  are 
wholly  separate  in  their  human  union,  as  we 
have  already  seen.  Thought  is  the  essence  of 
Soul,  Motion  is  the  essence  of  Body,  the  Passions 
result  from  the  connection  of  the  two,  and 
are  a  kind  of  mediating  principle  between 
the  opposites.  The  Passions  are  peculiar 
to  man,  animals  have  no  souls  and  hence 
no  passions  strictly.  Animals  have  bodies 
with  sensation  and  desire,  but  have  no  souls 
with  self-conscious  thought,  have  no  clear  and 
distinct  ideas.  Man  is,  therefore,  dual,  and  this 
dualism  is  chiefly  manifested  in  his  Passions,  in 
which  lies  the  possibility  of  his  moral  being. 

The  primal  notion  of  Descartes  is  that  the  Soul 
in  Passion  is  passive,  that  is,  is  determined  from 
without  by  "  the  animal  spirits  which  are  like  a 
very  fine  wind,  or  better,  a  pure  flame  which  is 
constantly  ascending  to  the  brain,"  being  com- 
posed of  ««  the  finest,  most  fiery  and  mobile  par- 
ticles of  the  blood."  In  the  pineal  gland 
(which  is  at  the  center  of  the  brain)  these  animal 


DESCARTES.  -  ETHICS.  105 

spirits  somehow  reach  and  stimulate  the  Soul 
which  is  immaterial  and  non-extended,  properly 
by  the  "  concourse  of  God."  So  after  all  this 
elaborate  machinery  of  the  Body  has  performed 
its  work,  the  little  miracle  lies  couched  in  the 
little  gland. 

At  any  rate''  the  animal  spirits  "  coming  from 
the  outside,  determine  the  Soul,  which  responds, 
suffers,  is  passive.  This  is  the  original  source 
of  the  Passions,  but  the  Soul  is  in  its  essence, 
thought,  self-conscious  and  self-determined ; 
hence  this  yielding  to  Passion  or  to  determina- 
tion from  without  contradicts  its  deepest  nature. 
Accordingly  the  Will  with  its  suppression  of  Pas- 
sion enters  at  this  point,  wherewith  the  Soul 
asserts  its  freedom.  Such  is  the  conflict  which 
lies  properly  between  Soul  and  Body,  each  seeking 
to  be  the  determinant  of  the  other.  It  is  wrong 
to  say  (declares  Descartes)  that  this  contest 
takes  place  in  the  mind,  between  two  opposite 
parts  of  the  Soul,  for  the  Soul  is  one  and  indi- 
visible. 

The  central  or  at  least  the  intermediate  agent 
in  the  foregoing  conflict,  is  the  Will,  which  is  of 
two  kinds :  in  the  one  kind  its  end  is  the  Soul 
itself,  and  in  the  other  its  end  is  the  Body.  The 
weak  Soul  is  one  that  has  a  Will  "  which  is 
carried  away  by  immediate  Passions,"  and  which 
"does  not  employ  its  proper  arms,  namely  a 
fixed  and  firm  judgment  pertaining  to  the  knowl- 


1 06    MODE  UN  E  UBOPEAN  PHIL  OSOPH  Y. 

edge  of  good  and  evil."  (Passions  of  the  Soul, 
Part  I,  Art.  48,  49.)  Moreover  there  may  be  a 
false  judgment,  hence  the  chief  object  is  to  know 
the  truth;  "  there  is  a  great  difference  between 
the  volitions  which  proceed  from  a  false  opinion 
and  those  which  rest  upon  the  knowledge  of  the 
truth."  The  latter  can  of  course  only  come 
through  "  clear  and  distinct  ideas,"  which  are, 
accordingly,  the  highest  content  of  the  Will, 
being  given  by  Reason  itself. 

From  the  preceding  remarks  it  is  evident  that 
Descartes  employs,  in  a  vague  and  uncertain  man- 
ner, the  fundamental  psychical  process.  This  is : 
(1)  Feeling,  which  is  the  essence  of  Passion,  or 
the  Soul  (Ego)  determined  externally  by  the 
outside  world;  (2)  Will,  or  the  active  power, 
which  is  double,  on  the  one  hand  obeying  and 
executing  Passion,  on  the  other  hand  subordin- 
ating it  and  asserting  the  Soul's  self-determina- 
tion; (3)  Intellect,  Judgment,  Reason,  clear 
and  distinct  Ideas,  which  form  the  supreme  con- 
tent of  the  Will.  These  three  distinctions  or 
activities  of  the  Soul  (or  Ego),  which  have  a 
great  future  before  them,  may  be  found  com- 
mingled with  many  other  and  less  pertinent  dis- 
tinctions, in  the  First  Part  of  the  above  men- 
tioned treatise  on  The  Passions  of  the  Soul,  in- 
dicating that  the  germ  of  Psychology  was  deeply 
imbedded  in  the  mind  of  Descartes,  though  tin- 
separated  as  yet  from  many  foreign  ingredients. 


DESCAE  TES.  —  E  THICS.  107 

It  is  evident  that  the  preceding  psychical  move- 
ment has  unfolded  the  specially  moral  element 
which  comes  to  light  in  the  subordination  of  Pas- 
sion to  Reason,  of  outer  necessity  to  inner  free- 
dom, of  Body  to  Soul,  of  the  obscure  and  con- 
fused in  thought  to  the  clear  and  distinct. 

The  word  Passion  in  Descartes  has  a  wide 
usage,  and  often  seems  to  correspond  nearly  to 
what  we  call  a  faculty  of  mind,  or  mental  activity. 
The  Soul  is  Ego,  and  the  Passions  of  the  Soul 
are  its  activities.  Perception  and  Imagination  he 
regards  as  Passions.  At  times  he  distinguishes 
Will,  or  the  reaction  of  the  Soul,  from  Passion; 
then,  again,  he  seems  to  regard  it  under  the  gen- 
eral head  of  Passion,  which  in  the  widest  sense 
is  the  Soul  both  suffering  and  doing,  active  and 
passive.  He  has  begun  classifying  the  activities 
of  the  Ego  as  it  subordinates  the  outer  world, 
and  thereby  can  become  ethical.  Passion  in 
Descartes'  view  is  a  natural  condition  of  the  Soul 
and  is  to  be  noted  and  investigated  like  the  facts 
of  nature  in  Physics.  Such  an  investigation  is 
the  first  stage  (the  psychical)  of  Ethical  Science. 

It  is  important  to  observe  that  he  has  the 
notion  of  self -consciousness,  even  if  somewhat 
dim.  This  he  calls  perception  "  which  has  as  its 
cause  the  Soul,"  not  the  Body,  which  gives  an- 
other kind  of  perception.  Through  the  Soul's 
perception  we  perceive  "  our  volitions,  our  imag- 
inations, or  other  thoughts  which  depend  on 


108         MODEEN  E UEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

these;  "  that  is,  the  Soul  perceives  its  own  acts; 
4 'for  it  is  certain  that  we  cannot  will  anything 
without  our  perceiving  by  the  same  means  that 
we  will  it;  "  and  hence  "one  can  say  that  the 
Soul  has  a  passion  of  perceiving  that  it  wills  ' ' 
when  it  wills.  Self -consciousness  also  is,  then, 
with  Descartes,  a  passion.  By  Leibniz  this  kind 
of  perception,  to  distinguish  it  from  that  of  the 
Body,  will  be  called  apperception.  (See  Passions 
of  the  Soul,  I,  Art.  19.) 

Thus  the  psychical  movement  of  the  Ego,  un- 
folding in  Descartes  the  Passions  of  the  Soul, 
begins  to  show  itself  in  its  three  main  forms  of 
Feeling,  Will,  and  Intellect,  together  with  the 
underlying  self-conscious  activity,  which  is  like- 
wise a  Passion.  Note  the  place  in  the  Cartesian 
system  assigned  to  this  psychical  movement  of 
the  Ego,  for  it  is  hereafter  to  occupy  a  very  dif- 
ferent position  in  the  Norm,  being  transferred  to 
the  first  place  and  made  the  basis  for  a  total 
transformation  of  Philosophy  itself. 

With  the  power  of  controlling  its  own  move- 
ments through  the  Will  and  Intellect,  the  Soul 
rises  to  the  next  sphere. 

IL  THE  MORAL  ELEMENT. — The  Passions  in 
themselves  are  neither  moral  nor  immoral,  ac- 
cording to  Descartes.  Hence  in  his  treatise  on 
the  Passions  he  indicates  that  his  procedure  is 
not  that  of  a  preacher  or  of  a  moralist,  but  that 
of  a  physicist.  They  are  natural  phenomena 


DE8CAETE8.  —  ETHICS.  109 

which  are  to  be  investigated,  defined  and  classi- 
fied. Still  they  lead  directly  to  good  and  evil,  to 
pleasure  and  pain,  to  advantage  and  disadvantage, 
and  so  have  to  be  moralized.  Says  he :  "  We 
see  that  the  Passions  are  all  good  of  their  own 
nature,  and  that  we  have  nothing  to  avoid  in  them 
except  their  excess  or  improper  employment," 
through  which  they  become  injurious  (III,  Art. 
211).  On  the  latter  score  he  gives  various 
warnings  against  the  sudden  surprise  of  Pas- 
sion ;  we  are  never  to  forget  that  * '  everything 
presenting  itself  to  the  imagination  tends  to 
deceive  the  Soul."  Those  succeed  best  "  who 
accustom  themselves  to  make  some  reflection 
upon  their  actions  before  proceeding  to  act." 
The  judgment  of  the  Reason  should  always  be 
obtained  for  the  conduct  of  the  Will  (note  that 
Descartes  here  regards  Passion  in  its  first  or  im- 
mediate form). 

Descartes  gives  a  classification  of  the  Passions, 
with  a  description,  usually  brief,  of  the  most 
important  ones.  It  is  not  every  object  presented 
by  the  senses,  which  has  the  power  of  exciting 
44  the  animal  spirits,"  and  so  producing  Passion. 
Each  individual  differs  in  regard  to  what  may 
stimulate  Passion,  and  the  same  individual  varies 
according  to  his  mood  or  the  state  of  his  Soul. 
Thus  there  is  an  endless  variety  of  Passions, 
each  of  which  has  its  own  distinct  character. 
Descartes  reduces  them  to  two  fundamental 


110         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

forms :  admiration  (  wonder)  which  is ' '  the  sudden 
surprise  of  the  Soul  leading  it  to  regard  rare  and 
extraordinary  objects,"  and  desire  (wish  to 
possess),  which  is  "  an  agitation  of  the  Soul 
caused  by  the  animal  spirits  disposing  it  to  will 
agreeable  objects  for  the  future."  Thus  the  one 
is  essentially  incoming  and  the  other  outgoing. 
From  these  two  Descartes  develops  what  he  calls 
his  six  primitive  Passions,  which  *«  are  as  it  were 
the  genera  whose  species  are  all  the  other  Pas- 
sions "  (III,  Art.  149).  After  these  come 
"the  particular  Passions"  as  he  names  them, 
one  of  which  stands  out  very  prominent,  called 
by  him  generosity,  "  which  causes  a  man  to 
esteem  himself  at  the  highest  point  which  can 
be  legitimately  allowed." 

This  generosity  (  noble  -  mindedness  )  also 
named  by  him  magnanimity,  is  not  Pride  (orgueil) 
but  rather  the  opposite,  proceeding  from  the 
consciousness  of  freedom  from  all  Passion.  It  is 
the  free  disposition,  not  determined  from  without, 
but  self-determined,  hence  ' '  naturally  impelled  to 
do  great  things,"  but  restrained  from  "  under- 
taking anything  of  which  it  does  not  feel  itself 
capable. ' '  So  we  behold  the  picture  of  *  *  the  gener- 
ous ' '  man  or  gentleman,  who  is  ' '  always  perfectly 
courteous,  affable,  full  of  services  toward  every- 
body. He  is  completely  master  of  his  Passions, 
particularly  of  his  desires;  without  envy,  without 
hate  or  fear  or  wrath."  (Ill,  Art.  155-6.) 


DESCAE  TES  —  E  THIC8.  1 1.1 

Thus  "generosity"  seems  to  be  the  supreme 
virtue,  the  highest  moral  attainment.  In  the 
foregoing  description  Descartes  is  generally  sup- 
posed to  be  looking  at  himself,  and  in  a  manner 
justifying  his  own  character  which  had  in  it  quite 
a  portion  of  self-esteem,  or,  as  the  poet  would 
call  it,  self -reverence.  In  fact,  the  introduction 
to  this  treatise  on  the  Passions  gives  a  specimen 
of  his  "  generosity."  He  blames  the  ancients 
for  their  lack  of  all  information  on  the  present 
subject,  "  so  that  I  have  no  hope  of  getting  at 
the  truth  except  by  separating  myself  from 
them."  Hence  he  feels  himself  obliged  to 
write  "  as  if  I  were  treating  a  matter  which 
nobody  before  me  had  ever  touched."  Yet  our 
author's  work  is  plainly  constructed  after  Aris- 
totle's Ethics,  to  which  it  is  vastly  inferior;  in 
fact,  Descartes'  own  '«  generosity,"  has  a  dis- 
tinct likeness  to  Aristotle's  magnanimity  (megalo- 
psychia)  in  which  Descartes  must  have  found 
himself. 

Still  our  philosopher  has  the  great  merit  of 
seeing  and  declaring  that  freedom  is  the  end  and 
content  of  the  moral  Soul.  The  moral  catharsis 
is  the  ascent  into  complete  freedom.  Of  this 
ascent  we  may  note  three  stages  in  Descartes :  — 

(1)  The  first  is  the  freedom  from  Passion, 
from  external  determination,  which  the  Soul  must 
strive  for  through  the  exercise  of  its  Free- Will 


112        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

moving  from  within  against  the  outer  determin- 
ant. Of  this  stage  enough  has  been  already  said. 

(2)  The  second  is  the  freedom  from  Error, 
whose  source  lies  just  in  the  Free- Will,  which 
can  affirm  the  false  or  the  true  judgment,  the 
obscure  or  the  distinct  idea.  For  Will  in  its 
freedom  is  the  unlimited,  while  Intellect  (as 
memory  or  imagination)  is  "  very  small  and  lim- 
ited in  me."  So  it  seems  that  "  in  my  Free-Will 
I  experience  something  greater  than  anything 
else  I  can  conceive  of ;  "  so  great  is  it  that 
44  through  it  principally  I  am  brought  to  recog- 
nize that  I  bear  the  image  of  God  "  (Meditation, 
IV ) .  Hence  my  Will  must  be  trained  to  take 
the  well  grounded  judgment,  the  clear  and  dis- 
tinct idea,  re-affirming  what  reason  affirms, 
rejecting  all  that  is  ungrounded  or  obscure. 

We  are  the  source  of  our  errors,  not  God,  who 
cannot  deceive  us,  being  the  source  of  truth. 
But  behind  this  last  source  we  cannot  go,  hence 
we  cannot  know  the  purposes  of  God,  or  final 
causes.  The  teleological  explanation  of  nature 
is  therefore  erroneous.  God  gives  us  clear  and 
distinct  ideas  for  knowing  the  world,  not  for 
knowing  himself;  He  is  means  for  us,  not  end. 
We  are  to  keep  our  Will  in  the  limits  of  our  In- 
telligence (entendement) ,  if  we  wish  to  escape 
from  error.  Hence  there  is  need  of  the  suspen- 
sion of  judgment  till  the  Idea  is  given  clear  and 
distinct. 


DESCARTES.— ETHICS.  113 

We  are,  accordingly,  to  acquire  freedom  from 
error  as  a  habit  (habitude);  "  for  in  this  con- 
sists the  greatest  and  principal  perfection  of 
man  "  (Meditation,  IV).  So  our  moral  perfec- 
tion is  decidedly  intellectual :  not  to  permit  our 
Will  to  have  any  other  content  but  the  clear  and 
distinct  Idea.  Thus  our  actions  will  be  good, 
being  filled  with  the  highest  rational  content. 
And  yet  this  is  not  quite  enough  for  Descartes. 

(3)  Man  is  unceasingly  to  affirm  his  freedom, 
securing  it,  willing  it,  fighting  for  it  as  the  chief 
boon  of  life.  This  is  properly  the  most  exalted 
feature  in  the  character  of  the  generous  man : 
he  sacrifices  all  for  his  freedom,  he  is  determined 
to  live  his  own  life  as  a  free  being;  fortune, 
family,  and  even  country  he  can  throw  away  (as 
Descartes  did)  for  the  sake  of  personal  freedom. 
He  may  live  for  philosophy  or  science,  but  first 
he  must  live  for  freedom,  which  he  has  to  safe- 
guard as  the  possibility  of* all  lofty  activity. 
Free-will  has,  therefore,  to  will  not  only  clear 
and  distinct  Ideas,  or  the  soul's  enfranchisement 
from  error,  but  also  to  will  freedom  itself  as  its 
own  ultimate  end  or  content.  Descartes  has  this 
exalted  consciousness  of  freedom  as  the  world  in 
which  his  work  is  to  be  done.  But  the  limita- 
tion is  likewise  present.  His  conception  of  free- 
dom is  essentially  individual,  not  institutional — 
a  fact  which  we  may  next  note. 

8 


1 1 4        MODERN  E UEOPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

III.  THE  INSTITUTIONAL  ELEMENT. — What  we 
may  call  the  realm  of  Social  Institutions  — 
Family,  Society,  State,  Church  —  whose  great 
object  as  a  whole  is  to  secure  to  man  his  free- 
dom and  to  give  him  a  free  world  to  live  in,  was  not 
distinctly  present  to  Descartes,  at  least  it  does 
not  appear  in  his  Philosophy  as  an  integral  part 
of  his  system. 

Already  in  the  Life  of  Descartes  we  have 
spoken  of  his  relations  to  State  and  Church.  He 
shunned  both  as  something  which  he  knew  not 
what  to  do  with ;  he  had  a  horror  of  political 
and  religious  innovation  ;  there  was  none  of  the 
martyr  or  even  of  the  institutional  reformer  in 
his  blood.  He  kept  out  of  the  way  of  his  own 
country  and  his  own  religion  by  living  as  a  vol- 
untary exile  in  a  foreign  country  and  under  a  dif- 
ferent religion.  Nor  did  he  ever  join  the  Family, 
nor  take  part  in  the  commercial  and  industrial 
order.  Aloofness  -from  the  institutional  world 
was  his  principle  and  his  life.  On  the  whole  his 
concentration  turned  primarily  upon  his  Ego,  and 
its  cognition  of  Truth,  its  knowledge  of  itself, 
of  God  and  of  Nature. 

A  complete  freedom  Descartes,  therefore,  can- 
not attain,  since  he  has  no  institutions.  There 
is  no  free  World  in  his  Philosophy  to  mediate 
Man's  individual  Free-will  with  the  divinely 
providential  Order,  which  is  the  creation  of 
God's  volition.  Hence  the  doctrine  of  Descartes 


DESCARTES.  -  ETHICS.  115 

shows  both  freedom  and  determinism,  not  in 
their  process  but  in  their  opposition.  Quite  after 
the  same  fashion  we  have  seen  in  it  Transcend- 
ence and  Immanence  unreconciled,  though  both 
are  stages  of  the  one  divine  process,  and  cannot  be 
held  apart  without  becoming  mutually  destruc- 
tive. 

What  underlies  the  philosophic  act  of  Des- 
cartes? Let  us  see.  The  philosopher  is  con- 
struing God  as  determining  the  Ego  to  know  the 
object.  That  is,  the  Ego  of  Descartes  determines 
in  thought  God  who  determines  it  to  knowledge. 
To  be  sure  this  individual  Cartesian  Ego  is  kept 
in  the  background,  though  it  is  just  what  creates 
the  entire  new  fabric  of  Divinity  before  us. 
The  philosopher  determines  the  God  who  de- 
termines him  unto  his  knowledge.  Yet  he  leaves 
himself  out  of  this  process  which  he  produces, 
and  of  which  he  is  certainly  a  very  important, 
indeed  the  first  member.  But  just  that  is  the 
peculiarity  of  all  Philosophy :  it  formulates  the 
Law,  Cause,  Principle  of  the  Universe  which  is 
over  all,  but  it  keeps  silent  about  itself  as  formu- 
lator.  Philosophy  is,  therefore,  not  only  abso- 
lute, but  absolutistic,  not  only  imperial  but 
imperious.  For  this  reason  it  can  never  formu- 
late a  complete  freedom. 

Descartes  is  still  a  philosopher  and  employs  the 
philosophic  Norm,  though  he  begins  to  put  into 
it  a  psychological  content,  that  of  the  Self.  He 


116         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

posits  a  God  causing  the  thinking  Ego  to  know 
the  object.  Yet  he  is  not  aware  that  he  is  just 
that  thinking  Ego  in  positing  such  a  God,  or 
absolute  principle.  If  he  could  have  formulated 
the  total  process  and  have  included  himself  in  it, 
he  would  have  transcended  the  philosophic  Norm, 
and  have  given  us  not  merely  a  new  Philosophy, 
or  a  new  Period  of  Philosophy,  but  a  new  Norm 
with  its  corresponding  Discipline.  And  yet, 
how  near  to  this  does  he  seem !  If  he  only 
could  have  seen  and  stated  that  the  thinking 
Ego  makes  in  thought  the  absolute  Principle  or 
God  who  makes  it  think,  he  would  have  broken 
through  the  transmitted  Norm  of  Philosophy 
into  that  of  Psychology. 

But  this  was  not  yet  to  be.  The  Seventeenth 
Century  is  to  go  to  school  to  Cartesianism,  and 
receive  a  great  training  from  it  in  many  things, 
but  especially  in  the  new  conception  of  God  as 
distinct  from  the  medieval.  The  divine  world 
is  not  beyond  but  is  here  and  now  at  work;  God 
is  not  simply  religious  but  is  also  secular,  and 
must  be  seen  even  in  the  little  act  of  knowing  a 
thing.  In  fact  three  Centuries  will  have  to  be 
trained  in  the  school  of  Descartes  and  his  suc- 
cessors, and  the  training  is  not  over  yet.  The 
philosopher  of  to-day  has  to  go  back  to  him  in 
order  to  go  through  him  to  the  more  modern 
philosophic  inheritance  and  thus  to  behold  the 


DESCARTES.  -  ETHICS.  117 

evolution  of  himself.     What  else  is  the  meaning 
of  this  book  of  ours? 

The  Spirit  of  Philosophy  voiced  by  Descartes 
speaks:  "I  have  been  thinking  of  Being  out- 
side of  me  hitherto,  but  now  I  am  going  to 
think  of  my  own  Being,  the  Being  of  my  Ego, 
of  my  self-conscious  Self."  Thus  the  Ego 
turns  back  upon  itself  and  is.  aware  of  itself, 
but  as  Being,  or  rather  as  the  essence  of  Being. 
This  is  still  philosophic,  since  it  seeks  the  essence 
of  Being  (the  ousia  of  the  on)  as  the  given. 
Thus  the  Ego  knows  itself  simply  to  be,  not  yet 
knowing  itself  to  be  creative  of  Being.  The 
Being  of  self-consciousness  is  asserted,  not  yet 
the  self-consciousness  of  Being.  The  first  is 
the  beginning,  the  second  is  the  end,  of  Modern 
Philosophy. 

So  much  for  Descartes  who  is  now  to  be  fol- 
lowed by  Spinoza  in  the  supreme  philosophic 
succession.  Already  we  noted  the  main  point  of 
development  out  of  the  one  toward  the  other. 
Bat  there  are  many  little  touches  in  Descartes 
which  hint  the  approaching  Philosophy.  One 
such  we  may  cite:  "  I  have  already  established 
that  Soul  and  Body  are  united  in  substance 
(substantiellement  unis)."  (See  Responses  aux 
qiiatriemes  objections.)  One  may  well  catch 
in  these  two  words  a  brief  gleam  of  the  coming 
Spinozan  substance,  which  will  next  appear  in  all 
its  fullness.  • 


1 1 8        MODERN  E  UROPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 


2.  Spfnoja* 

We  have  already  stated  that  Spinoza  is  the 
second  of  the  three  supreme  philosophers  over- 
arching the  Seventeenth  Century,  and  forming 
together  one  great  philosophic  process.  In 
this  process  he  is  not  merely  the  second,  but 
also  the  second  stage  of  it,  which  is  the  sepa- 
rative stage  revealing  the  deepest  dualism  of  the 
Century.  It  seems  a  strange  fact  in  the  history 
of  thought  that  the  most  students  of  Spinoza 
hitherto  have  only  seen,  or  at  least  only  empha- 
sized, the  pantheistic,  monistic,  unitary  side  of 
his  work.  But  there  is  also  an  individualistic, 
personally  ethical  side  to  him,  upon  which  several 
commentators  in  recent  years  have  put  strong 
stress,  thus  counterbalancing  the  previous 
one-sidedness.  In  this  way  the  profound  two- 
sidedness  of  Spinoza  has  come  to  light  as  never 
before;  he  has  in  him  the  abyss  of  his  age, 
its  deepest  contradiction.  If  he  makes  God 
swallow  up  the  individual  on  the  one  hand,  on 
the  other  he  makes  the  individual  return  to  God, 
and  in  a  manner  reproduce  Him  in  such  return. 
Both  these  sides  rose  up  in  the  Seventeenth 
Century,  grappled  with  each  other,  and  fought 
with  desperation.  There  was  the  man-devouring 
divine  absolutism  of  Louis  XIV,  in  whom  all  in- 


SPINOZA.  — LIFE.  119 

dividuality  was  quite  lost;  then  there  was  the 
counterpart  in  Holland,  man-asserting,  God- 
liberating.  Spinoza,  living  in  the  heart  of  this 
conflict,  has  precipitated  it  into  its  essence,  into 
the  pure  impersonal  form  of  Thought. 

The  three  fundamental  utterances  of  the  man 
Spinoza  are  his  Life,  his  Writings,  and  his  Phi- 
losophy. Between  them  all  is  a  remarkable  like- 
ness; each  seems  to  reflect  the  essence  of  the 
other  in  being  itself,  and  to  reflect  the  entire 
man  at  the  same  time.  We  may  well  say  that 
these  three  parts  constitute  the  whole  called 
Spinoza,  who  cannot  be  conceived  adequately 
except  through  "  those  things  which  are  equally 
in  each  part  and  in  the  whole,"  as  his  own  state- 
ment runs  (Ethics,  II,  37). 

I.  SPINOZA'S  LIFE.  —  There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  Spinoza's  Life,  when  fully  taken  up  and  ap- 
propriated by  a  human  Soul,  is  a  great  inspira- 
tion. In  this  regard  we  recognize  him  at  once 
to  be  one  of  the  philosophic  heroes  of  the  race, 
of  the  same  type  and  moral  composition  as  Soc- 
rates. He  had  the  same  steady  glance  beyond 
the  present  into  eternity,  the  same  serene  pursuit 
of  the  ideal  end  in  defiance  of  consequences,  the 
same  calm  look  straight  into  the  face  of  the  De- 
stroyer. But  his  we  can  hardly  deem  a  com- 
pleted task.  Dying  at  the  early  age  of  44,  he 
could  not  round  out  his  philosophic  life  to  its 
final  fulfillment.  Artists  and  poets  may  mature 


120        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

in  youth  and  pass  away ;  but  the  philosopher 
ripens  slowly  at  his  best.  Plato's  Republic  is 
not  the  product  of  a  young  or  even  of  a  middle- 
aged  man,  nor  is  Aristotle's  Metaphysics.  Kant's 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason  did  not  appear  till  the 
author  was  in  his  fifty-seventh  year.  Hegel's 
Logic  was  published  when  he  was  forty-six,  and 
Hegel  matured  still  more  afterwards.  Spinoza's 
life  is  a  grand  torso  in  which  we  can  descry 
the  outline  of  the  colossal  Whole  which  lay  in 
him.  Great  as  is  his  performance,  it  is  a  frag- 
ment, whose  conclusion  is  broken  off  by  the 
blow  of  Fate  which  gives  to  the  undertone  of  his 
life  a  plaintive  cast.  Still  we  may  well  regard  it 
as  the  most  inspiring,  soul-elevating  modern 
philosophic  Life. 

1.  First  Period  (1632-1656).  Baruch  de 
Spinoza  was  born  of  Jewish  parents  at  Am- 
sterdam, the  24th of  November,  1632.  After  his 
expulsion  from  the  synagogue  (1656)  he  changed 
the  Hebrew  Baruch  into  the  Latin  Benedictus. 
His  family  name  had  already  in  it  a  Latin  ele- 
ment brought  from  the  Spanish  peninsula,  whence 
his  ancestors  had  come  to  Holland.  With  this 
complete  Latinization  of  the  name  was  coupled  a 
similar  process  in  the  man,  for  Spinoza  wrote 
and  apparently  thought  in  Latin,  which  was  still 
in  his  time  the  language  of  intercourse  between 
the  learned  throughout  Europe. 


SPINOZA.  —  LIFE.  121 

One  cannot  fully  make  out  from  the  evidence 
whether  Spinoza  was  a  Spanish  or  Portuguese  Jew. 
It  perhaps  is  of  no  great  consequence;  both 
classes  were  closely  allied,  both  were  fugitives 
from  the  Spanish  Inquisition,  both  were  joined 
in  one  synagogue  at  Amsterdam,  whose  popular 
language  seems  to  have  been  Portuguese,  as  the 
anathema  pronounced  by  it  upon  Spinoza  (which 
has  been  found  and  printed)  was  written  in  that 
tongue.  The  home  speech  of  the  Spinozas,  how- 
ever, seems  to  have  been  Spanish,  a  knowledge 
of  which  passed  to  the  child. 

The  father  was  probably  one  of  those  refugees 
who  had  been  coming  to  Holland  for  more  than 
a  generation  before  Spinoza's  birth.  The  Spanish 
inquisitors  had  forced  Christianity  upon  many 
Jews  who  still  secretly  adhered  to  their  old 
faith,  and  only  waited  the  first  opportunity  to 
throw  off  their  disguise.  This  new  sort  of  Chris- 
tians (called  Marranos)  had  heard  with  delight 
of  the  successful  revolt  of  the  Netherlands,  and 
of  the  tolerant  principles  of  the  House  of  Orange. 
They  were  not  allowed  to  emigrate  openly,  so 
they  escaped  furtively ;  the  first  boat-load  from 
Portugal  is  said  to  have  reached  Holland  in 
1593.  Three  years  later  the  English  fleet  under 
Essex  landed  a  large  contingent  of  these  Marranos. 
And  they  kept  coming,  till  in  1598  the  first  syna- 
gogue was  opened  in  Amsterdam  by  permission 


1 22        MODERN  E  UEOPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

of  the  civil  authorities.     And  still  they  kept  coin- 
ing, till  in  1608  a  new  synagogue  was  needed. 

What  did  these  people  bring  to  their  new 
home?  The  commercial  skill  and  energy  of 
their  race  for  one  thing ;  also  the  knowledge  of 
numerous  mechanical  trades,  which  they  were 
all  required  to  learn.  But  they  likewise  brought 
a  peculiar  hardy  and  defiant  spirit  which  could 
not  be  made  to  submit  to  external  force  though 
armed  with  the  authority  of  State  and  Church. 
That  little  Portuguese  craft — the  Jewish  May- 
flower—  turned  from  Spain  to  the  North,  not  to 
the  South,  not  to  Africa,  not  following  the  ex- 
pelled Moors  cognate  in  blood  and  also  perse- 
cuted by  the  Spaniards.  They  were  Semites, 
but  they  directed  their  course  away  from  Semitic 
lands  to  those  of  a  different  race.  In  fact  the 
Spanish  people  is  strongly  impregnated  with 
Semitic  blood.  Spain  has  from  the  earliest  ages 
been  the  chief  gateway  of  the  Semites  into 
Europe.  The  old  Phenicians  had  settlements  in 
Spain,  one  of  which  was  Cadiz,  a  city  still  ex- 
isting. The  Carthagenians  came  next,  planting 
numerous  colonies.  But  the  greatest  Semitic 
invasion  was  that  of  the  Arabians,  whose  power 
in  Spain  lasted  some  seven  hundred  years,  and 
under  whom  the  Jews  prospered  and  multiplied. 
Thus  the  Spanish  peninsula  had  been  a  second 
Semitic  home,  the  European  one,  of  that  race. 
But  both  branches,  Arabians  and  Jews,  with 


SPINOZA.  —  LIFE.  123 

their  respective  religions  had  been  driven  from 
this  European  home  of  theirs,  and  were  seeking 
a  new  abode  in  other  lands. 

Thus  a  small  fragment  of  the  disrupted 
Jewish  people  flees  from  the  warm  Southern 
zone  of  its  ancestors,  quite  the  same  in  Palestine 
and  in  Spain,  and  turns  to  the  cold  North  for  its 
future  dwelling-place.  Certainly  a  very  daring, 
obstinate  body  of  men  chosen  by  a  kind  of 
Natural  Selection  to  face  the  dangers  of  the  sea 
as  well  as  a  wholly  foreign  latitude  and  race  for 
the  sake  of  their  conviction.  They  came  to  stay, 
bringing  family,  religion  and  God  along.  They 
had  heard  that  Holland  had  defeated  Spain,  their 
persecutor,  that  it  had  a  certain  degree  of 
religious  toleration,  that  it  was  becoming  the  first 
commercial  nation  in  Europe,  thus  furnishing  a 
fine  field  for  native  Jewish  ability.  But  as  these 
Jews  were  not  ignorant  people,  they  felt  or  possi- 
bly were  fully  aware  of  something  much  deeper : 
this  was  that  Holland  in  the  Sixteenth  Century 
was  fighting  the  battle  of  the  world's  civiliza- 
tion, being  the  self -chosen  protagonist  of  the 
Spirit  of  the  Age.  Anyhow  these  Jewish  emi- 
grants, bearing  in  their  souls  the  inheritance  of 
Semitic  culture  for  3000  years  and  more,  from 
old  Egypt  and  Judea  through  Greece  and  Rome 
and  the  Middle  Ages,  turned  Northward  from 
that  Mediterranean  world  in  whose  development 
they  had  participated  from  its  beginning,  and 


124        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

plunged  into  the  verj  heart  of  the  new  epoch. 
For  it  was  in  Holland  at  this  time  that  the 
scepter  of  power,  both  spiritual  and  material, 
was  seen  passing  from  the  South  to  the  North, 
from  the  Romanic  to  the  Teutonic  peoples. 
Truly  the  movement  of  these  Jews,  be  it  sprung 
of  mere  chance,  or  of  some  unfathomable 
instinct  peculiar  to  their  race,  seemed  to  be  in 
subtle  correspondence  with  the  movement  of  the 
World's  History,  which  had  already  started  to 
leave  its  old  Mediterranean  seats,  and  was  cross- 
ing the  Alps  to  ingraft  itself  upon  a  new  stock  of 
human  kind.  The  defeat  of  Spain  by  Holland, 
and  the  Thirty  Years'  War  gave  to  the  Teutonic 
peoples  independence  which  afterwards  ripened 
into  supremacy. 

These  thoughts  we  must  bring  before  ourselves 
if  we  would  fully  grasp  the  spiritual  descent  of 
Spinoza.  .  For  in  him  must  have  lain  by  inherit- 
ance that  long  Jewish  line  of  Mediterranean 
culture,  which  we  shall  find  determining  his  early 
education,  and  which  the  Jewish  colony  of  Am- 
sterdam kept  alive  and  propagated  in  their 
school. 

Spinoza's  father  was  a  merchant  and  lived  "  in 
a  good  house  not  far  from  the  old  Portuguese 
Synagogue  "  (Colerus).  He  is  declared  to  have 
been  of  good  family  and  of  good  education.  He 
sent  his*  son  to  the  Jewish  school  connected 
with  the  Synagogue,  giving  to  this  son  the  same 


SPINOZA.  —  LIFE.  125 

mental  and  religious  training  which  he  and 
his  ancestors  doubtless  had  received.  Young 
Spinoza  first  studied  the  Hebrew  tongue  and  the 
Hebrew  Bible;  then  came  the  long  line  of 
Hebrew  comments  upon  the  Bible,  especially  the 
Talmud  and  the  Cabbala  he  made  his  own.  The 
Hebrew  writers  of  the  Middle  Ages,  such  as  Mai- 
onides  and  Ibn-Ezra,  he  knew  in  part  at  least. 
Also  the  Greco-Jewish  literature  he  must  have 
worked  at,  though  he  claims  not  to  have  had  a 
critical  knowledge  of  the  Greek  tongue  in  a  pas- 
sage (Th.  Pol.  Treatise,  c.  10)  which  sounds  a 
good  deal  like  an  excuse  for  not  doing  what  he 
did  not  want  to  do.  Still  Spinoza  shows  a 
thoughtful  study  of  the  New  Testament  and  he 
cites  the  most  famous  Greco-Jewish  writers  of 
antiquity,  Josephus  and  Philo.  The  educated 
Jews  of  the  Spanish  peninsula  must  have  known 
something  of  the  great  Arabian  philosophers, 
their  Semitic  cousins,  and  Spinoza  could  hardly 
help  getting  a  notion  of  the  Arabian  philosophy, 
though  only  by  hearsay.  In  some  such  fashion 
we  may  conceive  the  extent  of  Spinoza's  Semitic 
inheritance  coming  through  many  centuries,  the 
general  nature  of  which  we  can  trace  in 
numerous  chapters  of  his  Theologico-Political 
Treatise. 

His  ability  made  him  a  marked  pupil  from  the 
beginning ;  he  was  intended  for  Theology,  says 
Colerus,  for  a  Rabbi  or  Teacher;  doubtless  the 


126         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

curse  of  his  people  against  him  was  intensified 
by  the  disappointment  at  losing  their  most  prom- 
ising scholar.  There  are  hints  that  at  an  early 
age  he  began  to  ask  hard  questions  of  his 
instructor,  whose  answers  did  not  satisfy  the 
boy.  It  would  have  been  strange  if  the  Cartesian 
spirit,  rife  at  this  time,  of  interrogating  the 
validity  of  all  transmitted  beliefs,  had  not  crept 
into  the  soul  of  the  aspiring  youth. 

Nor  should  we  fail  to  throw  a  glance  into  the 
family  circle  of  the  boy  and  try  to  image  what 
was  chiefly  talked  of  there.  The  escape  from 
the  Spanish  Inquisition,  tales  of  relatives  who 
perished  by  its  torture,  the  many  dangers  of  the 
voyage  to  the  new  home  —  every  man  and 
woman  could  tell  some  thrilling  story  of  personal 
experience  which  tested  the  spirit's  mettle.  Every 
old  Jew  of  the  neighborhood  could  look  back 
upon  deeds  worthy  of  the  hero,  which  he  did 
not  fail  to  set  forth  to  the  younger  generation 
born  in  Holland.  A  general  jubilation  must 
have  been  in  that  colony  at  the  news  of  the 
peace  of  Westphalia,  in  which  Spain  acknowl- 
edged the  independence  of  the  United  Provinces 
after  a  struggle  of  almost  a  century.  Still  there 
must  have  been  an  underlying  strain  of  love  for 
their  old  romantic  home  in  the  South  where 
their  ancestors  had  lived  so  many  generations. 
As  already  said,  the  family  language  of  the 
Spinozas  was  Spanish,  the  tongue  of  their 


SPINOZA.  —  LIFE.  127 

oppressors,  and  the  same  fact  seems  to  have 
been  general. 

Business  relations,  stirring  events  at  home 
and  abroad,  even  boyish  play  upon  the  streets 
must  have  at  an  early  age  brought  Spinoza  out 
of  his  confined  Jewish  community  into  the  great 
world  throbbing  around  him  in  Amsterdam, 
which  was  then  an  important  European  center,, 
Indeed  as  there  was  no  external  repression  the 
Jewish  exclusiveness  would  begin  of  itself  to 
relax.  The  new  generation  could  not  possibly 
be  held  so  rigidly  to  the  old  tenets,  hence  we 
read  of  troubles  in  the  Amsterdam  Synagogue. 
The  young  Jews  never  having  experienced  Span- 
ish oppression,  would  refuse  to  live  so  completely 
in  the  past,  but  would  give  some  response  to  the 
call  of  the  Spirit  of  the  Time.  The  old  set  would 
complain  of  the  lack  of  respect  for  age  and 
authority  on  the  part  of  the  rising  generation, 
and  would  start  a  course  of  discipline  more  or 
less  severe  to  curb  the  headstrong  youth.  Do 
we  not  see  something  of  the  same  sort  to-day 
in  America?  To  this  party  of  young  Jews 
Spinoza  belonged  and  was  probably  the  leader. 

After  his  school  years  —  we  can  not  tell  the 
exact  time  —  a  new  element  was  introduced  into 
his  life  by  the  choice  of  a  trade.  "  The  Law 
and  the  ancient  Jewish  Doctors  do  expressly  say 
that  it  is  not  enough  for  a  man  to  be  learned, 
but  that  he  ought  besides  to  learn  a  profession 


128        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

or  mechanical  art,  that  it  may  help  him  in  case 
of  necessity"  (Colerus).  Accordingly  Spinoza 
is  to  acquire  a  handicraft,  which  became  a  very 
important  thing  in  his  future,  for  by  it  he  was 
to  maintain  himself  in  his  independence  of 
thought  in  spite  of  all  anathemas,  and  to  live 
his  own  life  in  freedom.  But  what  handicraft 
did  he  choose?  One  which  brought  him  into 
direct  contact  with  the  most  recent  movement  of 
Physics :  the  preparation  of  lenses  for  the  tele- 
scope recently  invented.  It  had  been  the  true 
means  of  bringing  to  view  a  new  Heaven,  quite 
as  much  as  the  voyages  of  those  times  had 
drawn  the  curtain  from  a  new  Earth.  Galileo 
had  already  discovered  the  satellites  of  Jupiter ; 
the  most  famous  Dutch  scientist,  Christian  Huy- 
gens,  born  four  years  before  Spinoza,  had  turned 
his  telescope  upon  Saturn,  and  in  1654  he  dis- 
covered the  rings  of  that  planet.  Spinoza  knew 
Huygens,  and  later  they  became  competitors  in 
the  art  of  polishing  lenses  (Spinoza's  Letters, 
XV,  1665).  Everybody  began  looking  up  at 
the  skies  through  a  telescope,  which  was 
very  serviceable  to  the  navigator  also.  Still  it 
is  a  nightly  amusement  on  the  streets  of  the 
great  city  for  the  passer  to  take  a  peep  at  the 
moon.  Spinoza,  working  at  his  lenses,  had  to 
investigate  the  mathematical  properties  of  light 
which  fact  may  well  have  had  some  influence 
upon  his  purely  philosophical  studies.  For  light 


SPINOZA.  —  LIFE.  129 

seems  to  have  a  geometric  soul  in  its  movements, 
as  Spinoza's  philosophy  has  a  geometric  soul 
in  its  method.  Thus  his  handicraft,  going  in- 
ward, found,  or  produced,  its  spiritual  counter- 
part in  his  thought.  At  any  rate,  our  worthy 
Colerus  (Spinoza's  biographer),  is  right  in  say- 
ing that  Spinoza,  "  finding  himself  more  dis- 
posed to  inquire  into  natural  causes,  gave  over 
Divinity  and  betook  himself  altogether  to  Natural 
Philosophy.''  So  our  young  Jew  in  the  choice 
of  his  calling  did  not  follow  the  generality  of 
his  countrymen  in  taking  up  with  the  past, 
usually  in  the  form  of  old  clothes  and  old  shoes, 
but  seized  upon  the  very  newest  mechanical  art, 
and  one  which  brought  his  daily  task  into  line 
with  the  latest  discoveries  in  physical  science. 
No  writings,  however,  he  has  left  pertaining  to 
this  practical  field  of  his,  except  one  small 
treatise  on  the  Rainbow. 

Of  course  Spinoza  did  not  necessarily  confine 
himself  to  the  making  of  telescopic  lenses.  The 
microscope  also  had  been  invented  and  was  re- 
vealing its  wonders.  This  instrument,  it  seems, 
was  a  favorite  with  Spinoza,  who  ««  observed 
with  a  microscope  the  different  parts  of  the 
smallest  insects,  from  whence  he  drew  such  con- 
sequences as  seemed  to  him  to  agree  best  with  his 
discoveries."  (Colerus.) 

Into  Spinoza's  early  life  came  another  influence 
of  much  more  immediate  importance  than  his 

9 


130        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

handicraft  in  separating  him  from  his  Jewish  en- 
vironment. He  became  assistant  teacher  in  the 
private  school  of  Francis  van  den  Ende,  who 
was  deeply  imbued  with  the  learning  and  the 
skepticism  of  the  Renascence,  and  was  also  de- 
voted to  physical  science.  It  was  indeed  a 
school  quite  the  opposite  of  that  first  school  con- 
nected with  the  Synagogue.  No  theology  of 
any  kind  was  here  in  evidence ;  superstition  was 
mercilessly  satirized,  and  superstition  was  quite 
one  with  religion  for  van  den  Ende,  who  seems 
to  have  had  in  his  library  the  books  of  the  lead- 
ing free-thinkers  of  Europe.  Here  was  a  mine 
in  which  Spinoza  delved  for  about  two  years 
(1653-55).  It  was  probably  in  this  library 
that  Spinoza  became  acquainted  with  some  of 
the  writings  of  Giordano  Bruno,  and  deepened 
his  knowledge  of  Descartes  by  a  study  of  the 
printed  books  of  this  philosopher,  whose  influ- 
ence, however,  he  must  have  already  felt,  as  it 
was  working  profoundly  in  the  thought  of  the 
time.  It  is  to  be  observed  that  Spinoza  lived 
in  van  den  Ende's  house,  and  so  was  separated 
from  his  own  family  and  the  Jewish  com- 
munity, being  thereby  able  to  give  himself  up 
freely  to  his  new  studies.  He  perfected  his 
Latin  style  with  van  den  Ende,  who  was  a  good 
humanist;  previously  he  had  studied  Latin  with 
a  German  teacher,  but  the  bright  boy  must 
have  picked  up  during  childhood  many  a  frag- 


SPINOZA.  —  LIFE.  131 

ment  of  that  tongue,  which  was  so  generally  em- 
ployed in  Holland  by  the  learned,  both  Jewish  and 
Christian.  Three  important  acquisitions  may 
be  attributed  to  Spinoza's  stay  with  van  den 
Ende:  some  teaching  experience,  a  considerable 
dip  into  the  secular  philosophy  of  the  time,  and 
the  mastery  of  a  Latin  style,  which  was  to  be 
the  medium  of  expression  for  all  of  his  works, 
being  more  nearly  a  mother-tongue  to  him  than 
any  other  language. 

And  in  this  record  we  must  not  omit  to  men- 
tion a  fourth  experience  very  natural  to  a  young 
fellow  in  the  early  twenties.  Says  our  voucher, 
the  honest  Colerus :  "  Van  den  Ende  had  an  only 
daughter  who  understood  the  Latin  tongue  as 
well  as  music  so  perfectly  that  she  was  able  to 
teach  her  father's  pupils  in  his  absence.  Spinoza, 
having  often  occasion  to  see  and  speak  to  her, 
grew  in  love  with  her,  and  he  has  often  confessed 
that  he  designed  to  marry  her.  She  was  none 
of  the  most  beautiful,  but  she  had  a  great  deal 
of  wit,  a  great  capacity  and  a  jovial  humor, 
which  wrought  upon  the  heart  of  Spinoza  as 
well  as  upon  another  scholar  of  van  den  Ende 
whose  name  was  Kerkering,  a  native  of  Hamburg. 
The  latter  did  soon  perceive  that  he  had  a  rival 
and  grew  jealous  of  him.  This  moved  him  to 
redouble  his  care  and  his  attendance  upon  his 
mistress,  which  he  did  with  good  success.  But 
a  necklace  of  pearls  of  the  value  of  two  or  three 


132        MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY, 

hundred  pistoles  which  he  had  before  presented 
to  that  young  woman  did  without  doubt  con- 
tribute to  win  her  affection.  She  therefore 
promised  to  marry  him,  which  she  did  faithfully 
perform  when  Herr  Kerkering  had  abjured  the 
Lutheran  religion,  which  he  professed,  and  em- 
braced the  Roman  Catholic."  So  Spinoza  was 
distanced  by  a  rival  who  could  buy  a  pearl 
necklace  and  change  his  religion. 

Such  is  the  gleam  of  romance  which  seems  to 
enter  Spinoza's  life  at  this  period,  and  which 
Berthold  Auerbach  has  wrought  over  in  his  novel, 
Spinoza,  a  Thinker's  Life.  But  a  cruel  investi- 
gator has  shown  that  van  den  Ende's  daughter, 
Clara  Maria,  could  have  been  hardly  twelve 
years  old  when  Spinoza,  being  twice  that  age, 
left  Amsterdam  on  account  of  his  excommunica- 
tion. What  of  it?  The  impossibility  of  the 
affair  does  not  follow.  Then  we  can  take  the 
suggestion  of  Pollock  that  Spinoza  often  visited 
Amsterdam  from  his  retreat  and  took  occasion  to 
drop  in  upon  the  household  of  van  den  Ende ; 
thus  he  could  have  an  opportunity  to  talk  Latin  to 
Clara  Maria,  and  to  admire  her  maturing  woman- 
hood, for  she  did  not  get  married  till  fifteen 
years  after  Spinoza  had  left  the  city  (accord- 
ing to  the  record  consulted  by  Van  Vloten,  her 
marriage  took  place  in  1671).  Some  commen- 
tators on  Spinoza  claim  to  see  traces  of  this  un- 
fortunate love  in  his  Ethics,  and  are  inclined  to 


SPINOZA.  —  LIFE.  133 

assign  it  as  the  reason  why  he  never  afterwards 
married.  But  other  grounds  are  more  apparent. 
No  Jewess  would  be  inclined  to  take  a  renegade, 
and  no  Christian  girl  would  be  inclined  to  take  a 
Jew.  Then  the  insidious  disease  of  which  Spi- 
noza died  had  begun  to  show  its  early  traces,  and 
to  a  rational  man  like  him  forbade  matrimony. 
Besides  was  he  not  wedded  to  Philosophy,  a  very 
jealous  mistress  brooking  no  rival? 

We  now  come  to  the  great  act  of  separation 
and  expulsion  of  Spinoza  from  his  kindred,  his 
race,  and  his  religion  Already  we  have  noticed 
the  growing  inner  separation  which  made  him 
ready  for  the  final  blow,  and  which  caused  him 
to  say  afterwards  that  his  persecutors  merely 
anticipated  his  own  action.  It  was  observed  that 
he  seldom  attended  the  Synagogue,  that  he 
shunned  the  society  of  the  Jewish  doctors,  ap- 
parently avoiding  discussion.  Two  former  class- 
mates succeeded  by  an  artifice  in  worming  out  of 
him  compromising  opinions,  and  then  played  the 
part  of  informers.  There  was  a  great  stir, 
Spinoza  was  cited  before  the  court  of  the  Syna- 
gogue, which  laid  upon  him  the  lesser  anathema, 
demanding  a  recantation  within  thirty  days. 
But  he  refused  to  recant,  he  probably  desired  to 
be  cast  out,  which  for  him  had  become  liberation. 
To  quiet  the  scandal  it  would  seem  that  there  was 
an  attempt  to  bribe  Spinoza  to  silence,  by  the 
offer  of  a  pension  of  a  thousand  gulden,  without 


134        MODERN-  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  condition  of  recantation.  But  this  offer  he 
rejected  with  scorn,  protesting  that  "  he  was  not 
a  hypocrite,  and  minded  nothing  but  the  Truth." 
Evidently  he  had  resolved  upon  authorship  as  his 
highest  vocation,  and  he  did  not  propose  to  sell 
out  his  career.  After  such  contumacy  came  an 
attempt  to  assassinate  him.  ««  Spinoza  himself 
did  often  tell  them  that  one  evening,  as  he  was 
coming  out  of  the  old  Portuguese  Synagogue,  he 
saw  a  man  by  him  with  a  dagger  in  his  hand; 
whereupon  standing  upon  his  guard  and  going 
backward,  he  avoided  the  blow  which  reached  no 
further  than  his  clothes"  (Colerus  reporting 
Spinoza's  conversation  with  the  latter 's  landlord 
and  landlady).  Nor  must  we  leave  out  this  trait 
of  Spinoza  himself ;  "  He  kept  still  the  coat  that 
was  run  through  with  the  dagger,  as  a  memorial 
of  that  event."  It  is  no  wonder  that  he  "  did 
not  think  himself  safe  at  Amsterdam,"  and  soon 
left  the  city.  Not  simply  out  of  terror  did  he 
take  this  step,  but  "  he  was  desirous  to  go  on 
with  his  studies  in  a  quiet  retreat." 

Nothing  was  left  in  the  opinion  of  the  rab- 
binate but  to  excommunicate  the  refractory 
member,  and  to  pronounce  upon  him  the  grand 
anathema.  The  latter  was  written  out  and  read 
before  the  congregation.  The  Portuguese  origi- 
nal has  been  preserved  and  is  a  very  important 
document  for  estimating  aright  the  character  and 
the  work  of  Spinoza.  It  runs  as  follows :  — 


SPINOZA.  -  LIFE.  135 

44  With  the  judgment  of  the  saints  and  angels 
we  excommunicate,  cast  off,  curse  and  execrate 
Baruch  de  Espinoza,  with  the  consent  of  the 
elders  and  of  all  this  holy  congregation,  in  the 
presence  of  the  Holy  Books,  cursing  him  with  the 
anathema  wherewith  Joshua  cursed  Jericho,  and 
Elisha  cursed  the  boys,  and  with  all  the  curses 
written  in  the  Law. 

Cursed  be  he  by  day  and  cursed  by  night ; 
cursed  be  he  in  sleeping  and  in  waking,  cursed  in 
bis  going  out  and  coming  in.  ,  / 

May  the  Lord  never  pardon  him;  may  the 
Lord  make  His  fury  and  anger  burn  up  the  man ; 
may  the  Lord  separate  him  for  evil  from  all  the 
tribes  of  Israel. 

.And  you  who  cleave  to  the  Lord  your  God : 
let  none  of  you  speak  with  him  by  word  of  mouth 
or  by  writing,  let  no  one  do  him  any  kindness, 
or  stay  under  one  roof  with  him,  or  come  within 
four  cubits  of  him,  nor  read  anything  written  by 
him." 

Such  is  the  document  of  damnation,  breathing 
all  the  venom  of  the  fiercest  tribal  revenge  of  the 
Old  Testament.  We  can  now  see  from  what 
Spinoza  was  determined  to  separate  himself. 
Better  than  anything  else  does  this  piece  of  writ- 
ing show  how  impossible  it  was  for  him  to  stay 
in  a  communion  which  kept  alive  and  perpetuated 
such  a  spirit.  Out  of  this  execration  looms  up 
his  character.  Indeed  we  can  see  why  he  sought 


136        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

to  transform  the  old  God  of  his  fathers  into  an 
ethical  Deity.  Motives  for  his  future  career  and 
doctrine  may  well  be  found  in  this  Jewish  curse 
upon  a  Jew  who  had  defiantly  broken  over  the 
tribal  limits  into  freedom,  and  had  become  in 
thought  a  universal  man. 

What  shall  we  say  to  the  people  who  deliber- 
ately could  utter  and  set  down  in  writing  such 
anathemas  against  one  of  their  own  blood  who 
differed  from  them  in  religion?  They  were  not 
ignorant,  they  had  suffered  persecution,  still  they 
could  become  as  fierce  persecutors  as  the  Span- 
ish inquisition.  There  is  no  doubt  that  if  they 
had  possessed  the  civil  power,  they  would  have 
crucified  Spinoza,  as  once  Christ  was  crucified. 
Moreover  the  report  goes  that  they  sought  to  get 
a  decree  of  banishment  against  Spinoza  from  the 
Dutch  authorities.  The  further  question  will 
come  up :  Does  this  incident  show  a  persistent 
trait  of  Jewish  character?  Do  they  carry  with 
them  wherever  they  go,  in  spite  of  culture  and 
the  stern  discipline  of  suffering,  some  of  the  old 
tribal  hate  which  is  sure  to  beget  hate?  That 
many  individual  Jews  do  not,  is  very  manifest. 
But  the  community,  the  nation?  The  philoso- 
pher, determined,  if  he  be  worthy  of  the  name, 
not  to  hate  the  Jew  or  anybody  else,  still  has  to 
seek  by  virtue  of  his  vocation  the  cause  of  the 
animosity  which  the  Jews  as  a  body  seem  to  ex- 
cite among  all  peoples  where  they  settle.  The 


SPINOZA.  —  LIFE.  137 

treatment  of  Spinoza,  on  account  of  the  great- 
ness of  the  man,  has  risen  to  be  a  European 
act,  done  in  the  presence  of  all  time;  it  has 
turned  out  to  be  a  scene  of  the  World's  History 
in  which  not  only  its  few  obscure  participants 
in  Amsterdam,  but  their  entire  nation  from  the 
beginning  are  called  to  the  bar  of  judgment. 
The  greatest  Jew  that  Europe  has  produced  has 
been  cast  out,  cursed,  and  in  spirit  crucified  by  a 
body  of  European  Jews,  apparently  repeating 
history. 

One  asks  with  interest :  Did  they  ever  after- 
wards show  any  signs  of  repentance  or  shame 
for  their  action?  In  this  connection  the  follow- 
ing extract  from  Colerus  would  seem  to  have 
some  meaning :  — 

*  *  The  sentence  of  excommunication  was  pub- 
licly pronounced  by  old  man  Chacham  Abuabh, 
a  Rabbi  of  great  reputation  among  them.  I 
have  desired  in  vain  the  sons  of  that  old  Rabbi 
to  communicate  that  sentence  to  me;  they 
answered  that  they  could  not  find  it  among  the 
papers  of  their  father,  but  I  could  easily  perceive 
that  they  had  no  mind  to  impart  it  to  me." 

Colerus  published  his  biography  of  Spinoza  in 
1705  in  IJutch,  and  the  next  year  it  appeared  in 
French.  Thus  the  document  was  known  to  exist 
long  before  it  was  published. 

It  was  unquestionably  the  State  which  saved  Spi- 
noza—  a  fact  which  impressed  him  strongly,  and 


138        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

which  will  enter  deeply  into  his  speculations  here- 
after. It  is  quite  possible  that  the  Protestant 
Church  might  have  joined  hands  with  the  Syna- 
gogue in  driving  him  out  of  the  country.  But 
the  civil  authorities  evidently  would  not  disturb 
him  in  his  quiet  retreat.  This  important  fact 
of  his  life  will  become  one  of  his  main  doctrines, 
and  will  generate  the  pivotal  point  upon  which 
turns  one  of  his  greatest  books,  the  Theologico- 
Political  Treatise,  of  which  an  account  will  be 
given  later. 

If  Spinoza  suffered  the  modern  crucifixion  at 
the  hands  of  the  modern  Jews,  it  must  be  con- 
fessed that  his  doctrine  has  been  adopted  and 
cultivated  by  the  Aryan,  who  has  taken  it  up  into 
the  movement  of  the  Aryo-European  Philoso- 
phy. To  be  sure,  Spinoza  has  not  been  with- 
out his  Jewish  apostolate,  but  it  is  the  Aryan 
philosopher  who  has  adopted  him  and  given  him 
his  place  in  the  grand  philosophic  descent  of  the 
Ages.  Another  Jew,  or  rather  the  other  Jew  of 
History,  has  had  a  strikingly  analogous  destiny 
as  regards  doctrine. 

2.  Second  Period  ( 1656-1670).  Theresultof 
the  excommunication  of  Spinoza  was  his  retire- 
ment from  all  public  relations  of  life.  He  quit 
Amsterdam  and  went  to  a  country  place  not  far 
from  the  city  and  lived  in  the  house  of  a  friend 
who  belonged  to  a  sect  of  Dutch  dissenters  called 
Collegiants  whose  doctrines  had  been  condemned 


SPINOZA  —  LIFE.  139 

by  the  Synod  of  Dort.  Thus  the  persecuted 
Jew  and  the  persecuted  Protestant  dwelt  together 
in  the  mutual  sympathy  of  a  common  mis- 
fortune. Both  were  victims  of  organized  Re- 
ligion, but  both  were  secretly  tolerated  by  the 
State.  We  shall  find  this  fact  coloring  Spinoza's 
life  and  writings  :  the  political  Institution  is  to 
save  man's  freedom  of  thought  from  the  fury  of 
the  religious  Institution.  Particularly  in  the 
Theologico- Political  Treatise  his  pre-supposi- 
tion  is  that  any  form  of  the  religious  Institution, 
Synagogue,  Mosque  or  Church,  Protestant  or 
Catholic,  though  bitterly  persecuted  in  its  weak- 
ness, will  turn  persecutor  when  it  gets  the 
power,  and  inflict  the  same  wrong  which  it  has 
suffered.  Spinoza's  inference  is  that  Religion 
must  be  wholly  separated  from  the  civil  govern- 
ment. In  no  sense  does  he  propose  to  do  away 
with  the  religious  Institution,  but  to  assign  to 
Church  and  State  their  true  limits  in  relation 
to  the  individual.  In  such  a  thought  we  can 
well  understand  that  there  was  harmony  between 
Spinoza  and  his  new  environment  of  Collegiants. 
For  fourteen  years  Spinoza  remained  in  this 
condition  of  retirement  and  separation  from  the 
world,  social  and  institutional.  This  does  not 
mean  that  he  was  incomplete  isolation,  holding 
himself  aloof  from  friends  and  from  all  outsiders. 
On  the  contrary  he  was  quite  accessible  to  the 
few  who  might  wish  to  visit  him.  Still  his  life 


140        MODEBN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

during  this  Second  Period  was  that  of  the  retired 
student,  even  if  not  of  a  recluse.  He  turned 
inward  and  wrought  over  his  materials  in  solitude. 
Really  this  was  a  great  opportunity  for  making 
out  of  himself  a  philosopher.  We  know  very 
little  of  his  personal  history  during  these  four- 
teen years ;  we  know  far  more  of  his  preceding 
Period,  which  was  largely  enacted  in  the  face  of 
the  world.  But  now  he  withdraws  from  public 
notice  into  himself,  and  there  constructs  a  new 
world  of  his  own,  in  which  act  we  can  follow  him 
only  in  his  books. 

To  grasp  this  Second  Period  in  its  full  sweep, 
it  seems  best  to  look  at  it  in  two  successive  por- 
tions or  epochs,  each  of  which  lasted  about  seven 
years.  These  we  may  name  the  Collegiant 
Epoch  and  the  Voorburg  Epoch. 

(1)  Altogether  Spinoza  remained  with  his 
Collegiant  friends  some  seven  years,  and  even 
changed  locality  with  them  once,  accompanying 
them  from  their  shelter  near  Amsterdam  to 
Rhynsburg,  near  Ley  den.  At  the  same  time  he 
kept  up  his  trade  of  polishing  lenses,  and  became 
a  famous  expert,  so  that  Leibniz,  investigating 
certain  optical  problems,  wrote  to  him  (1671), 
recognizing  the  optician  but  not  the  philosopher, 
whom  he  will  afterwards  find  and  in  his  own 
way  appropriate. 

We  also  hear  of  a  class  coming  to  him  in  his 
retreat  and  studying  Descartes  under  his  guid- 


SPINOZA.  —  LIFE.  141 

ance.  Already  he  had  known  something  of 
Descartes,  whose  spirit  was  in  the  atmosphere 
of  the  place  and  of  the  time.  He  had  doubtless 
read  the  Discourse  and  the  Meditations,  essen- 
tially popular  books.  But  he  has  now  to  grapple 
with  the  Principia,  a  far  more  difficult  as  well 
as  more  comprehensive  work,  which  was  then 
making  a  great  stir  among  the  learned  circles  in 
Holland.  A  small  class  of  aspiring  young  men 
came  to  him  and  asked  him  to  assist  them  in 
mastering  the  new  philosophy.  Spinoza  had 
already  had  some  experience  in  teaching  the  im- 
mature pupils  of  a  school  in  the  common  branches 
of  education,  but  now  he  has  to  instruct  a  class 
of  cultivated  men  in  a  system  of  thought.  It  is 
evident  that  he  must  make  special  effort  to  ac- 
quire that  system  in  order  to  give  it  out  and  to 
explain  it  in  detail.  Thus  Spinoza  is  brought  in 
his  retreat -to  study  Descartes  very  thoroughly, 
and  slowly  to  remodel  the  Cartesian  principle 
from  his  own  point  of  view.  Moreover  the  philo- 
sophical club  becomes  more  or  less  a  band  of 
disciples,  and  thus  the  School  of  Spinoza  starts, 
which  is  by  no  means  dead  to-day. 

The  literary  result  of  this  instruction  is  still 
to  be  seen  in  Spinoza's  Commentary  on  the 
Principia  of  Descartes,  furnished  with  an  ap- 
pendix called  Cogitata  Metaphysica.  This  book, 
printed  in  1663,  is  expressly  declared  by  Spinoza 
(in  Letter  IX)  to  have  been  written  and  pub- 


142        M  ODEEN  E  UE  OPE  AN  PHIL  OSOPHI , 

lished  at  the  request  of  friends  who  knew  of  it, 
and  who  doubtless  were  members  of  the  before- 
mentioned  philosophical  club.  It  should  be 
noticed  that  these  Cartesian  studies  were  agree- 
able also  to  his  Collegiant  friends,  who  may  have 
shared  in  his  instruction,  and  who  were  known 
to  lean  toward  Cartesianism  (at  this  time  like- 
wise under  the  ban  of  the  dominant  Theology, 
which  was  Calvinistic)  on  account  of  its  doctrine 
of  Free-Will.  In  the  Appendix  to  his  book 
Spinoza  supports  this  doctrine,  probably  repro- 
ducing it  simply  as  the  view  of  Descartes,  and 
possibly  not  forgetting  that  such  a  view  was  con- 
sonant with  his  Collegiant  environment.  This 
fact  may  suggest  the  inner  ground  why  Spinoza 
at  last  came  to  feel  that  he  must  quit  the  Col- 
legiants,  for  he  was  a  determinist  in  his  way 
from  the  beginning. 

To  the  Cartesian  strand  of  Spinoza's  life  dur- 
ing these  years  we  can  now  add  another  and  quite 
different  one,  which  is  found  in  a  little  book  of 
his  not  long  since  discovered  and  published,  bear- 
the  title  of  a  Short  Treatise  on  God,  Man,  and 
the  latter' s  Happiness.  This  book  seems  also  to 
have  been  the  product  of  work  with  a  class.  It 
shows  the  full  sweep  of  §pinoza's  plan,  as  it  was 
afterwards  far  more  -fully  developed  in  his  Ethics. 
Here,  in  fact,  we  find  the  Spinozan  Norm  of 
Thought  in  its  germ,  this  Norm  more  nearly 
approaching  the  Neo-Platonic  than  any  other. 


SPINOZA.  -  LIFE.  143 

And  the  Neo-Platonic  Norm  has  had  affinities 
with  Jewish  thinking  from  the  beginning.  Cer- 
tain learned  Jews  of  Alexandria,  notably  Philo, 
maintained  several  doctrines  which  were  after- 
wards taken*  up  by  the  Neo-Platonic  movement, 
and  this  movement  in  turn  strongly  influenced 
certain  learned  Jews  of  the  Middle  Ages  —  Mai- 
monides,  Gersonides,  and  Chasdai  Crescas  who 
is  cited  by  Spinoza  in  the  Theologico-Political 
Treatise.  To  these  probably  is  to  be  added 
Giordano  Bruno,  whose  doctrine  of  the  identity 
of  God  and  Nature  is  to  be  found  in  the  two 
dialogues  which  are  included  in  the  /Short 
Treatise.  This  book,  however,  shows  Spinoza's 
Jewish  inheritance  intermingling  and  coalescing 
with  Cartesian  ideas,  which  it  also  contains  in 
abundance. 

We  can  now  see  what  lay  before  the  mind  of 
Spinoza  as  his  chief  problem  during  these  seven 
years.  The  philosophic  Norm  transmitted  to  him 
through  the  ages  he  was  to  fill  anew  and  to 
transform  with  a  fresh  content  derived  directly 
from  the  fundamental  thought  of  his  time.  Both 
strands  will  remain  in  his  work  always  visible, 
often  separable,  and  at  bottom  contradictory, 
producing  what  we  may  well  name  the  Spinozan 
dualism,  far  deeper  than  any  so-called  Cartesian 
dualism.  For  the  transmitted  Norm  will  furnish 
chiefly  the  metaphysical  portion  of  Spinoza's 
system,  and  will  remain  largely  true  to  its 


144        MODERN"  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Neo-Platonic  pantheistic  pattern;  but  the  psy- 
chological and  with  it  the  ethical  portion,  chiefly 
derived  from  Descartes,  will  be  individualistic 
rather  than  pantheistic,  and  will  run  directly 
counter  to  the  previous  metaphysical  portion. 
Here,  then,  lies  the  source  of  the  Spinozan  mo- 
nism, and  far  more  profoundly,  the  source  of  the 
Spinozan  dualism,  which  last  really  classifies  the 
whole  system  as  belonging  to  the  second  or  sep- 
arative stage  in  the  total  philosophic  movement 
of  the  Seventeenth  Century. 

But  the  time  has  now  arrived  when  he  is  to 
give  up  his  long  domicile  with  the  Collegian ts. 
The  cause  of  this  separation  is  not  known,  but 
we  can  reasonably  conjecture  that  Spinoza  had 
outgrown  his  environment  and  felt  no  longer  in 
harmony  with  its  people  either  philosophically 
or  religiously.  He  had  transcended  their  Carte- 
sianism,  and  had  come  to  hold  a  view  very  dif- 
ferent from  theirs  of  God  and  the  Divine  Order. 
He  began  to  feel  his  freedom  restrained  (his 
dear  libertas  philosphandi) ,  and  moreover  he 
wished  to  publish  some  books  which  would 
hardly  accord  with  the  principles  of  the  Collegi- 
ants.  One  of  these  books  was  already  finished 
and  waiting  for  its  opportunity;  others  were 
partly  written.  These  unborn  children  of  his 
brain  were  lustily  struggling  for  a  chance  to  live  ; 
surely  the  hour  has  struck,  he  is  up  and  off. 


SPINOZA.  —  LIFE.  145 

(2)  So  Spinoza  removes  in  1663  to  Voorburg,  a 
village  not  far  from  The  Hague,  where  he  stays 
the  next  seven  years.  Very  little  is  known  of 
him  during  this  time ;  he  continued  his  various 
works,  and  began  a  new  one,  on  The  Improvement 
of  the  Intellect,  which  seems  to  have  been  in- 
tended as  an  introduction  to  the  Ethics.  The 
most  significant  fact  about  this  work  is  that 
it  is  a  kind  of  psychological  propaedeutic  to  phi- 
losophy ;  Spinoza  proposes  to  examine  the  mind 
itself  before  dealing  with  the  metaphysical  con- 
cepts which  are  the  products  of  the  mind.  Of 
course  he  did  not  and  could  not  then  carry  out 
any  such  plan;  if  he  had  been  able  to  do  so,  his 
Ethics  would  have  been  a  part  of  his  psychology, 
instead  of  his  psychology  being  a  part  of  his 
Ethics,  as  is  the  actual  case.  The  introduction 
is  peculiar  as  showing  Spinoza  in  a  subjective 
mood,  during  which  he  indulges  in  reflections 
upon  his  past  life  and  recounts  his  inner  experi- 
ences and  purposes  somewhat  after  the  manner 
of  Descartes.  Such  a  personal  overture  corre- 
sponds, however,  to  the  psychological  content  of 
the  treatise,  which  deals  with  the  mind  or  Ego. 
Obstacles  long  prevented  the  publication  of 
Spinoza's  book  which  had  been  for  some  time 
substantially  completed.  Finally  at  the  very 
close  of  the  seven  long  Voorburg  years  of  wait- 
ing, in  1670,  The  Theologico- Political  Treatise 
appears,  without  the  author's  name,  giving  on 

10 


1 46        MODERN  E  UB  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

the  title-page  a  fictitious  publisher  and  a  fictitious 
place  of  publication.  Spinoza  seemed  well  aware 
of  the  outcry  which  would  be  made  against  the 
book,  particularly  by  the  clergy.  At  the  same 
time  its  doctrines  seemed  to  have  won  for  him 
powerful  political  friends,  who  probably  held 
opinions  similar  to  those  of  Spinoza  in  regard  to 
the  relations  of  State  and  Church.  At  any  rate 
he  must  have  felt  that  he  had  strong  protection 
before  he  made  the  next  change,  which  was  to 
take  up  his  permanent  abode  at  The  Hague,  the 
political  center  of  the  Dutch  Republic.  This 
took  place  in  1670,  and  lasted  about  another 
seven  years,  terminating  in  Spinoza's  death. 

3.  Third  Period  (1670-1677).  This  Period, 
though  brief  and  incomplete,  being  cut  short  by 
the  early  demise  of  the  philosopher,  deserves  its 
position  through  the  fact  that  Spinoza  now 
conies  out  of  his  long  retirement,  and  to  a  degree 
shares  in  the  institutional  life  of  his  country, 
especially  in  its  political  phase.  We  are  told 
that  already  in  1665  his  work  on  Ethics  was 
nearly  complete ;  we  may  suppose  that  he  carried 
the  almost  finished  book  with  him  to  The 
Hague.  Doubtless  it  was  his  growing  interest  in 
the  State  which  first  made  him  gravitate  to 
Voorburg,  from  which  suburb  to  the  capital  was 
but  a  step,  which  he  could  take  when  the  time 
was  ripe . 

In   fact  the  Dutch    Republic   about  the  year 


SPINOZA.  —  LIFE.  147 

1670  was  the  center  of  the  political  problem  of 
Europe.  It  was  still  engaged  in  a  desperate 
struggle  with  England  for  maritime  supremacy, 
which  brought  about  three  different  wars,  the 
last  of  which  (1672—4)  Spinoza  saw  while  living 
at  The  Hague.  But  the  greatest  conflict  which 
arose  during  this  time  was  with  the  king  of 
France  (Louis  XIV)  who  sought  to  destroy  Hol- 
land as  the  strongest  foe  of  his  political  and 
religious  ideas,  of  Absolutism  and  of  Catholi- 
cism. With  a  right  instinct  or  perchance  insight 
Spinoza  placed  himself  where  the  fate  of  Euro- 
pean liberty  in  that  age  was  being  decided. 
Though  not  an  actor,  he  was  on  the  ground 
looking  and  thinking. 

The  literary  outcome  of  this  Period  is  seen  in 
the  work  which  is  doubtless  the  last  he  ever 
wrote,  the  Political  Treatise.  His  thought  has 
now  turned  away  from  Religion  and  Metaphysics, 
and  is  devoting  itself  to  the  State.  We  see  at  once 
his  views  are  directly  connected  with  the  Poli- 
tics of  his  time,  even  when  he  speaks  no  names. 
The  theory  of  Institutions,  never  wholly  dormant 
in  his  speculation,  has  now  become  the  paramount, 
if  not  the  exclusive  interest  (see  remarks  on  the 
Political  Treatise  later,  under  the  head  of 
Spinoza's  Writings). 

It  was  a  great  shock  to  him  when  the  Dutch 
statesmen,  the  brothers  DeWitt,  were  murdered 
by  a  mob  in  1672.  They  had  given  him  a  small 


148         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

pension,  and  had  shown  him  friendship  in  various 
ways.  It  is  highly  probable  that  it  was  their 
influence  which  brought  him  to  The  Hague  and 
gave  a  political  direction  to  his  latest  thinking. 

But  after  their  death  he  must  have  kept  up  his 
relations  to  the  people  in  authority,  for  we  find 
him  engaged  in  what  appears  to  be  a  political 
mission.  He  went  to  the  camp  of  the  French 
invaders  of  his  country,  then  at  Utrecht,  in 
order  to  see  the  Prince  of  Conde,  the  commander 
of  the  enemy.  But  Spinoza  did  not  get  any 
interview  with  the  Prince,  and  returned  home 
where  the  populace  began  to  suspect  him  of 
being  a  spy.  Spinoza's  landlord  became  alarmed 
lest  a  mob  might  attack  his  house,  but  Spinoza 
44  put  him  in  heart  again"  by  saying  to  him: 
"  Fear  nothing,  I  can  justify  myself.  There  are 
some  of  the  most  considerable  persons  in  the 
State  who  know  what  put  me  upon  that  journey. 
As  soon  as  the  mob  makes  the  least  noise  at 
your  door,  I'll  go  and  meet  them,  though  they 
were  to  treat  me  as  they  treated  poor  Messieurs 
De  Witt.  I  am  a  good  KepubJican,  and  I  always 
aimed  at  the  glory  and  welfare  of  the  State  ' ' 
(Colerus).  Such  is  the  small  and  somewhat 
uncertain  gleam  of  Spinoza's  only  political  per- 
formance. 

In  the  year  1673  he  received  in  his  quiet  re- 
treat at  the  Hague,  where  he  lived  in  a  rented 
room  and  boarded  himself,  a  remarkable  offer 


SPINOZA.  —  LIFE.  149 

which  showed  his  increasing  fame.  The  Elector 
Palatine  asked  him  to  become  Professor  at 
the  University  of  Heidelberg,  cum  ampUssima 
libertate  philosophandi,  though  he  must  not 
attack  the  established  religion.  The  offer  was 
declined  as  Spinoza  felt  that  any  such  position 
would  interfere  with  his  freedom.  It  had  been 
his  life  to  keep  aloof  from  all  sects,  from  all 
patrons,  from  all  great  schools  and  universities, 
in  order  that  he  might  be  free  to  utter  the  truth 
as  he  saw  it.  He  was  "right.  In  his  little  room 
at  Van  der  Spyck's,  the  Universe  itself  was  his 
and  all  that  it  contains ;  in  the  considerable 
University  of  Heidelberg  he  would  have  been 
cramped  to  death  by  his  environment. 

During  these  seven  years  at  The  Hague  Spi- 
noza was  slowly  dying  of  consumption.  His  con- 
stitution had  never  been  strong,  and  he  "  had 
been  troubled  with  a  Phthysic  above  twenty 
years,"  says  Colerus,  drawing  information  from 
those  who  knew  him  well.  This  signified  much 
in  the  career  and  thought  of  Spinoza.  Since  his 
twenty-fourth  year  and  earlier,  hence  during  his 
whole  mature  life  an  insidious  disease  kept  gnaw- 
ing at  his  vitals,  and  being  incurable,  hung  over 
him  like  an  inexorable  Fate.  This  fact  colors 
his  doctrine  and  his  life.  His  strong  belief  in 
necessity  on  the  one  hand,  yet  on  the  other 
his  triumph  over  outer  destiny  and  his  complete 
self-mastery  while  in  the  very  jaws  of  the  fiend, 


150        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

were  intensified,   if  not  caused,  by  this  desperate 
struggle  with  a  life-long  malady. 

The  account  of  Spinoza's  last  moments  are 
given  by  Colerus  in  a  quaint,  yet  deeply  signifi- 
cant and  pathetic  way:  "  The  landlord  being 
come  from  Church  at  four  o'clock  or  thereabouts, 
Spinoza  went  down  stairs  and  had  a  pretty  long 
conversation  with  him,  which  did  particularly 
run  upon  the  sermon ;  and  having  taken  a  pipe 
of  tobacco  he  retired  into  his  chamber  which  was 
forward,  and  went  to  bed  betimes."  Yet  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  Spinoza  was  very  ill  during 
this  talk,  though  he  said  nothing  of  himself,  for 
his  conversation  ran  "  upon  the  sermon."  Still 
he  had  sent  for  a  physician  from  Amster- 
dam who  was  a  special  friend  of  his,  Ludwig 
Meyer  by  name,  as  if  conscious  of  what 
was  approaching.  "  Upon  Sunday  morning 
(the  next  day)  before  Church-time  he 
went  down  stairs  again,  and  discoursed  with 
his  landlord  and  his  wife,"  apparently  saying 
not  a  word  of  his  condition  and  showing  no 
sign,  though  he  must  have  been  then  dying. 
Meantime  the  physician  had  arrived,  and  he 
"  ordered  them  to  boil  an  old  cock  immediately 
that  Spinoza  might  take  some  broth  about  noon, 
which  he  did."  In  the  afternoon  the  people  of 
the  house  returned  to  Church,  while  the  physi- 
cian stayed  alone  with  Spinoza.  '«  But  as  they 
were  coming  from  Church,  they  were  very  much 


SPINOZA.  —  WRITINGS.  151 

surprised  to  hear  that  Spinoza  had  expired  about 
three  o'clock  in  the  presence  of  that  physician, 
who  that  very  evening  returned  to  Amsterdam 
by  the  night-boat."  That  surprise  of  the  house- 
hold tells  much  of  the  perfect  equanimity  of 
Spinoza  gazing  straight  into  the  face  of  death ; 
there  could  be  no  stronger  evidence  that  he  had 
realized  in  his  own  spirit  his  doctrine. 

Such  was  the  transition  into  the  Beyond  of 
the  philosopher,  the  change  usually  so  much 
dreaded,  but  not  at  all  dreaded  by  him.  In  that 
humble  house  where  he  rented  a  room,  in  which 
he  wrote  his  books,  polished  his  lenses,  and  even 
boarded  himself,  was  the  final  scene  enacted 
whereby  he  showed  himself  a  free  man,  having 
made  real  in  the  deed  his  own  words:  "Homo 
liber  de  nidla  re  minus  quam  de  morte  cogitat, 
et  ejus  sapientia  non  mortis  sed  vitce  meditatio 
est."  (Ethica,  Pars  IV,  Prop.  78.) 

II.  SPINOZA'S  WRITINGS. —  Latin  was  the  lan- 
guage employed  by  Spinoza  in  communicating 
his  thought  to  the  world.  Many  European 
philosophers  before  him  had  used  their  mother 
tongue  for  philosophy.  But  what  was  the 
mother-tongue  of  Spinoza?  It  is  not  so  easy  to 
say ;  he  seems  to  have  employed  with  a  fair  de- 
gree of  freedom  Teutonic,  Romanic  and  Semitic 
speech,  hovering  between  them  all.  In  his 
Jewish  home  the  language  was  Spanish  and  in 
the  synagogue'  it  was  Portuguese ;  after  his  ex- 


152        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

pulsion  he  must  have  heard  and  talked  chiefly 
Dutch,  though  it  is  declared  that  he  never 
mastered  it  in  a  literary  sense.  In  fact  the 
Dutch  themselves  have  not  produced  any  great 
work  of  Literature  in  their  tongue,  they  have  no 
Shakespeare  or  Dante,  no  Calderon  or  Camoens. 
Probably  the  greatest  literary  Dutchman  was 
Grotius  and  he  used  Latin.  The  Renascence 
developed  marvelously  the  Romance  languages 
and  literatures  —  Italian,  Spanish,  Portuguese, 
French ;  we  must  recollect  that  the  English  of 
Chaucer,  Shakespeare  and  Milton  is  largely  a 
Romance  tongue.  But  Teutonic  speech  had  to 
wait  for  its  literary  bloom  till  Goethe  and 
Lessing.  Thus  the  Dutch  vernacular  seems  to 
have  been  rejected  by  its  own  sons  for  the 
highest  literary  expression.  Spinoza  did  not  try 
to  change  this;  though  born  in  Holland,  he  was 
in  speech  more  Latin  than  Teutonic,  and  easily 
went  back  to  the  parental  source  of  his  Spanish 
or  Portuguese.  Moreover  Philosophy  still  spoke 
Latin  throughout  Europe,  even  in  those 
countries  where  Poetry  had  found  its  loftiest 
expression  in  the  vulgar  tongue.  German  as  the 
vehicle  of  philosophic  thought  had  not  yet  de- 
veloped its  power.  Among  Latin-writing  philos- 
ophers, Spinoza  ranks  easily  alongside  of  the 
two  greatest  —  Cicero  and  Aquinas,  and  he  is, 
in  certain  respects,  to  be  placed  before  both 


SPINOZA.  —  WRITINGS,  153 

these  in  the  grand  philosophic  evolution  of  the 
ages.  .  * 

The  Dutch  were  truly  the  foremost  European 
people  in  the  Seventeenth  Century,  the  bearers 
of  the  world-historical  destiny  of  Europe.  But 
they  somehow  gave  no  vernacular  utterance  of 
their  mighty  task  and  its  fulfillment  in  prose  or 
verse ;  they  produced  no  printed  words  reflecting 
their  heroic  deeds  and  thrilling  the  civilized 
nations  of  to-day.  This  is  doubtless  the  reason 
why  .their  work  has  not  been  duly  appreciated. 
We  have,  therefore,  to  think  that  Teutonic 
speech,  in  its  Dutch  and  other  varieties,  was  as 
yet  incapable  of  giving  an  adequate  literary,  still 
l6ss  an  adequate  philosophical  expression  of  the 
age.  From  this  point  of  view  also,  Spinoza 
showed  a  right  linguistic  instinct  by  composing 
his  philosophy  in  Latin. 

1.  The  Theologico- Political  Treatise.  The  pres- 
ent work  was  written  in  Latin  and  published 
in  1670,  Spinoza  being  then  38  years  old.  More- 
over, this  was  the  year  in  which  Spinoza  changed 
his  residence  from  Voorburg  to  The  Hague,  hav- 
ing resolved,  apparently,  to  print  and  to  propa- 
gate his  philosophy  after  his  long  study  and 
retirement.  His  system  was  substantially  com- 
plete at  this  date;  his  great  central  work,  the 
Ethics,  was  also  finished  with  the  possible  excep- 
tion of  a  few  additions  and  interpolations,  and 
was  to  be  published  shortly  after  the  present 


154         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

book,  which  may  well  be  deemed  a  kind  of  intro- 
duction to  the  whole  Spinoza.  Such  we  may 
consider  to  be  the  opening  of  the  third  period  of 
his  life. 

Spinoza  well  foreknew  the  outcry  which  the 
book  would  produce.  Accordingly  we  read  upon 
the  title-page  of  the  first  edition  that  it  was 
printed  by  Heinrich  Kiiherath  of  Hamburg, 
whereas  the  real  printer  was  Christopher  Conrad, 
of  Amsterdam.  The  author's  name  was  not 
given.  Soon  the  uproar  started,  the  refutations 
began  pouring  in,  and  the  author  duly  anathe- 
matized. The  Church,  of  course,  took  the  alarm. 
Jewish  writers  controverted  it,  the  Protestant 
States  General  of  Holland  prohibited  it,  Rome 
placed  it  upon  the  Index,  even  the  Cartesians 
disclaimed  and  denounced  it,  though  it  was  a 
direct,  legitimate  fruit  of  the  doctrine  of  their 
master.  What  was  the  matter?  No  book  could 
create  such  *a  universal  shout  of  pain,  if  it  did 
not  hit  the  sore  spot  of  the  age.  The  unanimity 
of  damnation  from  Jew  and  Gentile,  Protestant 
and  Catholic,  Church  and  State,  could  only  mean 
that  all  those  affected  with  the  malady  of  the 
time,  were  undergoing  a  probing,  painful,  but  in 
the  end  salutary,  to  the  very  seat  and  source  of 
their  disease.  For  like  the  individual,  the  age 
gets  angry  at  the  man  who  tells  to  its  face  the 
truth  about  itself.  In  times  past  this  wrath  has 
often  found  expression  in  torture,  burning  at  the 


SPINOZA.  —  WETTINGS.  155 

stake,  and  crucifixion.  If  we  now  read  the 
Theologico-Political  Treatise  we  cannot  find  much 
sulphur  in  it ;  we  have  to  throw  ourselves  back 
into  Spinoza's  time  and  spiritual  environment  in 
order  to  understand  the  tempest  it  produced  on 
all  sides  of  the  horizon. 

Already  the  age  was  in  a  deep  struggle  with 
its  presuppositions,  philosophical,  religious,  and 
political.  The  center  of  this  struggle  was  un- 
doubtedly Holland,  the  land  where  Thought  had 
won  its  greatest  freedom,  both  in  Church  arid 
State.  Holland,  then,  was  questioning  all  that 
had  been  hitherto  taken  for  granted  in  profound 
correspondence  with  her  movement  for  inner  and 
outer  liberty.  Still  there  was  a  strong  party  in 
reaction,  hesitating,  refusing,  resisting.  But, 
moved  largely  by  Descartes,  whose  thought-life 
belonged  to  Holland,  the  leading  spirits  of  that 
country  had  learned  to  doubt,  to  grapple  with 
their  presuppositions,  particularly  in  philosophy, 
above  any  other  land  of  Europe.  Yet  this  was  not 
done  without  many  a  protest  from  more  conser- 
vating  minds  who  dimly  foresaw  and  shuddered 
at  the  Heaven-scaling  step  to  which  such  a 
principle  was  driving  forward  the  time. 

Into  this  mightily  fermenting  period  enters  the 
Amsterdam  Jew  with  his  book.  Of  all  his  con- 
temporaries he  is  the  most  apt  pupil  of  Des- 
cartes, having  pushed  the  latter' s  doctrine  far 
beyond  its  original  limits,  and  applied  it  in  a 


156        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY, 

sphere  and  in  a  way  that  would  have  made  the 
old  master  shake  in  terror  with  his  careful, 
politic  adjustment  to  the  existent  order  in 
Church  and  State.  For  Spinoza  in  his  quiet 
study  has  come  to  the  conclusion,  that  in  this 
general  overhauling  of  all  transmitted  opinions 
and  beliefs,  the  grand  presupposition  of  the 
civilization  of  Europe,  the  Bible  both  Hebrew 
and  Christian,  is  to  be  summoned  before  this 
new  tribunal  of  Eeason  and  made  to  give  an  ac- 
count of  itself.  Is  not  this  Bible  with  its 
doctrines  and  ceremonies  the  chief  assumption 
of  the  world  around  me?  If  all  is  to  be  interro- 
gated afresh  (de  omnibus  dubitandum)  as  the 
indispensable  prerequisite  for  the  coming  order, 
why  make  an  exception  of  the  fundamental 
thing?  Colossal  audacity  is  this,  truly  Jewish, 
not  to  be  expected  of  any  European ;  only  can  it 
be  paralleled  by  the  audacity  of  another  Jew, 
Christ  himself,  who  also  challenged  the  faith  of 
his  fathers  and  introduced  the  new  dispensation. 
So  Spinoza  goes  back  sixteen  centuries  to  the 
Christian  beginning,  and  then  back  another  six-, 
teen  centuries  (or  more)  to  the  Hebrew  begin- 
ning, and  along  the  whole  line  he  drags  out  all 
the  presuppositions  of  Monotheism  itself  and 
brings  them  before  the  judgment-seat  of  his  indi- 
vidual Reason.  For  Spinoza  likewise  challenges 
the  one  only  God,  the  common  presupposition  of 
both  Jew  and  Christian,  investigating  sharply 


SPINOZA.  —  WETTINGS.  157 

the  revelation  He  has  made  of  Himself  in  the 
transmitted  Holy  Books  of  His  people.  It 
would  seem  that  according  to  Spinoza,  God  too 
needs  reconstruction  and  must  be  made  rational 
in  accord  with  the  Spirit  of  the  Age. 

We  may  now  see  why  it  came  that  a  Jew  was 
chosen  to  do  such  a  work,  namely  to  take  the 
next  great  step  in  philosophy.  Many  writers 
have  felt  the  profound  correspondence  of  Spinoza 
with  his  call,  which  was  at  that  time  the  call  of 
Europe.  The  cry  is  for  a  man  who  can  go  back, 
and  as  it  were  in  his  own  blood  can  find  and  dig 
out  the  religious  presuppositions  of  European 
civilization.  At  the  same  time  he  must  be 
modern,  the  most  modern  of  men,  filled  with 
the  new  thought  of  his  epoch.  Again  the  Aryan 
consciousness,  unable  to  find  itself  spiritually, 
is  to  be  passed  through  a  Jewish  mind,  as  was 
the  case  in  Christianity.  This  means  not  the 
overthrow  of  the  Bible,  but  a  new  knowledge  of 
it,  which  is  still  working  deeply  in  Theology. 
The  so-called  higher  criticism  of  to-day  goes 
back  to  this  work  .of  Spinoza.  Thus  the  Holy 
Book  of  the  Ages  shows  a  power  of  self -renewal 
down  Time,  having  revealed  such  a  character 
through  the  three  greatest  Jews  —  Moses,  Christ 
and  Spinoza.  Such  new  birth  seems  to  come  to 
it  only  through  a  Jewish  mind ;  only  a  Jew  can 
successfully  grapple  with  the  Jewish  Jehovah, 
and  make  Him  transform  Himself.  The  primi- 


158        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tive  tribal  God  of  the  Hebrews  can  become  uni- 
versal only  through  a  man  of  the  same  tribe  who 
has  become  universal  himself. 

The  reader  may  now  understand  the  loud 
uproar  as  well  as  the  fierce  persecution  which 
greeted  this  book  at  its  birth  and  has  followed  it 
down  to  the  present.  In  the  foregoing  fact  also 
we  begin  to  see  the  vast  significance  of  Spinoza 
as  an  historic  link  in  the  coming  ages,  for  the 
battle  which  he  so  emphatically  opened  is  by  no 
means  over  yet. 

The  Theologico-Political  Treatise  is  not  an 
organic  book  with  its  parts  carefully  ordered  into 
a  systematic  Whole.  It  is  rather  a  series  of 
essays  loosely  connected  pertaining  to  Theology 
and  the  State;  the  title  of  the  edition  of  1670, 
printed  during  Spinoza's  lifetime  and  probably 
emanating  from  him,  calls  it  a  Treatise  "  con- 
taining several  dissertations  "  (continens  aliquot 
dissertationes —  see  Pollock's  Spinoza,  In  trod. ,  p. 
XVI).  It  may  be  considered  a  kind  of  framework 
into  which  he  arranged  his  thoughts  on  the  pre- 
ceding topics  for  a  long  time,  probably  for  twenty 
years  (1650-1670).  We  have  here  echoes  of 
the  studies  of  the  youthful  Spinoza,  while 
still  a  student  at  the  school  of  the  Synagogue ; 
we  can  well  imagine  the  precocious  genius  of 
seventeen  or  eighteen  summers  with  the  blood  of 
the  South  hot  in  his  veins,  propounding  hard 
problems  to  his  teacher  in  the  Hebrew  Bible. 


SPINOZA.  —  WETTINGS.  159 

Moreover  such  a  youth  living  in  the  great  active 
city  of  Amsterdam  would  unconsciously  imbibe 
something  of  the  spirit  of  the  time,  which  was 
already  taking  a  decided  Cartesian  trend.  The 
Principles  of  Descartes  had  been  printed  in 
Latin  at  Amsterdam  in  1644,  and  his  earlier 
works  had  created  a  great  stir.  To  our  mind 
the  Jewish  boy  could  hardly  help  catching  some- 
what of  the  spirit  of  inquiry  then  abroad  in  a 
free  land,  and  engrafting  it  upon  his  Hebrew 
studies.  At  first  it  was  only  a  germ,  but  the 
germ  grew  to  an  unshaken  conviction,  which 
finally  caused  his  expulsion  from  the  Synagogue 
when  he  was  twenty-three  years  old. 

We  hold  that  the  Treatise  under  consideration 
contains,  particularly  in  some  of  its  earlier  por- 
tions, the  substance  of  the  thought  and  of  the 
discussions  which  led  to  Spinoza's  separation 
from  his  religion  and  his  people.  It  was  most 
natural  that  he  should  put  down  in  writing  such 
a  fearful  personal  experience,  really  his  re-birth 
into  a  new  world.  But  as  time  ran  on  and  as  he 
was  absent  from  the  scene  of  his  troubles,  other 
interests  began  to  come  predominantly  into  his 
life.  His  purely  speculative  studies  undoubtedly 
stood  first,  but  not  far  behind  was  his  interest  in 
the  State.  For  after  all  it  was  the  State  which 
had  saved  him  through  its  toleration.  This  fact 
took  strong  hold  of  him,  and  so  another  element 
was  introduced  into  his  book,  which  he  desig- 


160        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

nates  as  theologico-politicus  on  its  title-page,  and 
in  which  he  seeks  to  show  that  Free  Thought 
(libertas philosophandi)  will  not  only  not  endan- 
ger but  will  benefit  the  Eepublic. 

Accordingly  we  find  two  portions,  whose  divid- 
ing line  is  plainly  marked  (at  Chap.  16).  Of 
these  the  first  portion  treats  of  Eeligion,  and 
embraces  three-fourths  of  the  whole  work,  while 
the  second  portion  treats  of  the  State,  which 
takes  up  the  remaining  fourth.  The  latter  seems 
considerably  later  in  composition  than  the 
former,  and  shows  a  new  object  of  interest.  It 
has  a  double  character  :  though  the  Hebrew  State 
still  furnishes  examples  for  illustrating  principles, 
it  is  plain  that  the  Dutch  State  is  always  in  the 
background  of  the  author's  thought,  and  is  some- 
times cited  in  its  own  name. 

We  may,  therefore,  say  that  the  present 
Treatise  shows  the  religious  and  political  develop- 
ment of  Spinoza  for  some  twenty  years,  but  not 
directly  his  philosophical  development  which  was 
going  on  at  the  same  time  in  another  line  of 
works.  It  is  a  very  striking  evolution  of  a  great 
soul  in  spite  of  its  inconsistencies  and  incongru- 
ities. Particularly  we  may  trace  in  this  book 
Spinoza's  evolution  of  God  who  in  the  earlier  pas- 
sages is  still  the  transcendent  Hebrew  Jehovah, 
but  in  the  later  passages  decidedly  approaches 
the  immanent  God  of  Nature,  such  as  we  find  in 
the  Ethics.  Still  the  work  is  Jewish  from  first 


SPINOZA.  —  WETTINGS.  161 

to  last ;  Jewish  in  its  affirmation  and  in  its  nega- 
tion; when  he  denies,  he  is  still  a  Jew  denying 
Judaism.  Christ  and  the  Apostles  he  puts  on  a 
line  of  development  with  Moses  and  the  Prophets. 
That  he  is  the  third  in  this  great  line  of  Jewish 
Eevelation,  he  does  not  directly  say,  at  least  he 
cloes  not  emphasize  any  such  idea.  Still  he  seems 
at  times  somewhat  conscious  of  such  a  mission, 
that  of  uttering  the  Jew  of  Europe. 

Into  this  vast  biblical  reconstruction  inter- 
weaves the  doctrine  of  Descartes  as  a  trans- 
forming power.  The  enthronement  of  Reason 
with  its  clear  and  distinct  ideas  is  everywhere 
taken  for  granted,  and  means  the  summoning 
of  the  Universe  before  the  bar  of  the  Ego, 
though  Descartes  does  not  seem  to  have  intended 
any  such  universal  application  of  his  doctrine. 
Descartes  doubted  the  truth  of  the  transmitted 
Philosophy,  but  Spinoza  dared  doubt  the  truth 
of  the  transmitted  Religion  and  its  Bible,  yea  of 
the  transmitted  God.  This  is  his  tremendous 
significance;  he  makes  universal  the  Cartesian 
starting-point;  that  is  his  genius  —  universality. 
But  his  effort  is  not  merely  destructive;  it  is 
also  reconstructive;  he  too  might  answer  his 
antagonists:  *'  I  come  not  to  destroy  but  to 
fulfill." 

In  general,  the  Theologico- Political  Treatise 
springs  from  Spinoza's  grand  separation  from 
his  religion  and  his  race  and  his  race's  God. 

11 


162        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Hence  its  underlying  character  must  be  pro- 
nounced separative.  It  shows  three  great 
separations :  — 

1.  The  Individual  with  his  Reason,  self-deter- 
mined in  Thought,  must  be  allowed  freedom  of 
Thought   and    Speech   in  matters   of   Religion. 
Reason  is  not  to  be  accommodated  to  Scripture, 
and  hence  may  be  unscriptural.     On  the  other 
hand   Scripture   is  not  to  be  accommodated  to 
Reason,  but  is   self-determined  in  its  sphere   (is 
to  be  interpreted  through  itself).     Neither  is  to 
force  the  other  into   conformity  with   itself  in 
Thought. 

2.  The   Individual  with  his  Reason  is  to  be 
allowed  Free  Thought  in  political  matters,  also. 
Yet  he  is  to  obey  in  his  action  the  commands  of 
the  State  as  authoritative,   which   on  its  side  is 
also   self-determined.       Neither  is  to  force  the 
other  into  conformity  with  its  sphere ;  the  indi- 
vidual  is  not   to    assail  the  State's  law,  and  the 
State  is  not  to  assail  the  individual's    Thought 
even  in  its    expression.       So  the    separation   is 
complete  as  to  Intellect  but  not  as  to  Will ;    the 
latter  remains  for  the  future  problem. 

3.  These  two  Institutions,  the   religious  and 
the   political,    Spinoza   will  now   separate  from 
each  other,   after   having  separated    himself  as 
Reason  or  Thought,  from  both   of  them.     The 
State  is  not  to  prescribe  Religion  and  Religion  is 
not   to    determine    the    State.     This    is  a  great 


SPINOZA.  —  WRITINGS.  163 

idea,  one  in  which  Spinoza  reaches  not  only  out 
of  his  own  time  but  out  of  Europe.  The  com- 
plete separation  of  Church  and  State  has  not  yet 
been  attained  even  in  the  most  tolerant  and 
enlightened  European  nations.  Only  in  America 
has  such  a  separation  been  attained.  Spinoza 
may  well  seem  the  prediction  of  that  provision 
in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  which 
says:  "  Congress  shall  make  no  law  respecting 
an  establishment  of  religion  or  prohibiting  the 
free  exercise  thereof."  This  is  still  distinctive 
to  America,  though  France  is  now  (1903) 
striving  for  its  attainment.  The  other  conten- 
tion of  Spinoza  in  the  present  connection,  free- 
dom of  Thought  and  Speech,  is  European,  yet 
with  emphatic  exceptions. 

Such  are  the  three  great  separations  in  this 
Treatise :  as  thinking  individual,  the  man  is  to 
be  free  of  the  domination  of  both  Church  and 
State,  and  each  of  these  is  to  be  free  of  the 
domination  of  the  other.  The  Church  has  its 
sphere  in  teaching  and  enforcing  justice  and 
charity;  the  State  has  its  sphere  in  securing 
man's  rights ;  the  individual  in  outer  conduct  is 
determined  by  both  according  to  their  ends,  but 
in  thought  and  speech  he  is  self-determined,  free 
of  both  Church  and  State. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  such  an  outcome  leaves 
the  individual  in  a  deep  dualism,  that  between 
Thought  and  Action,  Intellect  and  Will.  Thus 


164        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

in  Spinoza  the  speculative  and  practical  sides  of 
human  Spirit  remain  in  contradiction  which  is 
bound  to  show  itself  in  the  shrillest  sort  of 
discord  hereafter. 

The  conclusion  of  the  Treatise  gives  Spinoza's 
attitude  :  < '  I  have  written  nothing  which  I  do  not 
most  willingly  submit  to  the  judgment  of  my 
country's  rulers.  For  if  they  think  that  any- 
thing I  have  said  is  hostile  to  the  laws  of  the 
land  or  to  the  common  welfare,  I  shall  retract 
it.  I  have  taken  care  first  of  all  that  whatever  I 
might  write  should  conform  to  patriotism,  religion 
and  good  morals."  These,  however,  do  not  con- 
flict with,  but  are  furthered  by  Free  Thought 
and  Free  Speech  in  a  State  which  allows  men 
"  to  think  as  as  they  please  and  to  say  what  they 
think."  (Compare  Descartes'  submission  «« to 
the  authority  of  the  Catholic  Church  "  at  the  end 
of  his  Principia.} 

2.  The  Political  Treatise.  The  reader  will  be 
at  once  struck  with  this  title,  similar  to  yet  dif- 
ferent from  the  preceding  one.  What  is  indi- 
cated by  the  change  is  true :  Spinoza  has  quite 
thrown  off  the  theological  element  in  the  present 
book  which  sets  forth  the  purely  secular  State, 
freed  from  its  connection  with  religion.  The  old 
Hebrew  theocratic  substrate  lay  deep  in  the  pre- 
vious Treatise,  as  its  double  title  suggests.  But 
now  the  State  is  looked  at  as  it  is  in  itself,  in  its 
own  right,  as  a  distinctive  institution ;  the  point 


SPINOZA.  —  WRITINGS.  165 

of  view  is  more  Greek  than  Hebrew,  and  indicates 
a  significant  new  stage  in  the  development  of 
Spinoza. 

The  Political  Treatise  was  one  of  those  books 
which  were  not  printed  during  the  author's 
life,  but  which  first  appeared  in  the  Opera  Post- 
huma,  dated  Amsterdam,  1677,  the  year  of 
Spinoza's  death.  It  is  generally  considered  his 
last  work,  though  the  exact  time  of  its  composi- 
tion cannot  be  ascertained. 

It  is  our  opinion  that  it  must  have  been  writ- 
ten chiefly  after  1672,  the  year  of  the  overthrow 
and  death  of  Jan  DeWitt,  who  had  held  the 
chief  authority  in  Holland  since  the  death  of 
William  II.  of  Orange  in  1650.  Spinoza  seems 
to  have  been  a  personal  acquaintance  and  possi- 
bly a  close  friend  of  DeWitt;  he  certainly  sym- 
pathized with  the  latter 's  party  in  its  opposition 
to  the  House  of  Orange.  This  party  was  really 
a  moneyed  aristocracy,  composed  of  the  rich 
burghers  of  Holland,  especially  of  Amsterdam, 
though  it  called  itself  republican  in  contrast 
with  the  monarchical  tendency  of  the  party  of 
the  Stadtholder,  who  was  the  Prince  of  Orange. 

This  conflict  between  monarchy  and  aristoc- 
racy gives  the  real  germ  out  of  which  the  Polit- 
ical Treatise  of  Spinoza  unfolds  itself.  We  see 
that  it  was  not  merely  the  ideal  projection  of  the 
secluded  philosopher,  though  it  be  that  too; 
along  with  its  speculative  side  turned  toward  the 


1 66        MODERN  E UEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

upper  world,  it  had  also  an  actual  practical  side 
turned  toward  the  lower  world.  The  book,  in 
spite  of  its  impartial  and  impersonal  manner, 
springs  out  of  the  time  and  circumstances  of  its 
author,  who  shows  a  deep,  warm  interest  in  what 
was  going  on  in  his  party  and  in  his  country. 
Fervid  heart-beats  both  of  sympathy  and  antag- 
onism the  attentive  reader  will  feel  here  and 
there  breaking  up  through  the  impassive  exterior 
of  the  philosopher  in  spite  of  his  strong  self- 
suppression. 

Spinoza  then  favored  the  Aristocracy  of  wealthy 
citizenship,  against  the  Monarch  above  and  the 
People  below.  One  might  think  at  the  first 
glance  that  this  runs  counter  to  Spinoza's  Philos- 
ophy, to  his  God  who  seems  such  an  all-devour- 
ing absolutist.  But  the  fact  is  that  the  monar- 
chical principle  of  the  Stadtholder  had  more 
popular  elements  'than  the  close  aristocracy  of 
the  Dutch  merchants.  Hence  the  people  even 
of  Amsterdam  sided  with  William  III  of  Orange 
(later  the  king  of  England)  in  the  grand  crisis 
of  the  struggle  with  France  under  Louis  XIV, 
who  deemed  it  necessary  to  crush  Holland  in 
taking  his  first  step  to  ward  universal  domination. 
The  horrible  death  of  the  two  De  Witts  (Jan  and 
Cornelius)  at  the  hands  of  a  mob  in  1672  was 
substantially  the  end  of  the  rule  of  the  aristo- 
cratic (republican)  party,  and  was  followed  by 
the  complete  supremacy  of  the  Stadtholder  and 


SPINOZA.—  WRITINGS.  167 

his  party.  These  two  facts,  the  fall  of  the  Aris- 
tocracy and  the  rise  of  the  Monarchy,  are  the 
central  principle  and  the  creative  cause  of  the 
present  Treatise. 

We  may  consider  the  first  and  most  external 
point  as  showing  the  interest  of  Spinoza :  nearly 
one-half  of  the  book  is  devoted  to  the  discussion 
of  Aristocracy,  which  has  a  fullness  of  detail  and 
a  certain  emphasis  and  sometimes  warmth  of  style 
found  in  no  other  portions  of  the  work.  His 
short  chapter  on  Democracy  (the  last)  has  more 
in  it  about  Aristocracy  than  about  Democracy, 
in  which  he  could 'have  no  local  interest,  as  it 
did  not  in  its  pure  form  exist  in  Holland.  Upon 
Monarchy,  however,  he  has  somewhat  to  say, 
both  for  and  against.  He  shows  heat  against 
dictatorships  (Chap.  10)  in  passages  which  un- 
doubtedly have  the  Prince  of  Orange  in  mind, 
who  was  substantially  dictator  of  the  inner  revo- 
lution of  1672,  which  upheld  the  war  with  France. 
And  it  was  well  that  he  was,  we  have  now  to 
say,  looking  back  at  these  events  through  the 
lapse  of  time.  In  this  respect  Spinoza  was  not 
the  voice  of  the  Ages,  though  in  other  respects  he 
certainly  was.,  He  traces  the  cause  of  the  de- 
struction of  the  Roman  State  to  the  fact  that 
everybody  in  a  time  of  terror  from  enemies 
"  turns  toward  the  man  who  is  renowned  for  his 
victories  and  sets  him  free  of  the  laws,  thereby 
establishing  the  worst  of  precedents. ' '  So  Spinoza 


1 68        MODERN  E  UEOPEAN  PHIL 080PH Y. 

saw  " the  death  of  liberty  "  in  the  stadtholder- 
ship  of  the  Prince  of  Orange,  hitting  him  not 
directly,  but  through  a  Roman  example. 

Thus  we  get  to  see  underneath  the  surface 
to  the  real  cause  and  purpose  of  the  present 
work.  But  when  it  comes  to  his  own  party, 
Spinoza  does  not  lack  criticism.  He  complains 
that  the  men  in  authority  have  neglected  their 
duty,  handing  over  the  business  to  secretaries 
and  other  officials  who  have  thereby  become  the 
real  authority  in  the  State:  ««  Which  thing  has 
been  fatal  to  the  Dutch . ' '  But  his  most  important 
criticism  of  his  own  party  is  (IX,  14)  where  he 
declares  that  "  the  Dutch  thought  that  to  keep 
their  liberty,  they  had  only  to  get  rid  of  their 
Count  "  (or  Stadtholder),  which  is  evidently  an 
allusion  to  the  suspension  of  the  office  of  Stadt- 
holder after  the  death  of  William  II,  and  the 
accession  to  supreme  power  of  the  grand  pen- 
sioner, Jan  DeWitt.  "  Still  they  (the  Dutch) 
never  thought  of  remoulding  the  body  of  their 
government,'*  but  they  left  it  organized  just  as  it 
was,  namely  on  a  monarchical  principle,  yet 
without  a  true  head,  so  that  "  most  of  the  sub- 
jects never  knew  where  lay  the  authority  of  the 
Government."  And  so  the  conclusion  is  plain 
that  "  the  overthrow  of  said  republic  has  arisen 
from  its  misforrned  condition  and  the  fewness  of 
its  rulers."  Both  these  evils  Spinoza  will  cor- 
rect by  a  reform  of  the  aristocratic  principle 


SPINOZA.  —  WETTINGS.  169 

which  he  unfolds  in  the  present  book.  Hence 
he  puts  so  much  stress  upon  making  the  govern- 
ing class  a  large  one,  and  upon  preventing  its 
diminution.  Also  he  will  reconstruct  the  con- 
stitution, making  it  aristocratic  through  and 
through,  according  to  the  principle  of  such  a 
government. 

Thus  Spinoza,  in  spite  of  his  protest  to  the 
contrary  (see  his  Introduction)  is  building,  after 
the  fashion  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  and  Sir 
Thomas  More  and  others  of  less  note,  an  ideal 
Republic.  The  reality  has  turned  out  inadequate, 
so  the  thinker  will  excogitate  a  new  scheme  of 
Government,  which  is  the  old  form  remodeled 
and  relieved  of  its  defects,  so  that  there  will 
arise  in  the  present  case  a  true  consistent  Aris- 
tocracy. In  like  manner,  Aristotle  in  ancient 
Hellas  sought  to  set  forth  a  reconstruction  of 
the  Greek  City-State  which  was  in  his  time 
declining.  The  same  purpose  runs  through 
Plato's  Republic,  though  in  many  respects  it  is 
very  different  from  Aristotle's  Politics.  But 
both  have  at  bottom  the  one  object,  the  rehabil- 
itation of  the  Greek  City- State  and  the  restora- 
tion of  it  to  its  pristine  glory. 

To  make  the  comparison  more  complete,  Aris- 
totle did  not  see,  though  he  was  the  friend  and 
teacher  of  Alexander  the  Great,  that  the  latter 
with  his  Empire  had  introduced  a  new  political 
principle  into  the  World's  History,  in  presence 


1 70        M  ODEEN  E  UE  OPE  A  N  PHIL  O  SOPHY. 

of  which  the  old  City-State  could  not  exist,  in- 
deed had  no  right  to  exist.  Similar  to  the 
ancient  philosopher  was  our  modern  philosopher, 
who  likewise  did  not  see  that  the  close,  moneyed 
Aristocracy  of  his  native  Amsterdam,  in  whose 
profits  his  Jewish  compatriots  had  a  good  share, 
had  departed  forever  with  the  death  of  Jan 
De  Witt,  being  wholly  unequal  to  meet  the  great 
coming  crisis,  which  demanded  a  strong  central 
authority.  Upon  Holland  had  been  laid  the 
burden  of  defending  freedom  and  civilization  in 
the  Seventeenth  Century;  to  the  calculation  of 
timid  capitalists  such  a  work  could  not  be  sub- 
jected. Money  is  not  to  rule,  but  to  be  ruled  in 
the  mighty  national  emergency.  Spinoza,  there- 
fore, did  not  see  the  bearing  of  the  events  hap- 
pening around  him ;  he  was  the  opponent  of  the 
House  of  Orange,  which  had  to  face  the  hardest 
problems  of  the  World's  History,  not  to  be 
solved  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Amsterdam 
Bourse.  The  greatness  of  William  of  Orange  is 
that  he  first  conquered  Dutch  capital,  and  then 
by  means  of  it  went  forth  to  conquer  French 
armies.  At  that  moment  Holland  under  his 
guidance  was  the  bearer  and  executor  of  the 
decree  of  the  World's  Spirit  against  the  new 
threat  of  Latin  imperialism,  quite  as  decisively 
as  was  Athens,  when  her  citizens  marched  out 
to  Marathon  against  Oriental  imperialism.  And 
in  the  present  contest  the  House  of  Orange  beat 


SPINOZA.  —  WBITINGS.  171 

back  France,  as  in  the  preceding  struggle  lasting 
eighty  years  it  had  beaten  back  Spain  and  left 
it  to  sink  down  into  insignificance  under  its  own 
self-torturing  Inquisition.  After  these  two 
supreme  acts,  altogether  the  greatest  of  their 
time  on  the  stage  of  Universal  History,  Hol- 
land's work  was  done;  her  political,  maritime, 
and  commercial  supremacy  passed  to  England 
and  her  learning  and  science,  after  a  century's 
lapse,  found  a  new  life  in  Germany.  And  the 
House  of  Orange  after  giving  to  its  country,  not 
the  most  capable  single  ruler,  but  the  most 
capable  line  of  rulers  for  one  hundred  and  fifty 
years  that  Europe  has  seen,  lost  its  power  of 
transmitting  its  greatness  and  vanished  from 
the  scene. 

Our  philosopher,  then,  though  placed  in  the 
very  heart  of  the  World's  History,  in  the  midst 
of  the  time's  two  contending  principles,  did  not 
see  their  significance.  What  contemporary  does 
even  to-day?  Indeed,  we  may  say  that  the  great 
but  far-off  end  of  education  is  to  train  man, 
every  man,  to  read  not  merely  books,  but  the 
purposes  and  decrees  of  the  World-Spirit  in  the 
events  taking  place  in  his  environing  world. 
That  is  yet  to  become  a  science  taught  in  the 
School  —  a  science  which,  we  see,  the  greatest 
philosophers  did  not  know.  Hence  it  comes 
that  Spinoza  is  such  an  interesting  figure  as  we 
watch  him  in  this  last  book  of  his,  seeking  to 


172          MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

conceal  with  an  imperturbable  inien  what  he 
nevertheless  reveals  surging  so  intensely  and  so 
deeply  through  his  personal  experience.  It  was 
doubtless  written  at  The  Hague,  where  Spinoza 
stayed  the  last  seven  years  of  his  life  (1670-77) 
amid  the  political  throbbings  of  the  period. 

Having  thus  noted  that  this  Treatise  has 
emphatically  its  roots  in  its  own  age,  we  may 
next  inquire  what  thinkers  of  the  past  furnished 
help  to  Spinoza.  We  have  no  doubt  of  the 
decided  influence  of  Aristotle's  Politics. 
Whether  this  influence  came  directly  from  the 
original  text  of  Aristotle  which  Spinoza  could 
read,  or  through  the  medium  of  the  Schoolmen, 
is  a  mooted  point ;  there  is  no  reason  why  he 
might  not  have  employed  both  ways.  His 
opening  thrust  against  the  making  of  ideal  com- 
monwealths, and  his  final  construction  of  such  a 
commonwealth  himself  is  in  profound  corre- 
spondence with  the  movement  of  Aristotle's 
book.  The  threefold  division  of  the  forms  of 
Government  (Monarchy,  Aristocracy,  and  De- 
mocracy), and  the  further  subdivision  of  each 
of  these  into  the  good  and  bad  sorts,  is  Aristote- 
lian. Both  the  philosophers  (as  above  remarked) 
show  a  common  underlying  spirit  and  purpose  in 
seeking  to  reconstruct  in  thought  and  by  means 
of  reforms,  to  re-establish  a  decadent  and  indeed 
transcended  form  of  Government;  such  a 
motive,  however,  is  usually  found  in  every  con- 


SPINOZA.  —  WRITINGS.  173 

struction  of  an  ideal  State  or  Society.  Other 
points  of  connection  might  be  noticed,  but  the 
greatest  inheritance  coming  down  to  Spinoza 
from  Aristotle,  doubtless  both  directly  and  indi- 
rectly, is  the  philosophic  Norm  —  Metaphysics, 
Physics  and  Ethics  —  whereof  we  shall  speak 
more  fully  in  another  place. 

Many  other  connecting  links  with  writers  past 
and  present  can  be  traced  in  Spinoza's  book, 
showing  its  spiritual  descent  in  time.  He  advo- 
cates the  State's  ownership  of  all  the  land  for 
his  Monarchy  though  not  for  his  Aristocracy, 
wherein  may  lie  a  reminiscence  of  Plato  or  of 
Sir  Thomas  More,  with  their  thoroughgoing 
communism.  Ideas  may  be  pointed  out  which 
he  holds  along  with  the  great  publicists  of  his 
age  —  Bodiu,  Albericus  Gentilis,  and  also  Hugo 
Grotius,  his  distinguished  countryman.  Ma- 
chiavelli'sPrmce  suggests  to  him  what  is  really  the 
deepest  spiritual  conflict  in  his  book,  the  conflict 
between  the  moral  and  the  institutional.  His 
indebtedness  to  the  contemporary  English  philoso- 
pher Hobbes  has  been  much  insisted  upon  by  some 
writers,  but  it  is  superficial.  The  purpose  of  the 
Leviathin  of  Hobbes  was  to  ground  the  absolute 
Monarchy,  which  was  certainly  distasteful  to 
Spinoza  whose  party  sought  to  set  aside  even  the 
limited  Monarch  in  the  Stadtholder.  On  meta- 
physical points  we  may  indeed  find  coincidences, 
most  of  which,  however,  were  the  common  prop- 


174         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

erty  of  the  time's  thought,  and  were  hardly 
copied  by  Spinoza  out  of  Hobbes.  Yet  even 
in  this  field  he  distinctly  declared  in  a  letter 
(No.  50)  his  fundamental  difference  from 
Hobbes  inasmuch  "  as  I  always  preserve  natural 
right  intact,"  allotting  to  the  magistrates  only 
so  much  right  over  the  individual  as  they  have 
of  actual  power. 

But  the  chief  fountain  of  modern  political 
science  both  in  theory  and  practice,  the  English 
Constitution,  seems  to  have  been  unknown  to 
Spinoza.  Here  again  he  cannot  be  blamed.  The 
Great  Civil  War  of  England  which  Spinoza  wit- 
nessed from  a  distance,  had  obscured  and  tempo- 
rarily sullied  the  English  Constitutional  develop- 
ment which  did  not  come  out  from  its  partial 
eclipse  into  full  splendor  till  the  revolution  of 
1688,  eleven  years  after  Spinoza's  death.  That 
event  also  had  to  vindicate  itself  by  time.  It  was 
largely  through  Montesquieu  in  his  Esprit  des 
Lois  (appeared  in  1748)  that  Europe  became 
informed  of  the  character  of  the  English  Con- 
stitution. It  is  probable  that  Spinoza  had  no 
great  love  for  the  English.  During  his  whole 
life  there  was  the  bitter  rivalry  for  maritime 
supremacy  between  England  and  Holland,  which 
repeatedly  culminated  in  war.  During  the  time 
he  was  writing  this  Political  Treatise  England 
was  aiding  France  in  her  assault  upon  Holland, 
though  the  latter  was  fighting  the  battle  for  the 


SPINOZA.  —  WRITINGS.  175 

civil  and  religious  liberty  of  Europe  against  the 
French  absolutist  Louis  XIV.  Representative 
government,  the  most  distinctive  trait  of  the 
English  Constitution,  seems  to  be  hardly  known 
to  Spinoza.  His  political  contrivances  do  not  em- 
brace representation  of  the  People,  the  mightiest 
fact  of  the  modern  State  which  is  still  devel- 
oping in  that  direction. 

Another  query-provoking  characteristic  of  the 
present  Treatise  is  that  the  author  now  drops  his 
geometric  method,  to  which  he  had  so  strictly 
adhered  in  his  Ethics.  What  is  the  reason? 
He  may  have  intended  this  book  for  a  more 
general  circle  of  readers,  he  may  have  grown 
weary  of  the  rigid  formalism  of  his  previous 
work,  or  he  may  have  even  become  doubtful  of 
its  validity.  Really,  however,  we  may  see  that 
this  change  of  expression  lies  in  the  change  of 
the  subject.  Spinoza  starts  his  Ethics  with  the 
conception  of  God,  who  is,  indeed,  the  beginning 
and  end  of  the  whole  book.  Now  Descartes  had 
already  taught  in  substance  that  God's  thought 
is  mathematical,  and  that  the  expression  of  the 
thought  of  God  in  philosophy  must  show  the 
same  certainty  and  necessity  as  mathematics. 
So  Spinoza  applies  the  geometric  method  to  his 
Ethics,  in  true  accord  with  its  divine  theme. 
But  he  proposes  at  the  start  to  treat  political 
science  empirically,  humanly,  and  hence  he  feels 
under  no  constraint  to  make  it  speak  as  God 


176        MODERN  E UEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

speaks  but  rather  as  man  speaks „  For  which 
change  of  method  the  reader,  being  human,  is 
thankful. 

Moreover  we  may  connect  this  change  of  pro- 
cedure with  another  fact  which  goes  to  the 
bottom  of  Spinoza's  entire  philosophy :  the  as- 
cending or  ethical  movement  of  his  thought  in 
contrast  with  its  descending  or  metaphysical 
movement.  Thus  the  present  treatise  would 
show  correspondence  with  the  second  phase  of 
the  grand  Spinozau  dualism  which  starts  with 
the  individual  (or  mode)  and  ascends  to  Sub- 
stance or  God.  If  this  be  his  last  book,  it  shows 
that  he  was  evolving  out  of  the  stage  of  Sub- 
stance, and  putting  stress  upon  its  opposite  or 
the  Individual.  In  fact,  the  theory  of  the  State 
is  a  constituent  part  of  Ethics,  belonging  to  the  in- 
stitutional element  thereof.  It  is  true  that  Spinoza 
never  brought  the  State  into  a  complete  organic 
relation  with  his  total  system,  though  he  was 
certainly  working  upon  this  subject  at  the  time 
of  his  death. 

The  next  book  of  Spinoza  which  we  shall  men- 
tion is  that  which  goes  by  the  name  of  Ethics, 
though  it  has  both  sides  —  metaphysical  and 
ethical  —  not  by  any  means  reconciled  but  rather 
in  opposition.  The  Political  Treatise  just  con- 
sidered belongs  to  one  side,  or  rather  to  one 
portion  of  one  side,  and  hence  is  of  limited  con- 
tent and  also  is  unfinished.  But  the  Ethics  is 


SPINOZA.  —  WHITINGS.  177 

the  universal  book  of  Spinoza,  into  which  and 
from  which  all  his  other  writings  may  be  seen 
to  proceed. 

3.  The  HJthics.  This  is  not  only  the  most 
important  work  of  Spinoza  but  is  to  be  regarded 
as  one  of  the  great  philosophical  books  of  the 
world,  ranking  with  Aristotle's  Metaphysics  and 
Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  Such  is  the 
place  to  which  it  has  been  slowly  assigned  by  the 
judgment  of  two  centuries  and  more. 

It  first  appeared  in  the  Opera  Posthuma  of 
Spinoza  (Amsterdam,  1677).  To  our  mind  it  is 
not  a  thoroughly  digested,  consecutively  organ- 
ized book;  it  shows  gaps,  overlappings,  contra- 
dictions, in  fact  the  supreme  contradiction 
between  his  metaphysical  and  his  ethical  views. 
This  is  the  line  upon  which  we  would  divide 
it  into  two  large  portions.  The  first  portion 
embracing  in  the  main  Parts  I  and  II,  is  essen- 
tially metaphysical ;  the  second  portion  embrac- 
ing Parts  III,  IV  and  V,  is  on  the  whole  ethical. 

These  two  portions,  as  we  shall  endeavor  to 
show  later,  are  just  opposite  in  tendency,  and 
strikingly  reveal  the  Spinozan  dualism.  It  is 
highly  probable  that  each  belongs  to  a  different 
period  in  the  author's  career.  The  fact  is  well 
known  that  he  was  writing  upon  the  JZthics  for 
many  years,  and  was  at  least  twice  on  the  point 
of  publishing  it,  when  some  unfavorable  occur- 
rence prevented.  A  careful  genetic  exposition 

12 


178        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  Ethics  would  show  that  it  was  a  growth, 
and  quite  a  long  one.  The  general  scheme  of 
the  book  is  a  sweep  from  Substance  down  to 
Mode  (as  self-conscious  Ego),  then  a  sweep 
back  again  from  Mode  to  Substance  or  God. 
This  scheme  has  a  general  resemblance  to  theNeo- 
Platonic  (see  Plotinus  in  Ancient  European 
Philosophy,  p.  614-6),  which  doubtless  came  to 
Spinoza  through  the  medieval  Jewish  philoso- 
phers. But  the  content  of  the  scheme  unfolds 
chiefly  out  of  Cartesian  doctrines,  in  whose 
atmosphere  Spinoza  lived,  wrought  and  thought. 

(a)  Taking  the  first  or  metaphysical  portion 
by  itself  (first  two  Parts),  we  observe  that  the 
author  begins  with  Substance,  the  One,  God, 
and  moves  from  it  through  Attribute  down  to 
Mode.  This  we  call  the  descent,  since  we  pass 
from  the  substantial  to  the  insubstantial,  to  the 
vanishing,  to  the  appearance. 

Still  Spinoza  has  a  good  deal  to  say  of  the 
Mode,  which  appears  in  the  form  of  the  individ- 
ual—  the  material  object,  the  human  body  and 
its  soul.  Properly  speaking,  these  themes  belong 
to  Physics,  but  with  Spinoza  they  are  hardly 
more  than  a  development  out  of  his  Metaphysics. 
It  is  in  the  middle  of  his  Second  Part  that  he 
makes  the  grand  turn  to  the  self-conscious  act, 
or  "the  idea  of  mind  "  (II.  20,  21),  though  in 
connection  with  the  body.  But  in  the  Third 
Part  he  begins  to  treat  of  the  Emotions,  and 


SPINOZA,  —  WRITINGS.  179 

thus  to  give  some  validity  to  the  human  individ- 
ual, to  whose  psychical  life  the  Emotions  belong. 

(b)  Distinctively  with  the  Third  Part  the 
ascent  starts,  and  continues,  with  some  rever- 
sions, to  the  end  of  the  work.  Already  we  have 
noticed  the  self-conscious  act  or  the  turn  of  the 
mind  upon  itself.  A  more  general  assertion  of 
individuality  is  the  following:  *'  Each  thing,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  in  itself,  endeavors  to  persevere 
in  its  own  being  (in  suo  esse  perseverare  con- 
atur"  III. -6).  Thus  the  Mode  begins  to  assert 
itself,  "  to  perservere  in  its  own  being"  — not 
merely  the  self -knowing  mind,  but  each  partic- 
ular thing  of  Nature. 

In  our  special  exposition  we  shall  unfold  quite 
fully  these  two  main  portions  of  Spinoza's  book 
on  Ethics.  There  we  shall  try  to  show  the 
philosophical  Norm  underlying  it  and  controlling 
it,  through  which  Norm  it  becomes  truly  a  Phi- 
losophy. Specially  just  this  dual  character  of 
the  Ethics  gives  Spinoza  his  distinctive  place  in 
the  history  of  the  world's  thought,  and  also  ranks 
him  in  the  philosophical  movement  of  the  Seven- 
teenth Century. 

The  chief  contents  of  the  Ethics  are  discussed 
and  ordered  in  our  succeeding  section  on  the 
Philosopy  of  Spinoza,  to  which  we  refer  the 
reader  for  further  details  about  this  book. 

4.  Minor  Writings.  Several  of  the  earlier  works 
of  Spinoza  have  been  preserved  which  show  the 


180        MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY, 

development  of  his  system,  particularly  as  it 
appears  in  the  Ethics.  These  works  also  give 
us  a  glimpse  of  Spinoza's  studies  of  preceding 
lines  of  thought. 

(1)  In  the  first  rank  must  be  placed  A  Brief 
Treatise  on  God,  Man  and  the  latter'' s  Happiness, 
first  published  in  1862  in  a  Dutch  translation  of 
the  original  Latin  which  has  been  lost.  This  little 
book  was  probably  written  some  time  after  Spi- 
noza tad  retired  from  Amsterdam  in  1656,  that 
it  might  serve  as  a  kind  of  manual  for -his  friends 
and  followers.  It  was  not  published  but  quietly 
passed  around  in  manuscript  copies  of  which  two 
have  been  preserved  in  the  Dutch  language. 
This  fact  shows  that  Spinoza  had  already  his 
disciples  and  was  forming  them  into  a  kind  of 
School,  which  doubtless  met  secretly  in  his 
abode  and  received  lessons  from  him  in  his  phi- 
losophy, which  the  present  work  shows  to  be 
decidedly  in  the  process  of  growth.  In  fact  it 
may  be  regard  as  the  author's  first  sketch  of  his 
Ethics,  showing  the  same  in  its  bud,  undevel- 
oped, yet  the  whole  coming  flower. 

The  most  striking  point  about  this  book  is  that 
it  has  essentially  the  same  general  movement 
and  total  organic  structure  as  the  Ethics.  First 
it  treats  of  God  with  whom  is  joined  Nature. 
Then  it  passes  to  man  and  considers  his  mind, 
the  kinds  of  knowing  and  the  passions,  till  it 
reaches  Happiness  and  Freedom.  The  title 


SPINOZA.  —  WRITINGS.  18 1 

itself  suggests  the  general  sweep  of  the  Ethics, 
which  also  treats  of  God,  Man,  the  latter 's  Hap- 
piness (or  Blessedness).  Such  is  the  interesting 
fact:  the  germinal  Norm  of  Spinoza's  greatest 
and  most  mature  book  must  have  been  present 
to  his  mind  at  the  age  of  24  or  thereabouts.  To 
be  sure  the  work  is  unripe,  undeveloped,  man- 
ifesting a  struggle  both  for  thought  and  ex- 
pression. Yet  herein  it  has  an  advantage:  it 
is  free  of  the  formal,  cramped,  geometric  method 
of  the  Ethics;  it  has  the  fresh,  keen,  dialectical 
utterance  of  the  young  thinker,  even  if  he  some- 
times cuts  himself  to  pieces  with  his  own  acute- 
ness. 

Besides  the  general  sweep  of  the  Whole,  we 
are  surprised  at  the  many  points  of  agreement  in 
details  between  the  two  books  (it  and  the 
Ethics.)  Here  are  Substance,  Attribute  and 
Mode,  in  their  line  of  descent,  yet  all  of  them 
not  yet  unfolded  to  what  they  are  in  the  Ethics. 
For  instance,  God  is  first  and  before  Substance 
in  the  Brief  Treatise;  while  Substance  is  first 
and  before  God  in  the  Ethics.  This  example  indi- 
cates Spinoza's  transition  from  Theology  to 
Philosophy  in  his  two  highest  categories.  The 
ethical  return  to  God  through  love,  which  is  also 
the  highest  knowledge,  is  likewise  indicated, 
though  not  so  fully  unfolded  as  in  the  Ethics. 
Moreover  the  union  with  God  through  love  and 
the  highest  knowledge  (here  the  fourth  kind)  is 


182          MODERN  E UEOPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

immediate,  and  becomes  a  sort  of  Plotinian 
ecstasy.  At  this  point  enters  a  mystical  element 
into  the  philosophy  of  Spinoza,  and  connects 
him  with  the  Neo-Platonists  and  the  medieval 
Jewish  philosophers,  and  with  the  whole  line  of 
pantheistic  thinkers  from  the  Alexandrians  down 
to  his  own  time.  This  line  has  been  quite  fully 
explored  by  recent  commentators  on  Spinoza  in 
connection  especially  with  the  present  treatise. 
In  fact,  this  is  the  strand  of  culture  which 
Spinoza  had  received  from  Jews  who  had 
brought  it  with  them  from  Spain. 

(2)  Another  important  minor  work  is  Spi- 
noza's Commentary  on  Descartes'  Principles  of 
Philosophy  (  Principia ) .  This  shows  the  second 
chief  strand  which  entered  into  and  determined 
Spinoza's  philosophy.  Descartes  was  the  con- 
temporary influence  working  upon  Spinoza,  while 
the  Short  Treatise  represents  the  past,  the  in- 
herited stream  of  thought  which  came  to  him 
chiefly  on  the  ancestral  lines  of  his  people's  cul- 
ture. Wholly  to  be  discredited,  therefore,  are 
the  recent  attempts  to  make  Spinoza  purely  the 
offshoot  of  the  Jewish-Cabbalistic  Medieval  think- 
ers ;  if  such  were  really  the  case  he  could  not 
have  his  present  position  in  the  modern  philoso- 
phy of  Europe.  At  the  same  time  Spinoza  is 
not  exclusively  a  Cartesian,  a  literal  follower  of 
the  master,  or  simply  a  later  phase  of  Cartesian- 
ism,  to  which  view  most  of  the  older  commenta- 


SPINOZA.  —  WHITINGS,  183 

tors  were  inclined.  In  one  sense,  of  course,  Spi- 
noza was  a  pupil  of  Descartes,  in  fact  the  latter 's 
greatest  pupil,  because  he  was  able  to  develop 
the  master's  doctrine  into  a  higher  stage  which 
was  the  next  great  system  of  thought  in  the  line 
of  philosophical  development.  So  Spinoza  if  he 
is  to  perform  his  world-historical  task  has  to 
go  through  and  get  out  of  Descartes  into  himself 
as  the  philosophical  representative  of  his  age. 

In  a  general  way,  therefore,  we  may  see  Spi- 
noza's training  to  Cartesianism  by  means  of  the 
present  book  which  was  first  published  in  1663 
at  Amsterdam.  The  original  itself  (Descartes' 
Principia)  was  not  yet  twenty  years  old,  hav- 
ing been  published  in  1644,  also  at  Amsterdam. 
Its  difficulties  evidently  called  up  the  private 
teacher  who  could  expound  its  doctrines.  Such 
a  class  of  friends  intimately  gathered  round 
Spinoza  for  the  more  thorough  study  of 
the  work,  the  outcome  being  the  present 
exposition.  These  friends  very  naturally  re- 
quested its  publication  (see  Spinoza's  Letter, 
IX),  as  they  always  do.  That  it  was  a  familiar 
subject  to  him  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  he 
completed  the  Second  Part  of  the  Principia  in 
two  weeks,  and  gave  it  "  into  the  hands  of  my 
friends"  who  of  course  "  soon  begged  me  to 
have  it  printed."  But  Spinoza  is  careful  to  indi- 
cate (in  the  letter  just  cited)  that  the  book  does 
not  contain  his  own  views,  which  have  already 


184        MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

become  quite  different  from  those  of  Descartes. 
Moreover  he  gives  these  significant  hints  about 
his  doctrines  seemingly  already  in  manuscript: 
"Through  this  occurrence  (the  aforesaid  publi- 
cation) it  may  be  that  some  persons  who  hold 
the  foremost  places  in  my  country,  will  be  found 
who  may  desire  to  see  what  I  have  written  and 
what  I  acknowledge  as  my  own,  and  that  they 
will  take  care  that  I  can  publish  them  without  any 
danger  of  inconvenience  from  the  law."  It  is 
evident  that  Spinoza  felt  that  he  might  be  prose- 
cuted if  he  published  his  own  works  at  this  time 
unless  he  had  the  protection  of  some  patron 
powerful  in  the  State.  For  he  always  looks  to 
the  State  for  succor  against  the  theological  ran- 
cor of  both  Jew  and  Protestant.  In  the  fore- 
going passage  Spinoza  was  evidently  thinking  of 
his  Theologico- Political  Treatise  which  was 
lying  in  his  desk,  destined  not  to  see  the  light 
till  seven  years  more  had  passed  away.  His 
"acquiescence  of  spirit"  shines  forth  in  some 
words  of  the  same  letter:  "  If  I  can  obtain  no 
such  protection,  I  shall  keep  silent  rather  than 
obtrude  my  opinions  upon  my  unwilling 
fatherland  (invita  patria) ,  and  render  its  people 
hostile  to  me."  This  was  the  fate  of  Spinoza: 
he  obtained  little  or  no  personal  fruition  of  his 
writings  during  his  life ;  but  it  shows  the  adaman- 
tine grit  of  the  man  that  he  would  do  his  work 


SPINOZA.  —  WHITINGS.  185 

anyhow,  without  recompense  in  money  or  honor 
from  his  people  and  his  age. 

In  the  present  work  on  Descartes  Spinoza 
claims  to  be  merely  the  expositor,  but  he  is  in 
spite  of  himself  the  interpreter.  Repeatedly, 
the  ideas  of  Spinoza  creep  into  the  explanation . 
of  Cartesianism  especially  in  the  demonstrations. 
Not  well  otherwise  could  it  be.  For  Spinoza  is 
really  interpreting  a  lower  stage  of  Philosophy 
by  a  higher;  in  fact  he  is  pushing  the  lower  into 
the  higher  which  is  his  own.  Properly  this  is 
the  chief  value  of  the  book :  it  gives  the  genesis 
of  Cartesianism  into  Spinozism,  though  frag- 
mentarily,  and  in  part  at  least  unintentionally. 

One  important  change  he  makes  purposely: 
the  book  of  Descartes  he  transforms  completely 
in  its  method,  and  applies  to  it  the  geometric 
manner  of  exposition.  The  certainty  which  'be- 
longs to  Mathematics  he  will  transfer  to  philos- 
ophy, following  herein  a  precept  of  Descartes, 
who,  however,  declined  to  carry  it  out  himself. 
Spinoza,  accordingly,  gets  the  training  for  the 
peculiar  form  which  he  imposes  upon  his  Ethics, 
in  his  present  work.  So  upon  this  point  he 
stands  quite  alone  in  the  History  of  Philosophy, 
though  herein  he  is  seeking  to  realize  Descartes. 

Spinoza's  comment  extends  only  to  the  first 
two  Parts  of  Descartes'  book,  with  a  small  frag- 
ment of  the  Third  Part.  But  there  is  an  appen- 
dix called  "  Metaphysical  Thoughts,"  in  which 


186        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Spinoza  works  with  a  somewhat  freer  hand  upon 
his  Cartesian  materials,  and  throws  aside  his 
geometric  method.  It  may  also  be  added  that 
the  present  book  was  published  the  same  year 
that  Spinoza  left  the  Collegiants,  who  were 
inclined  to  Cartesianism ;  his  separation  may 
well  indicate  that  he  bad  outgrown  them,  and 
that  he  no  longer  felt  at  home  in  his  old  environ- 
ment with  them. 

Putting  together  and  comparing  the  two  minor 
works  already  designated  we  observe  that  the  Short 
Treatise  has  the  tendency  to  the  infinite,  to  the 
transcending  of  alllimits  andto  the  union  of  man 
in  God,  after  the  Neo-Platonic,  pantheistic  man- 
ner; while  the  Commentary  on  the  Principles 
of  Descartes  has  quite  the  opposite  tendency, 
namely,  to  put  limits  upon  the  mind  and  to 
thrust  the  infinitude  of  thought  into  a  rigid  and 
narrow  geometric  mold.  Both  these  tendencies 
in  their  opposition  Spinoza  will  carry  over  into 
his  Ethics,  making  God  Himself  on  the  one 
hand  Substance  and  on  the  other  mathematical. 

(3)  There  is  a  third  minor  work  On  the 
Improvement  of  the  Intellect  (De  Emendatione 
Intellectus) ,  which  must  likewise  be  regarded  as 
a  preparatory  phase  of  the  Ethics.  The  impor- 
tance of  the  Intellect  in  the  scheme  of  Spinoza 
is  very  great.  It  is  the  controller,  he  seeks  to 
make  it  swallow  up  the  Will.  Through  it,  in  its 
highest  form  (intuition  in  the  Ethics)  man 


SPINOZA.  —  WRITINGS.  187 

beholds  the  divine  act  in  its  creative  power 
creating  the  world;  through  it  he  sees  the 
ultimate  truth  of  things. 

In  the  present  treatise  the  Intellect  has  four 
kinds  of  knowing  or  perception.  These  four  are 
reduced  to  three  in  the  Ethics,  which  fact  indi- 
cates an  advance.  About  this  part  of  his  sub- 
ject Spinoza  reflected  a  great  deal ;  the  kinds  of 
knowledge  or  the  modes  of  perception  he  turns 
over  and  over  in  manifold  repetition,  which  we 
need  not  repeat  here  after  him.  But  his  strug- 
gle to  co-ordinate  the  separate  activities  of  the 
Intellect  is  very  manifest.  He  seems  to  feel 
dimly  that  just  in  this  Psychology  of  the  Mind, 
of  which  Emotion,  Will  and  Intellect  are  three 
forms  or  stages,  lay  the  real  germ  of  his  work 
and  of  all  Philosophy  —  a  germ  which  the  future 
was  to  develop.  But  Spinoza  and  Spinoza's 
age  were  not  ready  for  any  such  development. 
Still  it  is  impressive  to  notice  that  there  lurked 
in  one  little  corner  of  his  philosophical  system 
the  germinal  movement  of  the  coming  Psy- 
chology. 

This  Treatise  remained  unfinished,  almost  as 
if  the  author  had  run  upon  some  obstacle  which 
he  could  not  surmount.  We  deem  it  highly 
probable  that  what  stopped  him  was  the  deduc- 
tion of  the  geometric  method  as  the  proper  one 
for  Philosophy.  If  so,  he  never  reached  his 
object.  He  had  developed  this  method  in  con- 


188        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

struing  Descartes'  Prineipia,  but  he  had  not 
grounded  it  in  Reason  or  Intellect.  This  seems 
to  be  the  gap  which  lies  between  the  present 
treatise  and  the  Ethics,  which  simply  takes  the 
geometric  method  for  granted  and  proceeds  to 
apply  it  without  justifying  its  employment.  We 
conceive  that  Spinoza,  starting  without  this 
method  in  his  Improvement  of  the  Intellect,  in- 
tends to  pass  over  into  it  as  the  final  outcome 
and  attainment  of  such  Improvement.  Thus  it 
would  be  ready  for  his  Ethics. 

Another  point  should  be  noted.  The  beginning 
of  this  treatise  is  evidently  an  imitation  of  Des- 
cartes' Discourse  on  Method,  as  regards  form. 
Spinoza  here  becomes  autobiographical,  and 
narrates  his  personal  experience  in  his  philo- 
sophical strivings.  He  tells  how  he  renounced  all 
finite  ends,  such  as  Riches,  Famine,  and  Pleas- 
ure, "for  Love  toward  a  thing  eternal  and 
infinite,"  which  fills  <*  the  mind  wholly  with 
joy"  (or  with  Blessednsss,  in  the  Ethics). 
"  The  fixed  Good,"  not  the  fleeting,  was  the 
great  end  with  him.  This  declares  his  decided 
ethical  bent,  while  Descartes  sought  after  a  cri- 
terion for  knowing  truth  from  falsehood.  More- 
over Spinoza  seeks  to  impart  his  end  and  to 
'*  endeavor  that  many  attain  it  with  me."  He 
longs  for  a  following,  he  must  have  a  kind  of 
school.  On  the  whole,  however,  personal  experi- 
ences fit  Descartes  better  than  Spinoza,  who  has 


SPINOZA.  —  WRITINGS.  189 

the  tendency,  at  least  in  one  direction,  to  make 
the  individual  a  mere  mode  or  appearance. 

The  Letters  of  Spinoza  can  here  be  only 
alluded  to.  They  have  biographical  value,  and 
they  also  constitute  a  kind  of  running  commen- 
tary upon  his  philosophy,  extending  from  1661 
till  a  short  time  before  his  death. 

5.  /Summary.  If  we  now  look  back  of  the 
totality  of  Spinoza's  works,  we  find  that  they 
are  fragments  of  one  great  fragment  of  a  vast 
philosophic  Whole.  We  may  well  place  the 
Ethics  as  the  central  achievement,  but  it  is  a 
part  or  fragment  round  which  cluster  other  frag- 
ments somewhat  in  the  following  order.  Pre- 
paratory to  it  and  showing  the  genesis  of  it  are  the 
three  minor  works  which  have  been  mentioned. 
But  after  it  and  completing  it  in  its  institutional 
stage  are  the  two  Treatises,  Politico-Theolo- 
gical and  Political.  Still  with  all  these  portions 
added,  the  Ethics  remains  incomplete  on  a  num- 
ber of  sides  as  a  system  of  Philosophy.  It  is 
most  defective  in  the  matter  of  Physics,  though 
in  this  sphere  Spinoza  has  something.  The 
edifice  is  not  finished,  though  enough  has  been 
done  to  show  its  colossal  proportions. 

And  now  we  shall  attempt  to  outline  this  vast 
philosophic  totality  which  has  had  the  peculiar 
trait  of  increasing  in  influence  and  importance 
with  the  centuries.  Spinoza's  system  does  not 
crumble,  but  actually  grows  with  time,  unfolding 


190         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

more  and  more  into  completeness,  as  if  it  were 
a  Hebrew  prophecy  moving  toward  its  fulfill- 
ment. 

III.  SPINOZA'S  PHILOSOPHY.  —  There  is  no  sin- 
gle work  of  Spinoza's  which  gives  the  complete 
system  of  his  Thought.  This  has  to  be  put  to- 
gether out  of  all  his  Writings,  which  sprang  up 
according  to  time  and  accident.  In  these  Writ- 
ings is  lurking  and  working  a  necessary  princi- 
ple, which  never  comes  to  a  full  expression  and 
organization  of  itself,  yet  which  is  the  source 
and  impelling  power  in  all  of  Spinoza's  philoso- 
phizing. He  is  seeking  to  formulate  the  great 
threefold  principle  of  the  Universe,  the  Abso- 
lute (or  God),  the  World  (or  Nature),  and  Man 
(or  Mind,  §oul),  in  his  way,  or  after  his  concep- 
tion. It  is  this  Norm,  unfolded  in  an  original 
manner,  which  makes  him  the  philosopher,  for 
all  philosophers  must  have  something  in  common 
which  causes  them  to  be  designated  by  the  com- 
mon name,  philosophers.  Spinoza  has,  there- 
fore, as  his  deepest  element,  the  philosophic 
Norm,  not  the  religious  or  the  psychological, 
though  we  shall  find  that  he  has  much  to  do  with 
religion  connecting  him  with  Past,  and  with 
psychology  connecting  him  with  the  Future. 

Spinoza  is,  therefore,  the  philosopher,  and  is 
moved,  often  unconsciously,  by  the  philosophic 
Norm,  after  which  the  thinking  Ego  is  formu- 
lating or  categorizing  the  Universe,  but  it  on  the 


SPINOZA.  —  PHILOSOPHY.  191 

whole  leaves  itself  out  of  the  fundamental  process 
of  its  own  thought.  Spinoza  declares  the  essence 
of  Being  (the  ousia  of  the  on)  to  be  Substance; 
yet  he,  the  philosopher,  producing  in  thought 
this  Substance,  is  himself  something  very  unsub- 
stantial and  vanishing  —  a  mere  mode ;  he  is  really 
not  a  part  or  stage  of  his  own  process.  This 
characteristic,  however,  he  shares  with  all  phi- 
losophers, since  it  lies  in  the  very  nature  of  the 
philosophic  Norm,  which  he  employs  and  of 
which  he  is  but  one  expression,  namely  the 
Spinozan. 

This  Norm  moves  through  the  three  stages, 
which  have  been  generally  called  Metaphysics, 
Physics,  and  Ethics.  These  are  all  seen  unfold- 
ing in  Spinoza  though  with  different  degrees  of 
strength  and  validity.  The  place  of  Physics  or 
the  science  of  Nature  as  such  has  a  tendency 
in  Spinoza  to  drop  down  to  a  secondary  or  even 
a  vanishing  stage ;  still  it  cannot  be  left  out  of 
the  normal  development  of  his  system.  In  fact 
the  thought  of  Spinoza  divides  or  rather  is  cleft 
fundamentally  into  the  two  grand  divisions,  the 
metaphysical  and  the  ethical,  which  constitute 
the  profoundest  dualism  in  the  Philosophy  of 
the  Seventeenth  Century.  This  basic  fact  we  shall 
seek  to  make  manifest  in  the  following  exposi- 
tion, which,  however,  proceeds  on  the  lines  of 
the  total  Norm  of  the  philosopher. 


192        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

A.  METAPHYSICS. 

The  distinctively  metaphysical  part  of  Spinoza's 
system  shows  us  his  bridge  out  of  Descartes  to 
his  own  original  Thought.  Everywhere  we  find 
Cartesian  starting-points  both  in  word  and  con- 
cept, till  the  philosopher  takes  us  by  the  hand 
and  leads'  us  over  into  his  own  new  territory. 
Spinoza  himself  did  not  make  this  transition 
all  at  once.  He  had  first  to  come  to  Descartes 
from  his  Jewish  and  other  antecedents,  linger 
awhile  on  the  outskirts  of  the  Cartesian  temple, 
then  enter  it  and  pass  through  it  in  all  its  details 
till  he  finally  moved  out  of  it  into  the  promised 
land  of  his  own  genius.  Thus  Spinoza  appropri- 
ates and  then  transcends  his  master,  who  therein 
shows  himself  to  be  truly  a  master,  being  able 
to  rear  a  pupil  who  can  surpass  him. 

In  a  general  way  we  can  trace  his  development 
into,  through,  and  out  of  Descartes  in  several  of 
his  earlier  writings,  especially  in  his  Short  Treatise 
and  in  his  commentary  on  the  Principia  of  the 
French  philosopher.  Atlast  in  his  great  work,  the 
Ethics,  he  gave  his  final  statement  of  this  spirit- 
ual transition  from  philosophic  pupilage  to  phil- 
osophic independence  —  a  pupilage  which  lasted 
probably  a  dozen  years.  Not  too  long  is  this  to 
assimilate  a  great  system  of  thought,  to  carry  it 
out  to  its  consequences  in  life,  and  then  to  mount 
above  it  into  a  world  of  your  own  creation.  Such 


SPINOZA.  —  ME  TA  PHYSICS.  1 93 

a  movement  we  may  read  in  the  First  Part  of  the 
Ethics,  divested  indeed  of  all  personal  reference 
and  precipitated  into  the  purest  abstractions  of 
Thinking. 

The  categories  in  which  the  present  metaphys- 
ical part  of  Spinoza's  system  unfolds  itself  are 
three — Substance,  Attribute,  and  Mode.  He 
seeks  to  express  the  pure  thought  of  the  All, 
such  as  it  is  in  itself,  freed  from  every  pre-sup- 
position.  At  first  he  seems  to  shun  the  intro- 
duction of  God  (though  defining  Him)  ;  soon, 
however,  he  has  to  identify  God  with  Substance 
(Deus  sive  substantia  I.  Prop.  11).  It  will 
conduce,  we  think,  to  a  more  definite  notion  of 
the  present  sphere,  if  we  cling  to  the  abstract 
term,  Substance,  though  it  is  not  to  be  forgotten 
that  Spinoza's  deepest  trait  is  to  carry  everything 
up  into  God. 

I.  Substance.  This  t6rm  in  its  narrow  sense 
applies  to  the  first  stage  of  the  present  sphere, 
though  in  its  larger  sense  it  includes  the  whole 
sphere,  embracing  also  Attribute  and  Mode, 
which  are  declared  to  be  of  Substance. 

Spinoza,  in  accord  with  his  geometric  method, 
starts  with  a  definition  of  Substance:  ««  By  Sub- 
stance I  understand  that  which  is  in  itself,  and 
is  conceived  through  itself;  that  is,  the  concep- 
tion of  it  does  not  need  the  conception  of  some- 
thing else  in  order  to  be  formed."  Here  we  are 
to  note  the  act  of  conception  (the  Ego)  intro- 

13 


194        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

duced  into  the  definition  of  Substance  which  is 
that  which  I  must  conceive  in  and  through  itself, 
not  through  another  object.  This  lurking  Ego 
we  shall  find  to  be  the  subtle  secret  demiurge 
constructing  Spinoza's  Philosophy,  and  then 
driving  it  beyond  itself  into  a  higher  synthesis. 

At  present,  however,  we  are  to  give  the  char- 
acteristics which  belong  to  the  conception  of 
Substance,  and  which  are  supposed  to  follow 
from  the  preceding  definition. 

(1)  Substance  is  one,  indeed  the  One,  and  the 
one    only  One  in  the  universe.     There   cannot 
exist  in   the   universe  two   or  more  Substances 
(I.  Pr.  5),  for  they  would  limit  each  other,  and 
thus  manifest  finitude  or  determination,  which  is 
the  negation  of  Substance. 

(2)  Substance  is  infinite,  indivisible,  indeter- 
minate.    These  three  predicates  all  express  the 
negative  side  of  Substance  as  the  One,  negating 
the  finite,  the    divisible   and  the    determinate. 
These  latter,   however,  have  really  the  negative 
principle     according     to    Spinoza,    since    they 
negate  Substance  (omnis  determinatio  est  nega- 
tio),  which  is  truly  the  positive  in  the  universe. 

(3)  Substance  is  the    cause   of   itself  (causa 
sui).     This    we    place    as   the   third    predicate 
of   Substance,    though    Spinoza   gives  it  as  the 
first  definition   in  his  Ethics-.   "  By  self  -cause  I 
mean   that  of  which   the  essence  involves  exist- 
ence,   or   that  of   which  the  nature  can  only  be 


SPINOZA.  —  ME  TAPH  7 SIC  8.  1 95 

conceived  as  existent."  Thus  it  combines  in  one 
the  separate  concepts  of  essence  and  existence. 
Self -cause  also  hints  the  inner  process  of  division 
within  itself  and  return  to  itself,  or  the  Psychosis. 
The  reality  corresponding  to  self-cause  is  the 
Ego  with  its  movement  into  seli-separation  and 
self -return,  whose  very  essence  is  its  existence, 
whose  internality  is  its  externality.  Thus  Spi- 
noza defining  self-cause  and  putting  it  as  his  start- 
ing-point, is  unconsciously  defining  the  Ego  (or 
Self)  as  his  first  principle  and  the  true  Sub- 
stance. This  is  a  great  thing  to  do  and  prophetic 
of  much  that  is  to  follow. 

There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that  this  category 
of  self-cause  as  metaphysical  shows  itself  imper- 
fect. It  may  be  said  that  if  a  thing  causes  itself , 
or  is  the  effect  of  itself,  it  has  to  exist  before 
itself,  has  to  be  before  its  own  being  in  order  to 
be.  Even  the  speculative  mind  has  to  take  a 
considerable  leap  before  it  can  find  anything  but 
contradiction  in  any  such  statement.  Or  if  the 
cause  is  simply  one  with  the  effect,  it  is  no  cause 
at  all,  it  vanishes  into  the  effect  which  in  its  turn 
vanishes  also  since  it  cannot  be  without  a  cause. 
Such  a  negative  dialectical  seesaw  lies  in  the 
category  of  self-cause,  inviting  the  skeptical 
spirit  to  seize  hold  of  it  and  to  turn  it  inside  out. 
Still  the  thought  here  is  true  and  profound,  but 
it  must  free  itself  of  its  own  metaphysical  en- 
tanglements by  being  grasped  and  formulated 


196         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

psychologically.  Taken  as  a  process  and  as  the 
very  process  of  the  Self,  the  thought  is  indeed 
new-born,  though  it  can  find  traces  of  its  an- 
cestry in  Spinoza's  self -cause. 

It  is  true  that  our  philosopher  does  not  put  an 
Ego  or  self -consciousness  into  his  Substance, 
denying  to  the  same  both  Intellect  and  Will 
which  are  rather  Modes  belonging  far  down  in 
the  individual  Self,  and  are  hardly  worthy  of  a 
place  in  the  Supreme  One.  Nor  yet  is  any  such 
thing  possible ;  the  worth  of  the  individual  has 
not  yet  fully  dawned  upon  him  or  upon  Europe, 
and  particularly  upon  that  most  aristocratic  of 
all  sciences,  Philosophy.  If  Spinoza  could  have 
put  the  self-conscious  Ego  into  the  heart  of  his 
Substance  and  have  wrought  it  out  into  a  consist- 
ent system  of  thought,  he  would  have  made  a 
spring  out  of  his  own  century  into  ours,  which  is 
a  feat  that  the  Time-Spirit  has  never  yet  per- 
mitted to  mortal  man.  Still  our  chief  interest  is 
to  watch  our  thought  fermenting  and  struggling 
already  in  Spinoza  and  to  trace  out  of  him  the 
descent  of  our  own  Age's  deepest  principle. 

On  the  other  hand  there  is  a  decided  backward 
tendency  in  Spinoza's  Substance.  These  predi- 
cates of  it  remind  us  of  Neo-Platonism,  es- 
pecially of  Plotinus,  whose  one  only  One  was 
also  above  self -consciousness,  was  above  Intellect 
and  Will,  above  all  determination,  finitude,  and 
separation ;  yet  somehow  mind  .and  matter  had  to 


SPINOZA.  —  METAPHYSICS.  197 

separate  from  it  and  overflow  out  of  it,  becoming 
individualized  in  soul  and  body,  like  the  Modes  of 
Spinoza  (see  our  Ancient  European  Philosophy, 
pp.  618-23).  Pantheism  this  doctrine  is  usually 
named  —  a  much-abused  and  uncertain  designa- 
tion. But  it  shows  an  important  strand  of  the 
past  running  through  Spinoza  which  connects 
him  with  Jewish  writers  of  the  middle  ages,  who 
in  turn  reach  back  to  the  Greek  Neo-Platonists, 
and  still  further  back  to  earlier  Alexandrian 
thinkers,  such  as  Philo. 

Still  Spinoza  took  his  Substance  directly  from 
Descartes,  to  whom  it  came  from  the  schoolmen. 
In  fact  we  can  plainly  see  our  philosopher  rising 
above  his  master  and  removing  a  fundamental  dif- 
ficulty in  the  Cartesian  conception  of  Substance 
which  is  said  to  be  of  two  kinds,  uncreated  and 
created,  the  latter  being  likewise  of  two  kinds, 
mind  and  matter,  whose  attributes  are  Thought 
and  Extension.  Descartes  holds  that  God  alone 
is  really  Substance,  which  term  has  not  the  same 
meaning  when  applied  to  created  objects.  Still 
Descartes,  after  having  made  the  distinction, 
does  not  use  it,  but  continues  to  speak  of 
Thought  and  Extension  as  Substances  along  with 
God.  This  ambiguity  Spinoza  avoids  by  employ- 
ing the  term  Attributes  for  Thought  and  Exten- 
sion as  derived  from  the  underived  One,  namely, 
Substance  or  God,  and  by  giving  them  a  distinct 
place  in  the  metaphysical  sphere  of  his  system. 


198         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

That  is,  he  wipes  out  mind  and  matter  (the 
created  Substances  of  Descartes),  but  preserves 
their  Attributes,  and  applies  these  directly  to  the 
one  uncreated  Substance. 

II.  Attributes.  It  is  declared  that'*  Substance 
consists  of  infinite  Attributes  "  (Ethics^.  Prop. 
II.),  infinite  in  character  and  in  number.  Here 
we  see  a  separative  principle  pertaining  to  Sub- 
stance, and  endowing  it  with  infinite  division. 
This  is  what  places  the  Attributes  in  the  second 
stage  of  the  present  sphere. 

Spinoza  has  given  a  definition  of  Attribute,  as 
it  is  one  of  the  things  with  which  he  has  to  start. 
Says  he :  "  By  Attribute  I  understand  that  which 
the  Intellect  perceives  concerning  Substance,  as 
constituting  the  essence  of  the  same."  Out  of 
this  definition  two  very  different  meanings  have 
developed  according  as  the  division  into  Attri- 
butes is  considered  to  be  put  into  Substance 
from  the  outside  by  the  Intellect  or  to  be 
unfolded  from  within  the  Substance  itself. 

(1)  Looking  into  the  definition,  we  observe 
that  the  Intellect  (or  Ego)  has  to  perceive  this 
Attribute,  and  to  find  it  in  Substance,  as  the 
essence  of  the  latter.  The  Attribute  is  "that 
which  the  Intellect  perceives,"  in  regard  to  Sub- 
stance :  in  which  statement  the  stress  is  upon  the 
subjective  derivation  of  the  Attribute.  A  view 
similar  to  this  is  found  among  medieval  Jewish 
theologians  who  held  that  the  Attributes  of  God 


SPINOZA.  —  METAPHYSICS.  199 

(or  of  Substance)  were  not  the  actual  determin- 
ations of  God  Himself,  who  was  the  infinite  and 
indeterminate  and  so  above  every  Attribute,  but 
were  the  ways  in  which  the  Intellect  (or  Ego) 
conceived  God  or  Substance.  Such  a  doctrine 
may  be  supposed  to  have  come  into  Spinoza's 
life  through  the  religious  teachings  of  his  people. 

(2)  Equally  certain  is  it  that  Spinoza  affirms 
the  inner  character  of  Substance  as  dividing  and 
unfolding  itself  into  many  Attributes,  which  are 
therefore  not  merely  subjective,  but  objective, 
inherent  in  Substance  itself.  Infinite  in  number 
are  the  Attributes  of  Substance,  yet  we  know 
only  two  —  Thought  and  Extension.  That  is, 
we  know  that  there  must  be  an  infinite  division 
of  Substance,  yet  we  can  grasp  definitely  and 
name  only  two  of  these  divisions. 

But  thus  Spinoza  is  aware  that  he  destroys  the 
unity  of  the  infinite  One  or  Substance.  He  must 
somehow  keep  out  all  division,  hence  he  declares 
that  *  *  no  Attribute  can  be  conceived  from  which 
it  would  result  that  Substance  can  divided" 
(Ethics ,  I.  Prop.  12).  Also  "  a  completely  in- 
finite Substance  is  indivisible"  (Ditto,  Prop.  13). 
This  Substance  Spinoza  identifies  with  God: 
'•  No  Substance  can  exist  or  can  be  conceived 
except  God"  (Ditto,  Prop.  14).  Here  we  see 
the  same  struggle  to  exclude  division  from  the 
One  or  God  which  can  be  observed  in  Neo-Pla- 
tonism.  And  there  is  the  same  failure.  Sub- 


200        MODERN  E  UEOPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

stance  must  be  deemed  as  passing  over  into  its 
Attributes,  separating  within  itself  and  positing 
itself  in  infinite  forms  of  which  we  can  know  only 
two,  Thought  and  Extension. 

But  how  about  these  two?  Between  them  is 
the  grand  difference,  as  between  mind  and 
matter,  soul  and  body.  Here  again  we  see 
Spinoza  working  over  a  phase  of  the  Cartesian 
dualism.  Thought  and  Extension  are  indeed 
infinite,  but  they  are  relatively  infinite,  not  abso- 
lutely infinite  like  Substance.  Still  further  they 
mutually  exclude  each  other  as  opposites.  This 
is  the  gulf:  "  Body  does  not  determine  mind  to 
think,  nor  does  the  mind  determine  the  body  to 
move"  (Ethics  III,  Prop.  2).  Still  the  two 
must  and  do  co-operate ;  mind  must  ideate  the 
object,  and  the  object  must  stimulate  the  mind. 
Or  is  all  knowing  of  the  object  a  Maya,  a  mere 
subjective  delusion?  So  Orienial  thinkers  have 
held,  but  Spinoza,  to  avoid  such  a  conclusion, 
introduce  his  conception  of  parallelism  (named 
also  correspondence  and  consubstantiality). 

(3)  This  is  uttered  by  Spinoza  in  one  of  his 
most  striking  propositions :  « «  The  order  and 
connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  as  the  order  and 
connection  of  objects"  (II,  Prop.  7).  But 
what  causes  this  complete  correspondence  be- 
tween two  opposite  and  mutually  exclusive  pro- 
cesses? "  Substance  thinking  and  Substance 
extended  are  one  and  the  same  thing,"  namely 


SPINOZA.  —  ME  TAPHYSICS.  201 

Substance  as  such,  which  is  thus  the  cause  and 
first  source  of  the  two  Attributes,  Thought  and 
Extension.  These  run  exactly  parallel  though 
wholly  independent  of  each  other,  and  must 
manifest  a  divine  correspondence  "in  their 
order  and  connection." 

This  is  another  phase  of  Spinoza's  evolution 
out  of  Descartes,  who  made  God  solve  the  dual- 
ism between  Thought  and  Extension  by  direct 
fiat,  hence  externally.  But  Spinoza  solves  the 
same  problem  by  the  inner  unfolding  of  God's 
own  nature — God  being  Substance.  It  is  not 
God's  Will,  for  God  has  no  Will  according  to 
Spinoza,  but  it  is  His  very  Being  which  issues 
into  Thought  and  Extension,  opposite  yet  in 
complete  correspondence  through  Him.  They 
are  consubstantial ,  moving  in  harmony  not 
through  themselves  but  through  their  first 
cause  which  is  Substance. 

We  now  see  the  real  purpose  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  Attributes :  it  is  to  unite  Thinking  and 
Being,  Mind  and  Matter,  Soul  and  Body  through 
the  principle  of  correspondence,  or,  to  use  the 
better  word,  consubstantiality.  It  is  still  the 
grand  question  which  was  especially  started 
by  Descartes :  How  can  I  know  the  external 
world?  Long  will  the  discussion  hold  out; 
it  is  still  going  on.  But  Spinoza  has 
given  his  answer,  and  from  it  will  un- 
fold his  system  of  Philosophy,  which  will  show 


202         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

an  inner  necessity  interlocking  the  whole  uni- 
verse. His  Ego  thinking  the  object  is  really  the 
thinking  Substance  which  at  the  same  time  is  the 
object  thought  in  exact  counterpart  (ordo  idea- 
rum  est  idem  ac  ordo  rerum)  without  a  break. 
Hence  Spinoza's  pantheism  can  hardly  be  said  to 
maintain  the  doctrine  of  the  Maya,  or  the 
world's  illusion,  as  does  the  Hindoo  pantheism. 
Still  it  has  great  difficulties  which  have  been 
uncovered  by  critics  and  have  driven  philosophic 
thought  out  of  Spinoza  into  other  and  later  sys- 
tems. Some  of  these  difficulties  we  shall  men- 
tion in  other  connections ;  but  there  is  one  which 
may  well  be  considered  now.  Though  Substance 
determines  Thought,  as  it  were  absolutely,  Spi- 
noza's Thought  is  certainly  here  determining  Sub- 
stance, thinking  that  which  thinks  it  or  posits  it 
as  thought.  Spinoza's  Ego  is,  therefore,  a  very 
important  factor  in  the  present  exposition,  for  it 
returns  to  the  Substance  which  creates  it,  re- 
creating the  same  in  Thought,  and  requiring  all 
his  readers  to  do  likewise.  Kenlly,  then,  the 
function  of  Substance  is  to  unfold  an  Attribute 
(Thought)  which  is  to  unfold  it  unfolding  into 
its  Attributes.  Spinoza's  Ego  secretly  projects 
the  God  who  makes  him,  yet  makes  him  the  God- 
maker.  Such  is  again  that  demiurgic  Ego  lurk- 
ing in  Spinoza's  and  in  all  Philosophy,  driving  it 
forward  from  one  system  to  another,  and  finally 


SPINOZA.  —  METAPHYSICS.  203 

driving   it  out   of   itself,  and  perchance  out  of 
Europe. 

The  important  point  won  by  Spinoza  in  the 
doctrine  of  Attributes  is  the  principle  of  consub- 
stantiality  in  Thought  and  Extension.  It  will 
furnish  the  ground  of  explanation  for  all  dualism 
in  the  world  of  manifestation  which  is  next  to 
be  considered  under  the  category  of  Modes. 
Properly  the  Attributes  have  no  individuals,  no 
consciousness,  no  Self.  This  is  what  is  next  to 
appear. 

III.  Modes.  These  are  changes  from  Substance, 
since  they  exist  not  in  themselves  (like  Sub- 
stance) but  through  another.  Yet  they  belong 
to  the  All,  are  determinations  of  Substance 
(affectiones  substantial) .  Spinoza  has  given  the 
definition  of  Mode  as  follows:  "By  Mode  I 
understand  determinations  of  substance,  or  that 
which  exists  in  another,  through  which  (other) 
it  is  conceived."  (Ethics  I.  Def.  5.)  In  an 
opposite  way  the  definition  of  Substance  declares 
it  to  be  "  that  which  exists  in  itself  and  is  con- 
ceived through  itself."  Mode  is,  therefore, 
Substance  determined,  finitized,  individualized; 
still  there  is  an  infinite  side  to  Mode  (infinite 
Modes,  as  Spinoza  says).  Motion,  for  instance, 
is  a  Mode  of  Substance  being  infinite,  without 
end  or  beginning,  yet  this  general  motion  (infinite 
Mode)  is  made  up  of  many  particular  Motions 
(finite  Modes)  which  arise  and  pass  away.  In 


204        MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

like  manner  all  the  particulars  of  Intellect  (in- 
finite Mode)  such  as  perception,  memory,  imagi- 
nation, are  finite  Modes  when  taken  sepa- 
rately, and  are  transitory.  The  links  of  the 
chain  are  finite  Modes,  but  the  total  chain  is  the 
infinite  Mode.  Or,  to  take  another  illustration, 
the  genus  is  Mode  as  infinite,  while  the  individ- 
uals constituting  the  genus  make  the  Mode  as 
finite  and  transitory.  Spinoza  repeatedly  speaks 
as  if  the  Universe  was  made  up  of  Substance 
and  Modes ;  what  then,  is  the  function  of  the 
Attributes?  It  is  to  divide  Substance  into  two 
mutually  exclusive  spheres,  Thought  and  Exten- 
sion, which  have  no  connection,  no  relation  with 
each  other.  They  can  be  made  to  correspond 
only  through  Substance,  which  thus  determines 
them. 

On  the  other  hand  each  Attribute  has  its. 
divisions  also  which  are  called  Modes,  that  is 
determinations  or  modifications  of  the  Attribute, 
and  through  it  of  the  Substance.  But  the 
further  fact  is  that  the  division  of  the  Attribute, 
namely  the  Modes  of  that  Attribute,  are  not 
mutually  exclusive.  For  instance,  the  divisions 
of  Thought  as  Attribute  are  Intellect  and  Will, 
which  even  in  their  difference  as  faculties  or 
mental  activities,  are  united  in  the  mind.  In  like 
manner  the  divisions  of  Extension  such  as  Motion 
and  Rest,  can  have  direct  relations  to  each  other, 
though  not  to  Thought  or  any  of  its  divisions. 


SPINOZA.  —  METAPHYSICS.  205 

Thus  the  original  rift  remains,  passing  from 
Substance,  through  the  Attributes  down  into  the 
Modes.  Each  Attribute  has,  therefore,  within 
itself  a  world  of  Modes,  all  of  which  stand  in 
connection  with  one  another,  but  not  in  any 
connection  with  the  Modes  of  a  different  Attri- 
bute. Thus  the  Modes  constitute  two  independ- 
ent worlds,  except  as  they  are  mediated  with 
each  other  through  Substance,  which  is  the 
supreme  determiner. 

Spinoza  seems  at  first  to  have  had  only  two 
stages  in  this  metaphysical  process  —  Substance 
and  Modes.  But  he  interjected  the  Attribute 
in  order  to  win  his  doctrine  of  consubstantiality 
which  explains  the  Cartesian  dualism  of  Thought 
and  Extension  as  well  as  settles  definitely  the 
function  of  Substance.  Then  he  could  fix  more 
precisely  the  significance  of  the  Mode,  which  is 

(1)  finite,  or  the  world  of  separate  individuals; 

(2)  these  constitute  the  Mode  as  infinite,  when 
joined  together  as  genus;   (3)  the  Mode  is  also 
consubstantial,    coming  into  relation    with    the 
Mode  of  a  different  Attribute  through  the  me- 
diation of  the  Highest,  namely  Substance.     Here, 
in  the  Mode,  another  Cartesian  dualism,  that  of 
mind  and  body,  is  explained  in  Spinozan  fashion. 
Mind  and   body  are  Modes,  the  one  of  Thought 
and   the  other  of   Extension;  "  the  mind  cannot 
determine  the    body  to  move,  nor  can  the  body 
determine  the  mind  to  think  "   (III.  Prop.     2). 


206         MODERN  E UBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Still  mind  and  body  are  consubstantial;  both  are 
determined  in  their  order  and  connection  by 
Substance.  In  Descartes  it  is  properly  the  fiat 
of  God  which  makes  soul  and  body  co-operate, 
uniting  the  unextended  and  the  extended  through 
and  in  the  pineal  gland. 

Looking  back  at  the  three  stages  of  the  meta- 
physics of  Spinoza's  Philosophy — Substance, 
Attribute,  and  Mode  — we  observe  that  each  of 
them  goes  back  to  Descartes  and  is  employed  to 
solve  a  problem  which  he  left  unsolved,  at  least 
unsolved  for  Spinoza.  The  latter  builds  upon 
Cartesian  foundations,  but  seeks  to  transcend  his 
master,  calling  to  his  aid  antecedent  Jewish  and 
Neo-Platonic  philosophers,  though  in  his  own 
independent  way.  We  see  Spinoza  breaking 
through  Descartes  into  himself  in  the  foregoing 
metaphysical  development;  he  rises  from  pupil- 
age to  mastery. 

It  is  usually  felt  that  there  is  a  process  in  these 
three  categories.  Hegel  looks  at  them  in  this 
light,  and  regards  them  as  the  forerunners  of  his 
own  three  categories  of  the  Conception  (Begriff), 
namely  the  Universal,  the  Particular,  and  the  In- 
dividual. Still  further,  there  is  the  suggestion 
of  the  psychical  process  (Psychosis),  though  it 
is  by  no  means  distinct  and  consciously  present  to 
Spinoza,  who  would  keep  the  self-conscious  Ego 
out  of  Substance  and  Attribute,  putting  it  down 
into  the  realm  of  the  Modes,  though  certainly  not 


SPINOZA.  —  ME  TAPHYSICS.  207 

extinguishing  it  in  Substance.  Still  the  Ego  of 
Spinoza  (as  already  pointed  out)  is  the  chief 
factor  in  constructing  this  entire  system,  though 
thrust  down  to  the  bottom  of  the  system  which 
it  has  built.  Thus  Spinoza,  while  solving  the 
dualisms  of  Descartes,  has  fallen  into  a  far  deeper 
dualism  himself,  the  nature  of  which  will  be 
more  fully  seen  when  we  come  to  his  final  or 
Ethical  stage. 

Still  in  the  Mode  we  can  spy  out  a  partial  re- 
turn to  and  participation  in  the  primal  Substance. 
For  when  Spinoza  speaks  of  an  infinite  Mode, 
he  applies  to  this  Mode  a  predicate  which 
he  has  already  assigned  to  Substance.  In  spite, 
therefore,  of  the  emphatic  descent  of  Substance 
to  Mode,  quite  like  the  Neo-Platonic  lapse,  there 
is  also  a  line  of  ascent  and  return  of  the  latter  to 
the  former,  even  if  incomplete.  Indeed  it  would 
seem  that  all  particular,  finite  Modes  can  rise  to 
the  genus  as  infinite  and  thus  share  in  Substance. 
Hence  the  underlying  psychical  return  can  be 
discerned  even  in  the  metaphysical  stage  of 
Spinoza. 

But  when  we  include  the  philosopher  in  his 
own  process  of  thought,  we  find  that  just  this  is 
what  he  has  been  doing.  Spinoza's  Ego,  which  is 
Mode,  must  go  back  to  Substance,  and  think  it, 
thus  creating  or  at  least  re-creating  it  in  thought. 
When  he  says  per  substantiam  intelligo  (I.  Pr.  3) 
he  as  Ego  is  defining,  thinking,  reproducing 


208         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Substance.  It  is  "that  which  is  conceived  in 
itself" — by  whom?  By  a  Mode  (Ego)  which 
has  been  derived  from  it.  Thus  that  which  is 
derived  or  caused,  returns  to  its  source  or  cause, 
and  derives  or  conceives  that.  Metaphysically 
this  is  a  complete  contradiction  according  to 
Spinoza,  for  Substance  is  its  own  eternal  cause 
and  not  Mode.  But  he  is  unconsciously  doing 
just  what  he  says  cannot  be  done,  and  is  psycho- 
logically correct  in  doing  so. 

It  has  been  also  noted  that  the  Attribute 
was  the  second  or  divisive  stage  in  the  total 
movement  of  Substance,  psychically  conceived. 
Yet  according  to  the  Spinozan  metaphysics,  Sub- 
stance is  indivisible,  indeterminate.  And  still  the 
Attribute  can  hardly  be  other  than  some  kind  of 
determination  of  Substance.  In  fact,  Spinoza 
makes  the  Attribute  just  the  realm  of  division ; 
and  ultimately  what  is  there  to  be  divided  but 
Substance,  the  One  and  All?  At  least  three 
divisions  of  these  Attributes  of  Substance  appear 
in  Spinoza :  ( 1)  Attributes  are  infinite  in  number, 
and  it  would  seem  in  quality.  This  indicates 
that  the  Attribute  is  the  principle  of  division. 
Of  what  else  can  this  be  but  of  Substance?  (2) 
Attributes  are  further  divided  into  the  known 
and  unknown  —  two  known,  all  the  rest  un- 
known. This  division  regards  the  subject,  the 
Ego,  within  its  supposed  limits.  (3)  The  explicit 


SPINOZA.  —  METAPHYSICS.  209 

division  of  the  Attributes  is  into  Thought  and 
Extension. 

Thus  it  appears  that  the  Attribute  is  the 
realm  of  division,  of  multiplicity,  for  Spinoza ; 
how  then  can  it  lie  outside  of  the  All  or  Sub- 
stance? Indeed  the  Attribute  of  Substance  is 
closely  related  to  the  essence  of  Being,  which  is 
the  old  formula  of  Philosophy,  and  which  Spi- 
noza sought  to  set  aside  as  implying  the  division 
of  Being  (or  Substance).  For  when  we  say 
essence,  cause,  principle  of  Being,  we  imply  that 
there  is  something  apart  from  or  behind  Being 
which  determines  it.  Spinoza's  Substance  is, 
therefore,  its  own  essence,  its  own  tfause  (causa 
sui)  ;  it  is  the  One  and  All  in  itself.  Still  it  has 
Attributes,  through  which  alone  it  can  be  con- 
ceived by  the  Ego,  without  which  therefore,  it 
could  not  be  an  object  of  knowledge.  Notwith- 
standing all  of  Spinoza's  efforts  to  exclude  divi- 
sion from  his  Substance,  it  creeps  in  and  stays, 
both  subjectively  and  objectively. 

Here  we  may  allude  to  a  controversy  between 
two  famous  historians  of  Philosophy  concerning 
this  matter — J.E.  Erdmann  and  K.Fischer  (both 
of  the  Hegelian  School).  Primarily  the  dis- 
pute turns  upon  the  translation  of  tanquam  in 
Spinoza's  definition  of  Attribute,  which  is  "  that 
which  the  Intellect  perceives  concerning  Sub- 
stance as  (or  as  if)  constituting  its  essence 
(TANQUAM  ejusdem  essentiam  constituens) ."  The 

14 


210         M  ODEEN  E  UE  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

first  translation  (as)  implies  that  the  Attributes 
are  real  constituents  of  Substance ;  the  second 
translation  (as  if)  implies  that  they  are  appar- 
ent constituents  of  Substance,  are  merely  in  the 
perceiving  Intellect,  not  in  God.  Without  going 
into  further  details  of  this  discussion,  the 
reader  can  see  at  once  that  both  sides  are  right 
in  a  sense  and  both  are  wrong  in  a  sense. 
Spinoza  has  both  in  his  conception,  both  the 
objective  and  the  subjective,  both  the  real  and 
the  apparent.  This  is  one  phase  of  his  dualism 
which  is  not  to  be  wiped  out  by  taking  one  side 
or  the  other.  Both  the  above-mentioned  philo- 
sophic gentlemen  are  just  alike  and  both  wrong 
in  taking  antagonistic  sides  in  this  matter.  We 
are  to  see  that  Spinoza  has  both  sides  and  both 
in  a  process  with  each  other,  which  process  is 
completed  by  a  third  principle  (consubstantiality  ) 
which  in  its  way  unites  both,  that  is,  both  object 
and  subject.  It  is  true  that  this  process  is  not 
explicitly  given  by  Spinoza,  still  it  is  the  inner 
unconscious  germ  unfolding  in  his  Philosophy. 
Evidently  there  is  but  one  solution  for  all 
these  contradictions  in  Spinoza:  they  must  be 
seen  as  a  process,  and  that  too  as  a  psychical  pro- 
cess (or  the  Psychosis),  whose  stages  if  held  apart 
become  purely  separative  and  contradictory. 
For  this  the  manner  of  Spinoza  is  largely  to 
blame.  He  proceeds  mathematically,  by  defini- 
tion, axiom,  postulate.  Thus  the  actual  process 


SPINOZA.  — METAPHYSICS.  211 

is  cut  to  pieces  and  thrown  out  bit  by  bit,  which 
the  reader  has  to  put  together  again  if  he  will 
form  a  consistent  Whole  out  of  these  fragments. 
The  geometric  manner  starts  with  the  solid  real 
world,  and  abstracts  surface  (or  plane),  line  and 
point,  out  of  which  it  constructs  the  new  geo- 
metric ideal  world.  Spinoza's  procedure  in 
Philosophy  seeks  to  be  similar ;  starting  with  the 
Universe  it  abstracts  Substance,  Attribute,  and 
Mode,  in  a  descending  conscious  line  to  the  last, 
which,  however,  as  Mode  (or  Point)  returns 
unconsciously  to  the  first  and  secretly  makes  the 
whole  a  process.  In  spite  of  his  Metaphysics 
and  Mathematics,  Spinoza  is  psychological  under- 
neath his  formalism,  and  must  be  ultimately  so 
interpreted.  In  fact,  just  this  is  his  greatness 
and  his  importance  for  the  future. 

Spinoza's  great  aim  in  his  doctrine  of  Sub- 
stance is  to  assail  and  batter  down  the  capricious 
God  of  his  time  —  the  God  of  Catholicism  and 
Augustine  as  well  as  the  God  of  Protestantism 
and  Calvin.  For  this  reason  he  has  been  called 
an  atheist  by  the  theologians,  but  he  is  not. 
By  Hegel  and  others  he  is  named  an  acosmist, 
or  one  who  denies  the  world,  but  this  title  also 
does  not  fit.  Others  call  him  just  the  opposite, 
a  cosmotheist,  others  a  pantheist,  the  latter 
being  his  most  common  designation.  The  im- 
partial reader  will  see  some  ground  for  all  these 
epithets,  yet  he  will  be  inclined  to  reject  them 


212        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

all  as  insufficient.  For  they  all  leave  out  that 
inwardly  working  psychical  process  without 
which  Spinoza  is  pure  absurdity  and  contradic- 
tion. In  fact,  the  interpretations  of  Spinoza 
have  made  a  history  of  themselves,  which  we 
shall  allude  to  more  fully  in  another  connection. 
Is  not  Spinoza  himself  somewhat  like  his  own 
God?  The  anthropomorphic  capricious  deity  of 
his  people  had  driven  him  forth  like  Hagar,  to 
the  wilderness,  out  of  his  Hebrew  world.  But 
he  finds  not  a  wilderness,  not  a  Godless  realm; 
jmthe  contrary,  he  possesses  the  inner  power  to 
reconstruct  the  whole  universe  and  to  re-make  its 
God,  who  in  this-  new  domain  cannot  be  capri- 
cious, or  even  transcendent  like  the  Cartesian 
deity.  God  is  now  immanent  in  the  world, 
works  according  to  His  law  and  nature  by  an 
inner  necessity  which  banishes  caprice  from  the 
universe.  God  is  a  geometric  movement  and 
requires  no  special  Will  or  Intellect  in  unfold- 
ing. Such  is  the  colossality  of  Spinoza's  thought, 
truly  absolute  and  all-comprehending.  But  it 
also  shows  great  limitations,  having  no  explicit 
process,  DO  Ego,  no  self -consciousness  in  its 
metaphysical  aspect.  The  result  is,  Spinoza's 
thought  shows  within  itself  on  its  descending 
side  inner  self -opposition  and  disintegration, 
which  finally  compels  it  to  overcome  itself  and 
rise  to  its  opposite. 


SPINOZA.  —  PHYSICS.  2 13 

The  outcome  then  of  the  preceding  metaphysi- 
cal movement  is  the  absoluteness  of  Substance, 
which  not  only  determines  the  world  but  is  the 
world.  This  Substance  is  God,  who  is  therefore 
immanent  in  Nature,  is  really  Nature,  so  that 
Spinoza  says  Deus  sive  Natura.  This  brings  us 
to  the  second  grand  division  of  the  philosophic 
Norm,  Nature,  which  we  are  now  to  see  through 
the  eyes  of  Spinoza. 

B.  PHYSICS. 

In  this  sphere  Spinoza  connects  with,  yet  also 
separates  from  Descartes.  Both  consider  the 
essence  of  the  material  world  to  be  Extension ; 
but  Descartes  makes  Extension  an  Attribute  of 
Matter  as  a  created  Substance,  while  Spinoza 
makes  Extension  directly  an  Attribute  of  the  one 
uncreated  (or  self-created)  Substance,  and  thus 
wipes  out  the  intervening  Cartesian  Matter. 
Hence  we  have  the  statement  (II.  2):  "Ex- 
tension is  an  Attribute  of  God,  or  God  is  an 
extended  thing  (res  extensa)."  In  Descartes 
Extension  is  material,  indeed  the  Primal  Matter; 
in  Spinoza  it  is  "  an  Attribute  of  God  "  who  is  the 
Extended,  and  is  not  Matter  directly,  as  created 
by  God.  At  the  same  time  Spinoza  asserts 
that  God  is  indivisible;  though  *<  an  extended 
thing,"  He  cannot  be  divided;  also  He  is  in- 
corporeal. Still  He  is  Substance,  is  the  All,  the 


2 1 4        MODERN  E UEOPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

self -caused.  The  divided,  the  corporeal,  the 
material  world  would  thus  seem  to  be  insub- 
stantial, illusory,  a  mere  Appearance.  Such  is 
one  side,  the  metaphysical  of  Spinoza,  which, 
being  carried  over  into  Physics,  reduces  this 
science  to  be  a  kind  of  unreal  phantasm.  But 
there  is  another  side  to  Spinoza,  just  the  oppo- 
site, in  fact,  and  these  sides  are  seen  grappling 
just  in  the  present  field  of  Nature. 

It  is  evident  that  the  system  of  Spinoza  in  strong 
contrast  to  that  of  Descartes,  cannot  present  a 
very  sympathetic  face  to  Physics,  the  second 
stage  of  the  philosophic  Norm,  the  one  dealing 
with  Nature,  the  finite  world  of  phenomena. 
"  Particular  things  are  Modes,  by  which  the 
Attributes  of  God  (Thought  and  Extension) 
are  expressed  in  a  certain  and  determinate  man- 
ner.' (I.  25.  cor.)  The  realm  of  Physics  is 
specially  the  realm  of  "  particular  things,"  which 
have  not  only  no  existence,  but  n»  essence  ex- 
cept in  God.  Thus  a  finite  object  has  no  reality 
in  itself,  as  is  inferred  from  the  following :  "  God 
is  not  only  the  efficient  cause  of  the  existence 
of  things,  but  also  of  their  essence  "  (I.  25)  ;  or 
their  true  essence,  the  essence  of  essences,  is  God. 
«*  A  thing  which  has  been  determined  by  God 
for  performing  something  cannot  make  itself 
undetermined"  (I.  27).  Still  less  can  it  be 
self-determined.  Such  is  the  expression  of 
Spinozan  necessity.  All  forms  of  particularity 


SPINOZA.  —  PHYSICS.  215 

are  Modes  having  neither  essence  nor  existence 
in  themselves,  but  having  only  an  apparent, 
illusory  being  through  our  way  of  conceiving 
them.  *'  In  the  Universe  there  is  nothing  con- 
tingent, but  all  is  determined  from  the  necessity 
of  the  divine  nature  to  exist  and  to  act  in  a 
certain  manner."  (I.  29.)  It  is,  then,  the 
essence  of  God  to  produce  things  which  have 
no  essence. 

But  just  here  Spinoza  makes  a  peculiar  dis- 
tinction. Every  particular  finite  thing  is  not 
determined  by  God  directly,  but  by  another 
cause  which  is  itself  finite  and  determined; 
still  further  this  finite  cause  is  determined  by 
another  finite  cause,  and  so  on  indefinitely 
(I.  28).  Thus  the  whole  determined  finite 
world  of  causation  is  separated  from  God,  who 
does  not  immediately  finitize  himself,  but 
through  some  medium.  From  the  absolute  (as 
God  or  his  attributes)  only  the  absolute  follows, 
and  from  the  finite  only  the  finite.  How  can  the 
chasm  be  crossed  from  infinite  to  finite,  from  God 
to  the  world?  On  the  whole,  the  chasm  is  not 
crossed,  the  dualism  remains  and  is  profoundly 
characteristic  of  Spinoza.  Still  he  often  seems 
aware  of  it  and  makes  a  struggle  to  unite  the 
two  sides  as  follows:  "The  finite  thing 
must  result  from  and  be  determined  to  existence 
and  activity  by  God  or  one  of  his  Attributes,  in 
so  far  this  Attribute  is  modified  by  a  modification 


216        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

which  is  finite  and  has  determinate  existence  " 
(I.  28,  Dem).  So  the  Attribute  (and  God,  too, 
it  would  seem)  can  be  modified  in  turn  by  a 
Mode,  or  a  finite  modification.  Very  important 
is  this  suggestion  for  the  coming  portion  of 
Spinoza's  system.  We  also  read  that  a  Mode 
can  "  exist  necessarily  and  as  infinite  "  (whereby 
there  are  two  kinds  of  Modes  at  least,  and  quite 
opposite),  and  that  such  a  Mode  "  can  be  derived 
either  from  the  absolute  nature  of  some  Attri- 
bute of  God,  or  from  some  Attribute  modified  by 
some  modification,  which  exists  necessarily  and  as 
infinite"  (I.  23).  All  these  fine  distinctions 
show  one  thing  very  decisively:  Spinoza's  tre- 
mendous struggle  to  keep  his  God  one  and 
above  all  division,  and  yet  to  find  some 
ground  for  the  multiplicity  of  Nature,  of  the 
finite  world,  and  its  existence.  He  recognizes 
that  the  Mode  (or  a  certain  form  of  it)  can  go 
back  and  modify  its  modifier,  the  Attribute,  and 
even  God,  as  we  shall  see  more  fully  later. 
Already  let  the  reader  carefully  note  this  turning- 
back  of  the  Mode,  its  reaction  against  the  iron 
chain  of  necessity  in  which  it  has  been  placed 
hitherto. 

So  Spinoza  in  his  treatment  of  Nature  will 
have  to  give  some  substantality  to  finite  things 
even  if  he  proclaims  also  their  insubstantial 
character.  Though  it  be  merely  a  modification 
of  the  Attribute,  it  is  at  times  endowed  with  the 


SPINOZA.  —  PHYSIC  8.  2 1 7 

power  of  modifying  the  Attribute.  Though  the 
finite,  determined  object  is  simply  a  negation,  yet 
it  "  is  really  a  negation  in  part  "  not  altogether 
(I.  8,  Schol.  1).  Then  this  negation  is  not  to 
be  left  out,  it  belongs  to  the  universe,  and  can- 
not rightly  be  omitted  from  Substance  or  God, 
though  Spinoza  hardly  knows  what  to  do  with  it. 
His  trouble  with  the  finite  is  indeed  fundamen- 
tal, he  will  always  be  driving  it  out,  yet  always 
letting  it  back  again  in  spite  of  himself.  After 
being  banished  from  his  process,  it  will  secretly 
assert  itself  as  a  part  of  that  process. 

The  twofoldness  will  particularly  show  itself 
in  his  Physics,  which  we  may  look  at  under 
three  heads:  Extension,  Body  (as  material), 
and  Body  (as  human,  with  Soul). 

I.  Extension.  As  this  is  one  of  the  two  Attri- 
butes of  Substance,  and  in  a  general  way 
embraces  the  material  or  finite  world,  we  shall  con- 
sider it  as  first  under  the  head  of  Physics.  Spinoza 
declares  emphatically  that  his  conception  of  Ex- 
tension is, different  from  that  of  Descartes  (in 
Epist.  69  and  70).  For  "Descartes  makes  Ex- 
tension an  inert  mass,  from  which  it  is  impossible 
to  prove  the  existence  of  bodies."  Furthermore, 
according  to  the  Cartesian  view,  God  sets  this 
mass  in  motion,  so  that  motion  comes  from  the 
outside  into  it,  and  is  not  a  Mode  of  it  coming 
from  within,  this  Extension  itself  being  an  At- 
tribute which  comes  from  Substance.  In  these 


218        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

views  we  see  plainly  the  distinction  between  the 
systems  of  Spinozaand  Descartes.  The  external 
mechanical  agency  of  God,  so  characteristic  of 
the  Cartesian  Philosophy,  Spinoza  puts  inside 
the  Universe,  in  fact  inside  of  God,  who  is  thus 
immanent  in  all  things,  even  the  immanent  cause, 
not  transcendent.  To  be  sure,  Spinoza  will  find 
it  quite  impossible  to  carry  this  thought  through 
his  entire  system  with  consistency.  We  feel  his 
trouble  already  in  the  term  immanent  cause ,  and 
also  in  self -cause. 

Accordingly,  Spinoza  holds  that  Motion  and 
Rest  are  the  modifications  of  Extension,  these 
being  named  infinite  Modes  —  an  expression 
which  has  already  been  noticed  and  which  has 
given  rise  to  much  questioning.  Why  should  the 
very  predicate  of  Mode,  the  finite,  be  suddenly 
changed  to  infinite,  which  is  the  fundamental 
predicate  of  Substance?  (I.  8.)  Here  is  an- 
other instance  of  that  return  of  the  Mode  to  its 
starting-point  in  Substance,  whereby  the  finite 
is  made  to  partake  of  the  infinite,  for. the  phrase 
infinite  Mode  puts  really  the  two  adjectives  to- 
gether, even  if  opposites.  Thus  Extension  has 
Motion  and  Rest  and  their  inter-relation  perpetu- 
ally going  on  within  itself,  and  herein  manifests 
a  kind  of  self-activity,  which,  though  a  Mode,  is 
infinite  and  so  substantial.  Undoubtedly  Spinoza 
does  not  state  these  two  phases  of  his  Mode  as 
two  stages  of  a  process,  but  as  two  sides  of  a 


SPINOZA.  —  PHYSICS.  2 1 9 

dualism,  which,  as  far  as  he  goes,  remains  in 
unreconciled  contradiction.  Still  less  does  he 
see  this  self -returning  activity  of  his  Mode  as  the 
very  necessity  of  his  own  Ego  to  complete  its 
process  in  its  thinking.  Nevertheless  it  is 
wonderful  to  observe  how  his  true  philosophic 
instinct,  against  his  conscious  purpose  drives  him 
covertly  to  turn  back  his  separated  and  estrayed 
Finite  into  the  Infinite. 

II.  Body  (as  material) .  The  corporeal  world 
is  one  with  which  Spinoza  has  little  congeniality, 
being  just  the  manifestation  of  finitude,  multi- 
plicity, division,  all  of  them  hateful  categories  to 
the  idealist.  Yet  this  Appearance  will  not  van- 
ish, but  persists  in  being  and  finally  has  to  be 
reckoned  with.  It  will  somehow  creep  into  the 
system  of  thought  from  which  it  has  been  ex- 
cluded, and  usually  splits  the  same  wide-open, 
making  that  which  sought  to  be  monistic  pain- 
fully dualistic. 

When  we  come  to  Body  we  pass  from  Exten- 
sion to  Mode,  "  which"  as  Spinoza  puts  it, 
•'  expresses  the  essence  of  God,  in  so  far  as  He  is 
an  extended  thing  (res  extensa),  in  a  certain  and 
determinate  manner."  (II.  Def.  1.)  Extension, 
as  Attribute,  is  still  infinite,  but  now  in  Body  as 
Mode  it  becomes  finite,  divided,  determined,  and 
really  is  not,  according  to  the  metaphysics  of 
Spinoza,  in  which  all  determination  is  negation. 
Yet  we  shall  find  here  too  that  the  particular 


220        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

thing,  or  the  finite  realm,  vanishes  on  one  side, 
and  then  rises  and  returns  on  the  other. 

The  two  Modes  of  Extension  already  noticed, 
Motion  and  Rest,  presuppose  the  material  body 
for  their  manifestation,  hence  "  all  bodies  are 
either  in  motion  or  rest  "  (II.  13  Ax.  1).  So  it 
comes  that  each  body  in  Motion  or  at  Rest  is 
determined  thereto  by  another  body  in  Motion 
or  at  Rest,  which  second  body  has  been  deter- 
mined thereto  by  still  another,  and  so  on  indefi- 
nitely. Thus  the  physical  world  presents  a  very 
changeful  countenance,  which  Spinoza  seems  to 
call  * '  the  face  of  the  whole  universe ' '  (fades 
tolius  universi,  Epist.  66)  ;  this  term,  however, 
may  include  both  Attributes,  Thought  and  Ex- 
tension. But  in  this  totality  of  all  things  with 
their  changes  is  the  infinite  Mode  which  is  always 
the  same.  "  We  may  conceive  the  whole  of 
Nature  to  be  one  individual,  whose  parts,  that 
is,  all  bodies,  vary  in  infinite  modes  without  any 
change  of  the  one  total  individual."  Spinoza 
says  he  would  unfold  this  subject  more  fully,  if 
he  were  writing  specially  on  body  (II.  Lemma  1 
Schol.  1 ) .  It  is  plain ,  however ,  that  he  conceives 
of  the  vast  changeful  multiplicity  of  Nature  as 
one  internally  self -developing  totality,  the  same 
beneath  all  its  mutations. 

To  put  now  the  stress  upon  the  particular 
element,  we  may  cite  the  pivotal  Proposition 
(V.  24)  :  •«  The  more  we  understand  particular 


SPINOZA.  —  PHYSICS.  22 1 

things,  the  more  we  understand  God,"  who  is 
their  "  efficient  cause  "  as  to  both  their  existence 
and  essence.  So  if  we  grasp  the  totality  of 
things  as  "  one  individual"  self -moving  within 
itself,  or  as  "  the  face  of  the  total  universe," 
we  may  see  God  by  the  act  of  intuition  (which 
is  the  third  stage  of  knowledge,  to  be  set  forth 
hereafter).  Herein  we  observe  that  the  supreme 
act  of  the  Intellect  is  to  bring  back  the  separated 
particular  thing  to  its  unity  with  the  All. 

Moreover,  Spinoza  distinctly  marks  an  ele- 
ment which  is  '*  equally  in  the  part  and  in  the 
whole"  (ceque  in  parte  ac  in  toto),  which  is 
the  unifying  principle  between  the  All  and  its 
particulars,  or  between  the  Infinite  and  Finite, 
or  between  Substance  and  Mode.  It  is  this 
element  which  is  "  common  to  all  things,"  and 
which  is  "  equally  in  the  part  and  in  the  whole," 
which,  therefore,  has  to  be  "  conceived  ade- 
quately," or  "  represented  by  an  adequate  idea 
in  the  mind,"  if  we  are  to  think  the  world  aright 
(see  II.  38-39).  Again  Spinoza  catches  a 
glimpse  of  a  very  fruitful  thought,  which  would 
unify  his  whole  system  if  carried  out  completely, 
but  having  taken  a  peep  he  drops  back  into  his 
dualism.  He  certainly  declares  that  if  the  mind 
is  to  reach  truth,  it  must  see  "that  which  is 
equally  in  the  part  and  in  the  whole."  To  be 
sure  he  does  not  tell  us  what  this  is,  nor  indicate 
that  it  is  a  process,  nor  even  remotely  hint  that 


222        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

it  is  the  mind's  own  proeess.  He  belongs  to  the 
middle  of  the  17th  century  and  leaves  profound 
suggestions  which  are  to  be  developed  by  those 
philosophers  who  come  after  him . 

We  say  that  when  he  seems  on  the  point  of 
rising  out  of  his  contradiction  and  dualism,  and 
states  the  very  principle  of  such  a  rise,  he  drops 
back  and  affirms  just  the  opposite.  Let  us  look 
at  one  of  his  Propositions  (II.  37),  already 
touched  upon  in  the  present  connection:  "  That 
which  is  common  to  all,  and  which  is  equally  in 
the  part  and  in  the  whole  does  not  constitute  the 
essence  of  any  particular  thing  (nullius  rei  singu- 
laris)."  Now  it  seems  to  us  that  just  the 
opposite  is  the  true  statement,  namely,  "  that 
which  is  equally  in  the  part  and  in  the  whole  " 
is  just  the  element  "  which  does  constitute  the 
essence  of  the  particular  thing,"  and  of  all  par- 
ticularity. At  the  same  time  it  is  plain  that  if 
Spinoza  had  made  any  such  statement,  he  would 
have  contradicted  the  outcome  of  his  entire  pre- 
ceding metaphysical  movement,  which  ends  in  the 
illusory,  negative  character  of  the  finite  or  par- 
ticular world,  as  the  realm  of  Modes. 

So  much  for  the  material  body  in  Nature, 
which  shows  the  Spinozan  characteristic  of  the 
open  lapse  into,  yet  the  secret  return  out  of, 
vanishing  finitude.  The  explicit  descent  of 
Nature  into  nothingness  is  counteracted  by  its 
implicit  ascent  into  participation  with  Substance. 


SPINOZA.  —  PHYSICS.  223 

But  now  we  come  to  the  Human  Body  with  its 
Soul,  in  which  field  Spinoza  develops  a  dis- 
tinctive movement  of  his  own. 

III.  Body  (human,  with  Soul  or  Mind).  The 
relation  of  Body  and  Soul  (the  latter  is  often 
called  mens  by  Spinoza),  as  a  philosophical  ques- 
tion was  inherited  directly  from  Descartes. 
Body  and  Mind  are  correlates,  consubstantial. 
"  The  human  Mind  must  perceive  all  that  takes 
place  in  the  Body."  Spinoza  seems  to  conceive 
at  first  an  immediate  unity  or  rather  consub- 
stantiality  between  Mind  and  Body.  «.« The 
human  Mind  is  adapted  for  perceiving  many 
things,"  namely  all  the  modifications  of  its 
Body  (II.  14).  Thus  the  Body  shows  its 
nature,  since  it  can  stimulate  the  Mind,  indeed 
this  is  what  makes  the  Body  human.  "  The 
idea  of  any  Mode  in  which  the  Body  is  affected 
from  external  bodies,  must  involve  the  nature  of 
the  human  Body"  (II.  16).  That  is,  the 
human  Body,  being  stimulated  from  without  finds 
an  immediate  response  in  the  Mind,  which 
response  is  an  idea.  The  human  Body  is  thus  a 
kind  of  medium  between  external  bodies  and  the 
idea  of  them  in  the  Mind.  "  If  the  human  Body 
is  affected  in  a  manner  which  involves  the  nature 
of  the  external  body  (material),  the  human  Mind 
will  contemplate  this  external  body  as  actually 
existing  or  as  present  to  itself  "  (II.  17).  This 
is  Spinoza's  view  of  sense-perception,  which 


224        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

brings  into  the  consubstantial  process  of  Body 
and  Mind  the  outer  world  of  material  objects. 
Hence  follows  an  important  conclusion:  "The 
human  Mind  does  not  know  body  itself,  not  even 
that  it  exists,  except  through  the  ideas  of  that 
body's  modifications  "  (II.  19).  A  great  history 
lies  in  this  statement,  nothing  less  than  the 
Kantian  Thing-in-itself ,  of  which  all  knowledge 
is  denied.  Already  in  Descartes  a  similar  germ  of 
denial  can  be  found.  Both  philosophers,  how- 
ever, fall  back  upon  God  to  vindicate  the  reality 
of  the  objective  world:  Descartes  upon  divine 
veracity,  Spinoza  upon  divine  Substance  in  and 
through  whom  "  the  order  of  ideas  is  the  same 
as  the  order  of  things."  But  when  the  Eight- 
eenth Century  has  undermined  this  divine  inter- 
ference of  the  Seventeenth  Century,  Hume  and 
Kant  will  shine  forth  in  all  their  skeptical  glory. 
This  central  position  of  the  human  Body,  lying 
between  the  idea  and  the  outer  material  world, 
is  dwelt  upon  quite  fully  by  Spinoza  (in  the  Sec- 
ond Part  of  his  Ethics) .  It  is  a  fresh  elaboration 
of  the  Cartesian  doctrine  of  Body  and  Soul  from 
the  new  standpoint  of  consubstantiality.  The 
mediating  God  between  these  opposites  is  no 
longer  transcendent,  outside  of  them,  but  imma- 
nent, within  them,  and  they  in  Him.  As  in 
Descartes,  so  in  Spinoza,  the  primary  stage  of 
the  human  Mind  (or  Soul)  as  the  ideal  correlate 
of  the  human  Body  belongs  to  the  stage  of 


SPINOZA.  —  PHYSICS.  225 

Physics,  inasmuch  as  the  latter  shows  it  deter- 
mined by  the  Body  which  is,  therefore,  his  start- 
ing-point in  the  present  sphere.  "  The  object 
of  the  idea  constituting  the  human  mind  is  the 
Body"  (II.  13).  The  Body  is  the  object  or 
thing  (mode  of  extension)  which  gives  the 
primal  idea  constituting  the  mind.  "Thus  we 
know  the  human  mind  to  be  not  only  united  to 
the  Body,  but  also  what  is  the  nature  of  such 
union."  «'  But  no  one  will  be  able  to  understand 
the  mind  adequately  or  distinctly  without  first 
adequately  knowing  the  nature  of  our  Body." 
(Do.  Schol.)  So  the  Body  furnishes  the  primal 
content  of  mind,  in  a  manner  determining  the 
same,  not  directly  but  through  Substance  or  "  in 
God."  Wherefore  it  comes  that  if  we  would 
find  out  the  difference  between  the  Mind  and 
other  things,  "  it  is  necessary  for  us  to  know  the 
nature  of  the  Mind's  object,  namely  the  human 
Body."  And  in  general,  "the  first  element  con- 
stituting the  actual  existence  of  the  human  Mind 
is  the  idea  of  some  particular  thing  actually  ex- 
isting." (II.  11.)  In  these  passages  the  drift 
is  that  the  human  Body  comes  first,  determining 
and  stimulating  the  mind  to  an  idea,  <«  which  is 
a  concept  of  the  mind  as  the  thing  which  thinks 
(res  cogitans)"  (II.  Def.  3). 

But  Mind  and  Body  are  wholly   separate,  hav- 
ing no  direct  connection    according  to  Spinoza. 

15 


226        MODERN  E  UROPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

Hence  the  question  arises,  How  can  the  Body  get 
to  be  an  object  of  the  Mind,  or  of  an  idea? 
This  carries  us  back  to  Substance  or  God  whose 
attributes  are  Thought  and  Extension.  Now 
Mind  is  a  mode  of  Thought,  and  Body  is  a  mode 
of  Extension ;  of  these  two  modes  God  is  the 
essence,  cause,  source,  or  the  whole  of  which 
they  are  apart.  '*  Hence  it  follows  that  the 
human  Mind  is  a  part  of  the  infinite  intellect  of 
God.  So,  when  we  say  the  Mind  perceives 
this  or  that  object,  we  affirm  nothing  else  than 
that  God  (not  in  so  far  as  he  is  infinite,  but  in  so 
far  as  he  is  unfolded  by  the  nature  of  the  human 
Mind),  has  this  or  that  idea."  (II.  11.  Cor.) 
Perception  is,  therefore,  the  act  of  Mind  re- 
ceiving from  God  the  idea  of  Body.  Yet  all  this 
must  take  place  in  God,  who  does  not  move  the 
Mind  from  the  outside  to  know  the  Body  — 
which  would  be  to  fall  back  into  Cartesianism, 
though  some  of  Spinoza's  expressions  cannot 
escape  this  charge. 

Here  it  is  that  the  principle  of  consubstan- 
tiality  plays  its  part.  The  human  Mind  (as  a 
mode  of  Thought)  and  the  human  Body  (as  a 
mode  of  Extension)  are  consubstantial :  they 
have  or  share  in  the  common  Substance  which  is 
God,  who  has  the  two  attributes  (Thought  and 
Extension),  which  are  therefore  of  one  Sub- 
stance (consubstantial).  This  is  Spinoza's 
method  of  getting  rid  of  the  external  causation 


SPINOZA.  —  PHYSIOS.  227 

of  God,  making  the  latter  immanent,  in  con- 
trast to  the  Cartesians.  Body  is  ideally  in  the 
Mind,  and  so  can  stimulate  it  in  and  through  the 
common  Substance  which  causes  the  idea  of 
Mind  as  the  correlate  of  the  Body.  Mind  and 
Body  thus  correspond  and  are  united,  but  they 
can  no  more  interpenetrate  than  can  the  obverse 
and  reverse  sides  of  a  coin,  whose  common 
material  (also  popularly  called  substance)  holds 
them  indissolubly  together. 

In  general,  the  Body  as  a  mode  of  Extension 
determines,  through  God  by  the  principle  of 
consubstantiality,  the  Mind  as  a  mode  of 
Thought.  This  principle  is  declared  in  the 
statement,  "  the  order  of  ideas  is  the  same  as 
the  order  of  things"  (II.  7),  the  ideas  follow- 
ing the  things  in  and  through  the  common  Sub- 
stance. 

But  now  comes  a  great  change.  Spinoza  be- 
gins to  speak  of  "  the  idea  or  cognition  of  the 
Mind  ' '  by  itself  ( II.  20) ,  or  the  Mind  as  self -know- 
ing, self-conscious.  To  be  sure  such  an  idea ' '  fol- 
lows in  God,"  and  is  to  be  referred  to  God  "  in 
the  same  manner  as  was  the  idea  of  Body . ' '  This 
can  hardly  mean  other  than  that  God  or  Substance 
is  self-conscious.  Moreover  "  this  idea  of  Mind 
is  united  to  Mind  in  the  same  way  that  Mind 
is  united  to  Body  "  (11.21).  Mind  is  thus  its 
own  Body  and  has  its  own  idea  of  itself,  "  in 
and  through  God."  Here  we  see  the  principle 


228          MODERN  E  U  ROPE  AN  PHIL  OSOPH  T. 

of  consubstantiality  passing  over  into  the  prin- 
ciple of  Self -consciousness,  in  which  the  mind 
becomes  its  own  content  (or  body).  "For  the 
idea  of  the  Mind  and  the  Mind  itself  are  one  and 
the  same  thing,  conceived  under  one  and  the 
same  attribute,  that  of  Thought."  But  Spinoza 
assigns  no  such  power  to  Body,  namely  of  turn- 
ing back  upon  itself  and  knowing  itself.  Here, 
then,  is  the  point  at  which  the  true  separation  of 
Mind  from  Body  takes  place,  for  Mind  bends 
around  (so  to  speak)  away  from  Body  and  takes 
up  itself.  «'  For  as  soon  as  any  person  knows 
anything,  he  knows  that  he  knows,  and  at  the 
same  time  he  knows  that  he  knows  that  he 
knows,  et  sic  in  infinitum."  (II.  21,  Schol.) 
Here  Spinoza  appeals  directly  to  the  self-con- 
scious Ego  as  the  ultimate.  Yet  he  does  this 
covertly,  as  it  were,  nodding;  when  he  wakes  up 
fully,  the  self-conscious  act  must  follow  in  and 
through  God.  The  self-activity  of  the  idea  he 
also  affirms,  for  we  are  not  to  think  "  the  idea 
to  be  something  dumb  or  inactive  (mutum)  like 
a  picture  on  a  tablet,  but  a  mode  of  thinking,  the 
act  of  intellect  itself."  (II.  43,  Schol.) 

But  with  this  transition  of  Mind  (Ego,  Soul) 
from  consubstantiality  to  self- consciousness,  wo 
have  passed  out  of  the  realm  of  Physics  with  its 
three  stages  of  Extension,  of  Body  as  material, 
and  of  Body  as  human  with  Mind.  In  each 
of  these  stages  we  have  watched  the  secret  pro- 


SPINOZA.  —  PHYSICS.  229 

cess  lurking  and  working  in  the  abstract,  dis- 
joined formulas  of  the  philosopher  forcing  his 
concrete  thought  into  his  geometric  mould.  At 
last  we  have  touched  bottom  in  the  long  descent 
from  Substance,  and  found  the  self-conscious 
Mind,  whose  very  nature  is  self -returning,  and 
which  can  now  start  the  grand  return  and  restora- 
tion to  the  Supreme  One,  whence  has  been  the 
lapse.  That  is,  we  have  reached  the  ethical  or 
more  particularly  the  psychological  stage  whose 
very  essence  is  the  self-conscious  Ego.  Pro- 
tracted and  possibly  tedious  has  been  the  philo- 
sophic flight  downwards  through  Metaphysics  and 
Physics,  since  the  latter  with  its  basic  attribute 
of  Extension  is  but  an  appendage  of  the  former. 
But  we  have  struck  the  mighty  recoil  of  the 
Self  —  wherewith  a  new  movement  and  a  new 
world  must  begin. 

It  is  true  that  Spinoza  does  not  explicitly 
say  this,  but  rather  the  contrary.  "  The  being 
of  Substance  does  not  pertain  to  the  essence  of 
man  "  for  man  is  but  a  mode  of  an  attribute 
of  Substance,  and  hence  two  removes  from  the 
latter.  He,  therefore,  has  no  substantial  being, 
really  no  divine  participation,  since  "  Substance 
does  not  constitute  the  form  (actuality)  of 
man."  Spinoza  uses  also  the  argument  that 
Substance  would  have  to  be  divided  were  it 
individualized  in  men.  "  There  is  but  one  Sub- 
stance but  there  are  many  men,"  which  multi- 


230         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

plicity  makes  them  insubstantial  (see  II.  Prop. 
10,  with  Scholia  and  Corollary).  Moreover  the 
activity  of  the  Mind  (intellectus  actu)  in  will, 
desire,  love,  must  be  referred  to  passive  nature 
(natura  naturata),  not  to  active  nature  (nalura 
naturans  or  Substance).  Indeed  there  is  no 
Will  as  free  cause  or  as  self-determined,  but 
only  as  determined  (I.  31,  32). 

Still  the  mind  turns  back  upon  itself,  is  not 
only  idea  of  Body  (-consubstantial),  but  is  also 
idea  of  mind  or  idea  of  idea  (self-conscious).  It 
is  true  that  God  determines  man  to  this  act, 
which  can  only  mean  that  God  determines  man 
to  be  self-determined.  We  may  repeat  that  just 
at  this  point  is  the  grand  turn  in  Spinoza,  the 
turn  from  the  metaphysical  to  the  psychological 
and  ethical.  Not,  however,  does  he  show  these 
as  the  two  great  stages  in  the  process  of  the 
Universe;  he  has  no  such  process  except  far 
down  in  his  unconscious  Self.  Hence  these 
two  stages  remain  explicitly  two  and  thus  con- 
stitute the  dualism  of  Spinoza,  and  also  that  of 
his  Century,  and  more  remotely  that  of  all 
Philosophy. 

C.  ETHICS. 

To  his  chief  philosophical  work  Spinoza  gave 
the  name  of  Ethics,  as  if  he  deemed  its  essential 
character  to  be  ethical  in  the  widest  sense.  We 


SPINOZA.  —  E  THICS.  23 1 

hold  that  this  view  of  his  book  is  correct.  Un- 
doubtedly it  has  two  very  marked  portions,  the 
metaphysical  and  the  ethical,  which  we  have 
named  the  descent  from  Substance  to  Mode  (as 
self-conscious  individual),  and  the  ascent  from 
Mode  to  Substance.  Under  the  first  head  we 
can  in  a  general  way  place  the  first  two  Parts  of 
the  Ethics,  under  the  second  head  the  last  three 
Parts.  This  second  portion,  the  ethical,  contains 
almost  twice  as  much  matter  as  the  first,  which 
fact  goes  to  show  where  Spinoza  placed  his  chief 
stress.  To  be  sure  the  dividing  line  cannot  be 
sharply  drawn,  the  two  sides  often  overlap  and 
intermingle;  still  the  division  holds  in  the  main. 
In  this  connection  another  curious  fact  may 
be  mentioned :  the  interpreters  of  Spinoza  have 
generally  emphasized  his  metaphysical  side,  and 
have  thrust  into  the  background  or  quite  left  out 
his  ethical  side.  Look  into  the  great  historians 
of  Philosophy :  they  give  a  very  full  exposition 
of  Substance,  Attribute,  and  Mode,  dwelling 
upon  Spinoza's  so-called  pantheistic  view  of  the 
world.  But  when  they  come  to  his  ethical  side, 
their  exposition  is  brief,  often  confused,  and,  as 
far  as  our  knowledge  of  them  goes,  always  un- 
cor related  with  the  rest  of  the  system.  No 
single  expression  about  Spinoza  has  been  cited 
oftener  and  with  more  approval  than  the  com- 
parison of  a  celebrated  historian  of  Philosophy 
who  says  that  Spinoza's  system  is  a  lion's  lair 


232         MODERN  E  UEOPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

which  many  footsteps  enter,  but  from  which 
none  are  ever  seen  to  emerge.  That  is  true  only 
of  the  metaphysical  side,  but  just  the  opposite  is 
true  of  the  ethical  side,  which  is  just  the  emerg- 
ence of  the  individual  from  the  lion's  lair  and 
the  capture  of  the  lion.  And  Hegel  would  never 
have  declared  that  Spinoza  conceives  only  of 
Substance  and  not  of  Subject  if  he  had  fully 
seen  and  realized  the  ethical  movement  of  his 
great  predecessor.  In  fact  the  German  inter- 
pretation has  chiefly  seized  upon  the  metaphysical 
(pantheistic)  element  of  Spinoza  with  a  national 
predilection.  On  the  other  hand  certain  British 
thinkers  have  begun  recently  to  put  stress  upon 
his  ethical  side.  It  would  seem  that  the  two 
great  elements  of  Spinoza's  system  divide  also 
the  Teutonic  race  into  its  two  chief  branches,  the 
one  of  which  dwells  upon  his  absolutistic  impe- 
rial Substance  swallowing  the  individual,  the 
other  of  which  selects  the  individual  making 
himself  valid  by  his  ethical  return  to  and  repro- 
duction of  Substance.  Are  not  these  traits  true 
respectively  of  the  German  and  Anglo-Saxon, 
and  also  true  of  their  institutions?  Still  Spinoza 
must  be  seen  to  have  both  sides  —  not  one  or  the 
other,  but  both. 

Briefly  stated,  the  content  of  Spinoza's  Ethics 
is  the  return  to  God.  There  is  no  doubt  that 
we  find  in  his  book  the  ethical  sweep  upward, 
and  that  this  is  the  chief  strength  and  great- 


SPINOZA.  — ETHICS.  233 

ness  of  it.  Herein  our  philosopher  follows  the 
Norm  originating  in  Plato  and  Aristotle,  both 
of  whom  have  a  sphere  of  Ethics  which  brings 
man  back  to  the  Idea,  or  to  the  Absolute,  or  to 
God.  The  Neo-Platonists  in  their  system  show 
the  same  ethical  return  to  the  Supreme  One. 
The  Spinozan  form  of  this  return  is  now  what 
we  are  to  study  with  some  care  and  fullness, 
as  it  is  the  profoundest  fact  of  his  Philosophy. 
We  may  again  recall  to  our  reader  that  here 
lies  the  third  and  completing  stage  of  the  pro- 
cess of  the  All  (the  Pampsychosis).  Really 
Spinoza,  the  Mode,  returns  and  reconstructs  the 
God  who  made  him  merely  Mode. 

The  ethical  movement  of  Spinoza,  as  we  con- 
template it  in  the  present  connection,  shows 
three  leading  stages,  the  psychical,  the  moral, 
and  the  institutional,  to  each  of  which  we  shall 
devote  some  details. 

I.  THE  PSYCHICAL  ELEMENT. — Already  in 
Physics  the  psychical  element  has  been  intro- 
duced under  the  head  of  Mind,  which  Spinoza 
represents  as  consubstantial  with  Body,  the  lat- 
ter being  the  stimulator  or  determinant  of  the 
former  "  in  God."  But  that  peculiar  power 
which  the  mind  has  of  turning  back  upon  itself 
in  its  own  activity  (idea  mentis,  or  even  idea  idece 
in  Spinoza's  terms)  is  the  great  act  of  separation 
from  the  Determined,  and  the  beginning  of  the 
Self-determined.  Here,  then,  is  the  starting- 


234        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

point  of  Ethics  proper,  which  science,  however, 
will  often  have  to  go  back  to  the  unconscious,  un- 
free,  determined  state  of  the  mind  in  order  to  take 
its  bearings  and  to  grasp  consciously  its  problem. 
For  this  return  of  the  mind  upon  itself  is  the 
mediating  stage  of  its  return  to  God,  which  is 
the  purpose  and  culmination  of  the  ethical  move- 
ment in  Spinoza.  "  The  human  mind  has  an 
adequate  knowledge  of  the  eternal  and  infinite 
essence  of  God"  (II.  47).  Thus  the  individual 
as  Mode,  being  able  to  know  himself  "in  and 
through  God  after  the  same  manner  in  which  he 
knows  the  human  body  "  (II.  20),  goes  back  in 
turn  to  God,  the  source  of  his  own  self-knowing, 
and  knows  Him  "  in  His  eternal  and  infinite 
essence."  We  see  here  the  round  of  spiritual 
existence  which  hovers  before  Spinoza  in  the 
present  case :  If  God  produces  self-conscious  man , 
the  latter  must  return  to  and  reproduce  God, 
This  process  plays  a  most  important  part,  usually 
under  the  name  of  Love:  "The  intellectual 
Love  of  the  mind  for  God  is  part  of  the  infinite 
Love  wherewith  God  loves  Himself  ' '  (V.  36). 
Thus  God  is  conceived  as  the  infinite  process  of 
Love,  of  which  man  with  his  intellectual  Love  of 
God,  is  a  stage  or  necessary  link  whereby  "  God 
loves  Himself  with  an  infinite  intellectual  Love  " 
(V.  35). 

Accordingly  we  find  moving  through  Spinoza's 
work  and  joining  together  (though  not  systematic- 


SPINOZA.  —  ETHICS.  235 


ally)  three  psychical  stages  which  represent  the 
fundamental  process  of  the  Mind  or  Ego,  both 
human  and  divine.  These  stages  are  first  the 
Mind  as  unconscious,  as  moved  from  without,  as 
Feeling,  Emotion,  Passion;  secondly  the  Mind  as 
moving  outwards,  determining  the  world,  sepa- 
rating within  and  going  forth,  as  Volition,  Will; 
thirdly  the  Mind  as  coming  back  to  itself  and 
bringing  the  world  along  in  knowledge,  the  self- 
returning  stage,  as  Intellect,  or  Understanding 
in  its  general  sense.  These  three  divisions, 
which  we  shall  call  Emotion  or  Feeling,  Will,  and 
Intellect,  are  at  present  recognized  as  the  basis 
of  all  Psychology  and  will  be  found  to  be  the 
organizing  process  of  Spinoza's  ethical  world, 
though  he  is  always  fragmentary  and  often  con- 
tradictory in  his  statements  pertaining  to  this 
sphere.  Still  if  we  put  together  all  the  pieces, 
we  shall  behold  his  psychical  doctrine  quite  fully 
elaborated. 

1.  JZmotion  (Peeling).  Spinoza  has  devoted 
the  Third  Part  of  his  greatest  work,  the  Ethics 
to  the  Origin  and  Nature  of  the  Emotions, 
which  he  calls  affects  of  the  Mind  (a  word  found 
in  older  English,  for  instance  in  Shakespeare). 
He  specially  claims  originality  in  his  treatment : 
"  Nobody,  as  far  as  I  know,  has  determined  the 
nature  and  power  of  these  affects,  nor  on  the  other 
hand  the  ability  of  the  mind  for  moderating 
them.'*  He  cannot,  however,  pass  by  the  work 


236        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

done  in  this  field  by  Descartes,  who  "  believed 
the  mind  to  have  absolute  power  over  its  actions," 
and  who  sought  "to  unfold  human  affects 
(passions)  into  their  primary  causes  "  and  also 
"  to  point  out  the  way  by  which  the  mind  can 
obtain  absolute  dominion  over  the  passions." 
Now  Spinoza  does  something  very  similar  and 
on  similar  lines.  Still  he  declares  his  opinion 
that  Descartes  "  shows  nothing  but  the  subtlety 
of  his  great  genius." 

This  is  a  curious  statement  on  the  part  of 
Spinoza.  The  reader  if  he  will  compare  the 
Third  Part  of  the  Ethics  with  Descartes'  Pas- 
sions of  the  Soul,  will  find  a  striking  likeness  in 
thought,  purpose,  and  movement  of  the  two 
works  (see  some  points  of  comparison  on  a  pre- 
ceding page  ).  And  Spinoza  is  here  like 
Descartes  in  asserting  his  exclusive  originality. 
Spinoza  too  seems  to  have  no  idea  that  he, 
however  original  he  may  be,  is  but  a  stage  in  the 
grand  evolution  of  Philosophy.  He  regards  his 
thought  as  isolated,  purely  individual,  like  unto 
itself  and  unto  nothing  else,  as  did  also  Descartes 
in  reference  to  his  work.  Such  a  view  seems  to 
the  present  time  not  only  a  mistake  in  doctrine 
but  a  piece  of  personal  vanity.  But  we  are  to 
recollect  a  very  significant  difference  between  us 
and  them :  our  culture  has  passed  through  the 
training  of  the  ^Nineteenth  Century,  which  is, 
in  the  movement  of  all  Philosophy,  just  the  evo- 


SPINOZA.  —  ETHICS.  237 

lutionary  Century.  This  fact  is  to  be  set  forth 
in  its  fullness  later  on,  but  now  we  are  to  note 
that  evolution,  both  spiritual  and  physical,  both 
Hegel's  and  Darwin's,  has  become  thoroughly 
ingrown  in  the  mental  fibre  of  our  period.  Very 
different  in  this  respect  was  the  Seventeenth  and 
also  the  Eighteenth  Century.  At  present  it  is 
only  the  uncultivated  genius  who  will  deem  his 
idea  wholly  original  and  newly  descended  from 
heaven,  and  will  talk  like  Descartes  and  Spinoza, 
unpretentious  as  the  latter  was  in  most  respects. 

In  his  doctrine  of  Emotion  Spinoza  starts  from 
the  proposition  :  "  Each  particular  thing,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  in  itself,  strives  to  persist  in  its  own 
being"  (III.  6).  For  the  particular  thing  is  a 
mode  by  which  an  attribute  of  God  is  expressed 
in  a  determinate  way,  hence  it  manifests  the 
power  and  being  of  God.  Moreover  '«  Nothing 
can  be  destroyed  except  by  a  cause  which  is  ex- 
ternal to  itself  "  (III.  4),  for  each  thing  in  itself 
persists  in  existence.  Still  further  this  quality, 
this  self-persistence  in  being  "  is  nought  but  the 
actual  essence  of  the  thing  itself  "  (III.  7).  It 
is  evident  that  in  these  passages  is  strongly  as- 
serted the  side  of  the  individuality  of  all  exist- 
ence, its  essentiality  in  contrast  to  what  seemed 
its  delusive  appearance  and  nothingness,  as  un- 
folded chiefly  in  the  First  Part  of  the  Ethics, 
or  the  metaphysical  portion. 

Now  we  come  to  a  distinction :  mind  and  also 


238        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

body  have  this  same  principle  of  self -persistence ; 
each  "strives  to  persevere  in  its  own  being" 
yet  in  different  manners.  This  difference  lies  in 
the  fact  that  the  mind  is  conscious,  while  the 
body  is  not.  *«  The  mind,  in  so  far  it  has  clear 
and  distinct  ideas  (and  hence  has  activity),  and 
also  in  so  far  as  it  has  confused  ideas  (and  hence 
has  passivity),  strives  to  persist  in  its  being  for 
an  indefinite  duration.  Of  this  striving  it  is  con- 
scious "  (III.  9.)  We  have  already  noticed  that 
at  this  point  Spinoza  makes  his  transition  out  of 
the  physical  (idea  corporis)  into  the  ethical 
(idea  idece).  But  now  we  are  to  see  this  gen- 
eral fact  of  Ethics  applied  specially  to  the  sphere 
of  Emotion.  Mind  as  the  idea  of  body  modified, 
returning  upon  itself  and  striving  to  keep  its  own 
being  in  the  self-conscious  act,  is  Emotion. 
Here  we  have  manifestly  the  following  process  : 
First,  the  start  is  made  with  a  modification  of 
the  Body;  secondly  Mind  is  determined  by  the 
modified  Body  to  the  idea  of  Body  (already  set 
forth  under  Physics)  ;  thirdly,  Mind  asserts  it- 
self against  this  determination  from  without  in 
the  self -returning  (self-conscious)  act.  Still  in 
this  last  stage  the  first  content  (which  is  Body 
modified)  remains,  yet  it  no  longer  merely  deter- 
mines the  mind  externally,  but  determines  it  to 
determine  itself,  that  is,  to  be  self-determined," 
"  to  persist  in  its  own  being."  Hence  we  see 
that  the  mind  in  the  preceding  process  is  at  one 


SPINOZA  —ETHICS.  239 

stage  passive,  and  at  another  is  active ;  wherefore 
Spinoza  says :  «'  Our  mind  is  partially  active,  and 
is  partially  passive  "  ;  the  former,  when  it  has  an 
adequate  idea,  that  is,  when  it  has  an  idea  of 
itself  or  is  self-conscious ;  the  latter,  when  it  has 
an  inadequate  idea  or  is  merely  the  idea  of  body 
(see  III.  1).  Spinoza  does  not  define  Emotion 
very  connectedly  in  spite  of  his  careful  summary 
at  the  end  of  the  Third  Part  of  the  Ethics.  At 
the  start  he  calls  it  "  a  modification  of  the  body," 
and  also  "the  idea  of  such  modification  "  (III. 
Def.  3).  At  the  end  he  says :  "  Emotion  which 
is  a  passivity  (pathema)  of  the  mind,  is  a  con- 
fused (inadequate)  idea,"  still  "  the  mind  affirms 
the  body's  power  of  existence,"  wherein  it  must 
be  active  (see  III,  at  the  conclusion). 

Putting  all  these  statements  together,  we  may 
define  Emotion  as  follows :  It  is  the  idea  of  the 
idea  of  modified  body,  having  an  active,  a  passive, 
and  an  external  element  in  its  process.  Or  we 
may  say :  the  external  world,  determining  the 
mind  to  its  primal  self-determine.d  (self-con- 
scious) activity,  is  Emotion.  Man  in  this 
emotional  stage  begins  to  declare  himself 
a  free  being  against  the  determination  of  his 
body,  which  has  also  to  be  present  and  to  be  a 
part  of  the  process.  Emotion  is  produced  by  the 
struggle  of  two  forms  of  self -persistence,  that  of 
mind  and  that  of  body. 

This    general     thought    of   Emotion    Spinoza 


240        MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

develops  into  three  forms  which  he  calls  Desire, 
Pleasure,  and  Pain,  in  each  of  which  the  modified 
Body  is  supposed  to  stimulate  the  mind  as  passive 
to  "  persist  in  its  own  being,"  that  is,  to  be 
active  and  to  assert  itself,  (a)  Desire  is  the  sim- 
ple immediate  act  of  Emotion,  as  the  effort 
(conatus)  for  self -persistence,  wherein  man  is 
conscious:  "  Desire  is  appetite  with  the  con- 
sciousness thereof  "  (III.  9,  Schol).  Desire  is 
primal:  «'  We  do  not  desire  a  thing  because  we 
think  it  good,  but  we  think  it  good  because  we 
desire  it."  In  a  different  statement  Spinoza 
says:  Desire  is  the  mind  as  determined  to  think 
of  one  thing  rather  than  another  ' '  through  the 
body's  power  of  existence."  (6)  Pleasure  is 
the  "passive  condition  (passio)  in  which  the 
mind  moves  to  a  greater  perfection"  (III.  11, 
/Schol).  Another  statement :  "  Pleasure  is  that 
Emotion  or  passivity  of  soul,  by  which  the  mind 
affirms  a  greater  power  of  existence  of  the  body  " 
(III.  ad  jinem),  which  would  seem  to  mean  a 
greater  perfection  (  seethe  previous  passage) .  (c) 
Pain  is  "  the  passive  condition  by  which  the 
mind  moves  to  a  lesser  perfection,"  or  it  is  that 
'*  Emotion  or  passivity  of  soul  by  which  the 
mind  affirms  a  lesser  power  of  existence  of  the 
body."  Such  are  the  three  different  forms  of 
Emotion  in  which  we  see  three  different  modifi- 
cations of  the  Body  determine  the  mind  as  passive 
to  that  activity  which  is  called  Emotion. 


SPIXOZA.  -  ETHIOS.  241 

These  are  the  three  primary  Emotions — De- 
sire, Pleasure,  Pain  —  from  which  Spinoza 
educes  all  the  other  Emotions  by  combining  them 
and  further  unfolding  them  in  various  ways. 
For  instance,  hate  and  love  in  their  manifold 
forms  are  derived  from  pain  and  pleasure 
primarily.  Thus  Spinoza  proceeds  to  give 
a  treatise  on-  the  Emotions,  mentioning  and 
defining  each  in  turn,  which  exposition  takes 
up  the  most  of  the  Third  Part  of  his  Ethics. 
It  is  evident  that  he  is  following  the  work  of 
Descartes  on  the  Passions,  who  also  has  his 
primary  and  derived  forms.  Moreover  Spi- 
noza's Emotion  is  not  so  very  different  from 
Descartes'  Passion.  Both  philosophers  conceive 
the  mind  or  soul  as  first  determined  from  the 
outside  by  body,  and  then  as  determining  itself 
in  a  self-conscious  act,  at  which  point,  however, 
Descartes  introduces  the  Will.  This  with  him  is 
the  power  of  choosing  either  way,  and  so  can  yield 
to  Passion  or  to  the  external  determinant,  but  on 
the  other  hand  can  subordinate  the  same  through 
its  own  self-determined,  self-conscious  act. 

It  is  also  at  this  point  that  Spinoza  takes  up 
the  Will  which  evidently  exercised  his  mind  a 
good  deal.  At  first  he  only  traverses  the  posi- 
tion of  Descartes,  but  at  last  he  will  be  found 
covertly  agreeing  with  his  French  predecessor, 
apparently  unconscious  of  his  own  evolution. 

2.  Will.  Spinoza's  exposition  of  the  Will  has 
16 


242         MODERN  EURO rEAN  PHIL OSO PHY. 

this  difficulty:  he  holds  its  different  stages 
apart,  sees  their  opposition,  but  not  their 
process.  We  have  already  found  the  same 
difficulty  in  other  portions  of  his  book. 
He  will  deny  Free-Will,  yet  will  also  affirm 
Freedom;  he  will  make  man's  act  a  part  of 
nature's  chain  of  causation,  yet  he  will  also  con- 
ceive man  as  responsible  for  his  bondage  to  nature. 
These  contradictions  he  sometimes  puts  side  by 
side,  apparently  without  seeing,  certainly  without 
expressly  unfolding  the  total  sphere  or  process  of 
which  they  may  be  valid  parts.  We,  if  we  are  to 
understand  him  fully,  have  to  supply  this  process 
though  we  are  always  to  recognize  it  as  supplied 
by  ourselves. 

(1)  There  is  no  Free-Will.  "The  mind  is 
determined  to  will  this  or  that  by  a  cause,  which 
is  determined  by  another  cause,  and  this  by  still 
another,  and  so  on  in  an  infinitely  regressive 
series "  (II.  48). 

The  Will  cannot  be  separated  from  the  mind 
as  * '  an  absolute  faculty ;  "  it  is  always  in  the 
concrete  act.  "In  the  mind  there  is  no  volition 
except  that  which  the  idea,  as  idea,  involves" 
(II.  49).  Hence  the  corollary:  "Will  and 
Intellect  are  one  and  the  same."  They  do  not 
exist  apart  from  the  single  act  of  mind ;  so  that 
"a  single  volition  and  a  single  idea  are  one  and 
the  same."  For  the  idea  is  not  "  like  a  mute 
picture  on  a  tablet"  (tabula  rasa),  but  is  self- 


SPINOZA.— ETHICS.  243 

asserting,  self -returning  (idea  idece)  through  its 
own  inner  activity.  In  this  way  Spinoza  claims 
that  he  "  has  removed  the  cause  of  error,"  which 
is  supposed  to  lie  in  the  Will  (allusion  to  Des- 
cartes). All  conflicts  between  Will  and  Reason 
he  resolves  into  a  difference  between  adequate 
and  inadequate  ideas  asserting  themselves.  Man 
is  but  a  '«  part  of  nature,"  a  link  in  the  grand 
concatenation  of  things. 

There  is  certainly  a  sphere  in  which  we  have 
to  grant  the  validity  of  Spinoza's  view.  With 
every  activity  of  the  Intellect  is  necessarily  im- 
plied Will,  otherwise  there  would  be  no  such 
activity.  The  whole  mind — Feeling,  Will,  and 
Intellect  —  is  present  in  some  form  in  every 
special  act  of  Mind.  Volition  is  at  least  im- 
plicitly contained  in  each  thought.  But  is  there 
no  separation  of  the  Will,  no  distinct  activity 
of  it  taken  by  itself?  Often  Spinoza  uses  the 
term  conatus  sese  conservandi  and  other  kindred 
terms,  in  order  to  express  the  effort  of  self -per- 
sistence. This  is  certainly  Will,  or  self -activity 
which  asserts  itself  against  external  determina- 
tion. 

(2)  There  is  Free-Will  but  it  is  in  bondage. 
Such  is  the  contradiction  which  Spinoza  labors 
over  in  many  places,  but  specially  in  the  Fourth 
Part  of  his  Ethics,  wrhich  is  entitled  Concerning 
Human  Bondage.  But  if  there  is  no  Free-Will, 
man  being  simply  a  part  of  nature  in  its  endless 


244        MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

chain  of  external  causation,  then  there  can  be  no 
bondage,  which  word  certainly  implies  that  man 
ideally  at  least,  is  free.  A  stone  which  falls  to 
the  earth  by  gravitation  cannot  be  said  to  be 
enslaved.  Only  a  free  being  can  be  enslaved, 
that  is,  externally  determined  against  his  own 
nature. 

Spinoza  often  acknowledges  this  fact.  In  the 
introduction  to  his  Fourth  Part  of  the  Ethics  he 
says  in  the  first  sentence :  "  Man's  impotence  in 
moderating  and  restraining  his  Emotions  (or  Pas- 
sions) I  call  bondage."  Such  language  can  only 
be  used  of  a  man  as  the  Free- Will  who  suffers 
himself  to  be  made  unfree.  Still  further :  "  A 
man  who  is  controlled  by  his  Emotions  is  not  his 
own  master  but  is  in  the  power  of  fortune  (ex- 
ternality) which  often  compels  him  to  follow  the 
worse  when  he  sees  the  better."  Here  is  surely 
a  difference  be.tween  willing  and  knowing,  be- 
tween intellect  and  volition. 

So  Spinoza  has  also  the  separation  of  the 
Will  from  the  Intellect  and  the  possible  subor- 
dination of  the  latter  to  the  former.  But  he  has 
likewise  the  opposite,  the  subordination  of  the 
Will  to  the  Intellect  or  Reason.  That  is,  Will 
can  have  Reason  as  the  content  of  its  activity, 
whereby  it  becomes  free. 

(3)  There  is  Freedom.  Following  the  Fourth 
Part  of  the  Ethics,  whose  theme  is  Human  Bond- 
age, is  the  Fifth  Part,  whose  theme  is  Human 


DESCARTES.  —PHYSICS.  245 

Liberty.  This  is  stated  in  the  title  which  has 
likewise  the  alternate,  the  Power  of  the  Intellect. 
Here,  then,  we  have  again  the  unity  of  Intellect 
and  Will,  not  in  the  implicit  form  as  before,  but 
explicit,  complete.  Intellect  or  Reason  furnishes 
its  content  to  the  Will  which  executes  the  same  in 
the  deed.  This  is  not  the  implicit  Will  which 
accompanies  every  mental  act  of  which  we  have 
above  taken  note. 

Already  in  the  Fourth  Part  (treating  of 
Human  Bondage)  Spinoza  .reached  the  free  man 
and  sought  to  detine  him  in  a  number  of  ways. 
"  A  free  man  thinks  of  death  least  of  all;  "  he 
is  not  determined  by  fear  or  hope,  he  is  free  of 
the  dominion  of  the  passions.  Moreover  the  strik- 
ing statement  may  be  here  cited:  "The  man 
who  is  governed  by  reason  is  more  free  in  the 
State  than  in  solitude  where  he  obeys  himself 
alone"  (IV.  73).  In  this  we  see  that  Spinoza 
strongly  affirms  institutional  freedom  as  com- 
pared with  merely  individual  freedom. 

In  the  Will  as  activity  Spinoza  places  perfec- 
tion and  immortality:  "  The  more  of  perfection 
anything  has,  the  more  it  acts  and  the  less  it 
suffers"  (V.  40).  This  activity,  however, 
Spinoza  unites  with  the  Intellect:  "  The  im- 
mortal part  of  the  mind  is  the  intellect  through 
which  we  act  "  (Z>o.  Carol.),  while  the  perish- 
able part  is  the  passive,  or  what  is  determined 
from  without.  But  the  supreme  attainment  of 


246          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

freedom  is  that  the  individual  who  was  but  "  a 
part  of  nature  "  or  merely  *'  a  link  in  the  chain 
of  causes  ' '  has  become  not  only  self -asserting 
against  such  external  bondage,  but  has  returned 
to  the  great  totality  of  Nature,  to  God  Himself, 
and  shares  in  His  process.  The  mind  of  man, 
once  but  a  mode  and  determined  by  the  All  from 
the  outside,  has  risen  to  a  participation  in  the  All 
from  the  inside.  This  is  the  highest  freedom 
and  produces  that  acquiescence  of  the  spirit  with 
the  divine  order  which  constitutes  the  truly  wise 
man  (or  philosopher).  Spinoza,  however,  con- 
siders this  phase  more  fully  under  Intellect,  to 
which  we  next  pass. 

3.  Intellect.  This  word  is  used  by  Spinoza  in 
two  fluctuating  senses,  a  wider  and  a  narrower. 
In  the  latter  the  term  is  applied  to  the  rational 
principle  in  man ;  but  in  the  former,  which  is  the 
general  usage  of  Spinoza,  Intellect  means  the 
sphere  of  cognition,  and  embraces  all  the  acts 
by  which  man  knows,  that  is,  appropriates  men- 
tally and  assimilates  the  object.  It  is,  there- 
fore, the  third,  or  self-returning  stage  in  the 
total  process  of  mind. 

It  is  evident  that  Spinoza  reflected  more  upon 
Intellect  than  upon  any  other  faculty  of  mind. 
He  was  very  partial  to  it,  indeed  too  partial,  for 
he  extends  its  sphere  at  the  expense  of  the  Will, 
in  regard  to  which  he  had  a  kind  of  spite,  or  at 
least  a  lack  of  due  appreciation.  The  theoretical 


SPINOZA.  -  ETHICS.  247 

sphere  in  his  view  enormously  overbalances  the 
practical;  which  fact  he  shows  in  his  own  ca- 
reer by  his  devotion  to  a  contemplative,  intellec- 
tual life.  May  we  not  find  something  Oriental 
in  this,  as  distinct  from  the  European  stress 
upon  will-power?  At  any  rate  the  complete 
subordination  of  the  Will  to  the  Intellect,  we 
might  say  the  complete  absorption  of  the  Will 
into  the  Intellect  at  times,  is  highly  characteristic 
of  Spinoza's  mind. 

Of  course  there  are  gradations  of  Intellect  or 
of  Knowledge.  Spinoza's  great  distinction  in 
this  sphere  is  that  of  adequate  (clear  and  dis- 
tinct) and  inadequate  (partial  and  confused) 
knowledge  or  ideas.  Upon  this  distinction 
chiefly  he  builds  his  intellectual  structure.  Even 
the  moral  principle  is  located  here.  "  The  knowl- 
edge of  good  and  evil  is  an  inadequate  knowl- 
edge "  (IV.  64).  All  immediate  sensuous 
experience  is  inadequate,  such  as  the  knowledge 
of  body.  But  "  all  ideas,  in  so  far  as  they  are 
referred  to  God  are  true,"  since  they  agree 
wholly  with  their  objects  or  are  adequate 
(II.  32). 

But  what  are  these  varieties  of  Intellect,  or 
kinds  of  knowing?  Spinoza  employs  three  main 
ones,  not,  however,  with  consistency  always.  In 
the  "  Improvement  of  tlie  Intellect ',"  Spinoza 
has  four  ways  of  "  perceiving  "  or  of  acquiring 
knowledge.  But  here  we  shall  follow  the  Ethics, 


248        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

which  repeatedly  speaks  of  three  kinds  of  knowl- 
edge though  in  this  book  too  there  are  places 
which  seem  to  suggest  other  divisions. 

1.  "I  shall  call  in  the  future  the  first  kind  of 
knowledge  Opinion,  Imagination "  (II.  40. 
Schol.  2).  But  this  first  kind  of  knowledge 
is  itself  of  various  grades :  that  of  * '  partic- 
ular things  presented  confusedly  through  our 
senses,"  or  immediate  sensation ;  then  that  which 
comes  from  "  signs  or  words  heard  and  read," 
whereby  we  recall  the  image  of  the  object.  This 
act  of  imaging  plays  a  great  part  in  Spinoza's 
psychology.  He  seems  inclined  in  places  to  put 
both  sense-perception  and  representation  under 
the  one  head  of  imagination,  thus  forming  his 
first  class  of  knowledge.  Both  these  activities, 
it  is  true,  deal  with  the  image,  but  in  sense-per- 
ception it  is  implicit  and  unconscious,  while  in 
representation  it  becomes  explicit  and  conscious. 
But  Spinoza  has  no  such  distinction,  at  least  not 
as  an  organizing  principle.  Sense-perception 
and  representation  are  not  yet  fully  differentiated 
in  his  mind  notwithstanding  some  scattered  hints. 

This  entire  field  of  imagination  (both  sensuous 
and  representative)  is  inadequate,  perishable,  of 
the  body.  "  The  mind  can  imagine  nothing,  nor 
even  recall  things  past,  except  while  the  body 
lasts"  (V.  21).  Still  the  mind  can  transcend 
this  limitation.  "  It  is  possible  for  the  mind  to 
refer  all  images  of  things  to  the  idea  of  God  ' ' 


SPINOZA.  —  ETHICS.  249 

(V.  14),  and  thus  form  adequate  ideas  of  them, 
though  they  be  primarily  "  affects  of  the  body.'* 
For  there  is  "  necessarily  in  God  an  idea  which 
expresses  the  essence  of  each  particular  human 
body  under  the  form  of  eternity  "  (V.  22). 
Thus  we  are  brought  to  one  of  Spinoza's  most 
famous  and  pivotal  statements,  sub  specie  eterni- 
tatis.  When  we  come  to  know  the  particular 
under  the  form  of  eternity,  we  have  reached 
adequate  ideas,  wherewith  we  pass  to  the  second 
stage  of  knowledge. 

2.  This  is  called  Reason  by  Spinoza,  and  brings 
us  into  the  realm  of  truth  out  of  falsehood. 
4 'Knowledge  of  the  first  kind  is  the  one  only 
cause  of  untruth,  while  knowledge  of  the  second 
kind  (and  third)  is  necessarily  true  "  (II.  41). 
Reason  perceives  the  necessity  of  things;  but 
this  necessity  of  things  is  the  very  necessity  of 
God's  eternal  nature  in  which  reason  partici- 
pates. "  To  see  things  under  a  certain  form  of 
eternity"  is  the  nature  of  Reason,  which  there- 
fore sees  "  those  things  which  are  common  to  all, 
and  which  are  equally  in  a  part  and  in  the  whole ' ' 
(II.  39).  Reason  rises  to  the  universal  and 
eternal  element  in  the  particular  thing,  which 
contains  also  the  essence  of  God.  It  may  do  so 
through  inference  or  reasoning.  "  Whatever 
ideas  in  the  mind  follow  from  ideas  which  are 
adequate  are  themselves  adequate"  (II.  40). 

Still  Reason  as  here  defined  simply  attains  the 


250        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

common  or  universal  from  the  given  particulars. 
But  can  the  mind  reach  the  point  of  seeing  the 
universal  create  its  particulars,  behold  God  mak- 
ing the  world,  or  the  infinite  becoming  finite? 
Spinoza  answers  yes,  though  he  contradicts  his 
entire  metaphysical  doctrine  of  Substance  in  such 
a  response.  This  brings  us  to  the  third  kind  of 
knowing. 

3.  Spinoza  calls  it  Intuition  (scienlia  intui- 
tivcC),  which  he  somewhat  stiffly  defines  as  "  the 
Knowledge  which  proceeds  from  an  adequate  idea 
of  the  formal  essence  of  certain  attributes  of 
God,  to  the  adequate  knowledge  of  the  essence 
of  things."  This  terminology  is  highly  Spino- 
zan,  describing  that  vision  or  intuition  of  God 
or  Substance,  as  it  moves  through  the  attribute 
to  the  mode  which  is  the  particular  thing,  wherein 
our  knowledge  as  Intuition  follows  after  and 
takes  up  the  divinely  creative  process,  as  set  forth 
in  the  metaphysical  portion  (see  preceding,  p. 
192).  For  every  particular  thing  participates  in 
the  divine  Substance,  hence  "  the  more  we  know 
particular  things,  the  more  we  know  God  "  (V. 
24)  .  And  we  can  know  Him,  "  for  the  human 
mind  has  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  infinite 
and  eternal  essence  of  God  "  (II.  47).  And 
"  as  all  things  are  in  God  and  conceived  through 
God,"  we  are  able  to  form  adequate  ideas  of 
these  things,  to  see  them  under  the  form  of 
eternity,  which  is  to  see  them  creatively.  This 


SPINOZA.  — ETHICS.  251 

is  Intuition  proper  which  first  grasps  the  original 
absolute  One  and  thence  moves  along  with  its 
world-creating  energy  to  the  Many,  to  the  par- 
ticular things  which  make  up  the  phenomenal 
universe.  Such  is  the  unity  immanent  in  and 
imparting  itself  to  all  multiplicity,  for  each  par- 
ticular thing  though  determined  from  without  by 
other  particular  things,  perseveres  in  its  own 
being,  which  fact  is  its  very  essence  coming  from 
the  eternal  and  necessary  essence  of  God.  And 
the  human  mind  with  its  intuitive  power,  can 
seize  this  essence  of  the  thing  coming  from  the 
essence  of  God. 

Thus  Spinoza  endows  the  human  mind  with 
the  power  of  returning  to  God  and  of  re-enact- 
ing His  creative  act  of  producing  the  Universe. 
The  individual  is  no  longer  a  fleeting,  insub- 
stantial, unreal  mode,  but  has  within  himself 
the  divinely  creative  process  of  the  One  and  the 
Many,  which  process  he  goes  through  mentally 
in  o  rder  to  know  each  particular  thing,  placing 
it  by  Intuition  under  the  form  of  eternity. 

Such  is  the  complete  sweep  of  Intellect  or  of 
the  movement  of  Knowledge  with  its  three  stages, 
starting  with  Imagination  which  deals  with  the 
particular  as  immediately  given,  then  rising  to 
Reason  which  sees  the  universal,  or  that  which 
is  "  equally  in  the  part  and  in  the  whole,"  and 
finally  attaining  Intuition  which  seizes  all  things 
in  their  generative  principle,  and  so  gets  back  of 


252        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  creates  the  starting  point  of  Intellect,  which 
was  the  particular  thing  as  immediately  given  in 
Imagination. 

Moreover  the  entire  psychical  element  in 
Spinoza,  embracing  the  far  larger  process  com- 
posed of  Emotion,  Will,  and  Intellect  is  herewith 
brought  to  a  conclusion.  How  these  three 
stages  of  the  total  mind  will  rise  out  of  their 
subordinate  position  in  Spinoza  and  other  phi- 
losophers, and  take  the  place  of  Philosophy  itself, 
unfolding  it  into  a  new  discipline  of  thought  and 
furnishing  the  very  process  of  all  science,  even 
that  of  Philosophy,  belongs  to  a  chapter  far 
ahead.  But  it  is  instructive  to  observe  the  bud 
present  and  starting  to  burst  in  the  work  of  the 
Jewish  philosopher,  in  whom  the  psychical 
process  (the  Psychosis),  manifests  a  striking 
phase  in  its  evolution.  For  this  reason  we  have 
unfolded  this  element  with  a  fullness  somewhat 
disproportionate  to  the  general  scope  of  our 
task. 

But  now  for  the  transitional  point  to  our  next 
sphere:  «'  The  supreme  effort  of  mind  (summus 
conatus)  and  the  supreme  virtue  (summa  virtus) 
is  to  know  things  by  this  third  kind  of  knowl- 
edge "  (V.  25).  With  such  a  conception  of 
virtue  which  man  strives  to  realize  in  life  we  have 
entered  the  realm  of  morality  in  the  Spinozan 
sense. 

II.  THE  MORAL  ELEMENT.  — Here  again  the 


SPINOZA.  —  ETHICS.  253 

reader  is  to  note  that  the  Moral  is  a  stage  or 
phase  of  the  Ethical,  the  latter  including  the 
total  process  of  man's  return  to  God,  or  to  Sub- 
stance in  the  Spinozan  sense.  We  have  just 
seen  the  psychical  return  which  culminates  in 
man's  knowing  the  process  of  God  through  intel- 
lectual intuition  (a  term  afterwards  used  by 
Schelling).  But  now  we  are  to  behold  the  moral 
return  which  culminates  in  the  intellectual  Love 
of  God.  The  moral  problem  is  the  problem  of 
the  individual  manifesting  the  divine  essence  not 
only  in  his  mind  or  intellect  but  particularly  in 
his  life  and  conduct.  Love  now  is  not  merely 
the  seeing  God,  but  the  being  God;  Love 
reproduces  the  divine  process  in  the  man 
practically  as  well  as  theoretically;  thus  in 
a  sense  God  becomes  man,  is  or  may  be 
incarnated  in  every  living  person  (without  the 
mediation  of  Christ  in  the  present  case,  for  Spi- 
noza was  still  a  Jew  and  so  was  naturally  loth  to 
acknowledge  the  only  Jew  greater  than  himself 
and  who  suffered  somewhat  like  himself  from  his 
own  race).  So  it  results  that  when  the  Divine 
Process  is  taken  up  into  the  man,  and  is  made 
his  very  essence,  he  has  attained  complete  free- 
dom, as  far  as  this  can  be  attained  by  the  indi- 
vidual in  himself ;  externality  is  morally  within 
him,  no  longer  outside  of  him  and  determining 
him. 

The  moral  element  manifests  several  stages  in 


254        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Spinoza,  which  as  usual  are  held  apart  and  pre- 
sented in  the  form  of  isolated  propositions,  after 
the  geometric  procedure .  Being  thus  given  with- 
out any  inner  movement,  they  seem  deeply  con- 
tradictory. In  our  exposition  we  shall  try  to  put 
these  separate  stages  together  in  such  a  manner 
that  their  process,  namely,  that  which  brings  them 
into  unity  both  with  themselves  and  with  the 
mind  seeking  to  understand  them,  will  be  at  least 
suggested.  In  this  process  of  the  moral  element 
in  man,  he  will  show  not  only  the  assertion  of 
himself  but  also  the  submission  of  himself,  and 
finally  his  complete  self-determination. 

1.  Self-assertion.  This  is  one  of  Spinoza's 
salient  doctrines,  often  reiterated  by  him  in 
diverse  connections.  '«  By  virtue  and  by  power  I 
mean  the  same  thing  "  (IV.  Def.  8).  Virtue  is 
primarily  man's  power  of  self-persistence  (per- 
severandi  in  suo  esse),  as  it  is  the  essence  in  every 
particular  thing.  "The  effort  of  self-preserva- 
tion is  the  first  and  sole  foundation  of  virtue." 
"  No  virtue  can  be  conceived  prior  to  this  one  " 
(see  IV.  22,  Dem.  et  CoroL).  The  good  is 
what  I  know  to  be  useful  to  me,  and  the  bad  is 
what  hinders  any  such  good  (IV.  Def.  land  2). 
Herein  Spinoza  certainly  puts  strong  emphasis 
upon  the  individual,  upon  the  egoistic  element  of 
human  nature,  which  is  often  at  the  present  time 
expressed  as  the  will-to-live. 

But  now  comes  something  very  different,  in- 


SPINOZA.  —  E  THICS.  255 

deed  opposite.  This  power  of  self -persistence 
both  in  man  and  in  the  thing  "  is  the  power  of 
God  or  of  Nature"  (IV-  4.  Dem),  and  this 
power  is  also  "  the  essence  of  God."  Man's 
will-to-live  is,  therefore,  the  Divine  in  Man. 
Thus  each  individual  asserts  himself  divinely 
against  other  individuals  asserting  themselves 
with  same  divine  right  of  individuality.  This 
gives  a  universe  in  struggle. 

Another  point  must  be  added :  * '  The  power 
by  which  a  man  persists  in  his  being  is  limited 
and  is  infinitely  surpassed  by  the  power  of  ex- 
ternal causes  "  (IV.  3),  which  come  from  the 
rest  of  the  world  asserting  itself.  Thus  man  is 
determined  from  without  or  through  Emotion 
(Passion)  which  he  has  to  meet  and  suppress  for 
the  sake  of  his  inner  moral  freedom.  Still  we 
are  not  to  forget  that  this  conflict  has  come 

o 

through  man's  assertion  of  himself  as  his  divine 
essence,  hence  as  his  primal  moral  act. 

In  the  foregoing  statements  we  find  a  move- 
ment which  runs  as  follows:  (1)  Self-assertion 
as  immediate,  the  first  right  of  the  individual  to 
be  himself,  and  nothing  else  and  nobody  else. 
Here  is  the  starting-point  of  morality,  according 
to  Spinoza.  (2)  But  this  self-assertion  is  not 
only  immediate,  but  God-given,  not  only  man's 
essence,  but  God's  essence  in  man,  has  not  only 
a  human  but  a  divine  right,  is  not  merely  self- 
ishness but  is  selfhood,  is  the  universal  in  the 


256        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

individual.  (3)  Thus  each  individual  is  divinely 
endowed  with  self-assertion  against  all  others, 
who  are  likewise  self -asserting,  and  the  world  of 
conflict  opens  in  which  the  individual  would  lose 
his  freedom  and  indeed  would  perish,  unless  he 
could  elevate  himself,  or  rather  humble  himself 
into  a  new  moral  sphere. 

2.  Stlf -submission.  In  the  world  of  conflict 
to  which  the  Self-assertion  of  the  individual  has 
led,  he  finds  himself  completely  overwhelmed  by 
the  outside  powers;  for  "  his  force  of  persisting 
in  his  own  being  is  infinitely  surpassed  by  the 
force  of  external  causes"  (IV.  3).  In  some 
manner  he  must  yield  and  submit  himself  to  the 
course  of  circumstances  which  is  that  of  grim 
necessity.  Yet  out  of  this  necessity  he  is  to  win 
not  only  life  but  freedom.  The  manifestation 
of  this  necessity  or  external  determination  in 
him  is  Emotion  (or  Passion) ;  the  outside  power 
drives  him  to  a  re-action  against  it,  which  is 
essentially  passionate.  This  is  what  he  must 
get  rid  of  by  the  moral  discipline  of  self -sub- 
mission, which  is,  in  general,  to  submit  himself 
to  God,  or  to  the  divine  order  of  things.  In 
such  a  discipline  there  is  likewise  a  movement  of 
which  we  may  observe  the  following  stages :  — 

(1)  The  mind  primarily  controls  itself  as 
Emotion  by  the  act  of  self -consciousness. 
When  the  Ego  in  passion  can  simply  think  of 
itself  in  passion,  it  is  far  on  the  way  of  curbing 


SPINOZA.  —  ETHICS.  257 

its  passion.  It  beholds  its  passionate  self  as 
another,  as  an  object  different  from  itself  which 
object  it  is  looking  at.  Thus  it  others  its  pas- 
sion and  throws  it  off  as  something  not  itself,  or 
transforms  it  into  something  which  is  itself. 
Such  is  the  primal  "  reniedj  for  the  Emotions," 
which  is  the  clear  and  distinct  idea  of  them. 
'«  An  Emotion  which  is  a  passion  ceases  to  be  a 
passion  as  soon  as  we  form  a  clear  distinct  idea 
of  the  same  "  (V.  3).  As  soon  as  we  turn  upon 
it  and  see  what  it  is,  it  no  longer  controls  us,  but 
we  control  it  and  can  subordinate  it  or  can  still 
give  wTay  to  it  consciously,  in  which  last  case  we 
become  the  more  depraved.  But  if  we  subor- 
dinate the  passions  to  reason,  we  fill  them  with  a 
new  purpose  and  transform  them  into  the 
bearers  of  the  Divine. 

(2)  The  mind  controls  itself  as  Emotion, 
when  it  beholds  itself  in  the  necessary  order  of 
things.  Man,  recognizing  his  place  in  the  grand 
totality  of  the  universe,  ascends  to  God  for  his 
view,  and  acquiesces  in  his  lot.  "In  so  far  as 
the  mind  recognizes  all  things  as  necessary,  it 
possesses  greater  power  over  its  Emotions,  or 
suffers  less  from  them"  (V.  6).  This  is  the 
stoical  phase  of  Spinoza's  morality,  but  we  must 
remember  that  it  is  not  the  only  phase.  If  he 
has  resignation,  he  also  has  self-assertion  and 
self-determination.  The  self-submission  to  a 
necessary  and  unchanging  order  is  the  relief 

17 


258         MODERN  EUROPEAN-  PHILOSOPHY. 

from  the  Emotion  which  is  stimulated  by  the 
particular  things  in  that  order.  We  must  rise  to 
the  thought  that  the  causing  object  is  necessi- 
tated, is  not  an  independent  self -active  some- 
thing, even  if  it  have  the  power  of  self- 
persistence. 

(3)  Thus  we  can  moralize  all  our  Emotions, 
wheeling  them  into  the  line  of  the  universal 
order,  which  is  to  subordinate  them  to  reason. 
When  the  Emotion  has  the  inadequate  idea  as  its 
content,  it  is  passionate ;  but  when  it  has 
the  adequate  idea  as  its  content,  it  is 
rational,  truly  ethical  (see  IV.  59.  Schol.). 
"  We  must  seek,  as  far  as  possible,  to 
obtain  a  clear  and  distinct  idea  of  every 
Emotion"  in  order  to  free  it  of  its  external 
particular  cause,  and  to  fill  it  with  its  rational 
end,  whereby  "  appetites  and  desires  which 
usually  spring  from  Emotions  will  become  in- 
capable of  excess  "  (V.  4.  SchoL).  So  Spinoza 
shows  the  way  in  which  we  may  transfigure  our 
whole  emotional  world  by  this  self -submission  to 
the  divinely  necessary  order  of  things.  In  such 
'«  acquiescence  of  the  spirit"  we  make  ourselves 
a  part  of  God's  process,  but  by  this  very  act  we 
also  make  God's  process  a  part  of  ourselves. 
Thus  through  self-submission  to  the  necessity  of 
the  divine  order,  we  have  disciplined  our 
Emotion  into  an  ethical  character,  and  made 


SPINOZA.  —  ETHICS.  259 

necessity  internal,  wherewith  we  pass  to   a  new 
stage. 

.  3.  Self -determination.  This  is  the  culmina- 
tion and  conclusion  of  the  moral  movement  in 
Spinoza,  expressed  in  a  term  of  Will  which,  in 
general,  signifies  complete  inner  freedom.  But 
this  state  must  have  a  corresponding  activity  of 
Intellect  which  has  to  know  God,  the  world  and 
itself  in  the  highest  way.  "  The  supreme  effort 
of  mind  and  the  supreme  virtue  is  to  know  things 
by  the  third  kind  of  knowledge  "  (V.  25).  This 
third  kind  of  knowledge  we  have  already  seen  to 
be  Intuition,  "from  which  springs  the  highest 
possible  form  of  acquiescence  "  (V.  27),  in 
which  statement  we  may  note  the  hint  that 
Spinoza's  acquiescentia  mentis  may  be  of  various 
kinds  or  grades.  But  Spinoza  has  also  an  emo- 
tional term  to  express  the  present  stage,  Love  or 
the  Love  of  God,  to  which  he  joins  the  adjective 
intellectual,  indicating  the  relation  of  this  Love 
to  Intellect,  and  to  its  faculty  of  Intuition,  which 
transfigures  the  immediate  Emotion  of  Desire 
into  THE  INTELLECTUAL  LOVE  OF  GOD.  This  is 
justly  considered  the  supreme  attainment,  both 
in  a  practical  and  a  theoretical  aspect,  of 
Spinoza's  Philosophy.  It  is  also  to  be  observed 
that  the  whole  man  as  Emotion,  as  Will,  and  as 
Intellect,  now  unites  himself  .in  one  all-embrac- 
ing return  to  God,  in  passion,  in  action,  and  in 
thought. 


260        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Moreover,  it  is  in  this  connection  that  Spinoza 
introduces  his  doctrine  of  immortality.  «'  The 
intellectual  Love  of  God,  which  arises  from  the 
third  kind  of  knowledge  is  eternal"  (V.  23), 
and  makes  the  mind  eternal  which  has  it,  by  its 
power  of  seeing  all  things  "  under  the  form  of 
eternity."  There  is  also  an  immortal  human 
body.  "  In  God  there  is  necessarily  an  idea 
which  expresses  the  essence  of  each  human  body 
under  the  form  of  eternity"  (V.  22),  which  is 
not,  therefore,  perishable.  The  consubstan- 
tiality  of  mind  and  body  makes  the  latter  also 
of  the  divine  and  eternal  Substance.  Each  of 
them,  mind  and  body,  has  a  mortal  and  immortal 
part  in  correspondence.  Imagination  (in  mind) 
and  externality  (in  body)  are  vanishing,  unreal, 
illusory,  both  of  them.  Yet  both  mind  and 
body  have  their  essence  in  God,  and  so  must 
endure.  Thus  Spinoza  conceives  a  kind  of  bodily 
immortality,  an  eternity  incorporate. 

In  the  present  sphere  there  is  also  a  movement 
with  its  distinctive  stages  which  are  separately 
given  by  the  author  in  his  geometric  fashion,  but 
which  we  shall  try  to  connect  together  by  their 
underlying  thought. 

(1)  God  loves  Himself.  This  is  declared 
directly:  "God  loves  Himself  with  an  infinite 
intellectual  Love"  (V.  35).  He  turns  back 
upon  Himself  and  sees  Himself  in  his  infinite 
perfection  which  he  loves.  In  this  manner  God 


SPINOZA.  —  ETHICS.  261 

is  conceived  as  the  process  of  the  Absolute  Self, 
making  Himself  an  object  to  Himself  and  re- 
turning into  Himself  "  in  Love."  This  can 
only  mean  that  God  is  a  self-conscious  Ego,  to 
which  thought  Spinoza  has  now  risen,  for  such 
a  conception  of  God  does  not  correspond  with 
what  he  says  elsewhere. 

(2)  Man  loves  God.     His  Love  toward  God 
is  that  same  intellectual  Love  with   which  God 
loves  Himself,  in  so  far  as  this  infinite  Love  can 
be  made  finite,   "  or  in  so  far  as  it  can  be  un- 
folded through  the  essence  of  the  human  mind 
considered  under  the  form  of  eternity  "   (  V.  36 ) . 
Man's  love  toward  God  is  "  a  part  of  the  infinite 
Love  with  which  God  loves  Himself."     So  God 
grants  Man  to  share   in  the  infinite  process  of 
Himself. 

"  Hence  it  follows  that  God,  in  so  far  as 
He  loves  Himself  loves  Man  and  also  that  God's 
Love  of  Man  and  Man's  Love  of  God  are  one  and 
the  same  "  (V.  36  Corol.)  ;  that  is,  both  these 
Loves  coming  from  the  extremes  of  the  Uni- 
verse, from  God  and  Man  toward  each  other, 
form  the  one  divine  process  of  the  All.  It  is 
evident  that  in  this  process  Man  has  become  not 
only  a  part  but  an  essential  part  of  God  Himself. 
So  we  reach  the  following  thought :  — 

(3)  God  loves  Himself  through  loving    Man 
who  loves  Him.     So  Man  has  to  return  in    Love 
to  God,  in  order  to   fulfill  the   cycle   of   divine 


262        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Love,  of  which  Man  has  become  a  necessary 
stage  just  through  his  Love  of  God  as  this  pro- 
cess. He,  though  a  part,  has  in  himself  the 
whole  of  that  process  of  which  he  is  a  part,  and 
so  he  is  an  integral  member  of  the  divine  order. 
Already  we  have  seen  in  another  connection  that 
"  those  things  which  are  equally  in  a  part  and 
in  the  whole  cannot  be  conceived  otherwise  than 
adequately  "  (II.  38).  Man  is  a  part,  God  is  the 
whole,  intellectual  Love  is  common  to  both,  is 
in  both,  whereby  each  has  the  same  process  in 
which  both  are  included.  That,  is  both  con- 
stitute one  process,  which  is  nevertheless  in  each 
wholly.  To  be  sure,  Spinoza  does  not  speak  of 
a  process  in  this  matter,  nor  does  he  explicitly 
grasp  intellectual  Love  as  a  process.  Still  it 
moves  from  Man  to  God  and  from  God  to  Man, 
embracing  both,  and  also  in  each.  This  certainly 
involves  a  process,  in  fact  just  the  process  of  the 
All,  which  we  have  called  the  Pampsychosis, 
here  and  elsewhere  lurking  in  the  movement  of 
Philosophy. 

God,  in  this  final  stage  of  Spinoza,  has  des- 
cended into  man,  has  become  Man,  whose 
essence  He  is  through  intellectual  Love.  Thus 
Man  has  attained  his  supreme  self-determination, 
God  being  within  him  as  his  own  very  self.  God 
completes  himself  in  Man  who  returns  in  Love 
to  God  within  himself. 

The  Moral   Element,  or   the    second    genera] 


SPINOZA.  —  ETHICS.  263 

stage  of  Spinoza's  Ethics,  has  now  brought  itself 
to  a  conclusion.  This  stage,  as  conceived  by 
Spinoza,  turns  on  the  separation  between  the 
individual  and  God,  and  shows  the  discipline  of 
the  former  into  harmony  and  unity  with  the 
latter.  First  the  individual  asserts  himself  in 
order  to  exist,  which  throws  him  into  conflict 
with  the  grand  totality  of  things;  secondly  the 
individual  submits  himself,  subduing  passitfn  and 
making  himself  a  link  in  the  great  Whole  outside 
of  him,  suffering  and  so  mastering  the  external 
determination  of  the  world  through  which  he 
finally  comes  to  determine  himself,  having  within 
him  now  the  Whole  of  which  he  was  but  a  part 
outside,  attaining  such  a  condition  through  the 
intellectual  Love  of  God.  This  condition  is  man's 
supreme  happiness,  called  by  Spinoza  Blessed- 
ness (Beatitudo),  which  "  is  not  the  reward 
of  virtue,  but  virtue  itself"  (V.  42,  the  last 
Proposition  in  Spinoza's  Ethics).  Moreover  this 
state  of  Blessedness  is  attainable  by  man  here 
and  now  upon  this  earth,  and  is  not  relegated  to 
a  future  life.  ; .;.••?. 

Thus  the  individual  instead  of  being  lost  in 
God,  as  he  seemed  to  be  in  the  metaphysical 
portion,  now  has  God  in  himself,  as  his  own 
essence.  Substance  before  swallowed  him,  but 
now  he  has  just  about  swallowed  Substance. 
Such  is  the  enormous  difference  between  the  be- 
ginning and  the  end  of  Spinoza's  Ethics,  a  chasm 


264         MODEBN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

as  wide  as  the  universe,  as  great  as  that  between 
God  and  Man.  Has  Spinoza  bridged  it?  Was 
it  even  his  purpose  to  bridge  it?  At  any  rate 
here  lies  the  Spinozan  dualism,  certainly  the 
deepest  of  his  century. 

Often  there  is  a  direct  contradiction  in  state- 
ments quite  close  together.  In  the  Fifth  Part 
(Pr.  17)  he  declares  that  God  is  without  love, 
and  a  little  later  (Pr.  19)  that  "  the  man  who 
loves  God  cannot  seek  to  have  God  love  him  in 
return."  This  is  true  of  Spinoza's  metaphysical 
God  or  of  Substance.  But  his  ethical  God  who 
appears  in  the  same  Fifth  Part  a  few  pages 
further  on,  is  just  the  opposite,  loving  man  with 
the  same  love  which  He  has  for  Himself  (V.  36 
CoroL).  What  does  such  a  flat  contradiction 
mean?  In  our  judgment  Spinoza's  Ethics  is 
made  up  of  doctrines  formed  at  two  different 
periods  of  the  philosopher's  development,  and 
are  represented  on  the  whole  by  th  e  metaphysical 
and  the  ethical  portions  of  the  book.  It  is  well 
known  that  the  Ethics  was  published  after  the 
author's  death,  and  doubtless  did  not  receive  his 
final  revision.  The  two  preceding  contradictory 
passages  belong  to  two  different  periods  of  Spi- 
noza's thought,  which  we  have  called  the  meta- 
physical and  the  ethical. 

Though  we  have  reached  the  end  of  the  book 
called  Ethics,  this  is  not  the  end  of  the  total 
ethical  movement  in  Spinoza.  The  individual 


SPINOZA.  —  ETHICS.  265 

has  attained  Blessedness  essentially  through  him- 
self, and  it  is  his  own.  The  intellectual  love  of 
God  is  a  moral  act,  a  personal  development,  of 
course  with  divine  co-operation.  But  what  about 
the  fellow-man?  In  one  proposition  occurs  the 
following:  "The  Love  of  God  is  the  more 
fostered  the  more  men  we  conceive  to  be  joined 
with  God  in  the  same  bond  of  Love  "  (V.  20). 
So  we  desire  that  "  all  should  have  this  happi- 
ness," which  is  reached  by  the  study  of  Spi- 
noza's philosophy.  Such  a  principle  of  union 
could  hardly  produce  more  than  a  religious 
fraternity  or  a  philosophical  school.  From  it 
the  great  institutions  of  the  world  have  not 
sprung. 

Yet  Spinoza  had  his  eye  upon  these  institutions 
even  in  his  Ethics.  Over  and  over  again  he 
speaks  of  the  advantages  of  human  association. 
Says  he :  "  To  man  nothing  is  more  useful  than 
man ;  nothing  is  more  excellent  for  self-preser- 
vation than  that  all  should  agree  in  all  things  to 
the  extent  that  the  minds  and  bodies  of  all  should 
constitute  one  mind  as  it  were,  and  one  body  for 
the  purpose  of  striving  to  preserve  their  being  " 
(IV.  18,  Schol.).  This  "  one  mind  and  ojie 
body  "  has  as  its  end  the  conservation  of  the  indi- 
vidual's existence,  or,  as  we  say,  to  secure  life 
and  property.  But  Spinoza  does  not  develop 
this  idea  of  the  institution,  nor  could  he  with  his 
doctrine  of  the  Will,  which  according  to  his  view 


266         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  quite  swallowed  up  in  the  Intellect.  The 
union  of  all  into  "  one  mind  and  one  body"  is  the 
union  of  thought  and  power,  of  Intellect  and 
Will ;  but  this  union  is  really  for  the  purpose 
of  willing  the  individual's  Will-to-live  (conatus 
sese  conservandi).  Herewith  we  catch  a  glimpse 
of  the  institutional  principle  rising  out  of  and 
supplementing  the  moral  element,  which  is 
essentially  individual  even  at  its  very  highest 
point  in  the  intellectual  Love  of  God.  This 
glimpse  will  guide  to  the  next  great  field  or  por- 
tion of  Ethics  cultivated  by  Spinoza. 

III.  THE  INSTITUTIONAL  ELEMENT.  —  In  the 
Fourth  Part  of  his  Ethics  our  philosopher  gives 
quite  a  little  dissertation  on  the  Free  Man,  to 
whose  characteristics  he  devotes  a  number  of 
Propositions  with  their  adjuncts.  He  evidently 
has  before  his  mind  the  Stoic  pattern  of  the 
Wise  Man,  who  has  become  internally  free 
through  reason,  and  who  has  transformed  his 
moral  life  according  to  its  behests. 

Finally,  in  the  last  Proposition  of  this  Fourth 
Part,  Spinoza  gives  us  something  of  a  surprise 
by  introducing  a  new  element:  "  The  man  who 
is^guided  by  reason  is  more  free  in  the  State 
where  he  lives  under  a  common  law,  than  in 
solitude  where  he  obeys  ®nly  himself"  (IV.  73). 
This  declaration  has  in  the  highest  degree  an  in- 
stitutional purport  as  distinct  from  the  moral  view 
of  man  as  individual.  Here  association  is  the 


SPINOZA.  -  ETHICS.  267 

principle,  with  the  subsumption  of  the  individual 
under  the  decree  (or  Will)  of  the  social  Whole. 
Thus  man  can  become  more  free  than  by  living 
alone,  more  free  by  obeying  objective  law  than 
by  following  his  own  subjective  caprice,  out  of 
which  the  Moral  Element  as  such  never  com- 
pletely rises.  "The  rational  man  in  so  far  as 
he  seeks  to  live  in  freedom,  desires  to  live  the 
common  life  according  to  the  laws  of  the  State  " 
(Ditto  Dem.).  Thus  Spinoza  emphatically  de- 
clares that  true  freedom  is  only  to  be  obtained 
through  the  civil  Institution. 

At  this  point  he  substantially  drops  the  sub- 
ject from  his  Ethics.  Yet  much  remains  to  be 
unfolded.  If  the  rational  man  finds  true  free- 
dom only  in  the  State,  then  this  institution  must 
be  a  chief  means  for  his  attaining  the  intellectual 
Love  of  God,  which  certainly  cannot  be  reached 
by  the  unfree  man.  The  State,  therefore,  (and 
with  it  the  whole  institutional  world)  ought  to  be 
shown  as  a  necessary  stage  in  man' s  complete  return 
to  God.  Blessedness  comes  through  freedom,  and 
freedom  as  real  comes  thro  ugh  the  State  (and  other 
institutions).  The  ethical  movement  as  a  whole 
should  have  the  institutional  element  as  an  integral 
part  of  itself,  otherwise  there  is  a  gap  or  rather 
a  lack  of  connection  in  the  total  process  of  the 
philosophical  Norm. 

This  lack  of  connection  is  found  in  Spinoza's 
scheme.  He  has  two  great  institutional  works, 


268        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  Political  Treatise,  and  the  Theologico- Poli- 
tical Treatise  (see  the  contents  of  both  given 
under  the  head  of  Spinoza's  Writings).  But 
these  two  works  are  not  organically  conjoined  with 
the  Ethics,  though  their  general  connection  is  cer- 
tainly suggested.  The  above  hint  regarding  man's 
freedom  involves  a  discussion  of  State,  Church 
and  Society  in  order  to  complete  the  Ethics  as 
a  totality.  But  Spinoza  concludes  his  book  with 
the  supreme  moral  attainment,  the  virtue  called 
Blessedness,  or  the  intellectual  Love  of  God, 
which  is  reached  through  the  individual  without 
the  aid  of  institutions. 

It  is  our  opinion  that  Spinoza  was  working  at 
this  problem  of  the  inner  connection  of  his 
system  when  he  died  at  the  age  of  44  years. 
The  various  parts  of  his  philosophy  had  grown 
piecemeal  out  of  that  ideal  totality  of  his  spirit 
which  was  as  yet  unexpressed  though  gradually 
developing.  The  result  is  Spinoza's  philosophic 
edifice  appears  before  us  as  composed  of  vast 
fragments,  from  which,  however,  we  can  catch 
the  outlines,  even  if  vague  in  places,  of  the 
mighty  Whole,  nothing  less  than  an  intellectual 
construction  of  the  Universe.  His  early  death 
prevented  completion,  for  the  philosopher  rarely 
if  ever  reaches  his  supreme  architectonic  develop- 
ment till  he  is  in  the  fifties. 

The  serious  reader,  coming  to  love  Spinoza's 
personality,  and  dwelling  in  contemplation  upon 


SPINOZA  —  ETHICS.  269 

his  incomplete  edifice,  will  long  to  fill  out  men- 
tally the  parts  that  are  wanting,  particularly  this 
institutional  part.  The  following  suggestions 
may  help  him  rear  some  of  the  missing  portions 
of  the  structure  :  — 

1.  We  must  first  consider  Spinoza  as  holding 
to  the   immediate  unity  of  Church   and   State. 
This  is  distinctly  his  primal  Jewish  inheritance, 
the  theocracy,  which,    however,  belongs  to   the 
whole    Orient.      The   title    of    his  early   work, 
Theologico- Political  Treatise,  indicates  this  fact 
(seethe  preceding  discussion  of  it  p.  I53etseq.). 
The  institutional  movement  of  Spinoza  is  toward 
separation  of  Church   and   State,      Hence   the 
following :  — 

2 .  In  the  Political  Treatise  we  have  an  expo- 
sition  of    the    State   without    its   ecclesiastical 
counterpart,  as  the  title  indicates  (see  the  discus- 
sion of  this  work  beginning  on  p.  164). 

3.  There  are  allusions  to  Education  and  faint 
outlines  of    the  Educative  Institution   scattered 
through  Spinoza's  books.    A  school  of  pupils  and 
followers  began  to  gather  around  him  early  in  his 
career;  he  deemed  it  among   the  highest  func^ 
tions  to  be  engaged  in  "  so   training  men  that 
they  come  at  last  to  live  under  the  dominion  of 
their  own  reason  "   (IV.  App.  9).     The  follow- 
ing passage  from  the  Improvement  of  the  Intellect 
shows  how  deeply  Spinoza  was  impelled    to  im- 
part his  philosophy  :   "  This,  then*  is  the  end  for 


270        MODERN"  EUROPEAN-  PHILOSOPHY. 

which  I  strive :  first  to  attain  an  harmonious 
nature,  and  then  to  assist  many  others  to  attain 
it  with  me."  Such  is  the  true  spirit  of  the 
teacher:  "it  is  a  condition  of  my  own  happi- 
ness that  many  others  may  know  as  I  know." 
Nor  is  this  work  done  at  random:  "We  must 
form  such  a  society  as  will  enable  men  in  general 
to  attain  it  in  the  easiest  way.  To  this  end  we 
are  to  study  Moral  Philosophy,"  in  which  Spi- 
noza's ^Ethics  may  have  been  written  as  a  text- 
book. Also  "  The  Theory  of  Education  "is  to 
be  studied,  along  with  Medicine  and  the  Physical 
Sciences.  Such  is  a  brief  outline  of  Spinoza's 
ideal  school  which  had  one  supreme  end:  "to 
reach  that  highest  human  perfection  which 
we  have  designated."  This  comes  through 
the  improvement  and  education  of  the  Intellect 
till  it  can  behold  all  things  "  under  the  form  of 
eternity."  Spinoza  had  around  himself  all  his 
life  a  school  of  this  sort,  private  indeed,  but  con- 
stituting a  small  band  of  zealous  disciples  who 
kept  his  apostolate  alive  long  after  his  death 
and  published  his  books.  What  else  means  that 
posthumous  edition  of  his  works  printed  only  a 
few  months  after  he  had  died  almost  penniless? 
4.  Of  one  other  kind  of  association  or  institu- 
tion we  catch  a  glimpse  in  Spinoza:  "  The  Love 
of  God  is  the  more  fostered,  the  greater  the 
number  of  men  we  conceive  to  be  joined  with 
God  in  the  bond  of  Love  "  (V.  20).  A  passing 


SPINOZA.  —  ETHICS.  27  i 

glimpse  is  this  of  Theopolis,  the  City  of  God, 
which  Leibniz  will  somewhat  more  fully  set 
forth  as  the  conclusion  of  his  Philosophy.  But 
Spinoza  has  the  germ  of  this  final  association  of 
men  joined  together  in  the  supreme  institution, 
the  Church  Universal,  through  the  common  Love 
of  God. 

Here,  then,  we  bring  to  an  end  the  Philosophy 
of  Spinoza,  whose  deepest  fact,  as  we  see  it,  is 
its  double  or  dualistic  character :  its  descent  on 
the  one  side  from  Substance  to  Mode,  meta- 
physical, pantheistic,  at  bottom  negative;  then 
its  ascent  on  the  other  side  from  Mode  to  Sub- 
stance or  God,  ethical,  theistic,  at  bottom  posi- 
tive. Already  we  have  sufficiently  emphasized 
this  Spinozan  dualism  as  representing  the  pro- 
foundest  struggle  of  the  Seventeenth  Century  in 
its  political,  religious,  and  social  history. 

But  now  we  approach  the  third  great  philoso- 
pher of  this  Century,  Leibniz,  whose  supreme 
philosophic  function  is  to  harmonize  the  dualism 
of  Spinoza,  out  of  whom  he  directly  grows.  It 
is,  therefore,  characteristic  of  Leibniz  that  he 
leaves  out  the  descent  and  starts  immediately 
with  the  ascent;  the  Spinozan  Mode  he  trans- 
forms into  the  Leibnizian  Monad,  putting  into 
the  same  the  principle  of  Substance.  It  is  true 
that  Spinoza  had  already  brought  his  Mode  back 
to  its  fountain-head  of  Substance,  so  that  it  be- 
came an  integral  element  of  the  Divine  Process. 


272         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY, 

Thus  we  may  say  that  Leibniz  begins  where 
Spinoza  leaves  off,  namely  with  the  Mode  de- 
veloped out  of  itself  into  the  Monad,  which 
Leibniz  himself  calls  at  first  a  form  of  Substance 
or  substantial  form.  And  we  shall  also  find  the 
consubstantial  doctrine  of  Spinoza's  Attribute 
passing  over  into  the  Leibnizian  Pre-established 
Harmony.  We  shall  likewise  see  Leibniz  de- 
veloping, clarifying,  and  universally  applying 
that  element  which  Spinoza  dimly  saw  as 
"  equally  in  the  part  and  in  the  whole/'  Finally, 
the  power  of  self-persistence  (pereverandi  in 
suo  esse)  is  modal  in  Spinoza,  but  becomes 
monodal  in  Leibniz.  Such  is  the  significant 
evolution  which  we  are  next  to  trace  in  the  third 
member  of  the  great  tri-personal  movement  of 
the  Philosophy  of  the  Seventeenth  Century. 


LEIBNIZ.  —  LIFE.  273 


3*  Xetbntj* 

The  career  of  Leibniz  falls  into  the  latter  part 
of  the  Seventeenth  Century,  and  runs  over  into 
the  Eighteenth.  This  period  witnessed  the  great 
culminating  struggle  between  what  may  be  called 
Absolutism  and  Individualism,  and  our  Philos- 
opher reflects,  of  course  in  his  way  the  spirit  of 
the  age.  The  very  year  he  arrived  at  Paris, 
Louis  XIV.,  the  political  and  religious  absolutist, 
was  throwing  his  troops  into  the  Netherlands  for 
another  fierce  attack  upon  the  liberty  there  in- 
trenched. He  was  seeking  to  do  what  Spain  had 
utterly  failed  to  accomplish  in  the  preceding  cen- 
tury. It  was  another  attempt  of  Latin  Europe  to 
wrest  the  scepter  of  temporal  and  spiritual  dom- 
ination from  Teutonic  Europe,  to  which  it  had  been 
gradually  passing.  The  great  conflict  of  the 
Thirty  Years'  War  in  Germany,  which  lay  chiefly 
between  the  Latin  and  the  Teutonic  religions, 
had  ended  in  a  peace  which  recognized  the  rift, 
and  really  had  made  it  perpetual.  That  same 
peace  left  Germany  a  cluster  of  separate  States, 
political  atoms,  or  in  Leibnizian  phrase,  Monads. 
Such  is  the  main  European  situation  which  lies 
back  of  our  philosopher  and  determines  his 
work. 

Leibniz  was  a  Teuton,  and  philosophized  the 
•  18 


274         MODERN  E  UROPEAN  PHIL OSOPEY. 

Teutonic  side,  with  its  individualistic  bent  on  the 
one  hand,  yet  on  the  other  with  the  effort  to 
bring  order  and  harmony  out  of  these  atomic 
struggles.  Hence  the  metaphysical  portion  of 
Leibniz 'Philosophy  will  have  two  main  categories, 
quite  opposite  if  not  contradictory :  the  Monad 
and  Pre-established  Harmony,  or  the  individual 
in  his  own  separate  little  world  (microcosm) 
and  also  in  the  great  total  scheme  of  the  universe 
(macrocosm).  Spinoza's  God  in  His  meta- 
physical aspect  was  an  all-devouring  Cronus,  in 
whom  the  individual  was  but  a  fleeting  appear- 
ance, a  phantasm  which  had  no  reality.  Herein 
Spinoza  gives  a  true  reflection  of  one  mighty 
tendency  of  the  time,  which  was  also  the  Seven- 
teenth Century.  This  was  the  tendency  to 
absolutism,  which  like  a  monster  of  legend, 
opened  its  prodigious  mouth  to  swallow  little 
Holland,  the  supreme  bearer  of  personal  liberty. 
Such  is  the  first  stress  of  Spinoza,  though  he  has 
also  a  second  and  different  stress;  Leibniz,  how- 
ever, puts  his  first  stress  upon  the  opposite 
principle,  the  individual,  the  Monad,  and  moves 
in  the  opposite  direction,  toward  authority, 
toward  *  *  the  Monad  of  Monads  ' '  which  is  the 
highest. 

In  general  we  may  conceive  the  philosophy  of 
Leibniz  to  start  with  the  Monad  as  the  given 
thing  and  to  show  its  movement  toward  the 
Supreme  One  which  does  not  destroy  it,  but 


LEIBNIZ.  —  LIFE.  275 

preserves  it  in  its  integrity,  and  harmonizes  it 
with  the  rest  of  the  Monads.  The  whole  ex- 
hibits the  grand  flight  of  the  independent, 
mutually  repellent  Monads  towards  a  central 
authority  which  keeps  them  in  order.  This  was 
the  living  Teutonic  problem,  especially  of  Prot- 
estant Teutonia  after  she  had  cut  loose  from  the 
old  Church  and  Empire,  from  the  transmitted 
institutions.  Leibniz  during  his  long  and  busy 
life  will  work  at  this  problem  in  quite  all  of  its 
essential  phases,  being  himself  a  Monad  trying 
to  bring  order  into  a  monadal  universe,  yet 
always  by  his  very  nature  dropping  back  into 
Monadism. 

It  is  no  wonder,  then,  that  his  philosophy  is 
called  a  Monadology,  or  science  of  the  Monads, 
he  himself  being  the  creative  Monad  in  his 
scheme.  Hence  we  may  expect  that  the  man 
Leibniz,  in  all  the  three  main  phases  in  which 
we  may  regard  him,  in  his  Life  and  Writings,  as 
well  as  in  his  Philosophy,  will  be  monadal, 
wherein  he  will  strikingly  represent  his  country 
and  his  age  in  their  innermost  spirit  and 
essence. 

I.  LIFE  OF  LEIBNIZ.  —  In  contrast  with  the 
simple,  retired  life  of  Spinoza,  that  of  Leibniz 
is  very  diversified.  The  latter  was  a  public  man 
all  his  active  years,  as  well  as  a  scholar.  He  had 
two  streams  of  existence,  practical  and  theoreti- 
cal, rushing  through  him,  often  parallel,  often 


276        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

intercrossing  and  cutting  up  his  activity  into 
fragments.  This  condition,  however,  was  not 
an  accident,  but  lay  in  his  own  deepest  nature. 

To  our  inind  the  central  stage  of  his  philo- 
sophic development  is  the  Hanoverian  Period, 
which  includes  chiefly  his  middle  life,  and  during 
which  he  was  slowly  unfolding  his  fundamental 
thought.  Of  course  there  is  a  Period  before  and 
a  Period  after  this  middle  one. 

It  is  doubtless  something  of  a  problem  to  grasp 
the  events  of  Leibniz'  life  in  such  a  way  as  to 
show  their  true  meaning  as  well  as  their  connec- 
tion with  the  time.  Externally  his  career  is  full 
of  manifold  changes — changes  of  place,  of  occupa- 
tions, of  opinions  and  thoughts.  We  may  well  say 
that  his  life  is  monadal,  made  up  of  little  centers 
of  effort  of  all  sorts,  yet  constituting  an  order, 
or  at  least  striving  for  the  principle  of  an  order. 
Such,  too,  is  his  character,  a  continual  explosion 
of  single  thoughts  into  deeds  and  words. 

1.  First  Period  (1646-1676).  Gottfried 
Wilhelm  Leibniz  was  born  at  Leipzig  on  the 
21st  day  of  June,  1646,  two  years  before  the 
Peace  of  Westphalia  which  left  Germany  in  its 
monadal  condition,  morally  as  well  as  politically 
and  religiously.  In  such  an  ethical  world  Leib- 
niz grew  up,  and  could  not  help  imbibing  its 
character. 

In  his  fifteen  thy  ear  he  began  his  studies  at  the 
University  of  Leipzig  and  worked  in  philosophy, 


LEIBNIZ.  —  LIFE.  277 

jurisprudence,  and  mathematics.  It  is  significant 
that  his  first  printed  dissertation  should  treat  of 
the  Principle  of  the  Individual,  being  written  in 
Latin  and  showing  considerable  philosophic  eru- 
dition. His  next  important  production  is  quite 
a  lengthy  mathematical  treatise  (De  Arte  Com- 
binatoria) .  There  is  no  doubt  that  Leibniz  was 
a  precocious  youth,  especially  in  his  power  of 
reading  many  books,  and  these  often  of  very 
abstruse  contents.  Leipzig,  however,  refused 
him  a  degree,  which  he  obtained  at  the  Univer- 
sity of  Altdorf ,  where  he  was  offered  a  profes- 
sorship. This  he  declined,  doubtless  feeling  it 
to  be  unfavorable  to  his  free,  full  development  in 
science.  We  recollect  that  Spinoza  also  refused 
such  a  place,  from  which  Descartes  likewise  held 
himself  aloof.  The  three  great  philosophers  of 
the  Seventeenth  Century,  were  not,  therefore, 
University  Professors. 

After  various  experiences  Leibniz  became  as- 
sociated with  Baron  von  Boineburg  (1667),  wrote 
several  tracts  pertaining  to  jurisprudence,  and 
advocated  a  more  general  use  of  the  German 
tongue  in  legal  business.  He  tried  to  bring 
about  an  internal  alliance  of  the  small  German 
States,  and  to  raise  some  kind  of  bulwark  against 
the  ambition  of  Louis  XIV.  To  this  monarch 
he  addressed  a  memorial  suggesting  an  expedition 
to  Egypt  in  order  to  divert  him  from  his  attack 
upon  Holland,  and  to  point  out  the  importance 


2  78         MODERN  E  UB  OPE  AN  PHIL  OSOPHT. 

of  conquering  Mohammedan  Turkey.  But  the 
crusading  spirit  was  dead,  and  Louis  had  other 
schemes  closer  at  home.  Still  the  French  king 
seemed  for  a  while  to  entertain  the  thought,  or, 
as  is  more  likely,  was  entertained  by  it ;  so  he 
graciously  permitted  Leibniz  to  appear  at  Paris, 
and  to  present  his  scheme  in  person. 

For  more  than  four  years  (from  March,  1672, 
till  December,  1676)  Leibniz  was  absent  from 
Germany,  spending  most  of  the  time  in  Paris, 
which  city  he  evidently  liked.  His  political 
mission  was  a  total  failure  from  the  start ;  he 
must  have  seen  the  French  armies  moving  in  the 
direction  of  Holland  as  he  journeyed  toward  the 
capital.  With  the  greater  intensity  he  threw 
himself  upon  Natural  Science,  Mathematics,  and 
Philosophy.  He  studied  Descartes  afresh  and 
became  acquainted  with  French  Cartesians  of 
distinction  like  Arnauld;  it  is  highly  probable 
that  he  found  out  something  about  Spinoza's 
doctrines  through  the  latter 's  friend,  Tschirn- 
hausen.  But  the  great  event  of  his  stay  at  Paris 
was  his  invention  of  the  Differential  Calculus, 
which  was  claimed  by  Newton  and  Newton's 
friends.  The  result  was  a  controversy  about 
priority,  which  has  not  wholly  ceased  at  the 
present  day.  He  also  learned  the  use  of  the 
French  tongue  to  such  perfection  that  it  became 
his  chief  philosophic  vehicle.  The  fact  is  that 
Leibniz  in  a  number  of  ways  Gallicised,  in  striking 


LEIBNIZ.  -  LIFE.  279 

contrast  with  the  Frenchman  Descartes,  who  ran 
away  from  France  and  Paris,  which  produced  in 
him  unreal  phantoms,  according  to  his  own 
statement. 

But  Leibniz,  apparently  for  financial  reasons, 
could  no  longer  remain  at  Paris.  His  friend 
Boineburg  had  died,  and  it  was  necessary  to  seek 
a  new  position.  He  could  not  live  in  philo- 
sophic retirement  like  Spinoza,  but  longed  for  a 
court  with  its  external  life  and  ceremony.  By 
way  of  England  where  he  did  not  see  Newton, 
and  through  Holland  where  he  saw  Spinoza,  he 
returned  to  Germany  about  the  close  of  the 
year  1676,  with  his  years  of  learning  and  appro- 
priation (Lehrjahre)  passing  over  into  a  time 
of  inner  elaboration  and  original  effort.  Paris 
was  the  important  turning-point;  in  Physics 
certainly  and  doubtless  in  Metaphysics  he  had 
begun  to  rise  out  of  Descartes  into  a  new  stage, 
and  in  Mathematics  he  had  made  a  permanent 
contribution  to  the  science. 

Philosophically  we  may  consider  his  visit  with 
Spinoza  in  Holland  as  the  time  of  his  transition 
from  his  First  into  his  Second  Period,  though  this 
transition  had  already  started  at  Paris  where 
Cartesianism  had  pushed  beyond  itself,  devel- 
oping its  inherent  pantheistic  tendency.  In  1675, 
the  year  before  Leibniz  quit  Paris,  the  Cartesian 
Nicolas  Malebranche  had  published  his  Recherche 
de  la  Verite,  in  which  he  maintains  that  "  the 


280        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

mind  dwells  in  God,  thinks  in  God,  sees  in  God." 
Really  it  is  God  who  thinks  in  me.  We  do  not 
behold  material  objects  immediately,  but  their 
"  types,  their  ideal  substance  as  this  exists  in 
God."  It  needed  only  Spinoza  to  say:  God 
is  just  this  substance  and  nothing  else,  not  a 
person  with  Intellect  and  Will.  Thus  we  reach 
Spinoza's  first,  or  metaphysical,  pantheistic 
stage. 

There  is  little  doubt  that  Leibniz  went  over 
into  Spinozism  with  the  evolving  spirit  of  the 
age,  and  stayed  fermenting  there  for  a  season. 
Indeed  he  had  to  work  through  this  stage  in 
order  to  come  to  himself,  to  his  own  doctrine. 
Hence  the  significance  of  his  visit  with  Spinoza, 
who  was  undoubtedly  the  magnet  which  drew 
him  to  Holland.  Leibniz  loved  human  inter- 
course, loved  the  individual  (Monad),  and 
always  sought  him  out  to  talk  with  him  face  to 
face.  At  Paris  already  Leibniz  had  discovered 
where  the  next  great  stage  of  Philosophy  was  in 
the  throes  of  birth.  In  France  the  Church 
would  surely  strangle  the  infant;  during  that 
age,  it  could  only  be  born  in  free  Holland 
and  be  allowed  to  live.  Truly  a  marvelous, 
world-forecasting  instinct  was  it  that  led  Leibniz 
to  The  Hague,  to  talk  over  the  present  state  of 
the  Universe  with  Spinoza,  who  was  then  so  near 
the  borderland  of  the  Beyond  (he  died  the  fol- 
lowing year). 


LEIBNIZ.  -  LIFE.  281 

A  recent  investigator  (Stein)  affirms  that 
Leibniz  stayed  with  Spinoza  a  full  month  in 
continuous  intercourse,  discussing  various  prob- 
lems and  reading  portions  of  the  Ethics^  then 
in  manuscript.  When  this  book  was  published 
the  next  year,  in  the  postumous  edition  (1677), 
Leibniz  is  known  to  have  studied  it  with  great 
care,  appropriating  it  profoundly  and  letting  it 
germinate  in  his  own  soul. 

Now  it  is  just  this  book  with  its  doctrine 
which  gives  to  Leibniz  his  great  philosophical 
task  at  which  he  keeps  laboring  during  his  entire 
Second  Period  of  some  twenty  years.  He  has 
to  adopt,  then  refute,  and  finally  transcend 
Spinozism  on  its  metaphysical  side.  There  was 
awhile  during  which  he  was  a  Spinozist,  then 
he  became  an  anti-Spinozist,  till  at  last  he  dis- 
covered himself  in  the  Monad.  Still  to  the  end 
of  his  life  he  would  at  times  fall  back  into  Spi- 
nozism. Cases  of  such  reversion  are  found  in 
his  latest  writings,  for  instance  in  his  Monadology 
and  in  his  Principes.  Astonishing  is  the  fact 
but  he  never  could  quite  escape  from  the  all-de- 
vouring maw  of  Spinozan  Substance,  even  while 
exploiting  his  Monad  in  opposition  to  it. 

At  this  point  we  should  note  the  fact,  very 
important  for  the  inner  connection  of  the  Phi- 
losophy of  the  Seventeenth  Century,  that  Leib- 
niz developed  positively  out  of  the  second  or 
ethical  stage  of  Spinoza,  while  toward  the  latter's 


282        MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

first  or  metaphysical  (pantheistic),  stage  he  bore 
himself  negatively  in  the  main,  even  if  some- 
times he  had  a  relapse.  Of  these  two  stages 
Leibniz  seems  to  have  been  dimly  aware,  though 
but  dimly,  if  we  may  judge  by  his  Refutation 
of  Spinoza  (translated  in  Duncan's  Leibniz). 
It  is  plain,  however,  by  this  same  Refutation, 
that  his  arguments  are  directed  against  the  first 
or  metaphysical  stage  of  Spinoza's  Philosophy, 
from  which  he  undoubtedly  re -acted  after  having 
adopted  it  and  then  worked  through  it  to  his 
own  independent  position.  Here  is  a  confession 
from  the  New  Essays,  written  probably  some 
twenty-five  years  after  the  time  to  which  it 
refers :  "  You  know  that  formerly  I  went  a  little 
too  far,  and  began  to  lean  to  the  side  of  the 
Spinozists  who  leave  only  infinite  power  to  God. 
But  the  new  light  has  cured  me  of  this,"  an 
allusion  to  his  own  doctrine.  He  acknowledges  a 
native  tendency,  seeing  '«  how  much  I  am  imbued 
with  admiration  and  with  love  for  this  sovereign 

o 

fountain  of  things  and  beauties."  It  is  manifest 
that  Leibniz  spans  the  entire  philosophical  move- 
ment of  the  Seventeenth  Century:  first  a  Carte- 
sian, then  a  Spinozist,  then  himself,  in  which  last 
case  he  shows  on  a  number  of  points  a  return  to 
Descartes. 

We  have  now  marked,  with  a  fair  degree  of 
distinctness,  we  hope,  his  transition  into  his 
Second  Period  which  begins  with  his  Spinozism 


LEIBNIZ.  —  LIFE.  283 

and  ends  with  the  full   development  and  formu- 
lation of  his  own  doctrine. 

2.  Second  Period  (1676-1696).  In  grouping 
the  Life  of  Leibniz  according  to  his  philosophic 
evolution,  the  Second  Period  offers  grave  diffi- 
culties. Regarding  the  system  of  Monads  and  of 
Pre-established  Harmony,  we  find  that  its  devel- 
opment was  very  slow,  and  proceeded  by  sudden 
brief  insights,  in  monadal  fashion.  Leibniz  the 
politician,  Leibniz  the  mathematician,  and 
Leibniz  the  philosopher,  seem  to  have  some- 
what different  periods,  and  thus  each  demands 
its  own  classification.  But  we  are  here  dealing 
specially  with  Leibniz  the  philosopher,  and  we 
place  the  dividing  line  between  his  Second  and 
Third  Periods  at  the  time  when  the  two  distinctive 
categories  of  his  system  are  decisively  uttered. 
This  was  about  1696-7.  The  term  Pre-estab- 
lished Harmony  makes  its  first  printed  appear- 
ance rather  shrinkingly  in  the  following  passage : 
"  That  which  results  in  the  other  substances  is 
only  by  virtue  of  a  Pre-established  Harmony  (if 
I  may  be  permitted  to  employ  this  word)  and  not 
through  an  actual  influence  or  through  the  trans- 
mission of  any  kind  or  quality  from  one  to  the 
other"  (£ '  claircissemenl ,  in  reply  to  M.  Fou- 
cher).  It  is  evident  from  this  very  passage  that 
Leibniz  sorely  needs  another  more  distinctive 
term  in  place  of  the  word  substance,  which  has 
been  worn  out  by  Descartes  and  Spinoza,  not  to 


284        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

speak  of  the  enormous  task  it  had  been  made  to 
do  by  the  medieval  thinkers.  'Hence,  the  next 
year  (1697)  an  expression  is  found  in  a  letter  of 
his  (Epistola  ad  Fardellam),  alluding  to  '«  the 
nature  of  Monads  and  Substances,"  the  two  words 
being  coupled  together  in  one  phrase  before  final 
separation.  He  continues:  De  origins  earum 
puto  me  jam  fixisse,  implying  that  he  had  now 
come  to  clearness  concerning  a  fundamental 
principle  of  his  system.  "  The  Monads  do  not 
arise  in  the  course  of  nature  but  by  divine  crea- 
tion, nor  do  they  pass  away  by  a  natural  process, 
but  by  annihilation ."  (jSame  Letter). 

Thus  after  fully  twenty  years'  incubation, 
Leibniz  has  elaborated  his  thought  and  expressed 
it  in  two  distinctive  categories,  with  which  he 
will  be  forever  associated  in  the  History  of 
Philosophy.  It  would  have  been  well  if  he  could 
have  found  a  third  category  equally  definite  and 
distinctive,  in  which  to  fix  firmly  his  idea  of  con- 
tinuity or  imperceptible  difference  which  hovers 
between  and  overcomes  all  separation  in  the 
universe.  There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that 
Leibniz  had  a  general  conception  of  his  system 
long  before  1696.  In  his  correspondence  with 
Arnauld  ten  years  previous  to  this  date,  he  gives 
a  fairly  complete  account  of  his  leading  ideas. 
During  the  whole  Second  Period  he  was  throwing 
out  his  thoughts  sporadically,  without  much 
order.  The  Monad  was  born  in  a  monadal 


LEIBNIZ.  —  LIFE.  285 

fashion  and  showed  its  character  by  its  sudden, 
explosive,  dynamic  appearance  at  quite  any  time 
in  any  kind  of  writing. 

The  outer  life  of  Leibniz  during  this  score  of 
years  shows  the  same  peculiarity.  On  his  return 
from  Paris  in  1676  he  entered  the  service  of 
Duke  John  Frederick,  to  whom  he  was  librarian 
and  privy  councillor  with  residence  at  the  court 
of  Hanover.  A  great  number  of  small  duties 
were  imposed  upon  him,  all  of  which  he  sought 
to  perform  in  a  large  sense,  as  if  each  little  task 
reflected  the  universe.  It  was  indeed  a  strong 
contrast:  from  the  macrocosm  of  Paris  he  is 
suddenly  whisked  into  the  microcosm  of  Han- 
over. The  court  was  small,  the  land  was 
small,  the  Duke  was  small,  his  policy  being  on 
the  whole  the  narrow  particularism  common 
to  the  German  Princes  of  that  time.  All  this 
smallness  Leibniz  tried  to  see  *  *  under  the  form 
of  eternity,"  but  such  a  task  was  not  small . 
He  had  to  write  the  history  of  the  little  dynasty, 
which  gave  him  an  opportunity  to  get  away  from 
the  court  in  search  of  documents  in  Italy  and 
elsewhere ;  but  his  best  years  passed  in  the  mean- 
time without  organizing  his  philosophy.  His 
chief  business  was  with  the  little  States  of 
Germany,  political  Monads  which  he  sought  to 
bring  into  some  kind  of  harmony.  Then  religion 
also  had  become  separative,  monadal;  first  was 
the  great  separation  between  Catholics  and  Prot- 


286        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

estants;  but  the  Protestants  in  turn  separated 
among  themselves  into  manifold  sects  or  religious 
Monads  mutually  exclusive  and  combative  —  a 
trait  which  they  have  not  yet  lost.  Quite  a 
portion  of  our  philosopher's  life  was  occupied 
with  an  attempt  to  bridge  the  chasm  between 
Catholicism  and  Protestantism;  this  failed,  still 
he  also  tried  his  hand  at  reconciling  the  Lutheran 
and  Reformed  divisions  among  Protestants.  So 
we  may  say  that  Leibniz  had  a  great  deal  of 
practical  experience  with  political  and  religious 
Monadology  while  he  was  working  out  his  phi- 
losophical Monadology.  His  monadal  philosophy 
is  verily  a  reflection  of  his  age,  of  his  people,  and 
of  their  moral  and  institutional  condition ;  also  a 
reflection  of  his  outer  active  life  and  of  his  inner 
personal  character.  For  Leibniz  himself  is  a 
Monad,  yea  a  Monad  over  all  these  Monads, 
reflecting  their  reflection  in  his  writing,  seeking 
to  establish  that  Pre-established  Harmony  of  his 
both  practically  and  theoretically.  Great  was 
his  endeavor  to  recognize  the  monadal  nature 
in  everything,  in  each  person,  each  State,  each 
Religion,  and  then  to  find  the  reconciling  prin- 
ciple, which  he  naturally  deemed  to  be  an  ideal 
divine  thing. 

At  this  point  we  place  the  substantial  comple- 
tion of  the  monadological  scheme  of  Leibniz  and 
therewith  the  end  of  the  Second  Period.  It  is 
true  that  already  ten  years  before  this  time  he 


LEIBNIZ.  —  LIFE.  287 

shows  its  fundamental  thoughts  in  his  Discourse 
on  Metaphysics,  and  in  the  Arnauld  Letters 
(both  translated  by  Montgomery,  Open  Court 
Publishing  Co.,  Chicago).  But  his  doctrine  is 
not  yet  formulated  in  its  own  right,  possessing 
its  own  distinctive  categories.  We  feel  still  the 
struggle  for  the  word  and  consequently  for  the 
thought.  All  philosophic  thought  is  not  yet 
fully  born  till  it  has  found  its  own  distinctive 
speech.  To  be  sure  in  a  sense  the  Philosophy  of 
Leibniz  was  never  built  out  into  a  fixed  system. 
The  Monads  he  will  use  during  the  coming  Period 
as  so  much  plastic  material  which  he  twists  and 
forms  and  transforms  somewhat  according  to  his 
necessities.  Still  the  Monads  remain  with  their 
Pre-established  Harmony  throughout  all  these 
manifold  metamorphoses. 

3.  Third  Period  (1696-1716).  Still  another 
twenty  years  Leibniz  lived,  full  of  ideas  and 
activities,  which  exploded  themselves  on  many 
subjects  and  in  many  directions.  Characteristic 
of  the  present  Period  is  the  fact  that  he  broke 
loose  from  his  narrow  sphere  in  Hanover  and 
ranged  pretty  freely  over  all  Germany  including 
Austria-  He  founded  the  Academy  of  Sciences 
at  Berlin  and  sought  to  found  similar  institutions 
at  Vienna  and  Dresden,  and  even  at  St.  Peters- 
burg. He  became  the  friend  and  intimate  of 
German  rulers  and  princesses ;  he  met  and  con- 
ferred with  Peter  the  Great  of  Russia  no  less 


288        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

than  three  times  at  different  places  in  Germany. 
He  lived  at  Vienna  for  nearly  two  years  and  was 
appointed  Imperial  Councillor.  Thus  Leibniz 
was  making  himself  universal  in  the  Teutonic 
world,  and  was  disseminating  his  philosophy  by 
personal  discourse  as  well  as  by  the  written  word. 
Two  of  his  largest  books,  applications  of  his 
doctrines,  belong  to  this  Period,  the  Essais  and 
the  Theodicee.  Moreover  he  brought  himself  to 
put  into  something  like  a  systematic  exposition 
his  explosive,  centrifugal  thoughts,  truly  Monads, 
in  the  Monadology. 

At  last  the  old  rover  turned  his  footsteps  back 
to  his  post  at  Hanover,  which  he  had  never  given 
up.  There  he  spent  the  last  two  years  of  his 
life  (1714—16)  in  tasks  which  must  be  pro- 
nounced unworthy  of  his  genius,  namely,  in 
completing  the  petty  annals  of  the  House  of 
Brunswick  and  in  a  theological  controversy  with 
the  English  clergyman,  Dr.  Clarke.  He  died  in 
Hanover,  Nov.  14,  1716,  discredited  by  the  court, 
disappointed  in  his  main  plans,  and  leaving  his 
work  in  fragments. 

The  lowly  but  self-determined  life  of  Spinoza 
is  far  more  inspiring  than  that  of  Leibniz  with 
his  excessive  fondness  for  people  of  high  birth 
and  station.  There  is  often  a  certain  polished 
servility  in  his  words  which  is  out  of  keeping 
with  the  true  philosopher.  Though  he  advo- 
cated the  use  of  his  native  homely  German,  he 


L  EIBNIZ  —  LIFE.  289 

wrote  his  chief  works  in  foreign  courtly  French. 
On  the  whole  he  is  not  an  ideal  character.  But 
of  his  extraordinary  talents  there  can  be  no  doubt. 
It  has  been  truly  declared  that  he  was  the  most 
universal  man  since  Aristotle,  equally  marvelous 
in  powers  of  acquisition  and  of  originality.  It 
was  his  chief  bane  that  he  loved  to  display  these 
powers  before  high  individuals  without  concen- 
trating upon  one  great  fundamental  task.  He 
cannot  be  acquitted  of  intellectual  vanity  which 
had  to  be  continually  gratified  by  fresh  admira- 
tion daily  renewed.  So  his  work  is  largely  made 
up  of  short  brilliant  coruscations  before  or  for 
applauding  friends  who  could  not  help  giving  him 
what  they  saw  he  wanted.  The  reader  to-day  is 
excited  to  similar  admiration  by  these  little  lit- 
erary Monads,  each  having  the  power  of  reflect- 
ing the  universe.  The  man  who  could  at  court 
give  such  a  thaumaturgic  display  of  intellect 
must  have  been  in  daily  demand.  His  system 
still  bears  the  appearance,  which  is  derived  from 
the  manner  of  its  origin:  it  has  an  unreal,  fan- 
tastic outside,  which  makes  it  look  like  a  pure 
play  of  the  imagination.  The  whole  thing  seems 
at  first  sight  a  philosophical  romance  constructed 
with  a  magician's  ingenuity.  It  takes  usually 
quite  a  little  while  for  most  readers  to  find  out 
that  the  author  is  really  serious  in  his  thought ; 
some  readers  never  find  him  out.  Still  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  we  have  here  a  genuine 

19 


290        MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

philosophy,  that  is,  a  formulation  of  the  essence 
or  principle  of  the  All.  Nay,  it  is  one  of  the 
most  important  philosophies,  in  direct  line  with 
the  most  exalted  achievements  in  this  field. 

II.  THE  WRITINGS  OF  LEIBNIZ. — These  are 
very  numerous,  and,  it  seems,  have  not  yet  been 
fully  published.  J.  E.  Erdmann  printed  101 
pieces  in  his  edition  of  the  Philosophical  Works 
of  Leibniz  (1840),  many  of  which  had  never 
before  been  given  to  the  public.  The  very  sight 
of  this  edition  of  Erdmann's  shows  the  scattered, 
separative,  monadal  character  of  our  philosopher's 
production.  Even  the  long  pieces,  like  the  Evsais 
and  the  Theodicee,  are  really  made  up  of  short 
pieces,  or  essays,  on  topics  which  are  not  closely 
connected.  We  cannot  help  noting  that  the 
writings  of  Leibniz  were  as  fragmentary  as  the 
German  nation  of  his  age,  so  that  the  German 
thinker  himself  seems  to  be  a  product  of  the 
peace  of  Westphalia. 

The  author's  literary  style  and  expression  bear 
the  same  mark.  On  this  point  we  may  cite  the 
words  of  one  of  the  greatest  German  critics, 
who  possessed  in  certain  respects  a  genius  kin- 
dred to  Leibniz.  Says  Herder:  "Leibniz  re- 
vealed his  whole  system  not  otherwise  than  as  it 
presented  itself  to  him,  in  glimpses  of  wit  and 
imagination,  as  it  lived  in  his  soul,  hence  in  short 
essays.  It  had  to  be  felt  in  the  warmth  of  this 
origin  and  of  this  connection,  otherwise  the  spirit 


LEIBNIZ.  —  WRITINGS.  291 

of  Leibniz  was  gone,  and  with  it  all  original  and 
primitive  truth  of  the  expression."  Herder  goes 
on  to  censure  Wolff  "  for  making  theorems  out 
of  these  prospects  and  glimpses  of  wit,  so  that 
they  lost  their  spontaneousness  "  (see  Merz' 
Leibniz). 

This  extract  in  our  judgment  hits  the  salient 
fact  in  the  character  of  these  manifold  Writings. 
They  abound  in  sudden  flashes  of  insight,  in- 
genious comparisons,  bright  images  which  often 
shoot  forth  with  an  instantaneous  explosive 
effect.  They  are  monadal,  giving  a  brief  repre- 
sentation of  the  universe  in  their  little  world, 
being  "  figurations  of  the  divinity  from  moment 
to  moment,"  to  use  a  Leibnizian  phrase  employed 
in  a  similar  connection.  It  should  be  added, 
.however,  that  Herder,  in  the  above  extract,  is 
not  fair  to  Wolff,  who,  even  if  somewhat  formal, 
was  a  great  systematizer  of  thought  and  fur- 
nished to  the  work  of  Leibniz  what  the  latter 
lacked,  namely  organization.  Herder  was  him- 
self a  genius  of  the  Leibnizian  cast,  bubbling 
over  with  detached  insights,  very  stimulating, 
essentially  monadal,  but  without  any  abiding 
sense  of  an  organic  Whole,  at  least  in  his  own 
case,  for  his  sharp  critical  eye  could  detect  this 
fault  in  others,  when  so  minded.  Hence  the 
above  defense  of  Leibniz  is  a  kind  of  self- 
defense. 

Unquestionably    the    most   important    philo- 


292          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

sophical  work,  though  not  the  most  bulky,  is  the 
Monadology,  first  printed  by  Erdmann  in  the 
original  French  in  1840,  though  there  was  a 
German  translation  from  the  manuscript  by 
Kohler  in  1720.  Leibniz  wrote  the  original  in 
1714  at  the  request  of  Prince  Eugene  of  Savoy 
who  wished  to  have  a  brief  survey  of  the  author's 
philosophy.  This  fact,  however,  has  been  de- 
nied by  Gerhardt,  an  editor  of  Leibniz'  Works, 
who  says  that  the  Principes,  and  not  the  Monad- 
ology  was  written  for  Prince  Eugene,  who  was 
the  most  distinguished  general  of  his  age,  and 
with  whom  Leibniz  became  intimately  acquainted 
at  Vienna.  It  certainly  accords  with  the  char- 
acter of  Leibniz  that  he  should  write  his  chief 
work  for  a  chief  celebrity  of  Europe;  nobody 
else  could  draw  it  out  of  him.  Still  it  should  be 
stated  that  the  original  manuscript  of  the  Mo- 
nadology  has  no  title ;  the  present  one  is  said  to 
have  been  given  to  it  by  Erdmann. 

At  any  rate  in  this  booklet  the  philosophy  of 
Leibniz  is  stated  in  a  more  concise  and  orderly 
manner  than  anywhere  else,  though  the  work  is 
not  a  well-connected  piece  of  writing;  it  shows 
the  monadal  tendency  in  treating  of  Monads. 
After  giving  the  psychical  element  of  the  Monad 
and  reaching  the  Ego,  the  author  jumps  to  con- 
sidering his  two  favorite  logical  categories  of 
Contradiction  and  of  Sufficient  Reason,  one  of 
which  furnishes  necessary  truth  (whose  opposite 


LEIBNIZ  —PHILOSOPHY.  293 

is  impossible),  and  the  other  contingent  truth 
(whose  opposite  is  possible).  Parallel  to  the 
two  kinds  of  knowledge  are  the  two  kinds  of 
causes,  final  and  efficient. 

«'  The  ultimate  reason  of  things  must  be  in  a 
necessary  substance  in  which  all  the  particular 
changes  exist  only  potentially,  as  if  in  the 
source — this  reason  is  what  we  call  God,  one 
and  sufficient"  (Hon.  37,  38),  outside  of  whom 
there  is  nothing  independent.  "  From  which  it 
follows  that  God  is  absolutely  perfect,  as  per- 
fection is  nothing  else  than  the  greatness  of  the 
positive  reality  seized  with  exactness  by  setting 
aside  all  limits,"  God  being  the  unlimited  and 
so  the  perfect,  the  absolutely  infinite.  Thus 
Leibniz  endeavors  to  grasp  the  All,  very  faintly 
and  dubiously  seeing  in  it  some  kind  of  a 
process.  We  can  observe  that  he  is  wrestling 
with  what  we  call  the  Pampsychosis,  catching 
hold  of  shreds  of  it  and  tearing  them  off,  seek- 
ing to  thrust  them  into  sentences  and  into  cate- 
gories. Though  all  these  multifarious  gleams 
and  insights,  and  even  phantasms,  runs  a  fun- 
damental principle  which  is  indeed  common  to 
all  Philosophy,  but  to  which  Leibniz  has  given 
his  own  unique  and  distinctive  form. 

III.  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LEIBNIZ.  —  Kepeatedly 
has  the  point  been  urged  that  Leibniz  has  no 
fully  jointed,  organic  system  of  thought,  that, 
indeed,  he  lacks  in  organizing  power.  Still  he 


294          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

would  not  be  a  philosopher  unless  he  revealed  the 
philosophic  Norm,  either  by  way  of  adoption  or  of 
opposition.  It  lay  deep  in  the  nature  of  Leibniz 
to  keep  his  first  principle  plastic,  adjustable,  not 
rigidly  systematic ;  thus  he  could  mould  it  over 
continually  according  to  occasion,  being  essen- 
tially a  formable  material  ready  to  sho©t  into  any 
shape.  This  constitutes  a  great  difficulty  in  the 
giving  an  organic  exposition  of  the  Leibnizian 
Philosophy;  in  its  details  it  gets  recalcitrant 
to  order  and  consistency;  the  further  we  go 
down  in  it  toward  minuteness,  the  more  self- 
repellent  and  monadal  it  becomes,  being  ulti- 
mately composed  of  individual  self-sufficient 
Monads.  On  the  other  hand,  as  we  rise  toward 
the  totality,  there  is  order,  yea  harmony  pre-es- 
tablished divinely,  which  controls  and  arranges 
the  infinitely  divided  world  of  Monads. 

Accordingly  we  shall  not  fail  to  find  in  Leibniz 
the  general  sweep  of  the  Norm,  the  primal  order- 
ing principle  of  all  Philosophies,  which  likewise 
show  themselves  as  Monads  requiring  a  Pre-es- 
tablished Harmony.  Our  philosopher,  therefore, 
will  reveal  his  spiritual  kinship  by  his  mighty  en- 
deavor to  formulate  the  Universe  in  its  threefold 
process  of  God,  World,  and  Man,  which  gives 
the  three  basic  sciences  of  Philosophy  —  Meta- 
physics, Physics,  and  Ethics.  Within  this  uni- 
versal Norm,  Leibniz  will  have  his  own  peculiar 
movement,  thought,  and  expression,  wherein  con- 


LEIBNIZ.  -  METAPHYSICS.  295 

sists  his  originality.  Such  is  the  general  fact 
which  is  now  to  be  set  forth  in  its  more  impor- 
tant details. 

A.  METAPHYSICS. 

This  portion  of  Philosophy  seeks  to  formulate 
the  essence  of  Being  in  the  pure  categories  of 
Thought,  as  these  are  employed  by  Leibniz. 
His  first  work  is  "  a  metaphysical  dissertation/' 
whose  theme  is  the  principle  of  the  individual 
(principium  individui),  and  in  which  he  sides 
with  the  Medieval  Nominalists  in  assigning  reality 
only  to  individuals,  since  whatever  exists  must 
by  its  very  existence  be  an  individual.  The  reader 
should  observe  the  relation  of  this  early  thought 
of  Leibniz  (written  when  he  was  net  more  than 
17  years  old)  to  his  matured  view  of  the  Monad, 
which  will  often  be  called  an  individual. 

Beside  this  scholastic  connection,  Leibniz 
stands  in  close  relation  to  Descartes,  whose  dual- 
ism of  Thought  and  Extension  he  strives  to  har- 
monize by  filling  up  the  gap  with  his  Monads. 
He  cites  Descartes  more  than  any  other  philoso- 
pher, usually  for  the  purpose  of  showing  his  own 
different  view.  This  he  did  so  often  and  with  so 
strong  an  emphasis,  that  he  was  accused  '*  of 
wishing  to  establish  his  reputation  on  the  ruins 
of  that  of  Descartes."  Such  an  imputation  he 
denies  with  warmth,  though  he  has  a  keen  eye 


296          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

for  the  shortcomings  not  only  of  the  doctrine 
but  also  of  the  character  of  Descartes,  "  who  had 
an  unbounded  ambition  to  elevate  himself  into 
being  the  head  of  a  party."  Nevertheless  Leib- 
niz declares:  "  it  is  my  custom  to  say  that  the 
Cartesian  Philosophy  is  as  it  were  the  ante-cham- 
ber of  Truth,  and  that  it  is  difficult  to  penetrate 
very  far  in  advance  without  having  passed 
through  that  Philosophy."  This  shows  that  he 
deems  Cartesianism  a  necessary  stage  in  the  evo- 
lution of  the  thought  of  the  time.  But  he  con- 
tinues: "  Still  you  deprive  yourself  of  the  true 
knowledge  of  the  basis  of  things,  if  you  stop 
there"  (see  Reponse  aux  Reflexions,  p.  142, 
Erdmannj.  That  is,  you  must  move  forward  to 
my  Philosophy,  which  is  the  true  solution  of  the 
previous  difficulties.  Such  a  statement  sounds 
doubtless  egotistical,  still  every  philosopher 
makes  it,  has  to  make  it,  if  he  believes  in  his 
own  work.  Time  has  confirmed  the  opinion  of 
Leibniz  in  this  matter. 

Very  certain  is  it  that  Leibniz  was  deeply 
indebted  to  another  philosopher,  to  whom  he 
pays  scant  recognition  —  Spinoza.  It  is  the 
Spinozan  doctrine  of  the  consubstantiality  of 
Thought  and  Extension,  which  suggested  to 
Leibniz  his  method  of  solving  the  Cartesian 
dualism.  The  poor,  humble  Jew  of  Amsterdam 
does  not  receive  his  dues  from  the  philosophic 


LEIBNIZ  —  METAPHYSICS.  297 

courtier,  who  never  misses  an  opportunity  to 
name  the  French  nobleman  as  antagonist. 

The  metaphysical  development  of  Leibniz* 
thought  will  show  itself  in  three  main  stages 
which  are  designated  as  follows :  The  Monad 
taken  by  itself,  the  Continuity  of  Monads,  and 
finally  Pre-established  Harmony.  These  three 
categories  are  employed  by  Leibniz  himself  in 
the  formulation  of  his  work,  though  often  in  a 
desultory  manner,  so  that  their  process  is  not 
manifest.  He  never  gave  any  complete  organi- 
zation of  his  system ;  we  have  to  think  that  he 
was  not  a  great  organizer  of  thought.  His 
genius  was  monadal  as  well  as  his  philosophy. 
His  way  of  writing  is  to  set  clown  scattered  in- 
sights in  any  shape  which  may  happen  to  be  at 
hand  —  letter,  essay,  article,  remark  —  each  of 
which  is  a  little  Monad  with  a  brief  dynamic 
energy  all  its  own.  Still  they  all  show  a  common 
character  and  principle,  a  Pre-established  Har- 
mony from  that  original  Monad,  the  philosopher 
himself. 

1.  The  Monad.  The  conception  of  the  Monad 
is  the  most  distinctive  as  well  as  fundamental 
thing  in  the  philosophy  of  Leibniz.  It  takes  the 
place  of  the  substance  of  Spinoza,  which  is  now 
infinitely  divided,  yet  each  division  is  substance. 
Hence  Leibniz  called  his  Monad  first  by  the 
name  of  substantial  forms  (a  scholastic  term) 
or  points  of  substance.  The  idea  of  punctate- 


298          M  ODEEN  E  UE  OP  BAN  PHIL  OSOPH  Y. 

ness  enters  into  them  strongly,  the  universe  is 
reduced  to  its  points,  which  however  are  not 
physical,  as  they  are  not  extended,  nor 
mathematical  as  they  have  force,  life,  and 
even  self-consciousness.  Hence  Leibniz  gives 
to  his  Monads  likewise  the  name  of  entel- 
echies  or  pure  activities,  an  Aristotelean  term 
which  designates  the  total  process  within 
itself,  or  the  self-determined.  From  this 
point  of  view  the  Universe  is  made  up  of  an  in- 
finite number  of  processes,  quite  independent  of 
each  other,  yet  each  reflecting  the  All.  The 
essence  of  Being  is,  then,  according  to  Leibniz, 
the  Monad,  which  does  not  arise  or  pass  away, 
though  it  has  internal  changes.  These  Monads 
have  also  an  atomic  character,  still  they  are  not 
the  atoms  of  Democritus,  to  whose  doctrine 
Leibniz  once  leaned,  since  they  have  an  inner 
self -active  energy.  They  are  individualized,  and 
no  two  individuals  are  alike;  to  be  different  in 
their  principle,  their  nature  has  in  it  difference, 
separation,  multiplicity.  The  vast  crystallized 
pyramid  of  Spinoza  is  smitten  by  the  blow  of 
Leibniz  and  reduced  to  very  powder.  The  mo- 
nistic All  becomes  the  monadal  Many. 

Still  the  purpose  of  Leibniz  is  not  to  lemain 
in  this  stage  of  separation  and  discord ;  his  grand 
object  is  harmony.  Hence  these  individualistic 
Monads  into  which  the  Cosmos  has  seemingly 
been  pulverized  are  to  be  harmonized  into  a  new 


LEIBNIZ.  —  ME  TAPHTS1CS.  299 

totality.  In  general  the  life  and  thought  of  our 
philosopher  were  largely  devoted  to  the  recon- 
ciliation of  differences.  We  have  seen  how  he 
sought  to  bring  together  the  two  divisions  of 
Christians,  Protestant  and  Catholic,  and  also 
the  two  divisions  of  Protestants,  Lutheran  and 
Reformed.  On  the  same  line  runs  his  philo- 
sophic endeavor,  so  that  his  other  great  category 
is  Pre-established  Harmony,  as  the  reconciling 
principle  of  his  independent  self-asserting  Mo- 
nads. Even  these  he  employs  for  harmonizing 
the  Cartesian  opposites,  Thought  and  Extension, 
whose  abyss  he  will  fill  up  with  a  continuity  of 
Monads,  thus  making  a  road  over  which  anybody 
can  pass. 

Coining  back  to  the  conception  of  the  .Monad, 
we  are  to  grasp  it  primarily  as  self-sufficient, 
self-dependent,  not  determined  from  without  by 
any  other  Monad.  It  is  itself  and  nothing  else; 
it  is  a  simple  substance,  not  composite,  but  is  the 
element  of  all  that  is  composite.  "  The  Monads 
have  no  windows,  by  which  anything  can  enter  or 
go  forth"  (Monadology ,  c.  7).  Still  "  each 
Monad  represents  the  Universe,"  each  element  or 
part  reflects  the  All  of  which  it  is  a  part,  other- 
wise it  would  not  be  a  part.  "  Each  spirit  being 
a  little  God  in  its  department,  it  results  that  such 
a  spirit  can  enter  into  society  with  God  "  (Do. 
c.  83,  84).  This  is  a  great  insight :  each  Monad 
has  in  it  the  image  of  the  All,  not  only  at  rest 


300          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

but  in  movement.  Each  portion  of  matter  is  not 
only  divisible  to  infinity,  but  also  each  minute 
subdivision  "has  its  own  movement;  otherwise 
it  would  be  impossible  for  each  portion  of  matter 
to  express  the  Universe  "  (Do.  c.  65).  Such  is 
the  general  conception  of  the  Monad,  which  must 
still  reveal  the  Whole  in  all  its  division. 

But  this  can  only  be  brought  about  through 
movement,  through  action.  The  Monad  cannot 
represent  the  Universe  as  a  placid  motionless  pic- 
ture, for  this  would  not  be  a  true  representation 
of  the  Universe  with  its  force,  its  energy,  its 
eternal  activity.  Hence  each  Monad  has  its  pro- 
cess, which  process,  strange  to  say,^is  expressed 
by  Leibniz  in  terms  more  psychological  than 
metaphysical.  In  brief,  the  following  is  the  pro- 
cess of  the  Monad :  T— 

(a)  There  is  an  unconscious  element  in  the 
Monad,  not  only  as  human  Ego,  but  even  as 
material.  Everything  that  exists  is  a  soul,  ac- 
cording to  Leibniz ;  body  or  extension  is  a  con- 
fused perception,  and  manifests  force  or  soul. 
Thus  the  Cartesian  separation  of  body  and  soul 
is  mediated;  properly  soul  alone  exists,  and  it  has 
always  perception  in  some  form.  The  lower  the 
being,  the  more  complete  is  its  unconscious,  or 
purely  potential  nature.  Still,  even  the  higher 
being,  endowed  with  intelligence,  has  around  its 
conscious  self  an  enveloping  sphere  of  uncon- 
sciousness, the  unborn  realm  of  its  potentialities. 


LEIBNIZ.  —  METAPHYSICS.  301 

Leibniz  calls  them  little  or  insensible  perceptions, 
"  in  consequence  of  which  the  present  is  full  of 
the  past,  yet  big  with  the  future  "  (JVouveaux 
Essais,  Avant-Propos).  Into  this  unconscious 
realm  the  mind  returns  in  sleep,  swoon,  and 
dream,  not  to  speak  of  other  similar  states. 
Feelings,  instincts,  impulses,  the  inheritance  of 
an  incalculable  ancestry  belong  to  these  little 
perceptions.  They  are  the  underlying  links 
which  secretly  join  together  not  only  all  life  but 
all  being,  so  that  "  Nature  makes  no  leaps,"  and 
continuity  is  the  law  over  al'l  separation. 

Such  is  the  unconscious  stage  of  the  Monad, 
reflecting  the  universe  ( as  it  must)  in  a  confused, 
undeveloped,  chaotic  way,  whose  manifestation  is 
matter.  But  in  this  unseparated  disordered  state 
lies  force,  the  tendency  to  separation  and  order 
which  must  be  looked  at  by  itself  in  the  total 
scheme. 

(6)  The  Monad  has  in  its  internal  process 
what  Leibniz  calls  Appelition,  which  is  "  the 
action  of  the  inner  principle  that  causes  change 
or  the  transition  from  one  perception  to  another" 
(Monadology r,  c.  15 ).  This  Appetition  rises  from 
the  previous  unconscious  realm  (des  perceptions 
insensibles),  being  "  an  effort  of  which  we  are 
not  aware"  (Nouveaux  Essais,  Book  II.  ch. 
21,  5).  Here  we  see  the  element  of  Will  in  the 
Monad,  properly  the  second  element  or  stage  of 
it  (as  suggested  in  the  extract  just  preceding), 


302         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

though  Leibniz  often  places  it  after  perception 
proper,  which  would  make  it  the  third  stage  in 
the  process  of  the  Monad. 

This  Will  or  Appetitiou  is  not  simply  the  voli- 
tion of  a  self-conscious  being,  but  belongs  like- 
wise to  matter,  is,  in  fact,  the  force  which  Leib- 
niz finds  in  all  material  objects,  being  just  the 
principle  of  their  extension.  The  Pan-dynam- 
ism of  our  philosopher  is  the  manifestation  of 
Will  in  the  Cosmos,  which  Will  must  show  itself 
in  every  Monad  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest. 
But  the  Monad,  having  no  windows  for  egress 
or  ingress,  must  keep  its  Will  within  itself, 
making  the  same  its  principle  of  inner  change, 
or  "  the  transition  from  one  perception  to 
another."  So  we  properly  pass  through  Will  or 
Appetition,  to  Perception,  which  is  the  third 
stage  of  the  process  of  the  Monad. 

(c)  All  Monads  are  endowed  with  Perception, 
from  highest  to  lowest,  which  enables  them 
to  reflect  the  Universe.  There  are  many  degrees 
of  Perception,  or  reflections  of  the  Universe, 
from  the  confused  and  unconscious  up  to  the 
clear  and  conscious.  "The  Monad  is  limited 
and  defined  by  the  degrees  of  distinctness  in 
Perception  "  (Mon.  c.  60).  Thus  Perception  is 
universal,  it  is  not  simply  thought,  not  neces- 
sarily sensation  even. 

The  Monad,  however,  cannot  perceive  any- 
thing outside  of  itself,  being  windowless,  unable 


LEIBNIZ.  —  METAPHYSICS.  303 

to  give  or  receive.  The  Monad,  high  and  low, 
perceives  itself  in  perceiving  the  Universe.  The 
upper  Monad,  the  Ego,  can  perceive  only  its  own 
states ;  the  external  world  it  cannot  reach ;  what 
seems  the  outside  reality  is  only  a  projection  of 
its  own  inner  modification.  That  such  modifica- 
tion corresponds  to  the  reality,  depends  on 
another  principle  which  will  be  considered  later. 
Here  we  see  the  reason  why  Leibniz  is  called 
the  father  of  German  idealism.  Thus  Percep- 
tion determines  the  gradation  of  all  being.  The 
Monad  in  which  the  Universe  reflects  itself  most 
clearly  and  distinctly,  has  the  most  exalted  Per- 
ception, and  is  itself  in  the  most  exalted  rank  of 
Monads.  The  human  soul  approaches  perfec- 
tion in  proportion  to  its  adequate  Perception  or 
representation  of  the  All  —  Perception  being  that 
"  state  which  envelops  or  represents  multiplic- 
ity in  unity  or  in  the  simplicity  of  substance" 
(Mon.  c.  14). 

The  Monad,  then,  cannot  perceive  anything  but 
itself,  and  such  Perception  of  Self  is  of  various 
gradations.  When  the  Monad  clearly  and  dis- 
tinctly reflects  itself  within  itself  (and  so  becomes 
like  God,  or  "  a  little  divinity  "  ),  it  is  rational, 
it  is  called  Spirit.  «*  Such  a  Spirit  is  capable  of 
performing  reflexive  acts  and  of  considering  that 
which  is  named  Ego  (Moi),  Substance,  Monad, 
Soul,  Spirit."  Thus  Perception  rises  to  Apper- 
ception. "  It  is  well  to  make  the  distinction  be- 


304          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tween  Perception  and  Apperception ;  the  former 
is  the  interior  state  of  the  Monad  representing 
external  things,  the  latter  is  the  reflexive  knowl- 
edge of  that  interior  state,  which  is  conscious- 
ness "  (conscience),  or  self-knowledge,  the  return 
of  Perception  upon  itself  or  its  reflexive  act  (see 
Principes  de  la  Nature  et  de  la  Grace,  c.  4,  5). 
Thus  Leibniz  grapples  with  the  self-conscious  Ego, 
calling  its  activity  Apperception.  And  in  the 
Monadology  (c.  30)  we  have  the  following :  "  It 
is  by  the  knowledge  of  necessary  truths  and  by 
their  abstractions  that  we  are  elevated  to  reflex- 
ive acts  which  cause  us  to  think  of  that  which 
is  called  Ego  (Moi),  and  of  considering  that  this 
or  that  is  in  us."  Thus  Leibniz  reaches  the 
self -reflection  of  the  Ego,  though  in  a  some- 
what roundabout  way.  He  continues:  "Thus 
it  is  that  in  thinking  about  ourselves  we 
think  of  Being,  Substance,  the  Immaterial,  even 
of  God,  conceiving  that  what  is  limited  in  us  is 
in  Him  without  limits.  Such  reflexive  acts  fur- 
nish the  chief  objects  of  our  reasonings."  The 
interest  of  these  passages  is  that  Leibniz  begins 
to  see  the  self-conscious  Ego  as  the  basis  of  all 
philosophic  thought.  It  is  true  that  he  has  but 
a  glimpse  which  soon  vanishes  into  his  meta- 
physical concepts.  If  he  could  have  developed 
all  that  lies  in  that  Ego  (Moi),  whose  reflex 
activity  so  excites  his  curiosity,  there  would  have 
been  no  Leibnizian  Philosophy,  strictly  speaking, 


LEIBNIZ.  —  METAPHYSICS.  305 

but  something  very  different,  nothing  less  than  a 
new  discipline  —  Psychology. 

Still  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  foregoing  pro- 
cess of  the  Monad  is  psychological,  rather  than 
purely  metaphysical.  Its  three  stages,  the  Un- 
conscious (Feeling),  Appetition  (Will),  Percep- 
tion (Intellect,  Spirit),  will  be  recognized  at 
once  as  the  three  fundamental  activities  of 
Psychology,  which  form  in  their  process  a  Psy- 
chosis. Undoubtedly  Leibniz  was  not  conscious 
of  any  such  procedure ;  we  have  to  pick  out  and 
piece  together  from  scattered  notices  these 
stages,  each  of  which  is  a  kind  of  Monad,  inde- 
pendent, self-sufficient,  occupied  with  its  own 
little  world.  Still  they  come  at  last  into  a  kind 
of  mutual  rhythmic  movement,  though  each 
remains  as  distinct  as  a  planet  whirling  around 
the  Sun. 

A  question  begins  to  obtrude  itself  at  this 
point:  How  does  that  Monad  called  Leibniz, 
whose  soul  has  no  window  through  which  he  can 
get  out  or  let  anything  in,  know  so  much  about 
other  Monads,  which  are  of  like  character, 
never  giving  or  receiving  any  visits?  He  seems 
doubly  penned  in,  being  shut  up  within  his  own 
house  and  shut  out  of  his  neighbor's  house  — 
a  situation  not  favorable  to  getting  information 
about  matters  abroad.  This  question,  not  un- 
importunate  now,  will  be  sure  to  come  up  again 
with  renewed  importunity. 

20 


306  MODERN  E UEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

We  have  found  that  the  Monad,  taken  by 
itself,  has  a  process  involving  three  stages,  which 
constitute  its  own  inner  life  or  movement.  But 
no  two  Monads  can  be  alike,  they  have  degrees 
of  condition,  lower  and  higher,  according  to 
which  they  are  now  to  be  arranged. 

2.  The  Order  of  the  Monads.  It  has  been 
already  stated  that  every  Monad  represents,  or 
in  a  way  reproduces  the  Universe,  but  such  re- 
production in  each  case  is  different,  according  to 
the  clearness  and  distinctness  of  the  Perception. 
Monads,  therefore,  show  degrees  of  perfection, 
and  so  there  rises  the  idea  of  an  ascending  line 
of  them,  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest.  Ejich 
Monad  has  been  called  a  point,  and  the  line  of 
ascent  is  composed  of  an  infinite  number  of 
points  (substantial,  not  physical  or  mathemat- 
ical) which  are  separated  from  one  another  by 
intervals  not  perceptible,  though  real.  This  line 
of  continuity  is  everywhere,  and  permits  no  gaps 
or  leaps,  which  the  continuous  Monads  prevent. 
Upon  this  principle  of  continuity  Leibniz  lays 
great  stress,  since  he  thinks  that  with  it  he  has 
done  away  with  all  the  grand  separations  in  the 
Universe,  such  as  soul  and  body,  man  and  brute, 
animal  and  vegetable,  even  life  and  death.  He 
has  a  veritable  horror  of  any  visible  breach ,  and 
he  starts  to  connecting  the  extremes  with  a  line 
of  his  Monads. 

Still  a  small  breach  always  remains,  for  the 


LEIBNIZ.  -  METAPHYSICS.  307 

Monads  cannot  strictly  interlink,  being  mutually 
exclusive.  But  the  separation  is  reduced  to 
invisibility ;  Leibniz  is  satisfied  if  the  gap  is  not 
perceptible.  The  ideal  line  of  ascent,  however, 
is  not  broken,  but  shows  a  hierarchical  order, 
between  whose  Monads  there  is  complete  differ- 
ence which  has  to  be  thought  even  if  it  be  not 
perceived.  This  is  truly  a  Leibnizian  compro- 
mise: the  independent  Monad  is  preserved,  but 
we  must  close  our  eyes  to  its  independence. 

(a)  The  gradation  of  the  Monads  from 
lowest  to  highest  has  already  been  alluded  to ; 
each  Monad  as  microcosm  reflects  the  great 
Whole  or  the  Macrocosm,  but  each  does  this  in 
its  own  way,  "  from  its  own  point  of  view."  If 
the  Perception  of  the  Monad  is  confused  and 
chaotic,  it  is  low  down  in  the  scale ;  but  if  its 
Perception  is  not  only  clear  but  self-clear,  rising 
to  Apperception,  it  is  proportionately  high  in  the 
monadal  scale. 

Here  the  modern  reader  begins  to  think  of 
evolution.  And  there  are  passages  in  Leibniz 
as  in  so  many  philosophers  and  poets,  which 
may  be  regarded  as  far-off  flashes  of  the  coming 
doctrine.  But  the  monadal  order  is  not  evolu- 
tionary ;  evolution  itself  has  yet  to  evolve. 

(6)  Next  comes  the  authority  with  which  the 
higher  Monads  are  endowed.  The  most  perfect 
of  them  are  the  rulers,  the  less  perfect  have  to 
obey.  The  dominant  Monad  (or  Entelechy, 


308          MODERN  E  UE  OPE  AN  PHIL  OSOPH  T. 

Soul)  exercises  the  supreme  government  in  the 
Leibnizian  Order.  "  Every  living  body  has  a 
dominant  Monad,  which  is  the  soul  of  it;  like- 
wise each  of  the  members  of  this  living  body  is 
full  of  other  living  bodies  of  which  each  in  turn 
has  its  dominant  Monad  or  soul"  (Mon.  c. 
70).  Such  is  the  hierarchical  arrangement  in 
every  organic  thing  which  has  rule  and  subordi- 
nation of  parts;  inorganic  objects,  such  as  a 
stone,  is  without  self -movement  because  it  has  no 
dominant  Monad,  but  is  simply  an  aggregation 
of  Monads  not  obeying  a  central  authority. 
Still  even  the  inorganic  object  is  not  soulless,  but 
properly  a  collection  of  souls.  < '  There  is  a  world 
of  creatures,  animals,  entelechies,  souls  in  the 
smallest  particle  of  matter"  (Mon.  c.  66). 
Every  portion  of  matter  may  be  deemed  a  pond 
full  of  fish,  each  fish  is  in  turn  a  pond  full  of 
Monads,  nay  each  drop  of  the  pond  is  a  world 
full  of  monadal  inhabitants.  Thus  Leibniz  cajsts 
his  glance  into  the  infinitely  small,  and  sees 
there  his  Universe.  With  his  microscopic  bent 
of  mind  he  beholds  a  heaven  peopled  with  in- 
numerable stars  "  in  the  smallest  particle  of 
matter."  Not  the  telescope  but  the  microscope 
is  his  instrument,  and  he  is  going  to  minimize 
the  vast  outer  Copernican  Universe,  finding  it  in 
the  least  constituent  of  itself,  even  in  a  grain  of 
dust.  Here  too  he  sees  that  which  is  "  equally 
in  the  part  and  in  the  whole." 


LEIBNIZ.  -   METAPHYSICS.  509 

In  another  passage,  Lettre  d  M.  Dangicourt, 
Leibniz  says:  «« I  believe  that  there  are  only 
Monads  in  Nature,  the  rest  is  merely  a  phenom- 
enon which  results  from  them.  Each  Monad  is 
a  mirror  of  the  Universe  according  to  its  point 
of  view,  accompanied  by  a  multitude  of  other 
Monads  composing  its  organic  body,  of  which 
there  is  the  dominant  Monad. "  Even  the 
Monads  have  their  king  or  ernper  or  as  supreme 
ruler,  while  down  the  line  run  a  large  number 
of  lesser  authorities  —  duke,  count,  baron,  etc., 
terminating  in  the  mass  of  plebeian  Monads, 
whose  Perception  of  the  Universe  is  very  con- 
fused and  disordered.  This  was  not  unlike  the 
Germany  of  his  time. 

(c)  None  the  less  does  the  Monad  possess 
autonomy  m  its  field,  being  determined  from 
within,  having  its  own  inner  process  unassailable 
by  any  outside  power.  The  governing  Monad 
cannot  subordinate  it  by  a  direct  exercise  of 
power.  The  act  of  obedience  must  be  the  obey- 
ing Monad's  own  act.  No  arbitrary  ruler  can  be 
permitted  in  this  monadal  realm.  If  there  be 
submission  to  law,  it  must  somehow  be  the 
Monad's  own  law.  Does  he  make  the  law  which 
governs  him?  Hardly;  not  yet  can  such  a  doc- 
trine be  thought  of  even  by  a  Leibniz,  who, 
however,  will  not  tolerate  any  capricious  despot 
exercising  authority  over  his  beloved  Monads. 

It  is  evident  that  here  an  old,  old  trouble  has 


310          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

shown  itself,  the  conflict  between  hegemony 
and  autonomy,  over  which  those  Monads,  the 
ancient  Greek  cities,  worried  themselves  so  long 
and  so  helplessly,  till  a  new  supreme  Power  (or 
Monad),  coming  from  the  outside  (Macedon), 
seized  them  all  and  subjected  them  to  its  sway. 
In  the  monadal  world  of  Leibniz  a  similar  con- 
flict has  arisen.  There  is  the  individual  Monad 
impervious,  independent,  all  alone,  existent  in  his 
own  self.  But  he  must  be  brought  into  order, 
must  be  obedient  to  authority,  and  dwell  in  a 
cosmos,  to  which  he  has  to  contribute  his  share. 
But  is  it  possible  to  do  anything  with  him  if  he 
gets  refractory? 

So  it  comes  that  the  ordering  of  the  Monads 
has  called  up  the  sharpest  kind  of  a  dualism, 
which  threatens  to  precipitate  the  whole  scheme 
into  chaos.  The  all-excluding  individuality  of 
the  Monad,  which  is  its  freedom,  must  be  main- 
tained ;  yet  it  must  also  be  made  to  fit  into  the 
established  order,  and  not  use  its  liberty  to  kick 
out  of  the  Universe.  To  overcome  this  dire 
trouble  which  his  own  principle,  his  dear  Monad, 
has  begotten  for  him,  he  excogitates  a  grand  plan 
of  reconciliation,  which  is  a  master-stroke  of  its 
kind.  To  be  sure,  the  hint  for  the  solution  of 
his  problem  he  unqestionably  derives  from 
Spinoza. 

3.  Pre-established  Harmony.  Such  is  the 
famous  category  which  Leibniz  flings  into  the 


LEJBNIZ.  —  ME  TAPH  YSICS.  3 1 1 

philosophic  stream  of  speech,  for  the  purpose  of 
allaying  the  discord  which  has  arisen  in  his 
monadal  Order.  Above  these  mutually  impene- 
trable Monads,  which  cannot  possibly  influence 
one  another  directly,  there  is  a  common  creative 
principle  which  has  established  all  in  a  Harmony, 
and  this  must,  therefore,  be  in  itself  pre-estab- 
lished, pre-existent,  determining  the  Monads  in 
their  inner  character. 

So  it  comes  that  the  lower  Monad  obeys 
through  the  necessity  of  its  own  Heaven-descended 
nature,  and  the  higher  Monad  rules  by  the  same 
necessity,  which  is  indeed  its  divine  right  of 
authority.  The  dominant  and  the  subject  Monads 
stand  in  their  external  relations  not  directly 
through  each  other  but  through  their  Pre-estab- 
lished Harmony.  Leibniz  illustrates  this  princi- 
ple particularly  by  the  conformity  which  exists 
between  those  two  wholly  separate  Monads,  Soul 
and  Body.  "The  Soul  follows  its  own  laws; 
and  the  Body  follows  its  own;  they  meet 
together  in  virtue  of  the  Pre-established  Har- 
mony which  exists  between  all  substances,  since 
they  are  representations  of  one  and  the  same 
Universe  "  (Mon.  c.  78).  Every  Monad,  re- 
flecting the  Universe,  has  a  content  harmonious 
with  that  of  all  other  Monads,  though  each  does 
this  differently,  "  from  its  own  point  of  view.'* 
Soul  and  body  exist  together  and  co-operate,  not 
immediately  through  each  other,  but  through  the 


3 1 2          MODERN  E  UBOPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

supreme  principle,  Pre-established  Harmony. 
*  *  In  this  system  the  Body  acts  as  if  there  were 
no  Soul,  and  the  Soul  acts  as  if  there  were  no 
Body  and  both  act  as  if  one  influenced  the  other  ' ' 
(Mon.  c.  81).  Such  is  the  world  of  appearance 
(as  if)  in  which  each  Monad  seems  to  determine 
the  other,  but  behind  this  appearance  is  the  true 
determiner  of  all,  Pre-established  Harmony. 
Similarly  in  the  solar  system  the  earth  seems 
to  determine  the  Sun,  but  the  truth  is  that  the 
Sun  determines  the  Earth.  The  planets  seem  to 
be  wanderers  going  whither  they  list,  but  we  now 
know  that  all  their  motions  are  determined  by 
the  celestial  law  of  Pre-established  Harmony. 
The  principle  of  the  Macrocosm  is  transferred  to 
the  Microcosm,  and  Copernicus  becomes  univer- 
sal in  Leibniz. 

But  this  Pre-established  Harmony  must  be 
conceived  as  active  within  itself,  indeed  creative, 
and  hence  it  has  a  process.  It  too  is  a  Monad 
or  rather  it  is  the  attribute  of  the  Supreme 
Monad  of  the  Universe,  which  every  created 
Monad  reflects.  Thus  arises  the  difference  be- 
tween the  kinds  of  Monads,  created  and  uncre- 
ated, or  creating.  The  creating  Monad,  having 
created  the  monadal  Universe  brings  us  back  to 
our  starting-point,  the  Monad  as  existent  and 
created.  But  first  a  few  words  about  this  process. 

(a)  The  Monad  of  Monads  has  pre-established 
Harmony  in  the  lesser  Monads,  which  are  derived 


LEIBNIZ.  -  METAPHYSICS.  313 

or  created,  being  born  "  by  the  continual  ful- 
gurations  of  the  Divinity  (Monad  of  Monads) 
from  moment  to  moment  "  (Mon.  c.  47).  This 
sounds  a  good  deal  like  Neo-Platonic  emanation. 
It  asserts  the  continuity  of  the  divine  process  of 
creation,  which  is  not  once  for  all.  This  Monad 
of  Monads  is  God,  "  the  primordial  unity  or  the 
simple  original  substance,"  which,  however, 
Leibniz  protests  is  not  one  with  the  Universe, 
but  distinct  from  it,  not  immanent  but  transcen- 
dent. He  seeks  to  avoid  the  Substance  of 
Spinoza,  by  putting  his  Monad  of  Monads  out- 
side of  the  world  of  created  Monads. 

(5)  Thus  the  Universe  of  Leibniz  is  cleft  in 
twain  by  the  two  kinds  of  Monads,  created  and 
uncreated.  This  is  a  return  to  the  Cartesian 
dualism  of  two  substances,  created  and  uncreated, 
which  Spinoza  seeks  to  overcome  by  his  doctrine 
of  the  one  absolute  substance.  From  this  point 
of  view  Leibniz  has  again  dualized  the  One  of 
Spinoza  who  could  not  think  of  putting  God 
outside  the  Universe,  and  thus  have  two  Uni- 
verses. The  created  Monads  cannot  perish 
naturally,  nor  begin  naturally;  they  can  be  de- 
stroyed or  be  created  only  by  the  act  of  God 
(the  Monad  of  Monads).  They  have  no  parts 
nor  extension,  nor  figure,  nor  can  they  be  divided. 
They  are  the  veritable  Atoms  of  Nature,  and  in  a 
word  the  elements  of  things  (Mon.  c.  3-6) .  Such 
is  the  Leibnizian  contribution:  the  self-deter- 


314          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

mined  Monad,  exploiting  itself  in  its  own  world. 
Yet  all  these  movements,  seemingly  free  and  from 
within,  are  really  given  to  it  from  without.  Here 
is  the  relapse  to  Descartes,  whose  God  determines 
the  substance  directly.  Leibniz  has  this  side  of 
external  determination,  but  with  it  also  the  self- 
determination  of  the  Monad. 

(c)  The  outcome  is  that  the  Monad  of  Monads 
determines  all  the  created  Monads  to  be  self- 
determining.  "The  fulgurations  of  Divinity" 
are  these  perpetual  acts  of  God  reproducing  the 
self-determination  of  the  Monad  which  is  as  yet 
too  weak  to  stand  on  its  freedom.  Individual 
liberty  in  the  age  of  Leibniz  was  helpless  with- 
out God's  continual  support.  That  was  never- 
theless a  great  thing  to  do :  the  philosopher 
makes  God  the  fountain  of  man's  freedom. 

The  correspondence  and  co-operation  of  Monad 
with  Monad  through  their  common  Pre-estab- 
lished Harmony  is  derived  from  Spinoza's  con- 
substantial  principle  (ordo  rerum  est  idem  ac 
ordo  idearum^).  Through  this  principle  the  Mo- 
nads are  substances  which  correspond  with  one 
another  and  so  can  unite  and  even  work  together. 

c3 

It  is  then  Spinoza  who  has  transformed  that 
unsocial,  exclusive  Monad  into  all  forms  of  asso- 
ciation, as  well  as  endowed  it  with  the  possi- 
bility of  love  and  charity.  Still  it  is  the  merit  of 
Leibniz  (as  against  Spinoza)  that  he  has  made 
the  individual  truly  substantial  and  endowed  him 


LEIBNIZ.  —  ME  TAPHYSICS.  3 15 

with  self-determination.  For  in  Spinoza  the 
Mode  (as  metaphysical)  is  powerless,  being 
wholly  absorbed  in  Substance ;  but  in  Leibniz 
the  Mode  becomes  the  Monad,  and  is  in  its  sphere 
self-determined.  This  rise,  however,  of  the 
Mode  to  God  follows  also  Spinoza,  but  in  his 
second  or  ethical  stage. 

Pre-established  Harmony,  then,  has  to  order 
a  world  of  Monads  which  God  has  created  in 
separation,  each  being  independent  with  its  own 
distinct  character,  according  to  its  degree  of 
perception.  Thus  we  come  to  a  new  begin- 
ning—  nothing  less  than  Nature,  or  the  World 
of  Monads,  which  is  next  to  be  shown  in  its 
arrangement  through  Pre-established  Harmony. 
The  preceding  stage  of  Metaphysics  has  unfolded 
the  principle  of  the  Monad ;  now  we  are  to  see 
that  principle  applied  to  the  monadal  Universe, 
which  here  must  start  with  Nature,  whose  science 
is  Physics. 

Observations.  1.  The  reader,  seeking  to  inte- 
grate all  Philosophies  into  one  great  move- 
ment, can  now  see  the  close  connection  between 
Spinoza  and  Leibniz.  The  following  points  may 
here  be  suggested:  («)  The  ascent  of  the 
Monad  to  its  Divine  Source  is  given  in  the  sec- 
ond or  ethical  stage  of  Spinoza.  The  latter 's 
descent  or  metaphysical  stage  is  not  only  left 
out,  but  assailed  by  Leibniz.  (5)  The  Mode  of 
Spinoza  through  "  the  persistence  in  its  own  be- 


316          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ing,"  may  well  have  suggested  the  Monad  which 
is  also  self -asserting.  Both  Mode  and  Monad 
are  brought  at  last  by  their  respective  promulga- 
tors  to  a  participation  in  God.  (c)  The  consub- 
stantial  principle  of  Spinoza  becomes  the  Pre- 
established  Harmony  of  Leibniz.  Yet  here  is  a 
great  difference :  Leibniz  holds  that  God  through 
Will  brings  about  this  correspondence,  for  in- 
stance between  mind  and  matter;  but  Spinoza 
holds  that  these  are  already  God  or  in  God,  be- 
ing simply  modifications  of  Him.  Here  we  have 
on  the  one  hand  the  Leibnizian  Transcendence, 
and  on  the  other  the  Spinozan  Immanence,  of  God. 
Moreover  it  is  at  this  point  that  we  may  see  the 
chief  propelling  motive  which  drove  Leibniz  to 
make  a  new  Philosophy  for  succeeding  that  of 
Spinoza:  he  sought  to  rescue  the  Christian  idea 
of  a  transcendent  Creator.  Hence  the  world 
with  Leibniz  is  contingent,  sprung  of  the  direct 
Will  of  God,  and  not  necessitated  or  emanated 
as  it  is  with  Spinoza,  (d)  The  highest  char- 
acteristic of  the  Monad  is  that  it  represents 
the  Universe,  it  is  the  part  which  ideally  con- 
tains the  whole  in  a  more  or  less  perfect  manner. 
Spinoza  also  has  that  which  is  * «  equally  in  the 
part  and  in  the  whole,"  whence  comes  "  the 
adequate  idea."  Thus  the  Leibnizian  perception 
or  representation  of  the  Monad  has  its  sugges- 
tion, rather  dim  to  be  sure,  in  Spinoza. 

2.  Thus  the  ethical  Spinoza  is  transferred  into 


LEIBNIZ.  —  METAPHYSICS.  3 17 

the  metaphysical  sphere  by  Leibniz,  for  the 
Monad  belongs  to  Metaphysics,  not  to  Ethics. 
This  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  Spinoza  has  God  as 
Substance,  while  Leibniz  has  the  Monad  as  Sub- 
stance. The  first  sentence  of  the  Monadology 
says:  "  The  Monad  is  nothing  else  than  a  sim- 
ple Substance,  which  goes  to  make  up  com- 
posites." 

Now  Leibniz  shows  (as  already  set  forth)  the 
psychical  process  in  his  "metaphysical  form" 
or  Monad,  whereas  Spinoza  shows  this  process 
in  his  ethical  stage.  Thus  Leibniz  makes  the 
Monad  the  First,  the  Absolute,  the  essence  of 
Being,  even  God,  who  is  Monad  of  Monads. 

3.  The  term  Monad  is  old,  going  back  to  the 
Pythagoreans.  Some  have  supposed  that  Leib- 
niz took  it  from  Bruno,  the  Italian  philosopher. 
Most  likely  is  the  conjecture  that  it  came  to  him 
from  his  friend,  Van  Helmont.  At  any  rate  he 
uses  the  word  in  a  sense  peculiar  to  himself. 
Leibniz  was  quite  fifty  years  old  before  his 
nomenclature  took  its  final  shape  in  the  terms 
Monad  and  Pre-established  Harmony.  The 
latter  came  first  (about  1695  or  1696).  Here  is 
said  to  be  the  first  use  of  the  term:  "  All  sub- 
stances have  activities,  but  properly  such  activities 
belong  only  in  the  substance  itself ;  that  which 
results  in  the  others  (substances)  is  only  in  vir- 
tue a  Pre-established  Harmony  (if  I  may  be  per- 
mitted to  use  this  word)."  (See  First Explan- 


318         MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ation  of  the  Neiv  System,  Erdmann,  p.  133.) 
The  reader  will  note  in  this  passage  the  need 
of  the  word  Monads  for  substances  in  contrast 
with  the  term  substance  itself.  The  next  year 
the  word  needed  will  appear,  and  Leibniz  will  be 
in  full  possession  of  his  two  most  significant  cate- 
gories. 

4.  The  influence  of  Copernicus  supplemented 
by  Kepler  produced  a  mighty  impression   upon 
Leibniz.     The  fact   that   man   must    deny   his 
immediate    sensations   in   order   to   reach  truth 
found  its  happiest  illustration  in  the  Copernican 
System  which  forces  him  to  see  the  Sun  stand 
and   the   earth    move  around   it  instead  of  the 
opposite.     To    be    rational    we    must    become 
heliocentric  instead  of  geocentric.     The  heliocen- 
tric idea  Leibniz  sought  to  bring  down  from  the 
skies  and  enthrone  in  the  kingdom  of  mind.    The 
plan  of  the  outer  Cosmos  was  true  of  the  inner, 
both  in  fact  were  one  Pre-established  Harmony, 
both  were  "  figurations  of  Divinity." 

5.  The  Soul,  the  Ego,  is  to  make  a  center  of 
order  in  the  little  world  (microcosm)  and  thus 
be  what  God  is  in  the  great  world  (macrocosm). 
The  science  of   Mathematics,  especially  in   the 
Seventeenth   Century,  unfolded   God's   method 
of  regulating  the  physical  universe.     Herein  man 
is  to  imitate  in  his  own  sphere  the  Divine  act, 
and   become   as   it   were   a  second  Providence. 
Says  Leibniz:   '«  Our  soul  is  architectonic  in  its 


LEIBNIZ.  —  PHYSICS.  3 1 9 

voluntary  actions,  and  uncovering  the  sciences 
according  to  which  God  has  regulated  things 
(by  weight,  measure,  number),  it  imitates  in 
its  little  world  that  which  God  does  in  the  great 
world  "  (Principes  de  la  Nature  et  de  la  Grace, 
c.  14). 

Our  next  duty,  then,  is  to  think  after  God 
the  realm  of  Nature,  and  to  see  its  Pre-established 
Harmony,  following  its  inner  connection  through 
the  continuity  of  the  Monads.  We  now  go 
down  to  the  bottom  of  the  World,  and  see  it 
in  its  primeval  form  or  chaos,  which  Leibniz 
calls  the  First  Matter.  Thence  we  rise  to  the 
Soul,  and  thus  compass  the  science  of  Physics, 
after  which  there  is  a  still  further  rise  (the 
ethical),  of  which  we  shall  speak  in  its  place. 

B.  PHYSICS. 

The  metaphysical  sphere  just  concluded  has 
given  the  inner  principle  of  all  things ;  now  we 
are  to  see  that  principle  taking  on  its  outer  shape 
and  manifesting  itself  in  the  World.  Just  as 
the  metaphysical  movement  showed  an  ascent, 
so  the  present  physical  [movement  will  show  an 
ascent,  beginning  with  the  lowest  and  rising  by 
imperceptible  gradations  through  nature  and 
beyond  it  to  the  ethical  sphere,  which  keeps  up 
the  ascent  to  the  supreme  attainment,  to  God. 

At  this  point  we  may  observe  a  difference  of 


820        MODERN-  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

procedure  between  Spinoza  and  Leibniz.  The 
former  tacks  his  Physics  on  the  end  of  his  Meta- 
physics, inasmuch  as  Nature  for  the  metaphysical 
Spinoza  was  but  a  vanishing  Mode,  quite  illusory. 
Hence  his  rise  begins  with  his  ethical  sphere,  as 
we  have  often  observed,  But  Leibniz  com- 
mences his  ascent  with  Nature  and  continues  it 
through  Man  to  God,  since  Nature  was  for 
Leibniz  not  wholly  an  illusion,  in  spite  of  certain 
Spinozan  tendencies. 

The  personal  starting-point  of  Leibnizian 
Physics,  indeed  of  Leibnizian  Philosophy,  is  the 
philosopher's  re-action  against  the  Cartesian 
dualism  of  Thought  and  Extension.  Matter  is 
something  more  than  passive  Extension;  its 
power  of  resistance,  when  it  is  assailed,  shows 
that.  But  Extension  itself,  as  a  state,  implies 
something  that  extends  itself.  It  is  not  simply 
inert  and  dead,  but  has  within  itself  a  separa- 
tion, a  going  forth  out  of  itself,  without  which 
it  could  not  be  conceived.  Thus  behind  Exten- 
sion is  a  somewhat  which  is  always  reproducing 
it,  renewing  it,  extending  it. 

The  absolutely  impassable  chasm  which  the 
Cartesians  place  between  Thought  and  Extension 
cannot  be  allowed  to  exist.  For  Thought  ap- 
proaches Extension  in  a  line  of  minute  differ- 
ences, and  Extension  approaches  Thought  in  a 
similar  line;  each,  so  to  speak,  reaches  out  the 
hand  to  the  other,  and  touches  the  tips  of  the 


LEIBNIZ.  —  PHYSICS.  321 

fingers  across  the  abyss.  Thus  there  is  the  Leib- 
nizian  continuity  between  Cartesian  extremes 
of  the  Universe.  The  self-conscious  mind  has 
in  it  countless  unconscious  conditions  (little  per- 
ceptions) which  run  back  toward  the  material 
world,  while  matter  shows  its  essence  to  be  an 
immaterial  principle,  which  gives  to  it  Exten- 
sion. 

The  physical  Philosophy  of  Leibniz,  there- 
fore, begins  with  affirming,  first,  that  matter  as 
extended  is  not  inactive,  but  must  always  be  ex- 
tending itself  in  order  to  stay  extended ;  secondly, 
that  matter,  through  its  resistance  to  any  outside 
impact,  shows  an  inner  force  comparable  to 
power  of  Will,  defending  itself,  as  it  were,  and 
revealing  character  and  individuality;  thirdly, 
matter,  by  this  activity,  suggests  a  process  con- 
tinually going  on  within  itself,  which  is  funda- 
mentally that  of  Thought,  Mind,  Ego.  Thus  it 
comes  that  Leibniz  calls  every  particle  of  matter  a 
soul,  and  thereby  binds  together  mind  and  matter 
with  a  chain  having  an  infinite  number  of  links. 

Matter  properly  belongs  to  the  sensible  world, 
but  the  essence  of  matter  is  immaterial,  not  ac- 
cessible to  the  senses,  which  can  only  give  a  per- 
verted view  of  it,  as  they  do  of  the  planetary 
world.  We  thus  conceive  Matter  in  its  first  or 
immediate  stage  as  dividing  within  itself,  and 
revealing  the  immaterial  and  insensible  as  its  own 
essential  principle,  which  Leibniz  calls  Force  at 

21 


322        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

first,  but  which  will  in  time  be  baptized  with  its 
philosophical  name,  Monad.  This,  however, 
suggests  the  complete  process,  which  we  shall 
name  Soul  in  the  present  connection.  Thus  the 
Physics  (philosophy  of  Nature)  of  Leibniz  may 
be  considered  under  the  three  leading  heads: 
Matter,  Force,  Soul. 

I.  Matter.  Leibniz  has  scattered  a  good  many 
observations  about  Matter  up  and  down  his  writ- 
ings. We  see  that  its  conception  gave  him  no 
small  trouble,  as  it  did  to  the  ancient  Philoso- 
phers. Primarily  he  divides  it  into  the  First  and 
Second  Matter,  or  in  general  Passive  and  Active 
Matter.  He  makes  God  the  "  cause  of  Matter," 
not  like  the  Platonic  Demiurge,  who  has  Matter 
as  given,  and  with  it  models  the  world ;  nor  like 
Aristotle's  First  Mover,  whom  Matter  (also 
given)  desires,  and  so  it  moves  toward  the 
Perfect  One,  producing  Motion  and  the  Cosmos. 
Leibniz  was  too  good  a  Christian  theologically  to 
assert  Matter  to  be  uncreated,  even  if  he  affirms 
it  to  be  eternal. 

Though  he  emphasizes  so  strongly  the  dyna- 
mic principle  of  Matter  in  general,  he  feels  that 
he  must  get  back  to  a  passive  Matter  '*  without 
any  soul  or  life  united  to  it."  This  he  does  in 
order  to  preserve  the  mechanical  view  of  the 
world  with  its  Mathematics,  which  had  been  «o 
marvelously  developed  in  his  time,  he  being  a 
great  mathematician  himself. 


LEIBNIZ.  —  PHYSICS.  323 

(  a  )  He  says :  * '  Matter  taken  in  itself  or  nude  is 
constituted  through  Antitypia  (resistance,  coun- 
terstroke)  and  Extension.  Through  the  first  of 
these  Matter  exists  in  space  (maintains  its  place  or 
locality)  ;  through  the  second  Matter  is  continued 
through  space,  and  has  figure  and  magnitude 
(De  anima  brutorum,  c.  1).  Such  is  the  First 
Matter  of  Leibniz  (prima  maferia)  which 
properly  ought  to  lie  back  of  even  these  two 
divisions  of  it,  which  are  two  attributes  (attri- 
buta).  Somewhat  differently  he  says  in  another 
passage:  "In  this  passive  power  of  resisting  I 
place  the  notion  itself  of  the  First  Matter  "  (Zte 
ipsa  Natura^  c.  11).  Elsewhere  he  asserts  that 
the  characteristic  of  Matter  lies  in  its  resistance, 
impenetrability  (Antitypria) .  Matter  was  a  dark 
uncertain  thought  to  Leibniz  as  it  was  to  Plato 
who  confesses  its  obscurity.  It  would  seem  that 
Leibniz  holds  this  First  Matter  to  be  the  com- 
plete opposite  of  God,  who  alone  is  Substance 
separate  from  all  Matter,  since  he  is  pure 
activity  Cactus  purus} ,  endowed  with  no  passive 
power,  which,  wherever  it  be,  constitutes  Matter. 
"  Now  all  created  substances  have  Antitypia,  "etc. 
(Epist.  ad  Wagnerium,  c.  4).  But  created  sub- 
stances are  not  then  really  the  First  Matter, 
which  must  be  conceived  previous  to  Matter  in- 
dividualized, and  so  having  resistance.  If  God 
be  the  absolutely  self-determined,  his  opposite 
must  be  the  absolutely  determinable  or  Primeval 


324        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Mutter,  which  however  is  not  something  given 
(as  in  Greek  thought  and  even  in  Origen)  but  is 
itself  created. 

(5)  The  Second  Matter  (materiel  secnnda,  ves- 
tita)  of  our  philosopher  is  also  called  Mass  or 
Body  "in  which  there  is  extension  along  with 
resistance."  This  Second  Matter  comes  from 
the  First  Matter,  the  latter  being  now  individual- 
ized, limited,  made  corporeal.  Moreover,  it  is 
the  phenomenon,  as  it  were  the  universal  Iris 
whose  function  is  to  appear.  Hence  the  First 
Matter  does  not  consist  in  mass  or  impenetra- 
bility, or  extension  which  properly  characterize 
the  Second  Matter;  "  the  First  Matter  is  essen- 
tial to  every  Monad  or  Soul  and  cannot  be  sepa- 
rated from  it "  being  the  very  potentiality  of  it, 
while  the  Second  Matter  as  clothed  (vestita), 
specialized,  phenomenal,  can  change.  Hence  it 
conies  that  "  God  through  his  absolute  power 
can  deprive  a  substance  of  Second  Matter,  but 
not  of  the  First,"  for,  taking  away  all  its  poten- 
tiality, it  would  remain  pure  activity  (actus  purus) 
which  is  Himself  (Epist.  ad  Des  Bosses,  No.  7). 
This  Second  Matter  may  be  compared  to  the 
garments  of  the  Harlequin,  who  remains  the 
same  in  putting  on  and  off  all  his  various 
costumes. 

Second  Matter  is,  therefore,  the  realm  of  cor- 
poreality, of  phenomena  which  are  again  divided 
by  Leibniz  into  real  and  imaginary.  With  real 


LEIBNIZ.  —  PHYSICS.  325 

phenomena,  such  as  masses  of  matter,  the  prin- 
ciple of  mechanism  enters,  since  they  determine 
one  another  in  a  variety  of  ways  externally, 
whereby  their  relations  become  measurable. 
Taken  together,  they  form  the  grand  mechanical 
totality,  which  the  Seventeenth  Century  particu- 
larly sought  to  determine. 

(c)  The  material  universe  may  thus  be  con- 
ceived as  one  vast  world-machine,  the  working 
of  whose  parts  can  be  calculated  and  measured. 
At  this  point  mathematics,  itself  a  grand  cal- 
culating machine,  must  be  developed  and  ap- 
plied. So  it  comes  that  the  idea  of  Pan-mechan- 
ism dawns  upon  the  human  mind,  which  it 
investigates  and  formulates  mathematically. 
"  The  machines  of  Nature,  being  machines  even 
in  their  smallest  parts,  are  indestructible,  inas- 
much each  little  machine  is  enveloped  by  a  larger 
one,  and  this  by  a  still  larger,  till  infinity  "  (/Sur 
le  Principe  de  Vie,  Erdmann,  p.  431).  God  is  the 
ultimate  maker  and  controller  of  this  world-ma- 
chine; when  He  calculates  and  thinks,  the  world 
arises  (  Cum  Deus  calculat  et  cogitalionem  exercet, 
fit  mundus.  Erdmann,  p.  77).  God's  thought 
of  the  world  is  mathematical ;  so  it  comes  that 
Science  shows  "  how  God  has  regulated  things 
(pondere,  mensura,  numero),"  that  is  mathemat- 
ically. Thus  the  divinely  creative  thought  of  the 
Universe  is  found  in  Mathematics  ideally  con- 
structing the  Pan-mechanism. 


326         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Undoubtedly  this  conception  comes  from  Des- 
cartes, whose  God  is  mechanical,  determining 
all  things  by  fiat  from  without.  We  shall  soon 
see  what  limits  Leibniz  places  upon  this  principle. 
He  says  (Epist.  de  Rvb.  Phil.)  "  adempta  rebus 
vi  agendi,  non  posse  eas  a  divina  Substantia 
distingui,  incidique  in  Spinosismum."  Thus 
Leibniz  plainly  sees  that  Descartes  logically 
leads  to  Spinoza ;  to  avoid  such  an  outcome  he 
develops  his  doctrine  of  Force  which  calls  for 
the  Monad. 

The  statements  of  Leibniz  about  Matter  scat- 
tered through  many  years  and  originating  in 
many  different  occasions  are  by  no  means  con- 
sistent. Particularly  are  his  distinctions  be- 
tween First  and  Second  Matter  fluctuating. 
Still  in  a  general  way  we  can  see  that  his  First 
Matter  is  potential,  passive,  the  primordial  possi- 
bility of  the  physical  universe ;  while  his  Second 
Matter  is  active,  real,  is  Body  individualized, 
and  so  introduces  the  mechanical  process  of  the 
physical  Universe,  whose  expression  is  properly 
Mathematics.  Thus  we  may  put  together  his 
conception  which  winds  about  through  a  good 
many  obscure  and  contradictory  utterances. 
But  in  this  sphere  all  nature  becomes  one  vast 
machine,  composed  of  many  machines  great  and 
small,  whose  controlling  idea  is  the  mathematical. 
For  when  God  starts  to  figuring,  there  springs 
into  being  the  Universe  as  Pan- mechanism. 


LEIBNIZ.  —  PHYSICS.  327 

Already  Matter  has  shown  a  secret  inner 
power  of  resistance,  even  when  called  inert,  and 
also  an  active  energy  going  outwards  as  Body. 
Now  this  activity,  Leibniz  will  separate  from  its 
material  and  look  at  by  itself,  calling  it  Force, 
which  he  deems  the  essence  of  Matter.  The 
thought  he  might  have  derived  from  Spinoza, 
who  assigns  to  everything  "the  effort  to  perse- 
vere in  its  own  being"  (Elk*  III.  Prop.  6). 
But  it  is  Leibniz  specially  who  abstracts  and  as 
it  were  isolates  this  effort  of  all  Nature,  formu- 
lating and  to  a  degree  organizing  it,  and  thereby 
passing  from  a  purely  mechanical  view  of  things 
to  a  new  stage  which  is  next  to  be  considered. 

II.  Force.  On  the  whole  this  is  the  most  im- 
portant physical  conception  of  Leibniz  and  rep- 
resents a  great  stage  in  the  movement  of  Science 
and  Philosophy.  The  scientists  of  to-day  are 
still  dealing  with  Force,  and  it  was  Leibniz  in 
particular  who  made  the  transition  from  a  me- 
chanical to  a  dynamical  view  of  the  universe, 
though  undoubtedly  the  idea  of  Force  had  been 
philosophized  upon  before  his  time.  Still  it  is 
the  most  distinctive  thing  in  the  Leibnizian  con- 
tribution to  the  World's  thoughts  about  Nature. 

Leibniz  does  not  fail  to  give  us  some  personal 
glances  into  the  evolution  of  this  principle  in  his 
own  mind.  In  his  Systeme  nouveau  de  la  Nature, 
he  tells  how  he  has  dared  to  publish  "  these 
meditations  though  they  are  not  popular  and  not 


328        MODE  RN  E  UR  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

fit  to  be  tasted  by  every  sort  of  spirit."  Mathe- 
matics and  Philosophy  he  had  studied  from  his 
youth .  Modern  authors  « «  charmed  me  by  their 
beautiful  methods  of  explaining  nature  mechan- 
ically. But  after  trying  to  fully  comprehend  the 
principles  of  Mechanics,  in  order  to  find  the  rea- 
son for  the  laws  of  Nature  which  experience 
showed,  I  perceived  that  this  consideration  alone 
of  the  extended  mass  was  not  sufficient,  and  that 
it  was  necessary  to  employ  in  addition  the  notion 
of  Force."  His  stay  at  Paris  ( 1672-6)  with  his 
special  study  of  Descartes  at  that  time,  laid  the 
foundation  of  these  views  which  revealed  the  tran- 
sition out  of  the  Cartesian  Pan-mechanism  into  the 
Leibnizian  Pan-dynamism.  "  So  I  had  to  recall 
and  reinhabilitate  substantial  forms  (of  the  Scho- 
lastics), so  decried  to-day/'  giving  them  a  new 
meaning,  so  that  their  nature  consisted  in  Force. 
*  *  From  this  it  follows  that  they  have  something 
analogous  to  feeling  and  appetite/'  they  are  a 
kind  of  self  or  Ego  (Monads). 

Thus  Leibniz  has  conceived  his  principle  of 
universal  Force,  but  also  the  vast  multiplicity  of 
Forces  which  he  is  to  order  into  a  world  of  their 
own. 

(a)  As  there  is  a  First  Matter,  so  there  is  a 
First  Force  (vis  primitiva  agendi)  "  which  is  the 
immanent  principle  or  law  (of  Nature),  impressed 
by  divine  decree"  (De  ipsa  N'atura,  c.  12). 
Upon  the  First  Matter  is  to  be  impressed  this 


LEIBNIZ.  —  PHYSICS.  329 

First  Force  *  *  in  order  to  make  it  complete  sub- 
stance." This  First  Force  is  also  called  the 
First  Entelechy  by  Leibniz,  using  an  Aristote- 
lian term.  But  this  First  Entelechy  is  not  simply 
affixed  to  a  particle  of  Matter,  but  is  its  principle 
or  law.  "  For  matter  changes  like  a  river,  but 
the  Entelechy  remains  while  the  machine  (or 
movement)  lasts  "  {Epist.  ad  Des  Bosses,  No. 
2).  There  is  a  second  meaning  of  Entelechy  in 
Leibniz,  equivalent  to  Monads,  Souls,  which 
show  the  total  process,  or  the  First  Entelechy 
actualized. 

Always  passive  Matter  has  an  active  principle, 
says  our  philosopher  in  a  well-known  passage: 
"  I  know  not  those  vain,  useless,  inactive  masses, 
of  which  people  talk.  There  is  activity  every- 
where; no  body  without  motion,  no  substance 
without  effort."  Extension  means  Force,  Re- 
pulsion means  Force,  all  Nature  is  full  of 
Forces. 

Thus  the  First  Force  differentiates  itself  into 
a  multiplicity  of  Forces,  each  of  which  has  its 
own  life  and  even  self. 

(5)  Hence  it  comes  that  Leibniz  speaks  so 
often  in  the  plural  of  Forces  —  real  unities,  sub- 
stantial points  or  forms,  Monads,  Entelechies. 
This  is  the  atomic  side  of  the  Leibnizian  doctrine, 
but  his  atom  is  not  mechanical  but  dynamic.  As 
we  saw  Matter  individualize  itself  in  Bodies  (the 
Second  Matter),  so  the  First  Force  (vis  primi- 


330        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tiva)  individualizes  itself  m  Forces  derivative, 
which  Leibniz  classes  under  the  head  of  Effort 
(Nouveaux  Essais,  Book  II.,  c.  21),  hinting  of 
Spinoza's  conalus. 

The  world-machine  above  considered  "has  an 
Entelechy  adequate  to  itself,  and  this  machine 
contains  other  machines  endowed  with  their  own 
adequate  Entelechies,  but  these  machines  are  in- 
adequate to  the  previous  Entelechy  "  (Epist.  ad 
Des  Bosses  No.  2).  Thus  Leibniz  seeks  t®  show 
the  dynamic  element  in  his  former  Mechanism. 
The  world-machine  has  as  its  moving  power 
(Entelechy  or  Soul)  a  world-force,  which  drives 
the  wheels  of  the  universe  through  its  own  inner 
energy.  The  outer  power  has  become  inner 
throughout  the  great  Whole,  and  each  little  ma- 
chine generates  its  own  Force,  which,  however, 
minutely  individualized,  has  unity,  is  indeed  one 
vast  dynamic  totality.  Thus  Leibniz  has  worked 
through  the  Cartesian  Pan-mechanism,  which 
makes  even  God  a  mechanical  power,  into  Pan- 
dynamism,  which  puts  the  moving  energy  inside 
the  object  great  and  small  and  all.  In  the 
physical  universe  he  has  asserted  the  idea  of 
immanence  against  the  Cartesian  transcendence, 
unfolding  on  a  line  with  Spinoza. 

Thus  Leibniz  seeks  to  universalize  Force, 
making  the  universe  its  store-hause  in  the 
whole  and  in  each  smallest  part.  Mechanical 
externality  of  Motion  must  be  supplemented  by 


LEIBNIZ.  -  PHYSICS.  331 

dynamical  internality  of  Force.  He  does  not 
throw  away  the  Mechanics  of  Nature,  but  marks 
its  sphere  as  that  of  "  the  particular  phenomena  of 
Nature  which  can  be  explained  mathematically 
or  mechanically;"  but  on  the  other  hand  "  the 
general  principles  of  Nature  are  metaphysical 
rather  than  geometric,"  hence  beyond  mathemat- 
ics ;  still  further  these  general  principles  ' '  belong 
rather  to  certain  indivisible  forms  or  entities  as 
the  causes  of  the  appearances  than  to  the  cor- 
poreal mass  of  extension"  (Discours  de  Met. 
35).  Such  an  "indivisible  form  "  is  the  Monad 
which  term  Leibniz  had  not  yet  adopted  at  the 
time  of  this  Discours  (1786).  In  this  concep- 
tion of  Force  working  in  the  smallest  element 
(Monad)  and  in  the  total  universe,  we  are 
again  reminded  of  Spinoza  whose  adequate  idea 
is  found  **  equally  in  a  part  and  in  the  whole  " 
(Eth.  II.  38).  For  the  Leibnizian  Force  is 
common  to  all  things  "  and  is  conceived  as 
equally  in  the  part  and  in  the  whole  "  — in  the 
Monad  and  in  the  All.  This  latter  phase  we  may 
now  glance  at. 

(c)  The  totality  of  Force  is  always  the  same 
in  the  universe  and  is  always  going  —  the  amount 
of  it  is  one,  not  to  be  increased  or  dimin- 
ished, and  so  is  eternally  preserved.  Great 
stress  is  placed  by  Leibniz  upon  the  conservation 
of  Force.  "It  is  not  the  quantity  of  Motion 
which  is  preserved,  but  that  of  Force.  *  *  *  There 


332         MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  preserved  the  same  quantity  of  motor  action 
in  the  world;  that  is,  in  any  given  hour  there  is 
as  much  motor  action  in  the  universe  as  in  any 
other  hour."  (LeMre  a  Mr.  Bayle.)  The  uni- 
verse is  a  vast  reservoir  of  Force  which  remains 
the  same  in  quantity.  Descartes  held  that  "the 
same  quantity  of  Motion  is  preserved  in  bodies, 
but  I  have  shown  that  the  same  moving  Force  is 
preserved,  for  which  he  took  the  quantity  of 
Motion . ' '  (  Eclaircissement ,  etc . )  Thus  Leibniz 
put  behind  all  Motion  of  bodies  their  gener- 
ating Force  which  is  the  same  in  quantity,  being 
the  essence  of  all  things  material,  Such  is  his 
conception  of  Pan-dynamism;  all  action,  all  mo- 
tion of  bodies  is  the  manifestation  of  Force 
which  is  never  lost,  never  diminished  in  quantity, 
the  reservoir  being  always  full  and  receiving 
back  what  it  sends  forth,  without  a  drop  ever 
splashing  out. 

Thus  Force  has  its  process  (like  the  Ego  or 
Moi)  showing  its  immediate,  separative,  and 
returning  stages,  and  having  "something  analo- 
gous to  feeling  and  appetite  (or  will).  It  is  a 
soul,  which  term  is  used  by  Leibniz  in  a  very 
wide  sense,  quite  embracing  the  whole  sweep 
from  Matter  to  Spirit. 

Really  we  get  the  idea  of  Force  from  our 
own  inner  experience,  from  the  Self  or  Soul, 
which  manifests  itself  in  phenomena.  Leibniz 
says  directly  that  we  have  to  conceive  these 


LEIBNIZ.  —  PHYSICS.  333 

metaphysical  atoms  (Monads)  after  the  image 
of  our  souls.  Then  he  calls  them  souls.  We 
think  that  he  is  on  the  point  of  passing  into 
psychology  purely  and  making  all  things,  "both 
in  the  part  and  in  the  whole,"  a  process  of 
the  Ego,  but  he  cannot  give  up  his  metaphys- 
ical wrappage.  Great  is  his  labor  ;  we  feel  like 
shouting  to  him  across  two  centuries,  "Drop 
your  substantial  forms,  drop  your  metaphysical 
atoms,  fling  away  even  your  Monads  and  come 
over  to  us."  Vain  is  the  exhortation,  and  yet 
just  listen  to  him.  "This  world  is  not  a  ma- 
chine as  Descartes  would  make  it.  Everything 
in  it  is  force,  soul,  life,  thought,  desire;"  if  so, 
why  not  make  that  your  philosophy?  "  What 
we  see  is  the  machine  but  this  is  only  the  out- 
side of  Being."  What  is,  then,  the  inside? 
«(  Being  is  that  which  itself  sees  "  and  also  sees 
itself.  And  yet  Leibniz  is  unable  to  free  his 
Soul  or  Ego  from  its  "  metaphysical  form,"  but 
subjects  its  process  still  to  the  Monad. 

He  has,  however,  reached  the  point  of  saying 
the  whole  Universe  is  Soul  both  in  its  oneness 
and  in  its  manyness .  On  this  line  we  shall  fol- 
low him  out. 

III.  Soul.  We  have  to  think  that  Leibniz  rose, 
partially  at  least,  above  the  dynamical  into  the 
psychical  principle,  and  endeavored  to  formulate 
its  process.  The  Soul  is  a  return  to  Matter  or 
the  outer  manifestation  of  the  inner  Force; 


334        MODERN  EUROPEAN"  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  Soul  is  the  total  process  of  the  inner  and 
outer,  or  of  Force  and  Matter,  which  are  no 
longer  in  a  state  of  separation  and  opposition, 
but  are  united  in  one  movement,  which  is  that 
of  Soul  and  Body.  Says  Leibniz:  "  Soul  is  the 
principle  of  inner  activity  in  the  Monad,  to 
which  the  outer  activity  corresponds."  This 
correspondence  of  the  external  in  the  internal  is 
representation,  which  is  also  called  perception 
by  Leibniz,  as  has  been  already  set  forth. 

All  that  has  been  hitherto  called  Matter,  and 
all  that  has  been  hitherto  called  Force,  is  now 
found  to  be  Soul.  To  Leibniz  the  world  was 
one  vast  Soul  made  up  of  an  infinite  number  of 
Souls,  greater  and  smaller.  Thus  the  Mechan- 
ical and  Dynamical  had  their  essence  and  end  in 
the  Psychical.  The  first  two  showed  the  work- 
ing of  efficient  or  finite  Causes.  The  last  re- 
vealed the  final  Cause.  Herein  lay  a  mighty 
thought  which  makes  the  Leibnizian  doctrine 
a  very  significant  stage  in  the  movement  of  all 
Philosophy.  The  author  sees  and  formulates, 
even  if  dimly  and  fantastically,  the  principle  that 
there  is  the  process  of  the  Ego  in  everything, 
and  that  the  Universe  is  to  be  grasped  as  one 
great  process  of  the  Ego,  embracing  and  order- 
ing all  other  processes,  minute  and  colossal. 

Souls  do  not  arise  and  pass  away,  being  "in- 
generable  and  imperishable."  Each  Soul  is  as 
old  as  the  world,  "  expresses  the  Universe,  is  as 


LEIBNIZ.  -  PHYSICS.  335 

durable,  as  subsistent  and  as  absolute  as  the  Uni- 
verse itself."  It  is  the  indestructible  unit  of 
individuality  which  can  perish  just  as  little  as  the 
Universe  which  it  represents.  The  succession  of 
the  Soul's  representations  (more  or  less  distinct 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  given  Soul)  re- 
sponds naturally  to  the  changes  of  the  Universe 
itself.  "  Immortality  of  the  Soul  belongs  not 
merely  to  man,  but  to  the  whole  realm  of  Nature 
through  its  monadal  character ' '  (  Systeme  nouveau, 
c.  15,  16).  Every  Soul  reflects  the  Infinite  with 
greater  and  greater  distinctness,  till  God  is 
reached  who  is  pure  self-reflection  (actus purus) , 
and  so  without  body,  which  belongs  to  every 
other  Soul  but  God. 

Thus  Nature,  according  to  Leibniz,  rises  to 
Pan-psychism,  the  Universe  from  Matter  up  to 
God  is  a  Soul  and  is  full  of  Souls.  These  are 
manifold  and  of  infinite  gradation ;  still  we  may 
find  in  Leibniz  himself  the  authority  for  ordering 
them  in  three  main  groups — the  material  Soul, 
the  organic  or  living  Soul,  the  rational  Soul  or 
Soul  as  Spirit. 

(a)  First  we  may  glance  at  the  material 
Soul.  "  I  accord  an  existence  as  ancient  as  the 
world,  not  only  to  the  Souls  of  animals,  but  in 
general  to  all  Monads;  and  I  maintain  that 
every  Soul  or  Monad  is  always  accompanied  by 
an  organized  body,  which,  however,  is  in  a  state 
of  perpetual  change."  (Lettre  a  Mr.  Des 


336         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Maizeaux.)  We  have  already  cited  the  Monad- 
ology  wh.ere  the  author  says  that  "  there  is  a 
world  full  of  Souls  in  each  particle  of  matter," 
or,  taking  a  more  moderate  comparison,  "  each 
particle  of  matter  is  like  a  garden  full  of  plants 
or  a  pond  full  of  fish"  (c.  66,  67).  There  is 
nothing  dead  in  the  universe,  no  Chaos,  no  confu- 
sion, but  in  appearance.  So  "  there  is  an  infinity 
of  creatures  in  the  least  portion  of  Matter" 
(Theodicte.  195),  active,  self-moving  Souls. 

It  is  only  through  this  conception  that  Leibniz 
can  see  that  each  material  part,  however  small, 
belongs  to  the  great  Whole,  to  the  Universe, 
which  it  reflects  in  being  Soul.  If  each  particle 
did  not  have  its  own  movement  or  process  rep- 
resenting the  All,  it  would  not  belong  to  the 
All,  it  would  have  to  be  a  universe  by  itself. 

The  predominance  of  the  passive  element, 
mere  inertia  (materia  prima)  drags  down  the 
perceptive  power  of  the  Monad,  which  power  is 
properly  its  active  Soul.  On  this  account  the 
Soul  or  Mumad  becomes  passive  and  material, 
when  this  First  Matter  has  the  upper  hand  and 
blurs  its  power  of  representing  the  Universe. 
But  on  the  other  hand  a  diminution  of  this  First 
Matter  may  allow  the  Monad  or  Soul  to  be  self- 
active;  thus  the  latter  is  organic,  moving  itself 
from  within. 

(b)  The  organic  or  living  Soul  rises  above  the 
material  Soul,  since  its  representation  of  the 


LEIBNIZ .  —  PHYSIOS.  337 

Universe  is  more  distinct,  hence  higher.  "  Even 
of  living  things  there  is  an  infinity  of  degrees  " 
in  accord  with  the  degrees  of  their  representa- 
tions, "  every  Monad  or  Soul  being  a  mirror  of 
the  Universe  after  its  fashion."  Very  important 
for  Leibniz  as  for  Decartes  is  the  relation  between 
Soul  and  Body.  "  The  organic  Body  of  a  living 
thing  is  a  kind  of  divine  Machine  or  a  natural 
automaton,  which  surpasses  infinitely  all  artificial 
automatons  "  or  those  which  are  merely  mechan- 
ical. "For  these  living  machines  (or  organic 
Bodies)  are  still  machines  in  their  smallest  parts, 
till  infinity  "  (Mon.  c.  64,  65). 

The  automatic  principle  or  self -movement  be- 
longs to  the  living  body  as  a  whole,  it  is  a  Ma- 
chine which  moves  itself,  and  is  composed  of 
an  infinite  number  of  self-moving  machines.  The 
total  organic  Monad,  the  living  Body,  is  reflected 
in  its  self-movement  by  its  countless  atomic 
Monads  also  self-moving  (a  curious  anticipation 
of  the  cell  in  modern  Biology).  Leibniz,  there- 
fore, holds  that  the  Body  is  a  Soul,  a  stage  of 
monadal  existence.  There  is  thus  no  difference 
between  them,  and  the  Cartesian  dualism  of  Soul 
and  Body  vanishes. 

There  is  much  fluctuation  in  the  numerous 
statements  of  Leibniz  regarding  Soul  and  Body. 
He  was  a  reconciler,  and  often  a  trimmer  ;  it  can- 
not be  denied  that  he  trims  his  doctrine  in  his 
letters  to  suit  his  correspondents.  To  a  Catholic 

22 


338        MODERtf  E UEOPEAN  PHIL O SOPHY. 

he  seeks  to. explain  how  his  principle  of  Monads  can 
comport  with  transubstantiation.  His  good  Cath- 
olic friends,  especially  Des  Bosses  and  Arnauld, 
he  wishes  to  win  to  his  Philosophy ;  the  result  is 
he  makes  an  adjustment  of  it  to  their  religious 
presuppositions,  which  may  be  very  ingenious, 
but  which  gives  both  to  the  man  and  his  doctrine 
an  uncertain  tinge.  Just  a  little  too  much  of 
policy  runs_  through  his  philosophic  utterances. 
Possibly  here  we  may  find  a  reason  why  he  never 
formulated  his  scheme  in  anything  like  a  com- 
plete system.  He  would  not  compromise  him- 
self: litera  scripta  manet.  Thus  his  Philosophy 
becomes  so  much  plastic  material  in  his  hands, 
always  ready  for  a  new  form  according  to 
circumstances. 

(c)  The  third  class  of  Souls  Leibniz  calls 
Spirits.  "  When  the  Soul  is  elevated  to  Reason 
it  is  something  more  sublime  (than  the  animal  or 
living  soul)  and  it  is  counted  among  Spirits  " 
(Principes  de  la  Nature  et  de  la  Grace,  c.  4) .  It 
is  these  Spirits  or  rational  animals  that  know 
necessary  truths  (like  those  of  Mathematics  and 
Logic).  Such  Souls  are  also  capable  of  reflexive 
acts  (self -consciousness)  and  they  can  consider 
the  Ego  (Moi),  or  Spirit  can  look  at  Spirit 
(Do.  c.  5).  This  is  what  Leibniz  calls  Apper- 
ception, "  which  is  not  given  to  all  Souls  nor 
always  to  the  same  Soul,"  for  even  the  rational 
Soul  has  its  unconscious  sphere. 


LEIBNIZ.  —  PHYSICS.  339 

In  fact,  Leibniz  seems  to  maintain  the  doctrine 
that  the  self-conscious,  rational  Soul  or  Spirit 
has  developed  from  a  previous  and  lower  state. 
Says  he:  "I  believe  that  human  Souls  have 
pre-existed,  not  as  rational  but  merely  as  sensi- 
tive Souls,  which  did  not  arrive  at  the  higher 
stage,  that  is,  of  Reason,  till  the  man  whom  the 
Soul  was  to  animate,  was  conceived"  (Lettre 
a  Des  Maizeaux).  This  means  that  there  is  a 
development  from  the  organic  or  sensitive  Soul 
to  the  rational;  but  is  there  likewise  a  devel- 
opment of  the  material  or  inorganic  Soul  to  the 
organic?  "Every  Soul  or  Monad  is  subject  to 
continual  changes,  and  these  natural  changes  must 
come  from  an  internal  principle,  since  noexternal- 
influence  can  enter  within  it  '\Mon.  10-11).  We 
can  scarcely  regard  these  statements  as  explicitly 
affirming  that  there  is  an  inner  evolution  from 
the  lowest  to  the  highest,  but  such  a  doctrine 
seems  to  be  suggested. 

Leibniz,  however,  rejects  anything  like  Metem- 
psychosis or  the  Transmigration  of  Souls,  which 
"  never  quit  all  their  body  or  pass  into  an  en- 
tirely new  body."  Still  there  is  Metamorphosis 
or  Transformation ;  "  souls  are  developed,  envel- 
oped, despoiled,  reclothed,  transformed,"  all  of 
which  means  only  change,  not  loss,  of  body. 
The  .sensitive  Soul  with  its  body  may  develop 
into  the  rational  Soul  with  its  body ;  but  such  a 
corresponding  change  in  the  organism  is  not  the 


340         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

work  of  Nature  but  of  God  Himself  through 
Pre-established  Harmony.  "God  alone  is  de- 
tached wholly  from  body,"  being  pure  activity. 
He  is  not  the  soul  of  the  Universe,  though  he  be 
present  everywhere ;  he  is  the  ruler  or  monarch 
of  it;  he  is  the  exception,  the  world  is  not  his 
body,  but  his  machine. 

Intimations  of  evolution  seem  to  have  been 
started  in  some  minds  by  the  doctrine  of  Leib- 
niz. One  of  his  correspondents,  M.  Rernond, 
in  a  letter  (1715)  asks  him:  "  By  what  means, 
by  what  degrees  can  a  central  and  dominant 
Monad,  which  constitutes  an  animal  at  a  certain 
time,  produce  or  even  be  at  another  time,  Mr. 
Leibniz  himself?  "  This  seems  to  call  for 
Darwin  or  indeed  something  beyond  Dar- 
win. The  answer  of  Leibniz  has  a  curious 
thought:  "A  perfect  Intelligence  (God)  rec- 
ognizes for  a  long  time  in  advance  the  future 
man  in  the  present  animal  both  as  to  soul  and 
as  to  body,"  since  He  has  pre-established  just 
this  evolution  of  both  together  in  harmony. 
This  is  not  far  from  saying  that  the  reciprocal 
evolution  of  the  soul  and  body  of  man  from 
lower  animals  belongs  to  the  doctrine  of  Pre- 
established  Harmony. 

At  any  rate  the  general  outcome  of  Leibnizian 
Physics  is  a  Universe  full  of  Soul,  which  has 
been  preceded  by  a  Universe  full  of  Force,  and 
still  further  back  by  a  Universe  full  of  Motion. 


LEIBNIZ.  —  PR  YSICS.  34 1 

Underlying  these  three  stages  is  not  only  an  evolu- 
tion but  a  process  since  Soul  takes  up  into  itself 
both  Motion  and  Force,  the  external  and  internal, 
culminating  in  its  own  self-returning  process 
within  itself,  called  Apperception  by  Leibniz, 
but  usually  known  now  as  self-consciousness. 

Looking  back  at  the  movement  of  Leibnizian 
Physics  we  see  that  our  philosopher  has  substan- 
tially undone  the  Cartesian  dualism  between  Mat- 
ter and  Mind  by  making  the  Universe  all  Soul, 
rising  through  the  principles  of  Pan-mechanism 
or  the  Universe  as  moved  from  without,  of  Pan- 
dynamism  or  the  Universe  as  moved  simply  from 
within,  to  Pan-psychism,  or  the  Universe  as  self- 
moved  or  self -reflect  ing,  of  which  the  Ego  or 
Spirit  is  the  culmination  with  its  self-conscious 
Reason. 

But  now  what?  Man  as  Spirit  is  "  the  image 
of  Divinity  itself,  or  of  the  author  of  Nature, 
being  capable  of  recognizing  the  system  of  the 
Universe,  and  of  imitating  somewhat  of  it 
creatively"  (Mon.  c.  83).  Thus  a  new  sphere 
arises  in  which  man  is  to  employ  his  Reason  in 
its  supreme  activity,  reproducing  the  Universe 
after  the  divinely  creative  power,  of  which  he 
has  "an  architectonic  coruscation."  Thus  the 
Soul  as  Spirit  or  Ego,  returning  upon  itself  in  the 
reflexive  act  or  self -consciousness  can  return  to 
God,  and  re-think  the  thought  of  the  Universe. 

Already   the  rational  Soul    or  Spirit  seemed 


342         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

to  rise  beyond  the  sphere  of  Physics  proper,  but 
Leibniz  connects  it  so  closely  with  the  two  pre- 
vious stages,  material  and  organic,  that  it  could 
not  be  well  separated  from  them  in  an  exposi- 
tion. But  the  Soul  as  rational  not  only  is  the 
principle  of  nature  and  hence  her  lord,,but  knows 
itself  to  be  such.  With  this  self-knowledge  the 
Soul  can  and  must  assert  its  primacy  over  Nature, 
whereby  it  becomes  ethical. 

The  object  of  Physics  is  attained  when  Nature 
is  wheeled  into  line  with  the  monadal  Universe, 
and  has  reached  rational  Man,  who  is  still  to  go 
forward  in  his  ascent,  but  this  ascent  is  like- 
wise a  return  to  and  participation  in  his  Divine 
Source. 

C.  ETHICS. 

Leibniz  has  touched  upon  every  leading  phase 
of  Ethics,  but  his  ideas  here  too  are  in  the  main 
monadal,  separated,  disconnected.  We  find  in 
his  various  lucubrations  something  on  the  moral, 
the  institutional  and  the  religious  spheres,  but 
not  joined  together  in  any  complete  order. 
In  fact,  if  the  Monad  be  taken  strictly,  it  is  hard 
to  see  how  Leibniz  can  have  any  Ethics,  in  the 
fundamental  form  of  this  science.  Man  is  a 
Monad  and  God  is  the  Monad  of  Monads;  in 
what  way  then  can  any  return  of  man  to  God  take 
place?  The  Monad  has  «'  no  windows  "  through 


LEIBNIZ.  —  ETHICS.  343 

which  anything  can  go  out  or  come  in,  they  have 
in  strictness  no  mutual  participation;  thus  the 
ethical  return  in  its  wide  sense  seems  quite 
impossible.  And  yet  Leibniz  will  at  last  bring 
it  about. 

Moreover  the  Monad,  in  its  complete  isolation 
and  individualism,  is  supremely  unsocial,  each 
having  its  own  little  world  all  to  itself.  How, 
then,  can  Monads  associate  and  form  together 
the  realm  of  Social  Institutions?  Though  Leib- 
niz was  an  official  of  the  State,  it  is  difficult  to 
see  in  what  way  a  State  could  arise  and  exist  in 
his  monadal  universe.  And  so  with  all  institu- 
tions, which  come  of  human  association.  Still 
also  here  the  unexpected  will  take  place. 

Nay,  if  morals  pertain  to  the  conduct  of 
the  individual  toward  other  individuals  and 
toward  the  rest  of  the  world,  it  is  hard  to 
see  how  the  Monad  can  be  a  moral  being. 
Man  the  Monad  is  set  in  order  by  the  Supreme 
Monad,  and  runs  harmoniously  with  the  rest  of 
the  universe  through  a  predetermined  principle ; 
his  action,  attuned  to  the  movement  of  the  All,  can- 
not be  called  his  own,  and  hence  cannot  be  called 
moral  in  the  customary  sense,  being  adjusted 
primordially  by  and  in  a  Pre-established  Har- 
mony .  Such  a  Monad  can  hardly  have  Duty  and 
Responsibility  in  the  matter  of  conduct,  which 
predicates  are  the  basic  ones  for  morality.  Still 
he  will  not  fail  to  employ  these  predicates. 


344        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Of  these  difficulties  Leibniz  himself  is  more  or 
less  aware.  Hence  we  may  observe,  when  he 
enters  the  ethical  sphere  in  his  writings,  he 
begins  to  shift,  to  tack  about,  and  to  re-adjust 
his  metaphysical  sphere,  in  which  he  gave  the 
pure  derivation  and  conception  of  the  Monad. 
Thus  a  separation  shows  itself  between  his  Meta- 
physics and  his  Ethics,  which  calls  to  mind  that 
of  Spinoza,  though  in  various  respects  different. 
It  must  be  confessed,  however,  that  Leibniz  in 
the  ethical  sphere  has  not  wholly  overcome  the 
Spinozan  dualism.  In  fact  he  sees  or  at  least 
dwells  on  only  the  monism  (or  metaphysical 
part  of  Spinoza),  not  the  dualism  which  appears 
when  the  ethical  portion  of  the  Spinozan  Norm 
is  considered.  Thus  the  Ethics  of  Leibniz,  from 
the  standpoint  of  his  system  as  a  whole,  seems 
to  hang  in  the  air. 

The  truth  is,  the  return  of  the  Monad  to  con- 
nection and  harmony  with  God  or  the  Monad  of 
Monads  has  already  been  made;  it  is  the  main 
fact  of  the  foregoing  metaphysical  sphere  of  the 
Leibnizian  Norm,  as  we  have  already  set  forth. 
Thus  Leibniz  has  in  strictness  no  ethical  return. 
Still  he,  being  a  man  learned  in  the  history  of 
Philosophy,  knew  of  Ethics  as  a  philosophical 
discipline  from  the  ancients  down  to  his  own  time. 
He  was  also  a  jurist  and  a  statesman,  so  that 
Institutions  came  into  his  daily  life  and  thought. 
Moreover  in  spite  of  his  formalism  and  even  his 


LEIBNIZ.  —  ETHICS.  345 

doubleness,  we  hold  Leibniz  to  have  been  a  relig- 
ious man,  and  hence  his  mind  was  much  occupied 
with  God,  Church,  and  Religion.  He  has  left 
writings  in  all  these  departments,  but  irregular, 
unorganized,  recalcitrant  to  his  Monadology. 

Such  is  the  negative  view  of  Leibnizian  Ethics, 
springing  out  of  his  Metaphysics  of  the  Monad 
as  above  set  forth.  But  this  is  by  no  means 
the  whole  of  the  ethical  Leibniz,  who  has  another 
strand,  even  if  contradictory  to  the  preceding 
metaphysical  movement.  It  is  this  second  strand 
which,  at  first  suppressed,  rises  to  the  surface 
and  in  the  end  sings  a  song  of  triumph  in  the 
City  of  God.  Both  sides  must  be  seen  in  their 
struggle,  in  their  .process  and  in  their  outcome 
which  is  reconciliation,  is  that  true  Harmony 
which,  pre-established  by  God,  returns  and  re- 
establishes Him  and  His  work. 

I.  THE  PSYCHICAL  ELEMENT. — This  must  be 
caught  up  and  put  together  from  many  different 
utterances  of  many  years,  for  it  is  monadal  like 
everything  Leibniz  did,  like  his  life  and  like  him- 
self. There  is  a  good  deal  of  it,  with  numerous 
variations,  yet  an  underlying  oneness  of  material 
which  is  essentially  plastic,  capable  of  taking 
many  forms  according  to  the  occasion. 

We  have  already  noted  that  the  Monad  as  a 
metaphysical  substance  has  in  it  a  psychical  pro- 
cess—  Feeling  the  (Unconscious),  Will  (Ap- 
petition)  and  Intellect  (Perception).  This  must 


346        MODEEN  E UEOPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

be  deemed  the  primal  inheritance  of  Leibnizian 
Ethics,  along  with  the  doctrine  of  Pre-established 
Harmony,  both  coming  down  from  the  Metaphy- 
sics of  our  philosopher.  That  is,  we  have  on  the 
one  hand  the  monadal  Ego,  internally  self -active, 
and  so  free ;  on  the  other  we  have  the  monadal 
God,  determining  this  Ego  as  subject  to  harmony 
with  the  objective  world.  Thus  the  dualism  be- 
tween the  Determined  and  the  Self-determined, 
or  between  Necessity  and  Freedom  rises  with  full 
intensity  in  the  Leibnizian  Monad  as  Ego. 

The  science  of  Ethics  is,  in  its  complete  sweep, 
as  we  have  often  said,  the  Return  to  God,  to  the 
Absolute  Spirit  on  the  part  of  the  separated  and 
alienated  Self  or  Monad.  The  ethical  problem  of 
Leibniz  is,  then,  to  restore  the  monadal  Self  out 
of  its  state  of  isolation  and  to  make  it,  from 
within  and  from  without,  an  integral  element  of 
the  total  Divine  Process. 

It  is  our  judgment  that  Leibniz  in  the  sphere 
of  the  psychical,  never  succeeded  in  working  him- 
self out  of  his  dualism.  Hence  all  his  thoughts 
upon  this  subject  have  a  tendency  to  run  double, 
they  go  in  pairs  of  contradictories,  which  he  can- 
not fully  bring  together  in  reconciliation,  or  in 
the  unity  of  their  process.  Our  exposition  will 
try  to  show  this  characteristic  by  unfolding  along 
the  line  of  his  main  doubles.  First,  Feeling  will 
show  itself  as  Pain  and  Pleasure;  secondly,  Will 
as  determined  and  free  Will;  thirdly,  Intellect 


LEIBNIZ.  —  E  THICS.  347 

as  Evil  and  Good.  Thus  the  psychical  element  is 
seen  to  dualize  itself  in  each  stage  of  its  process. 

1.  Pain  and  Pleasure.  As  these  two  feelings 
enter  into  all  our  moral  states,  Pleasure  being 
"  one  of  the  principal  points  of  Blessedness," 
while  Pain  is  the  accompaniment  of  Evil,  they 
are  passingly  defined  by  Leibniz.  Pleasure  is 
«'  the  feeling  of  rare  perfection  "  (Letter  to  Ni- 
caisse,  1698),  or  is  "  a  sense  of  perfection" 
(Def.  Eth).  On  the  other  hand  "Pain  is  the 
feeling  of  imperfection,"  limitation,  finitude. 
We  may  say,  therefore,  that  in  proportion  as  the 
Monad  can  feel  its  passivity  (or  First  Matter) , 
it  is  capable  of  Pain ;  and  in  proportion  as  it  can 
feel  its  activity  (or  free  Self)  it  is  capable  of 
Pleasure.  Limitation  brought  home  to  a  free 
(self -limited)  being,  is  painful,  but  to  transcend 
such  limitation  must  be  pleasurable  to  its  deepest 
nature. 

This  idea  of  Pain  and  Pleasure  comes  from 
Spinoza,  who  says:  "  Pleasure  (Icetitia)  is  the 
transition  from  a  less  to  a  greater  perfection. 
Pain  (tristitia)  is  the  transition  from  a  greater 
to  a  less  perfection"  (Ethica  III.,  Prop.  59, 
Def.  2  and  3).  Spinoza  puts  stress  upon  the 
movement  (transition).  Moreover  we  may  note 
wherein  this  perfection  lies  according  to 
Spinoza.  It  is  "through  our  participation  in 
the  divine  nature  ' '  whereby  our  actions  become 
more  perfect  as  well  as  our  knowledge  of  God 


348        MODERN  E  UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

(Elh.  II.,  Prop.  49,  Scholium  adfinem).  This 
thought  will  also  deeply  influence  Leibniz,  as 
we  shall  see  further  on  when  we  come  to  his 
City  of  God.  We  should  observe,  too,  that 
Spinoza  here  shows  his  second  or  ethical  stage  of 
the  Norm,  not  his  first  or  metaphysical.  The 
former  was  that  portion  of  Spinoza  which  Leib- 
niz profoundly,  and  in  part  unconsciously,  ap- 
propriated and  transformed  into  his  own  system  ; 
but  the  latter  or  metaphysical  portion  he  rejected. 
In  the  preceding  passage  Spinoza  conceives  his 
Ego  (we)  or  Mode  to  ascend  to  and  share  in 
God,  which  is  not  the  Spinozan  descent  but 
his  ascent,  the  latter  being  the  determining  fact 
of  the  Leibnizian  Philosophy. 

Feeling  leads  to  Will,  is  indeed  the  potential 
stage  of  activity;  to  feel  perfection  (which  is 
Pleasure)  leads  us  to  will  it,  to  make  it  real. 
The  Leibnizian  view  of  Will  reveals  still  more 
deeply  than  Feeling  the  dualism  in  his  psychical 
thought. 

2.  Determinism  and  Freedom.  Already  in  the 
metaphysical  portion  the  double  character  of  the 
Monad  has  been  set  forth,  on  the  one  hand  free 
and  self -moving  within  and  even  self-conscious, 
but  on  the  other  hand  determined  from  without 
by  Pre-established  Harmony  and  so  necessitated. 
No  subject  gave  Leibniz  more  trouble,  and  on 
none  is  he  more  two-edged.  He  calls  it  "a 
famous  labyrinth  where  our  reason  very  often 


LEIBNIZ.  —  E  TRIGS.  349 

goes  astray."  He  seeks  to  distinguish  the  kinds 
of  freedom,  and  to  define  the  term;  at  bottom 
his  labor  seems  to  little  purpose.  "  There  is  the 
freedom  which  is  opposed  to  the  imperfection  of 
the  spirit,"  to  its  passivity  or  passion,  when  it  is 
dominated  by  Nature  or  the  First  Matter.  In 
this  sense  God  alone  is  free,  being  pure  activity 
Cactus  purus).  "  Then  there  is  the  freedom 
which  is  opposed  to  necessity,"  to  external  de- 
termination. But  how  can  a  thinker  whose  doc- 
trine is  Pre-established  Harmony  through  God, 
vindicate  man's  freedom?  Still  Leibniz  grapples 
with  the  task  and  excogitates  his  doctrine  of 
contingency,  which,  he  says,  is  the  true  oppo- 
site of  necessity  and  not  freedom.  To  go  back 
to  the  beginning,  God  chose  among  innumerable 
sorts  of  worlds,  to  create  the  best  possible 
one  which  is  ours.  But  God  was  under  no 
necessity  to  make  just  our  kind  of  a  world, 
unless  we  call  his  a  moral  necessity  to  choose 
the  best.  This  is  not  the  metaphysical  necessity 
like  that  of  Spinoza.  Still  if  we  grant  this  free- 
dom to  God,  has  man,  the  created,  the  pre-estab- 
lished, any  of  it?  Leibniz  tries  to  say  yes,  and 
declares  that  all  human  action  is  contingent,  the 
opposite  being  logically  possible.  Still  it  is 
really  impossible.  Says  he:  "  All  things  are  cer- 
tain and  predetermined  in  man  as  in  everything 
else,  and  the  human  Soul  (or  Ego)  is  a  kind  of 
spiritual  automaton"  (Th.  54).  Very  curious 


350         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  his  shifting  from  necessity  to  inclination  or  con- 
tingency :  "  In  Adam  there  was  no  moral  neces- 
sity of  sinning,  but  only  this,  that  the  inclina- 
tion to  sin  prevailed  in  him . ' '  He  followed  inclin- 
ation or  the  stronger  motive,  but  could  he  help 
himself?  Hear  the  next  sentence:  "  There  was 
a  certain  pre-determination  (in  Adam's  sin)  but 
no  necessity . ' '  He  might  have  done  the  opposite , 
still  he  could  not  help  himself .  So  Leibniz  will 
give  us  a  determined  contingency  for  freedom 
instead  of  downright  necessity.  Ideally  you 
are  free,  but  really  you  are  not.  The  Monad 
may  be  free  within  itself  (though  this  can  be 
questioned),  but  in  the  world  it  must  be  deter- 
mined. What,  then,  is  freedom  worth? 

Leibniz  sought  to  transcend  the  immediate 
capricious  Free- Will  of  Descartes ;  he  also  sought 
to  circumvent  the  determinism  of  Spinoza.  But 
in  the  latter  case  he  hardly  succeeds  meta- 
physically, though  in  the  ethical  sphere  we  shall 
be  able  later  to  chronicle  a  success  (see  the  doc- 
trine of  association  of  the  Monads).  The  ada- 
mantine chain  of  Spinozan  Necessity  was  too 
strong  for  Leibniz,  he  could  not  quite  break  it 
nor  shake  it  off.  And  the  reason  is,  in  our 
opinion,  because  he  sought  to  overthrow  it  di- 
rectly, by  counter-argument,  and  then  by  com- 
promise. But  really  it  overthrew  him.  Still 
we  must  remember  his  protest  with  hand 
stretched  to  Heaven  even  while  he  is  sinking 


LEIBNIZ.  — ETHICS.  351 

under  the  waves  of  Spinoza's  all-devouring 
Ocean. 

But  Will  must  have  a  content,  something 
must  be  willed,  "  we  do  not  will  to  will."  At 
this  point  a  new  pair  of  moral  terms  appears, 
yet  very  old,  coming  to  the  Will  from  Intellect, 
according  to  Leibniz. 

3.  Evil  and  Good.  Three  kinds  of  Evil  (and 
also  of  Good)  are  distinguished  by  our  philoso- 
pher: metaphysical  (imperfection  or  limitation), 
physical  (suffering),  and  moral  (sin).  There 
can  be  little  doubt  that  the  first  is  the  source  of 
the  other  two.  Evil  is  the  negation  of  perfec- 
tion, and  this  negation  is  nothing  else  than  the 
lack  of  clear  and  distinct  ideas  or  perceptions. 
'*  There  is  an  original  imperfection  in  the  crea- 
ture, since  he  is  limited  in  knowledge  and  can  be 
mistaken,"  from  which  fact  spring  all  his  de- 
linquencies. Leibniz  takes  pains  to  controvert 
the  position  of  Descartes  that  the  source  of 
error  lies  in  the  Will  more  than  in  the  Intellect 
(see  preceding  p.  112).  Moreover  with  Des- 
cartes the  Will  in  its  freedom  is  the  unlimited, 
while  the  Intellect  is  the  limited ;  but  with  Leib- 
niz the  Intellect  in  its  clear  perceptions  possesses 
the  element  of  the  unlimited,  while  the  Will  must 
be  finite  from  its  being  determined.  The  Leib- 
nizian  Will  has  apparently  no  power  of  re-acting 
against  the  suggestions  of  Intellect  with  its 
erroneous  judgments.  Descartes  gives  it  the 


352         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

power  of  resisting  them.  Leibniz  has  to  say 
that  if  we  always  judged  aright,  we  would  act 
aright;  if  our  intelligence  were  perfect,  our 
conduct  would  be  perfect. 

We  read  in  his  Abridgment  of  the  Theodicy  : 
"God  is  infinite,  and  the  Devil  is  limited;  Good 
may  and  does  advance  ad  infinitum,  while  Evil 
has  its  bounds. "  If  this  were  carried  out,  the 
Devil  ought  to  be  the  First  Matter,  purely  pas- 
sive, simply  inert:  which  would  certainly  over- 
throw his  supposed  power  in  the  world.  "  The 
blessed  approach  Divinity,  and  make  such 
progress  in  the  Good  as  is  impossible  for  the 
damned  to  make  in  Evil  "  (see  Duncan's  Leib- 
niz,^. 196).  Progress  in  the  infinite  has  un- 
doubtedly far  greater  potentialities  than  progress 
in  the  finite. 

At  this  point  it  can  be  seen  what  a  hubbub 
Leibniz  would  be  sure  to  call  up  around  his  ears. 
For  instance,  the  idea  that  the  Devil  might  be 
Pure  Matter,  without  activity,  would  assuredly 
not  be  in  favor  with  a  certain  class  of  theolo- 
gians, who  had  been  fighting  the  arch-fiend  all 
their  lives  in  a  kind  of  ever-lasting  drawn  battle. 
And  we  hold  they  would  be  right.  One  might 
as  well  reduce  the  Devil  to  Pure  Space,  and  be 
done  with  him,  as  another  philosopher  once  did. 
But  when  such  a  controversy,  especially  a  reli- 
gious one,  waxes  hot,  Leibniz  the  reconciler,  the 
compromiser,  the  grand  intellectual  acrobat  of 


LEIBNIZ.  —  ETHICS.  353 

the  age  begins  his  marvelous  contortions,  his 
double  somersaults  through  an  intricate  array  of 
definitions,  distinctions  and  explanations,  in 
which  he  says  that  what  he  says  means  some- 
thing different  from  what  he  says.  In  these 
excursions  there  is  no  need  of  following  him,  for 
the  simple  reason  that  it  is  impossible  to  believe 
him,  or  to  believe  that  he  believes  himself.  Of 
course  this  tendency  is  the  weak,  perchance  the 
weakest,  spot  in  a  great  man. 

The  Intellect  returns  to  Feeling  (the  first  psy- 
chical stage)  and  includes  Pain  and  Pleasure  in  its 
Evil  and  Good.  This  is  indicated  in  the  following 
passage:  "  The  Good  is  what  is  proper  to  produce 
and  increase  Pleasure  in  us,  or  to  abridge  and 
diminish  some  Pain.  Evil  is  proper  to  produce 
or  increase  Pain  in  us,  or  to  diminish  some 
Pleasure."  Then  Feeling  leads  to  Activity,  to 
Will,  whose  content  is  furnished  by  Intellect. 
Thus  the  psychical  round  of  the  Mind  is  com- 
pleted in  its  ethical  phase,  showing  each  of  its 
three  stages  dualized  in  pairs  of  opposites. 

Evil,  then,  belongs  to  the  Intellect,  and  con- 
sists in  the  absence  of  clear  perceptions  in  the 
monadal  Ego.  God  is  the  presence  of  such  per- 
ceptions. Hence  God  is  supremely  good,  be- 
cause He  is  perfect  in  perception,  or  knowledge. 
The  good  man  is  good  by  virtue  of  sharing  in 
this  divine  perfection  of  perception,  and  men  are 

23 


354         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

graded  in  goodness  according  to  the  different 
degrees  of  it  in  their  intellect. 

Hence  arises  an  inseparable  connection  in  Leib- 
niz between  Morals  and  Religion.  An  inde- 
pendent science  of  Duty  is  not  the  Leibnizian 
morality.  For  this  reason  these  two  principles 
(moral  and  religious)  must  be  considered  to- 
gether. 

II.  THE  MORAL  AND  RELIGIOUS  ELEMENT.  — 
If  God  makes  man  moral  by  giving  him  distinct 
perceptions,  and  also  grades  man's  morality  by 
grading  his  preceptions,  morality  vanishes  in  the 
divine  act  and  becomes  religion.  This  result, 
however,  Leibniz  does  not  like,  it  savors  too 
much  of  Spinozan  necessity,  of  which,  however, 
he  could  never  fully  rid  himself,  and  with  which 
we  see  him  in  a  perpetual  struggle.  So  he  in- 
jects, or,  we  might  say,  smuggles  into  his  deter- 
mined, pre-established  Monad  as  Ego,  a  limited 
quota  of  self-determination,  so  that  it  can, 
apparently  through  itself,  suppress  Passion  and 
Appetite,  and  thus  have  some  morality  of  the 
traditional  kind. 

In  the  writings  of  Leibniz  we  find  many  echoes 
of  what  Descartes  and  Spinoza  have  said  of  the 
Passions  and  Emotions.  Some  of  these  he  has 
defined  specially  in  his  own  way.  Also  he  has 
listed  the  virtues  with  accompanying  explana- 
tions. All  this  is  done  in  his  individualistic 
manner,  in  separate  shots  hitting  and  missing. 


LEIBNIZ.  —  E  THIC8.  355 

His  general  view  of  the  moral  universe  may  be 
illustrated  by  the  following  extracts  from  the 
Theodicee  (147):  "  God  plays  with  those  little 
Gods  (so  to  speak)  whom  He  has  seen  fit  to 
create."  Such  a  "  little  God  is  man,  in  his  own 
world  or  microcosm,  which  he  governs  after  his 
own  fashion,"  namely  with  Free- Will  which  the 
Creator  has  given  him  "  permitting  him  to  range 
freely  in  his  own  department."  One  asks  here, 
How  can  such  a  Monad  of  a  man  be  moral,  all  to 
himself?  Still  our  little  God  "  does  wonders  in 
his  little  sphere ; ' '  but  also  ' '  he  is  guilty  of  great 
faults,  because  he  abandons  himself  to  his  pas- 
sions, and  because  God  abandons  him  to  his 
senses."  Such  misdeeds  of  his,  however,  can 
only  be  done  to  himself,  not  to  his  neighbor,  not 
to  institutions,  nor  to  God,  in  monadal  strictness. 
Still  "  God  punishes  him  for  them,  now  as  a 
father  or  preceptor  chastising  his  children,  now 
as  a  just  judge  punishing  those  who  abandon 
him."  Thus  our  philosopher  injects  into  his 
Monad  Free-Will  and  Responsibility  for  the  deed, 
which  do  not  belong  to  its  constitution  meta- 
physically, as  it  is  set  in  order  and  runs  accord- 
ing to  Pre-established  Harmony. 

Moreover  it  is  evident  that  the  Pre-established 
Harmony,  through  Free-Will  and  its  evil  con- 
duct has  become  inharmonious.  This  difficulty 
Leibniz  recognizes  and  tackles  in  the  following 
fashion:  "God,  by  a  marvelous  artifice,  turns 


356         MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

all  the  defects  of  these  little  worlds  into  the 
greater  ornamentation  of  his  large  World." 
What  a  cunning  fellow  God  must  be,  quite  equal 
to  Leibniz  himself,  as  the  supreme  diplomat, 
permitting  all  the  little  courtiers  their  Free- 
Will,  yet  turning  all  their  cabals  against  him 
and  their  meanness  into  the  universal  har- 
mony of  the  State.  This  Leibnizian  note  runs 
through  the  whole  Theodicee :  God  is  the 
adroit  manager  of  all  these  willful  Monads  per- 
petually doing  evil  and  making  discord  which  he 
skillfully  turns  into  the  universal  concord.  "  So 
the  apparent  deformities  of  the  little  World 
are  re-united  in  the  beauties  of  the  great  World 
and  show  no  opposition  to  the  unity  of  the  one 
Principle,  universal  and  infinitely  perfect;  on 
the  contrary,  these  little  worlds  just  in  their 
deformities  augment  our  admiration  of  divine 
Wisdom  which  makes  evil  serve  for  the  greatest 
good."  Such  is  the  famous  Leibnizian  optimism, 
a  very  fragile  part  of  the  mail  if  he  be  really  in 
earnest  about  it,  which  we  cannot  help  doubting 
at  times,  for  the  thing  sounds  just  a  little  too 
comic.  Let  those  who  may,  be  edified  by  such 
pious  reflections,  which  are  drawn  out  to  an 
appalling  length  in  the  Theodicee. 

From  the  foregoing  citations  it  is  manifest 
that  Religion  is  very  closely  interwoven  with 
Morals  in  Leibniz.  God  alone  has  clear  and  dis- 
tinct knowledge,  hence  he  is  the  wholly  free  being 


LEIBNIZ.  —  ETHICS.  357 

and  thus  supremely  moral.  Man  in  like  manner 
has  liberty,  in  so  far  as  he  knows  clearly  and 
distinctly.  His  reason  is  the  source  of  his 
morality,  while  his  senses,  having  confused 
ideas,  are  the  source  of  servitude  and  evil.  If 
he  knows  God  truly,  he  has  clear  and  distinct 
ideas  and  is  moral.  Thus  knowledge  is  the  good 
and  ignorance  is  the  evil.  Herein  Leibniz  goes 
back  quite  to  Socrates  who  identified  knowledge 
and  virtue.  Evil  appearing  to  be  good  to  our  in- 
telligence deceives  us,  and  Jeads  us  into  wicked- 
ness, for  no  person  is  willingly  bad  —  he 
mistakes  or  is  ignorant. 

It  is  always  worth  while  to  keep  in  mind 
what  a  part  is  played  in  the  Philosophy  of  the 
Seventeenth  Century  by  the  doctrine  of  "  clear 
and  distinct  ideas/'  It  was  started  by  Descartes, 
retained  by  Spinoza,  and  still  further  elaborated 
by  Leibniz.  But  all  hold  that  a  clear  and  dis- 
tinct idea  is  God's  and  is  the  connecting  principle 
between  the  human  and  the  divine  minds.  It 
belongs  to  Reason  and  is  what  makes  Morality 
and  Religion,  man  and  God,  rational. 

The  dualism  of  the  Monad  is  also  divine,  and 
so  there  are  two  different  or  rather  opposite 
conceptions  of  God  in  Leibniz,  each  of  these 
conceptions  having  several  distinct  shades  or  sub- 
divisions. As  the  Monad  of  Monads  he  must  be 
in  isolation  like  the  simple  Monad,  having  no 
windows ;  as  supreme  he  must  be  the  most  in- 


358        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

dividualistic  of  all  Monads.  Still  he  has  to 
perform  one  action  at  the  start,  even  if  inactive 
afterwards :  he  must  pre-establish  Harmony 
among  the  Monads.  Another  turn  of  the  same 
thought  declares  that  he  is  this  pre-established 
Harmony,  and  thus  is  continually  bringing  it 
forth.  These  are  variations  in  the  metaphysical 
Monad  as  God. 

On  the  other  hand,  God  is  declared  to  be  the 
creator  of  Monads,  which  are  conceived  to  be 
the  products  of  Divine  Will;  thus  the  Monad 
of  Monads  has  "  a  window,"  and  communicates 
himself  freely  to  a  world  of  his  own  creation. 
But  such  creation  is  again  spoken  of  as  a  kind  of 
emanation  or  Neo-Platonic  overflow  of  God  into 
the  Monads  which  come  forth  "  by  the  continual 
figurations  of  the  Deity  from  instant  to 
instant/'  which  do  not  appear  to  be  acts  of 
creation.  At  any  rate  instead  of  divine  isolation 
we  have  here  divine  communication,  which  makes 
some  kind  of  a  return  to  God  possible  and  hence 
is  ethical  in  the  wide  sense  of  the  term.  It  can- 
not be  denied,  however,  that  Leibniz  has  a  pan- 
theistic tinge  in  his  conception  of  God,  in  fact  he 
is  both  theistic  and  pantheistic. 

Leibniz  postulates  Free-Will  in  the  realm  of 
Morals  and  Religion,  yet  it  must  have  its  content 
given  by  Reason,  so  that  it  'is  not  capricious. 
But  in  the  purely  metaphysical  sphere  the  Monad 
cannot  have  Free-Will,  since  it  is  determined  by 


L  EIBNIZ .  —  E  THICS.  351) 

Pre-established  Harmony.  Here  again,  in  the 
matter  of  liberty  we  note  the  contradiction 
between  the  Ethics  and  the  Metaphysics  of 
Leibniz,  who  injects  from  the  outside  a  Free- 
Will  into  the  Monad.  Is  Leibniz  a  necessitarian 
or  a  libertarian?  It  is  a  disputed  question,  but 
really  he  is  both,  he  is  the  one  in  Metaphysics, 
the  other  in  Ethics. 

Thus  Leibniz  seeks  in  his  way  to  rescue,  par- 
tially at  least,  Free- Will.  Next  we  shall  look  at 
him  taking  a  still  greater  step,  even  if  incon- 
sistent with  his  previous  system.  He  actually 
affirms  the  association  of  "  spirits  or  reasonable 
beings,"  between  whom  and  ordinary  souls  or 
Monads,  there  is  a  great  difference.  For  these 
spirits  are  not  merely  images  of  the  universe  in 
general,  but  they  are  in  addition  "images  of 
God  Himself,  capable  of  knowing  the  universe," 
of  consciously  turning  back  upon  it  and  of  re- 
producing it  in  thought,  or  of  building  it  over 
again  by  "architectonic  coruscations"  of  the 
divinely  creative  energy.  Now  we  reach  the  re- 
sult: "it  is  this  capacity  which  makes  spirits 
(or  reasonable  beings)  capable  of  entering  into 
a  kind  of  association  with  God,"  and  through 
Him  with  one  another.  "  Thus  God  is  no  longer 
in  their  regard  such  as  is  an  inventor  in  relation 
to  his  machine,  but  such  as  is  a  prince  to  his 
subjects,  or  even  a  father  to  his  children"  (Mon. 
83,  84).  What  now  has  become  of  God  as  the 


360         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

mechanical  orderer  of  the  Monads,  or  as  the  pre- 
established  harmonizer  of  all  things?  He  has 
created  a  Monad  which  is  not  simply  to  be  put 
into  order  from  the  outside,  but  which  can  turn 
back  and  in  some  part  reproduce  the  divinely 
creative  act  of  God  Himself.  Such  a  Monad  can 
now  associate  with  God  and  with  its  fellow 
Monad  —  wherewith  we  enter  a  new  stage. 

III.  THE  INSTITUTIONAL  ELEMENT.  —  Thus 
rises  to  view  the  supreme  conception  of  Leibniz : 
the  City  of  God,  which  is  "  the  assemblage  of 
the  spirits/'  in  a  community,  and  which  consti- 
tutes "  the  most  perfect  State  possible,  under 
the  most  perfect  of  Monarchs."  Such  is  the 
glimpse,  and  it  is  but  a  glimpse,  a  gleam,  re- 
vealing like  a  flash  of  lightning  the  Heavenly 
City  in  outline.  It  is  not  developed,  not  de- 
scribed; it  comes  with  a  sudden  explosion,  mo- 
nadal,  dynamic,  Leibnizian — and  then  darkness. 
The  aged  philosopher  here  ascends  to  the  highest 
pinnacle  of  his  genius  and  views  for  a  moment 
(at  the  end  of  the  Monadology)  the  future,  like 
Moses  on  the  mountain  beholding  before  he 
dies,  the  promised  land.  Thus  Leibniz  sees,  in 
the  clouds  to  be  sure,  the  City  of  God,  but  did 
he  also  see,  with  his  new  principle  of  associa- 
tion, that  he  would  have  to  reconstruct  his 
whole  system  of  Philosophy  from  the  beginning? 

In  this  conception  Leibniz  draws  deeply  upon 
the  past  as  well  as  looks  out  upon  the  future. 


L  E1BN1Z.  —  E  THICS.  36 1 

First  we  think  of  Saint  Augustine's  Civitas  Dei, 
which,  however,  goes  back  to  Plato  for  many  of 
its  lineaments.  Thus  Leibniz  too,  like  so  many 
philosophers,  ancient  and  modern,  had  an  ideal 
State  hovering  before  him,  a  kind  of  Monadopolis, 
in  which  the  Monads  exchange  their  isolation  for 
association.  It  need  hardly  be  said  that  this  is 
just  the  reverse  of  their  character  as  set  forth  in 
the  metaphysical  portion  of  the  Leibnizian  Philos- 
ophy. Thus,  however,  a  universal  institutional 
world  hovers  before  him  as  the  ethical  outcome 
of  his  system,  appearing  already  in  his  Dis- 
cours  de  Metapliysique  (36,  37),  whereby  God 
4 'humanizes  himself"  and  enters  "into  social 
relations  with  us."  Thus  he  answers  himself, 
in  fact  transcends  himself  into  a  new  Philos- 
ophy. "  This  City  of  God,  this  universal 
monarchy,  is  a  moral  world  in  the  natural 
world;"  yet  it  is  more  than  moral,  it  is  in- 
stitutional. "  It  is  by  virtue  of  this  divine 
City  that  God  reveals  his  goodness,  rather  than 
his  wisdom  and  power  which  are  shown  every- 
where "  (Mon.  86).  Thus  there  is  also  a  trans- 
formation of  God  who  may  now  be  called 
good  for  the  first  time,  through  the  Insti- 
tution. Truly  Leibniz  has  not  only  moralized 
but  institutionalized  God  Himself,  who  is, 
therefore,  to  be  considered  not  simply  as 
'*  the  architect  of  the  machine  of  the  universe  " 
(which  he  is  for  the  lower  Monads  of  the 


362          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Kingdom  of  Nature),  but  he  is  also  "  the 
sovereign  of  the  divine  City  of  Spirits"  (who 
belong  to  the  Kingdom  of  Grace).  Thus  He  is 
the  principle  of  all  human  association,  the  central 
source  of  the  Social  Institutions  of  Man,  who 
accordingly  requites  Him  with  «'  pure  Divine 
Love,  which  causes  us  to  take  pleasure  in  the 
supreme  happiness  of  that  which  we  love."  It 
is  this  Love  of  God  which  makes  "  all  wise  and 
virtuous  persons  act  in  conformity  to  the  Divine 
Will,"  that  is,  they  will  the  Will  of  God  not  as 
arbitrary  but  as  institutional,  or,  in  Leibnizian 
phrase,  as  "the  Sovereign  of  the  Divine  City  " 
(Mon.  86-90). 

Still  even  for  this  City  of  God,  in  which  all 
are  associated  through  Divine  Love,  the  sugges- 
tion is  found  also  in  Spinoza.  Says  he:  "  This 
Love  toward  God  cannot  be  soiled  by  envy  or 
jealousy ;  but  it  is  the  more  fostered,  the  more 
men  we  conceive  to  be  joined  with  God  in  the 
same  bond  of  Love"  (V.  Prop.  20).  Such  is 
the  hint,  not  developed  by  Spinoza;  but  we  have 
the  right  to  say  that  he  was  going  toward  the 
City  of  God  when  he  died.  The  second  or 
ethical  portion  of  his  great  work  (the  Ethics) 
moves  also  in  the  same  direction,  as  has  been 
already  indicated,  and  this  was  the  portion  which 
especially  influenced  Leibniz.  .  ••«' 

Nevertheless,  with  this  institutional  outline  of 
the  grand  Kepublic,  or  rather  Monarchy  of 


LEIBNIZ.  —  ETHICS.  363 

Spirits,  which  signifies  the  association  of  rational 
beings  in  a  world  of  Institutions,  Leibniz  takes 
a  distinct  step  in  advance  of  Spinoza,  who 
though  supremely  an  institutional  man  (naturally 
more  so  than  Leibniz)  never  quite  succeeded  in 
working  out  and  formulating  his  principle  of 
association.  So  he  was  as  yet  unable  to  make 
definitely  the  transition  from  the  moral  to  the 
institutional  sphere,  though  he  was  certainly  far 
on  the  way  thereto,  being  prevented  by  his  early 
death,  as  we  have  often  to  say  to  ourselves  in 
pathetic  retrospect. 

It  must  also  be  acknowledged  that  the  Leib- 
nizian  Pure  Love  of  God  as  institutional,  that  is 
of  God,  as  founder  and  ruler  of  the  Divine 
City  which  is  the  center  and  source  of  all  asso- 
ciation, is  a  more  concrete  and  loftier  conception 
than  the  Spinozan  Intellectual  Love  of  God, 
which  remains  an  individual  relation,  and  hence 
is  moral  or  subjectively  religious,  but  not  insti- 
tutional. Through  his  form  of  Divine  Lovre 
Spinoza  does  not  explicitly  bring  his  fellow-men 
into  association  with  one  another,  and  thereby 
call  forth  Institutions.  To  be  sure,  Leibniz  does 
not  develop  his  conception  of  Divine  Love,  he 
holds  it  by  no  means  with  a  firm  mental  grip, 
sometimes  he  grasps  and  sometimes  he  does  not 
seem  to  grasp  its  institutional  side,  but  keeps  it 
as  individual  as  Spinoza's  (compare  the  two 
statements  of  Love  pure,  veritable,  in  the  Monad- 


364          MODERN  E UEOPEA  .V  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

ology  and  in  the  Principes  de  la  Nature  et  de  la 
Grace). 

Thus  it  would  seem  that  Leibniz  has  risen  be- 
yond his  metaphysical  system  which  has  become 
an  incumbrance  to  him,  a  sort  of  shell  which 
once  subserved  a  purpose,  but  which  now  bur- 
dens him,  having  outgrown  it  quite  when  he 
enters  the  City  of  God.  Unconsciously  he  has 
sloughed  it  off,  though  he  still  seeks  to  carry  it 
along  in  his  ascent  to  his  new  world.  He  cannot 
yet  part  from  his  metaphysical  edifice,  even 
when  he  passes  into  the  future,  but  the  coming 
century  will  smite  it  and  shivei  it  to  pieces. 

At  this  point  the  ethical  stage  of  Leibniz  comes 
to  its  conclusion  and  with  it  the  entire  Norm  — 
Metaphysics,  Physics  and  Ethics  — •  as  manifested 
in  his  Philosophy.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the 
ethical  stage  in  the  end  overcomes  the  isolated 
metaphysical  Monad  (of  the  first  stage)  which 
becomes  socialized  through  God.  In  Spinoza 
likewise  we  observed  the  Mode  rising  above  its 
merely  phenomenal  metaphysical  stage.  Thus 
the  Monad  (and  also  the  Mode)  undoes  itself 
along  with  the  entire  monadal  order,  whereby  the 
whole  domain  of  the  Metaphysics  of  the  Seven- 
teenth Century  has  risen  through  its  own  inner 
movement  into  a  stage  beyond  itself,  of  which 
we  shall  hear  in  the  coming  Century. 

Moreover  with  the  conclusion  of  the  Leib- 
nizian  Philosophy,  the  philosophical  movement 


LEIBNIZ.  —  E  THICS.  365 

of  the  entire  Century  has  concluded  itself.  The 
main  problem  of  this  Century  we  may  formulate 
in  this  wise :  How  can  I  (Ego)  be  made  to  know 
the  object?  The  answer  is  through  God  in  some 
way,  and  the  three  ways  give  the  three  Philoso- 
phies—  Cartesian,  Spinozan,  and  Leibnizian. 

There  is  a  famous  illustration  of  the  two 
clocks  belonging  to  the  whole  period,  from  Des- 
cartes down.  We  cite  here  the  turn  which 
Leibniz  (^Erdmann^  p.  133)  gives  to  it:  "  Imag- 
ine two  clocks  which  agree  perfectly.  Such 
agreement  can  be  brought  about  in  three  ways: 
1st,  by  mutual  influence;  2nd,  by  a  workman 
who  keeps  both  together  at  every  moment;  3rd, 
by  constructing  the  two  clocks  so  accurately  that 
they  move  in  accord  continuously.  Put  now  soul 
and  body  in  place  of  those  two  clocks.  The  first 
way  is  that  of  vulgar  philosophy ;  the  second  is 
that  of  continual  assistance  of  the  Creator;  the 
third  is  that  of  Pre-established  Harmony,  which 
is  my  hypothesis." 

This  comparison  of  two  clocks  had  been  used 
before  by  Descartes,  by  Geulinx  and  also  by 
others.  It  is  a  distinct  Cartesian  inheritance, 
and  has  now  descended  to  Leibniz  who  readjusts 
it  to  his  own  doctrine.  This  one  comparison 
reflects  the  whole  movement  of  the  philosophy 
of  the  Seventeenth  Century  in  its  various  stages. 
For  in  tha't  century  God  is  the  grand  clockmaker 
fixing  and  keeping  in  order  the  two  clocks  of  the 


366          MODERN  E  UR  OPE  A  Y  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

Universe  which  represent  its  dualism.  The 
great  thinkers  of  that  period  —  Descartes,  Spi- 
noza, and  Leibniz  —  assign  to  God  the  task  of 
uniting  Thought  and  Extension,  Mind  and  Matter, 
Soul  and  Body.  But  each  philosopher  makes 
God  perform  this  task  in  a  different  way .  In 
Descartes  He  does  it  by  fiat,  in  Spinoza  by  mak- 
ing the  two  sides  consubstantial,  in  Leibniz  by 
Pre-established  Harmony. 

From  this  illustration  we  can  see  the  mechan- 
ical and  hence  the  mathematical  bent  of  the 
time.  The  function  of  God  is  conceived  by  the 
Philosophy  of  the  Eighteenth  Century  in  a 
mathematical  fashion.  For  this  reason  Spinoza 
is  peculiarly  the  expression  of  his  age:  he 
adopted  the  geometric  method  for  his  Phi- 
losophy. He  applied  the  science  of  exten- 
sion (Geometry)  to  mind,  inasmuch  as  we 
have  no  science  of  the  mind  as  such. 
The  two  attributes  of  Substance  are  ex- 
tension and  mind,  which  must  -be,  there- 
fore, consubstantial.  Hence  Geometry  must 
be  the  principle  of  mind  through  the  common 
Substance.  Herein,  too,  we  may  note  the 
pantheistic  tendency:  Mathematics  is  the  Sub- 
stance of  the  phenomenal  world  of  forms,  con- 
trolling it  by  an  inherent  necessity.  The  world 
mathematically  follows  from  the  definition  of 
God,  who  does  not  create  but  is  the  world; 
as  cause  of  it,  he  is  simply  causa  sui.  Hence 


LEIBNIZ  —ETHICS.  367 

there  is  a  monistic  and  even  pantheistic 
tinge  in  Geometry,  which  reduces  all  the  multi- 
plicity of  nature  to  the  one  abstract  process  of 
point,  line  and  surface.  Spinoza  declares  that 
there  can  be  no  truth  without  Mathematics,  God 
Himself  or  Substance  being  mathematical. 

The  implicit  separation  between  the  trans- 
cendent and  the  immanent  spheres,  which 
runs  through  the  Seventeenth  Century,  and 
which  were  held  together  by  Leibniz  with 
great  difficulty  and  doubtful  success,  becomes 
an  explicit  acknowledged  separation  in  the 
Eighteenth  Century,  and  is  expressly  formu- 
lated as  that  between  the  unknowable  and  the 
knowable.  It  is  still  the  modern  problem  of 
the  Ego  knowing  the  object,  but  this  takes 
place  no  longer  through  "  the  concourse  of 
God,"  whch  is  now  to  be  relegated  to  a  realm 
outside  of  the  knowledge  of  the  Ego. 


$»t 


THE      EIGHTEENTH      CENTURY.— 
REVOLUTION. 

The  general  character  of  the  Eighteenth  Cen- 
tury is  that-  of  re-action  against  what  has  been 
transmitted  in  thought  and  institutions.  The 
human  mind,  though  active  in  the  preceding 
Century  and  asserting  itself,  still  adopted  for  its 
expression  the  formulas  coming  down  from  the 
past.  The  Eighteenth  Century  is  a  revolt  on  the 
part  of  the  human  Self  against  the  swaddling 
clothes  in  which  it  has  been  wrapped  from  ages 
immemorial.  It  proposes  to  tear  them  off  and 
even  to  burn  them  up.  It  is,  therefore,  the 
revolutionary  Century  of  our  modern  time,  if 
not  of  all  time.. 
(368) 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTUEY.  369 

Its  declared,  explicit  attitude  is,  accordingly, 
negative.  It  assails  and  seeks  to  destroy  what  is 
established  at  times  with  a  ferocity  which  has 
rarely  had  a  parallel.  But  underneath  this  neg- 
ative energy  there  is  secretly  at  work  a  positive, 
constructive  spirit  which  is  preparing  the  new 
order.  Both  these  forces,  the  open  negative  and 
the  latent  positive,  go  together  and  cannot  be 
neglected  in  any  adequate  exposition  of  this 
Century  or  of  its  Philosophies. 

The  manifestation  of  such  a  negative  might  in 
Philosophy  is  what  is  known  as  Skepticism. 
Man  becomes  skeptical  of  truth,  of  all  thought, 
indeed  of  himself.  From  the  philosophic  point 
of  view  the  Eighteenth  is  the  great  skeptical 
Century,  in  which  the  whole  objective  realm  be- 
gins to  grow  unreal  and  become  a  phantasm. 
The  World-Spirit  itself  seems  to  turn  skeptic. 
To  be  sure  the  History  of  Philosophy  shows 
other  periods  of  Skepticism.  The  old  Greeks 
started  it  as  they  did  nearly  everything  else  good 
and  bad.  But  Mephistopheles,  "  the  spirit  that 
denies,"  appears  never  before  to  have  gotten  such 
a  complete  grip  on  a  whole  Century. 

I.  If  we  look  at  the  European  political  History 
of  the  Eighteenth  Century,  we  find  that  it  lies, 
both  in  its  outer  sweep  and  in  its  inner  signifi- 
cance, between  two  great  epoch-making  Revolu- 
tions —  the  English  Revolution  of  1688  and  the 
French  Revolution  beginning  about  one  hundred 

24 


370          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

years  later.  They  form  the  revolutionary  set- 
ting of  the  whole  Century,  and  constitute  the 
most  striking,  the  most  overwhelmingly  spectacu- 
lar expression  of  its  very  soul. 

The  Revolution  of  1688  in  England  made  a. 
dynastic  change  at  the  command  of  the  English 
people.  The  House  of  Stewart  was  deprived 
of  its  regal  inheritance  by  the  new  power,  and 
another  line  of  rulers  was  put  in  its  place.  Thus 
the  established  right  was  set  aside;  the  inherit- 
ance coming  down  from  the  fathers  and  intrenched 
in  law  was  annulled  in  England,  and  soon  came  to 
be  questioned  everywhere  in  Europe.  By  this 
act  England  places  herself  at  the  head  of  the 
world-historical  movement  of  the  age.  Her 
character  is  action,  and  she  has  acted  with  deci- 
sion. Thus  we  may  say  that  her  revolutionary 
deed  in  1688  is  a  typical  deed,  deeply  forecasting 
the  future.  In  the  beginning  of  the  Seventeenth 
Century  the  transmitted  thought  of  the  age  was 
denied,  but  England  passes  at  once  to  action 
and  denies  the  transmitted  right  of  the  ages,  and 
summons  it  before  a  higher  tribunal.  Thereby 
she  really  opens  the  Eighteenth  Century  as  far  as 
any  special  opening  can  be  designated .  The  result 
is  Philosophy  crosses  the  channel  from  the  Teu- 
tonic continent  where  it  has  dwelt  for  a  century, 
and  an  Englishman,  John  Locke,  becomes  the 
philosopher  of  Europe. 

It  is  true  that  England  only  changed  from  one 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY.  371 

dynasty  to  another;  the  dynastic  principle,  long 
inherited  and  deeply  ingrown  with  her  national 
life,  she  preserved,  to  be  sure  with  certain  strict 
limitations.  But  after  a  hundred  years  the  sec- 
ond great  and  greatest  Eevolution  of  Europe 
takes  place  in  France  which  seeks  to  destroy  root 
and  branch  the  dynastic  principle  along  with  the 
total  inheritance  of  the  ages.  The  world  has 
been  all  wrong  hitherto,  particularly  its  estab- 
lished rights,  its  law;  so  France  proposes  to  wipe 
out  the  entire  past  and  to  begin  over  again. 
Thus  the  Eighteenth  Century  expires  in  the 
most  tremendous  negative  act  in  all  history,  if 
we  take  into  account  its  brevity  and  its  com- 
pleteness. That  a  new  positive  order  lay  ger- 
minating in  this  destructive  energy  is  never  to  be 
forgotten. 

Such  are  the  two  tone-giving  European  Revo- 
lutions of  the  Century,  but  we  must  not  fail  to 
note  that  there  was  a  third  extra-European  Revo- 
lution which  took  place  during  the  same  Century, 
and  which  was  at  bottom  the  true  positive  solu- 
tion of  this  negative  epoch  of-  Europe.  The 
American  Revolution  also  rejected  the  dynastic 
principle  and  in  its  stead  advanced  to  the  new 
principle  of  government  in  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States.  But  another  Century,  the 
nineteenth,  will  have  to  pass,  before  any  such 
fact  can  be  generally  recognized  and  thus  weave 


372         MODERN'  EUEOPE 'AN  PHILOSOPHY. 

its  strand  into  the  historic  evolution  of  civiliza- 
tion. 

II.  The  Wars  of  Europe  during  the  Eighteenth 
Century  have  the  same  general  cast:  they  are 
chiefly  dynastic  struggles  in  which  the  prin- 
ciple of  monarchical  inheritance  falls  into  con- 
flct  with  itself  and  largely  destroys  its  own  valid- 
ity. The  two  chief  wars  openly  turn  on  the  right 
of  dynastic  Succession :  so  we  have  the  wars  of 
the  Spanish  and  the  Austrian  Succession.  Legiti- 
macy assails  legitimacy,  and  really  undermines 
itself.  The  two  dynasties  which  had  most  stren- 
uously maintained  the  supreme  privilege  of  birth 
in  their  own  respective  lines,  were  the  Bourbons 
and  the  Hapsburgers.  Now  these  two  houses  fall 
out  with  each  other  and  quarrel  over  their  in- 
heritance, each  side  claiming  lands  and  peoples 
as  their  birthright.  These  personal  quarrels  of 
sovereigns  convulsed  Europe  for  the  greater  part 
of  the  Eighteenth  Century. 

The  war  of  the  Spanish  Succession  (1701-14), 
starting  with  the  century,  was  a  great  training 
for  all  Europe,-  educating  it  to  disregard  legiti- 
macy. Louis  XIV.  was  the  leader ;  the  most  hide- 
bound defender  of  the  divine  right  of  kings,  he 
did  most  to  destroy  it  by  violating  it  everywhere 
for  what  he  deemed  his  own  interest.  In  him 
royalty  destroyed  royalty.  At  first  this  took 
place  in  other  countries ;  but  finally  his  negative 
act  must  come  back  to  his  own  France  and  slay 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY.  373 

the  representative  of  his  own  House.  The  peace 
of  Utrecht  (1*714)  already  contains  the  germs  of 
the  French  Revolution.  Legitimacy  denies  itself, 
recognizing  that  something  mightier  than  it  is, 
has  it  by  the  throat  and  uses  it  as  a  means. 

Toward  the  middle  of  the  century  arose  the 
war  of  the  Austrian  Succession,  repeating  in 
Teutonic  lands  substantially  the  same  lesson. 
The  established  right  of  birth  is  questioned, 
denied ;  the  State  is  no  longer  merely  a  royal  per- 
quisite. Kingly  privilege  has  been  overthrown 
by  kings ;  title  by  birth  cannot  stand  in  the  way 
of  another  and  mightier  title. 

It  is  manifest  that  the  supreme  institutional 
conflict  of  the  Eighteenth  is  different  from  that 
of  the  Seventeenth  Century.  During  the  latter 
we  saw  the  struggle  of  Religions,  the  Latin 
against  the  Teutonic.  But  at  present  the  relig- 
ious contest  has  receded  into  the  background; 
the  dual  Church,  Protestant  and  Catholic,  is 
acknowledged  as  a  fact  by  both  parties.  Divi- 
sion now  enters  the  Catholic  side  and  splits 
asunder  its  two  chief  defenders,  the  Bourbons 
and  the  Hapsburgers,  not  on  a  religious  but  on  a 
political  question.  The  outcome  is  that  each 
undermines  the  legitimacy  of  the  other;  each 
assails  the  established  order  of  succession  coming 
down  from  the  past,  while  pretending  to  main- 
tain it. 

Thus  it  comes  that  right  itself  as  transmitted 


374          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

down  the  ages  is  made  to  contradict  itself.  For 
each  party  trumps  up  a  claim  supported  by  a 
long  string  of  precedents,  for  the  purpose  of 
justifying  its  view  of  its  own  case.  The  double 
line  of  soldiers  in  battle  array  has  as  its  coun- 
terpart a  similar  double  line  of  jurists  in  battle 
array.  Thus  right  has  divided  within  itself  and 
gives  the  lie  to  itself,  and  certainly  proves  one 
thing:  the  truth  of  its  own  self-contradiction. 

Such  is  the  general  condition  of  old  Europe, 
Latin  and  Teutonic,  moribund,  in  a  state  of  self- 
negation  which  means  Revolution.  But  is  there 
no  positive  principle  lurking  in  this  mass  of 
national  decay?  Already  in  the  North  a  new 
State  has  been  slowly  evolving,  Teutonic  and 
Protestant.  This  is  Prussia  whose  greatness 
has  been  built  upon  the  ruins  of  legitimacy. 
In  1701  the  Duke  Frederick  III.  makes 
his  country  a  kingdom,  wrenching  his  new 
title  from  Austria  as  the  price  of  his  sup- 
port. The  next  king,  Frederick  William  I., 
strengthens  the  army  and  organizes  the  new 
State  into  a  huge  fighting  machine.  Those  giant 
grenadiers  of  his  have  been  much  laughed 
at,  but  they  are  truly  typical  of  the  com- 
ing Prussia.  He  never  uses  his  implement,  but 
hoards  up  a  vast  reservoir  of.  power  for  his 
successor  who  will  use  it  with  tremendous  en- 
ergy. This  successor  is  none  other  than 
Frederick  the  Great,  who  starts  with  seizing 


TEE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY.  375 

Silesia  (1740),  certainly  in  violation  of  long- 
established  right.  To  be  sure  Frederick  also 
can  play  the  European  game  of  digging  up  some 
antiquated  claim  from  the  dusty  legal  documents 
of  the  past.  Johann  Peter  von  Ludewig,  Pro- 
fessor of  Jurisprudence  at  Halle,  will  refute  all 
established  rights  in  favor  of  this  right  of 
Frederick,  very  old  and  yet  very  .new.  The 
Kantian  antinomy  has  indeed  entered  the  realm 
of  right,  since  each  side  proves  the  complete 
validity  of  its  claim,  yet  the  two  claims  are  di- 
rectly opposite.  The  result  is  the  Silesian  Wars, 
at  the  end  of  which  Frederick  holds  Silesia,  to 
the  decided  defeat  of  legitimacy.  He  is  the 
great  revolutionist  of  his  time,  though  a  king, 
whose  prerogative  rests  upon  the  destruction  of 
prerogative.  He  founds  the  new  European  State, 
whose  royal  title  springs  from  the  denial  of  royal 
title.  And  yet  Prussia  will  continue  still  to 
assert  strongly  royalty  and  legitimacy,  and  that 
is  just  the  Prussian  contradiction  to-day. 

Kant  is  truly  the  philosopher  of  this  epoch. 
His  conflict  of  the  Antinomies  is  named  after 
and  directly  taken  from  the  conflict  of  Laws, 
which  we  have  just  designated.  Intellect  has 
thus  become  inherently  self-contradictory  and 
self-annulling.  Such  is  the  fierce  criticism  of  the 
Eighteenth  Century  handed  down  to  us  by  Kant. 
What  is  to  be  done?  His  answer  is:  Fall 
back  upon  Will,  upon  the  assertion  of  your 


376          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Ego's  power,  for  your  Intellect  is  a  hopeless 
maze  of  bewilderment.  That  is  what  Fred- 
erick the  Great  actually  did.  The  strong  man, 
the  strong  nature  alone  can  settle  this  con- 
fusion, this  approaching  cataclysm  in  which  all 
Europe  threatens  to  be  submerged.  In  fact  the 
law  of  inheritance  can  no  longer  be  allowed  to 
control;  if  you  go  back  far  enough,  every  royal 
House  and  many  of  the  nobility,  and  some  of 
the  common  herd,  can  make  out  a  claim  for  king- 
doms as  their  birthright.  Moreover,  provinces 
and  whole  peoples  can  no  longer  be  made  a  foot- 
ball with  which  monarchs  play  against  one  an- 
other the  game  of  legitimacy.  The  whole  thing 
must  stop  by  an  act  of  Will,  the  imperial,  truly 
the  Kantian  imperative. 

III.  Such  we  see  to  be  the  external  manifes- 
tation of  the  Spirit  of  the  Eighteenth  Century 
in  the  events  of  History.  In  correspondence 
with  this  spirit  we  shall  behold  the  individual 
turning  against  his  philosophical  inheritance  and 
denying  it  in  the  interest  of  his  free  Self.  It 
was  no  accident  that  England  was  the  chosen 
arena  for  this  new  beginning.  For  nature  her- 
self has  individualized  England,  making  it  an 
island,  yet  large  enough  for  a  nation,  truly  the 
island-nation,  isolated,  separated  from  the  con- 
tinental mass  of  nations  with  their  undefined  and 
ever-changing  boundaries.  England  is,  there- 
fore, the  natural  home  of  individuality,  the  real 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTUIiY.  377 

monadal  land,  full  of  Monads  and  itself  a  Monad, 
or  indeed  the  Monad  of  all  national  Monads.  Yet 
with  the  metaphysical  shell  of  Leibnizian  monad- 
ism  England  and  her  philosophy  can  have  nothing 
to  do ;  that  is  just  what  they  will  break  to  pieces 
and  fling  away,  asserting  the  Ego  in  its  own 
naked  right,  without  being  dressed  up  in  its 
monadal  trappings,  which  really  hide  it  from  the 
English  mind.  Such  is,  in  general,  the  act  of 
Locke,  veritably  the  English  philosopher,  philos- 
ophizing against  Philosophy  the  transmitted, 
and  asserting  his  Ego  as  the  determining  center 
of  thought  for  the  future. 

When  William  of  Orange,  Stadtholder  of  Hol- 
land, passed  over  the  channel  and  made  himself 
king  of  England  with  the  consent  of  its  people, 
there  was  enacted  a  great  historic  deed,  typical, 
universal,  reflecting  the  movement  of  European 
civilization.  He  destroyed  the  dynastic  idea  of 
mere  inheritance  and  thereby  founded  a  new  dy- 
uasty.  Philosophy  left  the  Continent  with  him 
and  kept  its  headquarters  in  Great  Britain  till  its 
negative  work  was  completed  in  Hume,  when 
it  was  brought  back  by  Kant  to  the  new  con- 
tinental State,  Prussia,  where  it  was  destined 
to  celebrate  its  greatest  modern  triumph.  Such 
was  its  extraordinary  leap  from  the  extreme 
West  to  the  extreme  East  of  Teutonic  Europe, 
from  the  Anglo-Saxon  to  the  German  at  Konigs- 
berg,  as  if  making  ready  for  a  supreme  at- 


378         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tempt  to  philosophize  the  spirit  of  the  whole 
Teutonic  race.  And  that  is  just  what  will  be 
done  in  the  coming  Nineteenth  Century. 

Such  is  the  vast  spatial  stride  of  Philosophy, 
turning  back  from  the  Western  boundary  of 
its  modern  supporters  to  their  primitive  seat 
in  the  East,  thus  overarching  all  Teutonia. 
This  philosophic  arch  of  the  Eighteenth  Cen- 
tury we  may  conceive  as  extending  from  the 
birthplace  of  John  Locke  in  Western  England 
to  the  home  of  Inimanuel  Kant  in  East- 
ern Prussia.  From  rim  to  rim  is  the  sweep, 
after  which  is  to  come  a  mighty  concentration. 
Very  different  was  the  topographical  character 
of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Seventeenth  Century. 
It  was  confined  to  one  small  Teutonic  country, 
Holland,  and  to  the  not  very  distant  province  of 
Hanover,  the  chief  home  of  Leibniz.  But  Leib- 
niz was  the  philosopher  who  burst  these  narrow 
bounds  with  his  dynamic  energy  and  scattered 
his  monadal  thoughts  through  all  Germany, 
even  unto  Berlin  and  Vienna.  Indeed  Leibniz 
may  be  said  to  have  Germanized  modern  Philoso- 
phy in  his  later  years,  when  he  had  substantially 
given  up  his  earlier  attempt  to  Gallicise  it,  which 
was  impossible  on  account  of  the  dominant 
Catholic  Church,  with  its  own  established  Philos- 
ophy. Thus  Philosophy  during  the  Eighteenth 
Century  becomes  the  chief  intellectual  Discipline 


TEE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTUEY.  379 

of  Teutonic  Europe,  but  of  the  Protestant  part 
thereof. 

IV.  Philosophy  in  its  greatest  masters  no 
longer  speaks  Latin  during  the  Eighteenth  Cen- 
tury, but  Teutonic.  In  the  previous  century  we 
noted  that  its  chief  language  was  Latin  or  the 
French  daughter  of  the  Latin.  Now  it  is  to 
speak  first  English  and  then  German.  Of  course 
English  has  a  strong  Latin  element,  but  its 
linguistic  structure  and  soul  remain  essentially 
Teutonic.  Talking  in  the  vernacular,  Philos- 
ophy now  passes  from  speaking  French 
(Descartes  and  Leibniz)  to  speaking  English 
(Locke  and  Hume).  Distinguishing  for  our 
present  purpose  French  and  English,  we  may  say 
that  in  general  French  is  a  Teutonized  Latin, 
and  English  is  a  Latinized  Teutonic.  Thus  in 
the  movement  of  philosophic  speech,  English  is 
the  intermediate  between  French  and  German, 
while  French  and  English  are  intermediate  be- 
tween Latin  and  German.  In  the  movement  of 
this  line  of  languages,  we  may  observe  the 
movement  of  Philosophy  itself,  which  is  slowly 
passing,  stepping  by  centuries,  as  it  were,  from 
the  Latin  to  the  German  world  and  its  speech. 

Thus  Philosophy  as  the  great  Teutonic  Dis- 
cipline begins  to  talk  its  mother  tongue  as  the 
immediate  direct  utterance  of  the  Ego,  throwing 
aside  its  inherited  speech  as  old  clothes.  This 
again  we  see  to  be  characteristic  of  the  Eight- 


380          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

eenth  Century  in  its  revolt  against  the  trans- 
mitted, the  established,  the  past  inheritance 
generally.  The  spontaneous  expression  of  the 
Self  in  its  native  tongue  had  already  manifested 
itself  with  unequaled  power  in  English  Litera- 
ture. But  now  English  Philosophy,  or  we  may 
say  European  Philosophy  is  to  talk  English,  for 
a  while  at  least. 

It  should  be  observed,  however,  that  both 
Locke  and  Hume  have  a  very  decided  Latin 
element  in  their  English  style.  Both  show  a 
Latin  culture,  which  passes  over  into  their  writ- 
ings; particularly  is  this  the  case  with  Hume. 
In  fact  we  may  hear  a  pronounced  Latin  accent 
in  the  English  of  the  Eighteenth  Century. 
Its  literature  has  a  tendency  to  be  classical, 
formal,  Latinized ;  witness  Pope  and  Dr.  Samuel 
Johnson.  Not  till  the  end  of  the  Century,  when 
the  Romantic  revival  had  started  its  ferment,  do 
we  again  hear  the  Anglo-Saxon  accent  in  English. 
Even  in  language  we  may  thus  observe  that  the 
transmitted  principle  has  become  negative  to 
itself;  Locke  with  his  Latin  culture  belittles  the 
study  of  Latin  in  his  work  on  Education.  So 
Philosophy  talks  English  even  if  a  Latinized 
English;  when  it  wants  to  talk  Teutonic,  it  will 
quit  England  and  go  back  to  the  old  Teutonic 
home. 

V.  In  this  manner  we  conceive  the  Philoso- 
phy of  the  Eighteenth  Century  as  reflecting  its 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY.  381 

character  in  the  language  which  it  uses,  flinging 
away  its  alien  speech  transmitted  from  the  ages, 
and  betaking  itself  to  the  spontaneous  fountain 
of  the  mother-tongue,  even  if  we  see  the  old 
Latin  categories  lying  imbedded  everywhere  in 
the  linguistic  stream.  But  a  much  deeper,  in- 
deed just  about  the  deepest  fact  of  the  present 
Century's  Philosophy,  comes  to  light  at  this 
point:  its  attitude  toward  the  Norm,  that  philo- 
sophical Norm  running  through  and  transmitted 
from  all  past  Philosophy.  Will  it  reject  that, 
too,  in  keeping  with  its  revolt  against  everything 
handed  down  from  the  fathers?  The  answer 
must  be,  Yes.  The  very  process  which  makes 
Philosophy  and  has  made  it  from  the  beginning, 
must  be  passed  through  the  fiery  furnace  of 
neglect,  unconscious  denial,  and  finally  of  con- 
scious refutation  and  rejection. 

On  the  other  hand  it  cannot  get  rid  of  its 
own  Norm ;  Philosophy  denying  Philosophy  will 
still  show  itself  to  be  philosophical  in  spite  of 
itself.  It  cannot  assail  itself  without  furnish- 
ing the  very  weapons  of  such  assault.  One  can- 
not philosophize  without  treating  of  God,  World, 
and  Man.  Herein  the  Eighteenth  Century  will 
show  that  inner  self-opposition  and  self -nega- 
tion which  we  have  already  seen  to  be  its  pro- 
foundest  characteristic.  It  is  truly  a  dialec- 
tical Century  (in  the  Platonic  sense),  being 
divided  within  itself  and  torn  to  pieces  in  the 


382        MODERN  E UEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

strife  of  its  own  self-warring  Dialectic.  It 
turns  against  the  established  world  outwardly, 
but  in  doing  so  it  turns  against  itself  inwardly. 
Thus  it  is  revolutionary  to  the  core,  without 
and  within,  and  shows  the  complete  sweep  of 
the  spirit  as  negative. 

It  is  true  that  Locke  and  Hume  and  the 
English  thinkers  generally  must  be  acquitted  of 
any  acquaintance  with  the  philosophical  Norm. 
This  could  only  be  derived  from  the  History  of 
Philosophy,  from  that  past  speculation  which 
Locke  and  Hume  thought  so  frivolous,  though 
they  knew  so  little  of  it.  To  be  sure  they  can 
hardly  be  blamed  for  such  ignorance,  which  is 
that  of  the  educated  men  of  their  time  and 
country.  It  required  the.  evolutionary  Nine- 
teenth Century,  returning  to  all  forms  of  the 
past  with  sympathetic  study,  to  bring  out  the 
deep  significance  of  the  History  of  Philosophy. 
What  could  the  Eighteenth  Century  do  but  spurn 
it  as  something  transmitted?  The  negative 
movement  against  the  Norm  is  seen  in  all  three 
of  this  Century's  greatest  philosophers,  though 
in  different  degrees  of  intensity.  Locke  neglects 
it,  Hume  denies  it  unconsciously,  while  Kant 
refutes  it  consciously  and  rejects  all  the  knowl- 
edge which  it  has  hitherto  given.  Such  is  the 
purpose  of  what  we  may  well  consider  the  central 
and  pivotal  portion  of  Kant's  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason,  namely  the  section  on  the  Transcenden- 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY.  383 

tal  Dialectic.  This  we  may  deem  the  culminat- 
ing point' of  the  Century's  negation  of  Philoso- 
phy, in  which  the  philosophic  Norm  itself  is 
assailed  fiercely  and  for  a  time  quite  obliterated 
by  a  philosopher.  Kant  in  his  way  knew  about 
the  Norm  which  had  come  down  to  him  from  the 
Seventeenth  Century  in  a  kind  of  undercurrent 
through  Wolf  chiefly,  who  clung  to  it  and  also 
to  Latin  speech  in  part,  for  philosophic  exposi- 
tion. Kant  is,  therefore,  the  philosophic  hero 
of  negation,  and,  as  Hegel  declares,  is  the  philo- 
sophic counterpart  of  the  French  Revolution. 

Still  we  must  not  forget  the  other  side  already 
mentioned.  Each  of  these  philosophers  cannot 
do  without  the  Norm  of  their  science,  otherwise 
none  of  them  would  be  philosophers.  They  all 
pre-suppose  it  even  when  denying  it;  their  work, 
even  when  negative,  proceeds  on  the  lines  of  the 
Norm  and  shows  its  divisions,  metaphysical,  phy- 
sical, ethical.  But  it  seems  out  of  place  to  foist 
this  Norm  upon  these  philosophers  when  they 
leave  it  out  or  deny  it  on  principle.  Accordingly 
we  shall  have  to  begin  with  them  a  new  procedure 
by  placing  the  Norm  in  a  subordinate  position. 
We  shall  try  to  follow  each  of  them  in  his  own  way . 
Each  has  set  forth  his  fundamental  thought  in  a 
book  which  is  his  central  work.  This  work  we 
shall  analyze  in  our  exposition  and  unfold  the 
standpoint  of  the  author  after  his  own  method . 
Still  we  shall  not  fail  to  note  the  Norm,  which, 


384        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

despite  his  implicit  or  expressed  opposition,  will 
lurk  in  his  Philosophy  as  a  whole. 

Thus  we  shall  follow  each  individual  philos- 
opher in  his  normative  book,  in  which  he  to  a 
degree  makes  his  own  Norm,  asserting  himself 
or  his  Ego  against  the  transmitted  Norm,  which, 
however,  will  be  found  to  be  secretly  underlying 
all  his  work. 

VI .  We  should  also  note  the  character  of  the 
Natural  Science  of  the  Eighteenth  Century.  It 
is  the  great  chemical  Century,  as  the  preceding 
was  mechanical.  The  visible  material  world  is 
analyzed  and  reduced  to  its  simple  elements. 
Thus  the  separative  tendency  of  the  period  shows 
itself  in  the  treatment  of  Nature.  Chemistry 
now  passes  out  of  its  uncertain  alchemistic  stage 
into  a  true  science.  Moreover,  the  great  original 
chemical  philosophers  of  the  Eighteenth  Cen- 
tury are  English  —  Black,  Cavendish,  Priestley. 
The  discovery  of  oxygen  may  be  considered  the 
new  birth  of  chemistry.  When  water  was  sep- 
arated into  its  two  elemental  gases,  oxygen  and 
hydrogen,  the  typical  genetic  fact  of  all  Chem- 
ism  was  brought  to  light.  Like  the  English 
philosophy  of  the  Eighteenth  Century,  English 
chemical  ideas  passed  over  to  France  when  they 
were  organized  anew,  particularly  by  Lavoisier. 

Thus  the  new  forces  of  Nature  which  divide 
and  drive  bodies  asunder  into  their  elements  were 
developed  and  specially  cultivated  by  minds 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY.  385 

which  were  themselves  in  this  separative  condi- 
tion, and  which  were  just  therein  deeply  accord- 
ant with  their  Century's  spirit.  This  in  the 
realm  of  Natural  Science  we  may  deem  dy- 
namical; an  explosive,  revolutionary,  dissolving 
principle  is  made  to  show  itself  everywhere  in 
the  material  universe.  Thus  after  the  preceding 
Pan-mechanism  follows  the  period  of  Pan-dyna- 
mism, which  was  indeed  foreshadowed  theoreti- 
cally in  the  Philosophy  of  Leibniz,  but  was 
realized  in  the  Century  after  him.  Descartes 
makes  God  mathematical  for  controlling  the 
caprice  of  the  Ego;  Spinoza  does  the  same  still 
more  emphatically,  at  least  on  one  side  of  him ; 
Leibniz,  however,  gives  to  his  Monad  (as  Ego) 
a  sphere  of  self -activity,  even  if  this  is  pre- 
established.  But  in  the  Eighteenth  Century  the 
dynamic  Ego  is  let  loose  by  Locke,  though  in  a 
limited  field,  and  is  allowed  free  range,  till  it 
runs  up  against  the  walls  of  the  universe,  which 
walls  constitute  the  grand  separation  between  the 
known  and  the  unknown. 

VII.  In  a  general  way  we  may  thus  bring  be- 
fore ourselves  the  deep  inner  scission  and  self- 
separation  of  the  Century.  It  is  in  one  inces- 
sant war  against  its  own  past,  against  its  own 
origin  and  parentage.  Hence  it  is  in  a  war 
against  itself.  If  what  produced  the  child  be  so 
utterly  bad  and  worthless,  what  must  the  child 
itself  be,  and  what  must  the  child  say  about 

25 


386  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

itself?  So  it  comes  that  Philosophy  as  the 
purest  and  most  transparent  expression  of  the 
age,  will  have  such  a  poor  opinion  of  itself,  and 
show  its  own  self-inflicted  wounds  to  the  gaze  of 
the  whole  world.  Its  great  object  from  the  begin- 
ning is  to  know  Truth,  Truth,  as  objective  and 
real ;  but  now  it  has  come  to  deny  that  it  can  know 
Truth,  or  cognize  the  object  as  it  is  in  itself. 

We  have  already  indicated  that  the  three 
supreme  philosophers  of  the  Eighteenth  Century 
are  Locke,  Hume  and  Kant.  Each  is  to  be  re- 
garded singly,  in  his  own  right,  but  the  final 
fruit  of  studying  them  is  to  see  them  as  the 
three  great  stages  of  the  one  process  which 
spans  the  entire  Eighteenth  Century,  and  makes 
it  a  philosophic  Whole.  The  tri-personal  move- 
ment we  behold  rise  to  the  surface  again,  as  we 
have  seen  it  throughout  the  History  of  Philos- 
ophy from  the  starting-point  in  ancient  Miletus. 
We  may  deem  it  a  manifestation  of  what  lies 
deepest  in  the  grand  philosophic  development 
through  the  ages,  a  kind  of  personal  epiphany 
and  incarnation  of  the  Pampsychosis.  To  be 
sure,  there  are  other  lesser  movements,  though 
important,  in  connection  with  the  one  supreme 
movement ;  but  it  is  the  purpose  of  the  present 
work  to  concentrate  attention  upon  this  one  all- 
comprehending  sweep  of  the  Philosophy  of  the 
Century. 

This  sweep  in  the  main  lies  between  two  un- 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY.  387 

knowable  realms  which  we  may  call  the  Ego- 
in-itself  and  the  Object-in-itself.  Such  is  the 
limit  to  knowledge  which  essentially  shows 
the  phenomenal  Ego  (the  counterpart  of 
the  Ego-in-itself)  seeking  to  grasp  the  phe- 
nomenal Object  (the  counterpart  to  the  Object- 
in-itself).  Thus  both  sides',  Ego  and  Object, 
are  divided  into  an  essence  (that  which  is 
in  itself)  and  an  appearance  (that  which  is  phe- 
nomenal). This  is  the  fundamental  divisive 
principle  of  the  Eighteenth  Century  which  makes 
its  Philosophy  the  second  stage  of  the  total 
modern  movement  of  Philosophy.  This  division 
is  accepted  by  Locke,  Hume  and  Kant;  they  all 
aim  to  show  the  relation  of  the  phenomenal  Ego 
to  the  phenomenal  Object  in  the  act  of  knowing. 
But  within  the  field,  thus  marked  off  (that  of  the 
Eighteenth  Century)  they  form  a  process  of 
which  each  of  them  is  a  stage.  This  fact  we 
may  briefly  set  forth  in  advance  as  follows :  — 

1.  Locke.  The  phenomenal  Ego  can  know  the 
phenomenal  Object  immediately  —  the  latter  be- 
ing the  direct  cause  of  Sensation  in  the  former. 
Here  lies  Locke's  meaning  of  experience. 

2.  Hume.  The  phenomenal  Ego  cannot  know 
the   phenomenal  Object — the  latter   as  the  ex- 
tended cannot  reach  the  former  as  the  unextended, 
and  hence  cannot  directly  cause   even  Sensation . 
Here   lies    Hume's  denial  of  experience.     His  is 
the  great  separative  doctrine  of   this   separative 


388        MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

century,  separating  the  Ego  knowing  and  the 
Object  known  by  an  impassable  line.  Yet  this 
denial  of  his  we  shall  find  him  denying. 

3.  Kant.  The  phenomenal  Ego  can  know  the 
phenomenal  Object  mediately — the  latter  being 
first  wrought  over  and  put  into  the  Ego's  own 
forms  of  Sense-perception  and  then  into  the 
categories  of  the  Understanding  (all  of  which 
is  to  be  explained  when  we  come  to  Kant 
specially). 

Such  is,  very  generally  stated,  the  philosophic 
process  of  the  Eighteenth  Century,  in  which  we 
see  that  Kant  is  a  return  to  Locke  through 
Hume,  and  thus  completes  within  himself  the 
total  movement  of  the  Century.  They  all  recog- 
nize an  unknown  realm  outside  their  known  one, 
which  is  secretly  determined  in  some  way  by  the 
former.  For  all  three  this  unknown  realm  is 
properly  that  of  God,  who  is  for  them  the  third 
element  of  the  Norm.  The  essence  or  innate- 
ness  of  things  cannot  be  known,  as  being  the 
God-given.  The  Eighteenth  Century  seems  to 
have  made  a  kind  of  compromise  with  God: 
You  keep  in  your  sphere  (the  unknown)  and 
I  (Ego)  shall  keep  in  mine  (the  known).  Thus 
the  Ego  asserts  that  it  can  know  in  its  limited 
sphere  without  "  the  concourse  of  God,"  who 
always  in  the  previous  Century  "  assisted  "  the 
Ego  to  know  the  Object. 


LOCKE.  —  PHILOSOPHIC  CHARACTER.     389 


I.  Xocfce* 

The  great  function  of  Locke  is  to  circumscribe 
human  intelligence.  He  seeks  to  draw  a  sphere 
within  which  man  can  have  knowledge,  but  out- 
side of  this  sphere  man  cannot  know  anything 
on  account  of  the  limitation  of  his  faculties.  We 
may  conceive  Locke  with  a  huge  pair  of  com- 
passes in  his  hand  drawing  a  circle  and  saying : 
Here  is  the  boundary  line  beyond  which  the  mind 
is  not  to  go. 

Moreover  Locke  will  naturally  claim  that  this 
boundary  line  is  laid  down  by  God  Himself  at 
the  creation,  and  that  he,  the  philosopher,  has 
simply  found  it  and  is  brushing  away  the  rub- 
bish of  former  philosophers  who  had  covered 
it  over  and  obscured  it  with  meaningless  terms. 
God  is,  therefore,  the  limit-maker  for  man; 
His  supreme  decree  laid  upon  His  creature  is : 
"  Thus  far  and  no  farther."  Quite  different  is 
the  God  of  the  previous  Seventeenth  Century, 
who  imparts  to  man  immediately  Ideas  clear  and 
distinct  through  which  he  knows  the  object  in 
its  truth,  without  limitation.  But  Locke  beholds 
God  as  the  Idea-limiting,  not  the  Idea-giving, 
and  ridicules  the  very  notion  of  man's  knowing 
absolutely  what  God  can  give,  except  the  limit. 

Thus  our  philosopher  runs  a  line  of  demarca-. 


390         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tion  between  the  knowable  and  the  unknowable 
which  is  destined  to  remain  in  Anglo-Saxon 
thinking  down  to  the  present.  Moreover  we  s.ee 
wherein  he  divides  the  total  field  of  cognition  of 
the  previous  Century  into  two  new  fields,  the 
knowable  and  the  unknowable.  This  division  is 
what  gives  the  fundamental  characteristic  to  the 
whole  Philosophy  of  the  Eighteenth  Century: 
it  is  separative,  divisive,  analytic,  hostile  to  unity, 
to  the  transmitted  system,  indeed  to  the  con- 
ceived totality  of  things.  It  divides  the  Universe 
and  throws  one-half  away,  thus  knowing  only 
one  half  or  one  side,  which  is  sure  to  show  its 
halfness  or  one-sidedness.  Hence  this  Century 
is  inherently  self -annulling,  negative  to  its  own 
negation,  or,  as  we  say,  dialetical ;  and  we  should 
make  haste  to  add  that  herein  lies  its  surpassing 
interest  and  its  meaning  for  humanity's  culture, 
even  if  the  lesson  need  not  be  prolonged  for  a 
hundred  years. 

Locke,  then,  reflecting  the  spirit  of ,  the  age, 
had  an  overwhelming  sense  of  human  limitation. 
It  is  the  theme  to  which  he  returns  again  and 
again,  and  is  the  creative  thought  which  brought 
his  supreme  book  into  existence.  Still  the  com- 
pensation must  not  be  left  out.  If  he  ran  a  wall 
around  the  human  mind  not  to  be  scaled,  within 
that  wall  he  left  the  mind  free,  self -active,  capa- 
ble of  having  its  own  Ideas  without  the  interfer- 
ence even  of  God.  So  Locke  has  a  sphere  of 


L OCKE.  —  PHILOSOPHIC  CHARACTER.      391 

individual  freedom,  even  if  limited.  Moreover 
this  spirit  of  freedom  belongs  to  every  Ego,  is 
peculiarly  its  own.  Hence  no  other  Ego  is  to 
lord  it  over  me  in  my  inner  sphere ;  therein  I  am 
to  be  tolerated.  Hence  Locke's  strong  defense 
of  Toleration  which  with  him  is  not  only  a  polit- 
ical and  religious  doctrine,  but  reaches  to  the 
bottom  of  his  Philosophy,  and  springs  out  of  his 
view  of  man.  It  may  be  said  that  Locke's  as- 
sault is  upon  absolutism  in  all  its  forms,  in  State, 
Church  and  Mind.  The  Kevolution  of  1688  was 
a  Revolution  in  favor  of  Limitation,  and  intro- 
duced into  England  a  limited  Monarchy,  a  lim- 
ited Church,  a  limited  God,  and  even  a  limited 
Universe  in  full  contradiction  with  itself  as  ex- 
pressed in  the  Lockian  Philosophy  of  Limitation. 
Herein  England  took  the  lead  of  the  Century, 
overthrowing  absolutism  and  Louis  XIV.  in  ex- 
ternal war,  but  even  more  decisively  taking  pos- 
session of  the  French  and  indeed  the  European 
mind  through  the  Philosophy  of  Locke. 

With  this  general  outlook  upon  the  vast  ex- 
pansion and  influence  of  Locke's  thought,  we 
may  turn  back  to  find  the  original  source  of  it  in 
his  life,  the  primordial  cell,  as  it  were,  of  this 
marvelous  development.  In  the  Epistle  to  the 
Reader,  which  is  prefixed  to  Locke's  supreme 
work,  the  Essay  concerning  Human  Under- 
standing^ the  author  indulges  in  a  little  piece  of 
reminiscence  about  the  origin  and  history  of  his 


392          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

book.  He  speaks  of  "  five  or  six  friends  meet- 
ing at  my  chamber,  and  discoursing  on  a  subject 
very  remote  from  this,  found  themselves  quickly 
at  a  stand  by  the  difficulties  that  arose  on  all 
sides."  Such  was  the  impassable  wall  limiting 
their  understanding  of  one  another.  "  After  we 
had  a  while  puzzled  ourselves  without  coming 
any  nearer  a  resolution  of  those  doubts  which 
perplexed  us,  it  came  into  my  thoughts  that  we 
took  a  wrong  course,  and  that  before  we  set 
ourselves  upon  inquiries  of  that  nature,  it  was 
necessary  to  examine  our  own  abilities,  and  see 
what  objects  our  understandings  were  or  were 
not  fitted  to  deal  with."  To  find  the  limitations 
of  Human  Intelligence,  to  discover  what  we  can 
and  cannot  know,  should  be  now  the  first  object. 
"This  I  proposed  to  the  company  who  all 
readily  assented ;  and  thereupon  it  was  agreed 
that  this  should  be  our  first  inquiry."  Truly  it 
was  high  time ;  not  only  that  little  private  club, 
but  the  whole  age  was  demanding  such  an  in- 
vestigation. "  Some  hasty  undigested  thoughts 
on  a  subject  I  had  never  before  considered, 
which  I  set  down  against  our  next  meeting,  gave 
the  first  entrance  into  this  Discourse." 

Thus  Locke  describes  the  occasion  and  the 
motive  of  his  book,  glancing  backward  from  its 
final  completed  state  (probably  in  1689)  just  on 
the  eve  of  publication,  and  contemplating  its 
starting-point.  Just  when  this  was  cannot  now 


L 0 CKE.  —  PHILOSOPHIC  CHARACTER.    393 

be  told  with  exactness.  But  in  Locke's  common- 
place book  of  the  year  1671  we  find  that  he  was 
thinking  about  "  the  human  Intellect,"  in  this 
fashion:  "  First  I  imagine  that  all  knowledge  is 
founded  on  and  ultimately  derives  itself  from 
sense  or  something  analogous  to  it,  and  may  be 
called  Sensation."  To  this  first  source  of  knowl- 
edge, Locke  in  his  Essay  will  add  another,  which 
he  calls  Eeflection.  Still  further  back  in  a  frag- 
ment, De  Arte  Medico, ,  dated  1668  we  find  Locke 
declaring  with  some  warmth  that  "  true  knowl- 
edge grew  first  in  the  world  by  experience  and 
rational  observations ;  but  proud  man,  not  con- 
tent with  that  knowledge  he  was  capable  of,  and 
which  was  useful  to  him,  would  needs  penetrate 
into  the  hidden  causes  of  things,  lay  down 
principles  and  establish  maxims  to  himself  about 
the  operations  of  nature  and  then  expect  that 
Nature  (or  in  truth  God)  should  proceed  ac- 
cording to  those  laws  which  his  (man's)  maxims 
had  prescribed  to  Him  (God)."  Almost 
bitter  is  the  note  here;  Locke's  dislike 
of  Cause,  Principle,  Maxim,  all  of  them 
metaphysical  categories  seeking  to  express  the 
essence  of  Being,  crops  out  with  emphasis ;  he 
seems  to  think  that  "  proud  man  "  in  employing 
them  presumes  to  foist  them  upon  God.  Very 
insolent,  indeed  blasphemous,  is  such  conduct  in 
man  whose  "  narrow  weak  faculties  could  reach 
no  farther  than  the  observation  and  memory  of 


394        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

some  few  facts  produced  by  visible  external 
causes,  but  in  a  way  utterly  beyond  the  reach  of 
his  apprehension."  Thus  the  presumptuous 
mortal  has  undertaken  to  determine  God,  instead 
of  letting  God  (and  Nature)  determine  him, 
while  he  quietly  receives  and  records  the  message 
from  above  on  that  blank  piece  of  white  paper 
called  his  mind.  But  this  is  not  the  end  of  the 
evil.  **  Man  still  affecting  something  of  Deity, 
labored  by  his  imagination  to  supply  what  his 
observation  and  experience  failed  him  in;  and 
when  he  could  not  discover  the  principles,  causes 
and  methods  of  nature's  workmanship,  he  would 
need  fashion  all  those  out  of  his  own  thought, 
and  make  a  world  to  himself,  framed  and  gov- 
erned by  his  own  intelligence,"  in  a  kind  of 
rivalry  with  God.  Surely  a  Satanic  act  is  it 
that  man  should  dare  be  an  independent  world- 
maker —  an  act  of  revolt  like  that  of  Satan's. 
But  even  here  the  evil  does  not  end.  "  This 
vanity  spread  itself  into  many  useful  parts  of 
Natural  Philosophy;  and  by  how  much  the 
more  it  seemed  subtle,  sublime,  and  learned,  by 
so  much  the  more  it  proved  pernicious  and  hurt- 
ful, by  hindering  the  growth  of  practical  knowl- 
edge," which  is  indeed  the  only  knowledge 
worth  having,  according  to  our  philosopher  who 
finds  yet  another  bad  result.  "Thus  the  most 
acute  and  ingenious  part  of  the  man  being  by 
custom  and  education  engaged  in  empty  specula- 


LOCKE.  —  PHILOSOPHIC  CHARACTER.      395 

tions,  the  improvement  of  useful  arts  was  left  to 
the  meaner  sort  of  people."  What  a  prodigious 
echo  has  followed  these  words,  which  are  still 
heard  with  a  loud  resonance  in  the  present. 
Such  is  the  result  of  the  existing  education: 
absolute  perversion  of  the  mind.  We  shall  have 
to  look  into  this  matter  and  write  our  book  on 
education,  though  the  world  be  "  filled  with 
books  and  disputes"  on  account  of  the  fore- 
going perverse  use  of  intellect.  **  Books  have 
multiplied  without  the  increase  of  knowledge," 
that  is,  true  knowledge  and  not  "  dry  barren 
notions,  empty  and  impracticable,"  which  "  are 
but  the  puppets  of  men's  fancies  and  imagina- 
tions," and  which  "  remain  puppets  still  after 
forty  years'  dawdling." 

In  such  fashion  the  philosopher  "  lets  himself 
loose  into  the  ocean  "  of  indignation  at  the  way 
things  are  going  in  Oxford  and  elsewhere.  His 
words  break  open  his  soul  and  let  us  see  what  is 
hotly  fermenting  there,  and  preparing  some 
future  task  in  the  way  of  correcting  these  evils. 
For  Locke  believes  in  the  practical,  and  surely 
here  is  enough  to  set  him  to  work.  In  this 
fragment  just  cited  we  may  indeed  trace  germs 
of  his  future  performance,  particularly  do  we 
hear  the  ground  tones  of  his  Essay  echoing 
mightily  through  his  troubled  spirit.  This  frag- 
ment written  primarijy  about  medicine  and  cor- 
poreal ailments,  has  another  distinction :  it  shows 


396  MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Doctor  Locke  making  his  transition  from  bodily 
to  mental  therapeutics,  the  latter  being  his  true 
vocation  for  the  future.  He  starts  with  speak- 
ing contemptuously  of  the  man  who  «*  shall 
reduce  medicine  into  the  regular  form  of  a 
science"  as  one  who  "has  indeed  done  some- 
thing to  enlarge  the  art  of  talking  and  perhaps 
laid  the  foundation  for  endless  disputes,"  but 
nothing  at  all  "  to  bring  men  to  a  knowledge  of 
the  infirmities  of  their  own  bodies  with  the  safe 
and  discreet  way  of  their  cure."  He  hates  sys- 
tem and  systematized  science  as  a  creation  of  the 
speculative  imagination  dealing  in  empty  words 
and  unproved  assertions.  From  the  preceding 
extracts  we  can  also  see  why  Locke  in  his  earlier 
career  at  Oxford  was  considered  turbulent  and 
discontented  before  the  pressure  cf  the  timed 
made  him  the  most  prudent  and  taciturn  of  men. 
The  above  cited  fragment  (Zte  Arte  Medico, ) 
has  for  us  another  important  purpose :  it  marks 
a  great  turning-point  in  Locke's  life.  It  is 
evident  that  he  is  disgusted  at  Oxford,  disgusted 
with  books,  with  study,  with  all  kinds  of  erudi- 
tion. It  seems  highly  probable,  if  he  has  the 
chance,  he  will  quit  the  halls  of  learning,  at 
least  for  a  time,  and  try  his  hand  at  a  practical 
vocation.  At  the  critical  moment  as  usual,  the 
Goddess  Opportunity  appears  and  opens  for  him 
a  new  career.  In  the  year  1666  he  meets  Lord 
Ashley  by  accident ;  the  acquaintance  soon  ripens 


LOCKE.  —  LIFE.  897 

into  warm  and  enduring  friendship.  The  fol- 
lowing year  Locke  goes  to  London  and  lives  in 
the  home  of  his  Lordship  into  whose  service  he 
enters.  In  1668,  the  date  of  the  above  frag- 
ment, Locke  was  elected  a  Fellow  of  the  Royal 
Society,  whose  object  was  the  promotion  and 
cultivation  of  Natural  Science.  According  to 
one  of  Locke's  friends  (Lady  Mashain),  the 
meeting  "  at  my  chamber"  above  narrated  took 
place  in  1670  or  1671,  though  another  friend 
(Sir  James  Tyrrell),  places  it  in  1673.  Still, 
even  if  this  meeting  was  the  starting-point  of 
the  composition  of  the  Essay ,  the  ideas  in  it 
were  certainly  seething  through  Locke's  mind 
years  before  and  taking  shape.  Here,  then,  we 
have  ascertained  what  may  be  deemed  the  main 
turning-point  in  Locke's  philosophic  life,  and 
have  found  the  pivotal  fact  for  viewing  organ- 
ically his  entire  career. 

I.  LOCKE'S  LIFE.  —  This  we  shall  now  sees 
to  behold  in  the  three  customary  epochs  or 
periods  into  which  every  complete  career 
seems  to  fall  with  more  or  less  distinct- 
ness. Accordingly,  we  may  suppose  that 
the  great  change  in  Locke's  outer  life,  the 
change  from  Oxford  to  London,  from  the  studi- 
ous routine  at  the  University  to  the  stirring  prac- 
tical work  of  the  world,  corresponded  to  an 
inner  change  which,  though  previously  prepared 
for,  began  to  show  itself  in  new  plans  and  pur- 


398          MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHIL Q SOPHY. 

poses.  The  turn  toward  his  new  career  may  be 
placed  approximately  in  1667,  at  which  point  he 
enters  what  may  be  called  the  Second  Period 
lasting  some  twenty -two  years,  till  the  printing 
of  the  Essay  in  1689.  After  this  came  the  pro- 
pagation and  defense  of  his  works,  along  with 
other  employments.  These  three  Periods  we 
shall  fill  out  with  some  details. 

1.  First  Period  (1632-67).  John  Locke  was 
born  at  Wrington,  county  of  Somerset,  England, 
August  29th,  1632,  of  Puritan  stock.  His  boy- 
hood thus  falls  into  the  stirring  times  of  the 
Great  Civil  War,  in  which  his  father  was  for  a 
while  an  officer  on  the  parliamentary  side,  that 
is,  against  the  king.  Locke's  youth  was  passed 
amid  discussions  on  the  question  of  royal  author- 
ity. The  people  of  England  were  summoning 
their  ruler  to  their  judgment  seat,  claiming  the 
right  to  scrutinize  his  acts  after  their  standard. 
Such  must  have  been  the  atmosphere  in  the  boy's 
home,  and  he  could  hardly  help  sharing  the 
spirit  around  him.  When  he  was  ten  years  old 
the  War  began,  and  he  must  have  seen  with  a 
beating  heart  his  father  marching  among  the 
soldiers  who  were  going  to  fight  against  the  king. 
He  was  mature  enough  to  follow  with  sympathy 
the  ups  and  downs  of  the  struggle  which  surged 
in  his  own  neighborhood,  particularly  when  the 
Royalists  under  Prince  Rupert  took  Bristol  in 
1643.  Finally  by  the  decisive  battle  of  Naseby 


LOCKE.  —  LIFE.  399 

the  contest  of  arms  was  substantially  over  when 
our  youth  was  nearly  thirteen  years  old ;  he  saw 
the  established  authority  humbled,  he  saw  revo- 
lution triumphant.  4 

Such  an  experience  could  not  help  producing 
a  strong  impression  upon  the  susceptible  boy  — 
an  impression  which  showed  its  traces  through 
all  his  future  actions  and  writings.  Locke  con- 
tinued in  a  state  of  protest  against  authority  his 
whole  life.  His  great  Essay  is  a  long  protest 
against  the  authority  of  the  Schools,  and  the 
transmitted  thought  of  the  ages.  His  letters  on 
Toleration  assert  the  right  of  the  individual  in 
the  matter  of  religious  and  political  opinions. 
A  critique  of  the  established  State,  Church,  and 
Education  runs  through  his  books,  often  in  a 
kind  of  unconscious  undercurrent.  Such  a  stream 
of  tendency  we  can  well  track  to  its  fountain- 
head  in  the  experiences  of  his  youth.  The  time, 
voicing  itself,  not  only  in  fierce  discussion,  but 
also  in  deadly  conflict,  gave  to  the  boy  his  early 
training,  imparting  to  him  that  bent  of  mind 
which  he  carried  with  him  to  the  grave. 

An  important  change  of  environment  came  to 
him  when  in  1646  he  was  admitted  to  the  West- 
minster School,  London,  where  he  stayed  six 
years  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  here  also  he 
was  in  a  state  of  protest,  particularly  against 
both  method  and  material  of  instruction.  He 
was  accustomed  to  say  in  after  life  that  he  got 


400          MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

little  good  out  of  his  early  education.  In  the 
Westminster  School  he  was  drilled  in  Latin  and 
Greek,  had  to  write  themes  and  make  verses  in 
the  dead  languages,  was  compelled  to  "  learn 
by  heart  great  parcels  of  the  authors  which  are 
taught;"  in  fine,  the  erudition  of  the  past  was 
pumped  into  his  memory  by  that  energetic 
pedagogical  forcing-pump  called  Dr.  Busby, 
head-master  of  the  school,  whose  fame  in  this 
line  is  not  extinct  to  this  day.  We  can  still 
read  between  lines  of  Locke's  Some  Thoughts 
concerning  Education  what  view  he  took  of  his 
instruction  at  Westminster.  He  would  like  to 
"  find  a  school  wherein  it  is  possible  for  the 
Master  to  look  after  the  manners"  and  morals 
of  his  scholars  instead  of  spending  so  much  time 
4 '  about  a  little  Latin  and  Greek"  which  have 
small  utility  in  after  life.  "  I  know  not  why  any- 
one should  waste  his  time  and  beat  his  head  about 
Latin  Grammar "  — evidently  an  unpleasant 
reminiscence]  to  Locke  and  to  many  others. 
Often  one  cannot  help  noting  a  vein  of  queru- 
lousness  in  these  remarks,  which,  even  when 
just,  does  not  enhance  their  value. 

And  it  is  highly  probable  that  Locke  under- 
valued the  strict  and  somewhat  formal  training 
which  he  received  at  Westminster.  It  was  good 
for  him,  it  was  just  what  he  needed.  The  re- 
mark has  come  down  that  he  in  his  later  years 
at  Oxford  was  a  turbulent  discontented  fellow, 


LOCKE.— LIFE.  401 

evidently  in  the  habit  of  criticising  things  right 
and  left.  When  he  went  to  Holland,  he  had 
often  to  converse  in  Latin  with  the  learned 
men  of  the  country,  and  he  wrote  his  first 
Letter  on  Toleration  in  that  dead  tongue.  One 
has  the  right  to  surmise  that  without  a  very 
powerful  and  persistent  pressure  he  would  not 
have  learned  Latin,  seeing  that  he  so  disliked 
"  the  charging  the  mind  with  the  multiplied  rules 
and  intricacies  of  Latin  Grammar,"  which  must 
have  been  particularly  hard  for  Locke's  mind, 
as  were  all  intricacies,  especially  intricacies  of 
thought,  as  we  shall  see  later. 

Moreover,  the  spirit  of  the  time  was  also 
educating  the  youth,  as  it  never  fails  to  take  a 
hand  in  such  matters.  What  did  not  happen  in 
London  and  in  England  during  the  six  years 
that  young  John  Locke  was  in  school  at  W^est- 
minster?  These  years  lay  between  1646  and 
1652.  They  saw  the  king,  Charles  the  First, 
defeated,  captured,  imprisoned,  beheaded  by  his 
own  people  who  had  indeed  called  him  to 
account.  They  saw  Parliament  going  through  a 
variety  of  transformations  with  a  rapidity  that 
still  makes  the  head  dizzy.  They  saw  the 
victorious  party,  after  getting  rid  of  its  royal 
enemies  and  breaking  down  the  established 
authority,  shiver  itself  into  a  hundred  fragments, 
each  of  which  asserted  the  divinity  of  its  own 
doctrine  and  the  damnability  of  everybody 

26 


402          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

else's.  Finally  tney  saw  the  strong  hand  rise 
out  of  and  above  this  struggling,  fighting  mass 
of  atoms,  into  which  the  nation  had  resolved  it- 
self, and  seize  it  with  a  mighty  grip  and  coerce 
the  chaos  into  an  order  which  it  could  not  bring 
out  of  itself.  In  1652,  the  last  year  of  Locke's 
stay,  the  Protectorate  of  Oliver  Cromwell  was 
already  a  fact,  though  it  was  not  formally  pro- 
claimed till  the  following  year.  With  truth  it 
may  be  said  that  no  other  revolution  ever  re- 
volved with  a  mightier  energy,  so  many,  so 
great,  so  sudden,  and  so  far-reaching  were  the 
changes  which  England  was  whirled  through  in 
the  mentioned  six  years.  The  student  Locke 
was  one  of  these  struggling  atoms,  wrestling 
and  fighting  against  the  transmitted  education 
which  was  being  forced  upon  him  in  his  school. 
Still  he  passed  to  the  University,  matriculating 
in  1652  at  Christ  Church,  Oxford,  having  been 
elected  to  what  is  called  a  Junior  Studentship. 
He  could  not  help  finding  the  same  enemies  at 
Oxford  that  he  knew  at  Westminster :  traditional 
lore,  memorizing  of  empty  words,  in  general  the 
formal  erudition  transmitted  from  the  past,  against 
which  past  he  and  all  England  were  then  in  open 
revolt.  But  there  was  one  important  difference 
between  the  University  and  the  School :  he  found 
little  or  no  pressure  exerted  from  the  outside. 
There  was  here  no  furious,  remorseless  Dr.  Busby 
ready  to  trounce  the  hated  Latin  Grammar  or 


LOCKE.— LIFE.  403 

other  learned  lumber  into  his  recalcitrant  brain. 
Of  this  difference  Locke  was  not  slow  to  take 
advantage.  So  we  hear  that  «'  he  spent  a  good 
part  of  his  first  year  at  the  University  in  reading 
romances,"  since  he  did  not  like  the  disputations, 
chiefly  metaphysical  and  Aristotelian,  which  were 
still  in  vogue  at  Oxford.  Great  was  his  discour- 
agement also,  for  he  did  not  understand  the 
subtleties  of  philosophy.  His  friend,  Lady 
Masham,  reporting  Locke's  own  conversations 
late  in  life,  says  rather  softly:  "This  dis- 
cour^gement  kept  him  from  being  any  very 
hard  student  at  the  University  and  put  him 
upon  seeking  the  company  of  pleasant  and 
witty  men,"  and  so  he  had  a  jolly  good  time  after 
all.  "  I  have  often  heard  him  say,"  records  the 
same  reporter,  "  that  he  had  so  small  satisfaction 
from  his  Oxford  studies  that  he  became  discon- 
tented with  his  manner  of  life,"  and  blamed  his 
father  for  his  present  untoward  destiny. 

Still  there  came  a  ray  of  light.  Whence? 
From  reading  Descartes.  Listen  again  to  our 
gentle  reporter:  "  He  was  rejoiced,  for  though 
he  very  often  differed  in  opinion  from  the 
writer  " — he  was  bound  to  do  that — "  yet  he 
found  what  he  (Descartes)  said  was  very  intelli- 
gible "  —  and  hence  very  different  from  the  other 
metaphysical  books  at  Oxford  —  "  from  which 
(fact)  he  was  encouraged  to  think  that  his  not 
having  understood  others  had  possibly  not 


404        MODERN  E UEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

proceeded  from  a  defect  in  his  own  under- 
standing." So  he  pats  himself  moderately  on 
the  back.  But  this  remark  gives  a  true  glimpse 
into  the  nature  and  limits  of  Locke's  mind,  which 
had  little  or  no  grip  on  Metaphysics  proper. 
But  the  popular  manner  of  Descartes,  especially 
in  his  Discourse  on  Method,  attracted  and  en- 
couraged Locke,  who  now  might  think  that  he 
too  could  become  a  philosopher.  In  fact  Locke's 
Essay  very  palpably  imitates  the  general  manner 
of  Descartes  who  is  decidedly  inclined  to  intro- 
duce his  personal  experiences,  his  Ego,  inte  his 
philosophical  exposition.  Both  record  "  what  I 
think,"  my  particular  determinations,  though 
such  a  manner  fits  Locke's  theme  better  than  it 
does  that  of  Descartes. 

Thus  we  may  see  a  positive  pnilosophical 
strand  begin  to  develop  itself  in  Locke,  who  is 
otherwise  so  very  negative  to  speculation.  In- 
deed his  general  attitude  was  negative,  critical, 
fault-finding.  Anthony  Wood,  the  Oxford  anti- 
quarian, who  was  his  fellow-student,  gives  the 
following  report  of  him:  "This  same  John 
Locke  was  a  man  of  turbulent  spirit,  clamorous 
and  discontented;  while  the  rest  of  our  club 
took  notes  deferentially  from  the  mouth  of  the 
master,  the  said  Locke  scorned  to  do  so,  but  was 
ever  prating  and  troublesome,"  These  words 
have  in  them  a  touch  of  personal  dislike,  but 
they  suggest  the  truth.  The  two  men,  Wood 


LOCKE.  -  LIF.E.  405 

and  Locke,  were  indeed  opposites;  Wood  was 
archaeological  in  his  tastes  and  studies,  and  so 
lived  in  the  past,  while  Locke  had  broken  with 
the  past,  and  ridiculed  its  devotees.  Moreover 
they  belonged  to  different  political  parties  in  that 
age  when  party  meant  hate  and  even  blood.  At 
any  rate  "  this  John  Locke  "  is  not  now  going 
to  take  notes  deferentially  from  the  mouth  of 
any  master. 

During  fifteen  years  (1652-1667)  Locke  re- 
mained almost  uninterruptedly  at  the  University 
employed  in  various  relations.  He  took  his  two 
degrees,  he  was  lecturer  in  Greek  and  Rhetoric, 
he  held  the  censorship  of  Moral  Philosophy ;  and 
he  seems  at  one  time  to  have  thought  of  enter- 
ing holy  orders.  But  he  could  not  screw  him- 
self up  to  the  point  of  taking  any  decided  step. 
He  disliked  sacerdotalism,  he  had  grown  averse 
to  the  dogmatism  and  narrowness  of  the  sects, 
he  had  become  a  latitudinarian  and  a  believer  in 
toleration.  While  he  was  at  Oxford  in  this 
unsettled  state  of  mind,  a  great  political  event 
took  place :  the  restoration  of  Charles  the  Sec- 
ond in  1660.  England  returned  to  monarchy 
and  authority,  to  its  past  traditions  in  Church 
and  State.  There  is  no  doubt  that  Locke  shared 
in  this  return,  at  least  for  a  time.  We 
begin  to  hear  distinctly  a  new  note :  "As  for 
myself  there  is  no  one  can  have  a  greater  respect 
and  veneration  for  authority  than  I."  Mark  the 


406          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

declaration,  as  it  will  remain  in  a  limited 
sense  true  for  the  future,  though  not  wholly 
true.  Casting  a  look  backwards  he  further 
states:  "  I  no  sooner  perceived  myself  in  the 
world,  but  I  found  myself  in  a  storm  which 
has  lasted  almost  hitherto,  and  therefore  cannot 
but  entertain  the  approaches  of  a  calm,  with  the 
greatest  joy  and  satisfaction."  Such  was  the 
new  hope  of  Locke  and  of  England  at  the  Res- 
toration. He  shows  a  reaction  against  liberty 
and  its  asserters,  who  "  are  the  greatest  engros- 
sers of  it,  too,"  and,  moreover,  "  I  find  that  a 
general  freedom  is  but  a  general  bondage." 
Wait ;  we  shall  see  how  he  holds  out,  and  whether 
this  incoming  Stewart  is  still  a  Stewart. 

But  there  is  one  change  which  should  be  noted  : 
the  "  turbulent  prating  John  Locke  "  of  Anthony 
Wood  will  learn  to  hold  his  tongue,  will  become 
famous  for  his  taciturnity.  Such  is  clearly  the 
dictate  of  prudence  henceforth  at  Oxford.  The 
spoken  word  is  soon  to  become  dangerous  to  the 
speaker  unless  it  tally  with  authority.  Accord- 
ingly we  may  now  begin  to  apply  to  Locke  one 
of  his  own  favorite  sayings:  Nullum  numen 
abest  si  sit  Prudentia. 

After  1660  Locke  remained  at  the  University 
with  the  exception  of  a  brief  absence  in  Ger- 
many, during  which  he  was  secretary  to  an 
English  diplomatist.  In  1667,  however,  came  a 
separation,  when  he  went  to  live  in  London,  and 


LOCKE.— LIFE.  407 

entered  the  service  of  Lord  Ashley,  who  after- 
wards became  the  first  Lord  Shaftesbury,  with 
whose  varied  fortunes  Locke  was  for  many  years 
connected. 

2.  Second  Period  (1667-1689).  ThusLocKe 
withdrew  from  Oxford  not  wholly  and  forever, 
still  it  is  a  withdrawal.  On  a  former  page  we 
have  given  reasons  why  about  this  time  the 
germ  of  his  chief  work  had  begun  to  show  itself. 
He  was  now  thirty-five  years  old,  he  was  dissat- 
isfied with  learning,  and  longed  for  practical  life 
in  which  experience  was  the  main  thing.  He 
had  already  been  following  the  trend  of  the 
time  and  had  made  numerous  experiments  in 
Natural  Science,  and  specially  in  Medicine. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  he  had  likewise  felt  the 
rein  tightening  on  him  at  Oxford,  and  foreseen 
the  restraints  about  to  be  placed  upon  free 
thought  and  free  speech.  It  was  getting  plainer 
every  year  that  Charles  the  Second,  like  the  rest 
of  the  Stewarts,  would  not  permit  himself  to 
be  summoned  to  the  bar  of  Public  Opinion  in 
England.  The  Kestoration  in  his  view  meant 
that  the  revolutionary  right  of  individual  judg- 
ment was  to  be  put  down.  We  have  seen  that 
in  1660  Locke  hailed  the  return  of  the  old 
order,  but  during  the  next  seven  years  he  had 
begun  to  react  from  his  reaction.  This  fact 
will  manifest  itself  in  his  writings  of  the  present 
Period,  which  will  show  the  author  erecting 


408          M  ODE  UN  E  UB  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

bulwarks  on  all  possible  sides  against  external 
authority.  Such  an  object  we  shall  find  particu- 
larly in  his  Essay  as  regards  the  transmitted 
knowledge  of  the  whole  past. 

Another  doubt  not  to  be  omitted  enters  Locke's 
life  about  this  time :  the  doubt  about  his  health. 
His  physical  constitution  had  never  been  robust ; 
his  brother  died  of  consumption  at  an  early  age. 
He  begins  to  be  troubled  with  asthma,  which 
followed  him  through  his  entire  life.  This  ca- 
pricious disease  is  well  known  to  have  a  peculiar 
effect  upon  the  imagination  of  its  victim.  We 
hear  a  good  deal  of  Locke's  hacking  cough,  in- 
dicative of  a  lung  disease.  It  led  him  to  take  a 
short  journey  to  France  in  1672,  and  to  plan  a 
long  stay  in  some  southern  latitude.  He  did  no 
small  amount  of  work,  but  his  health  was  never 
out  of  his  mind.  He  became  a  confirmed  valetudi- 
narian. One  reason  why  he  studied  medicine 
was  to  look  into  his  bodily  troubles,  to  experi- 
ment with  his  manifold  maladies,  and  to  test  his 
own  remedies.  This  tendency  not  only  influenced 
his  mind,  but  colored  his  temperament.  It 
helped  to  make  him  one  of  the  most  circumspect 
of  mortals,  being  always  on  the  lookout  for 
something  unexpected  to  crash  in  upon  his 
health.  It  intensified  his  bent  toward  the  exper- 
imental side  of  knowledge.  Every  physician 
knows  how  difficult  it  often  is  to  trace  the  relation 
of  cause  to  effect  in  disease.  Locke  shows  a 


LOCKE.  — LIFE.  409 

tendency  to  question  causation  generally,  which 
questioning  becomes  downright  denial  in  Hume, 
who  was  a  logical  development  out  of  Locke. 
But  the  preservative  principle  of  this  disease 
must  not  be  forgotten.  Locke,  sickly,  asthmatic, 
wheezing,  coughing,  lived  a  long  life  and  did  an 
enormous  amount  of  work,  because  he  took  care 
of  himself,  watching  and  observing  with  fore- 
thought the  physical  and  mental  limits  of  his 
powers.  If  he  had  been  a  stronger  man,  he 
would  have  died  sooner  and  done  less.  Great  is 
the  conservative  force  of  the  valetudinarian  who 
often  seems  able  to  turn  his  very  disease  into  a 
source  of  vital  energy.  This  is  by  no  means  in- 
tended to  imply  that  Locke  feigned  his  illness  or 
that  his  physical  troubles  were  imaginary.  On 
the  contrary  they  were  real  and  gave  him  a  great 
lesson  in  the  art  of  life,  teaching  him  how  to 
transform  the  destructive  assaults  upon  his  body 
into  a  means  for  its  preservation  and  activity. 
And  from  body  he  will  pass  to  mind,  which  he 
will  subject  to  a  similar  treatment. 

In  a  letter  from  Paris  dated  June,  1677,  there 
is  a  humorous  glance  into  this  side  of  his  life,  giv- 
ing a  playful  account  of  his  unceasing  efforts  to 
woo  his  capricious  mistress  Hygeia.  "My 
health  is  the  only  mistress  I  have  a  long  time 
courted,  and  so  coy  a  one  that  I  think  it  will 
take  up  the  remainder  of  my  days  to  obtain  her 
good  graces  and  keep  her  in  a  good  humor." 


410          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

This  seems  to  have  been  about  the  only  serious 
courtship  of  his  life  and  so  he  never  got  married, 
spending  his  days  in  pursuing  a  fair  maiden 
whom  he  never  caught,  who  had  the  perverse 
habit  of  always  fleeing  from  him  when  he 
followed  her  and  of  coming  back  when  he  ceased 
pursuit. 

After  entering  the  service  of  Lord  Ashley, 
Locke  is  much  engaged  in  public  business.  It  is 
supposed  he  had  a  hand  in  drawing  up  The 
Fundamental  Constitutions  of  Carolina,  issued 
on  March  1st,  1669.  This  is  notable  as  an  early 
instance  of  a  written  Constitution  for  governing 
an  English  Colony  in  America.  Locke,  how- 
ever, could  hardly  have  been  the  author  of  the 
entire  instrument,  which,  originating  with  English 
noblemen,  has  a  decided  feudal  tendency.  Quite 
different  are  the  early  New  England  documents 
of  this  sort,  springing  as  they  did  from  the 
people.  During  1672-3  he  held  various  Govern- 
ment offices,  his  patron  Shaftesbury  having 
become  Lord  Chancellor  of  England.  With  the 
latter's  fall  from  power,  Locke's  fortunes 
changed.  In  1675  he  took  his  long  contem- 
plated trip  abroad,  staying  four  years  in  France. 
During  this  lengthy  period  of  leisure  he  worked 
chiefly  at  his  Essay,  which  he  brought  back  to 
England  "  completed,"  according  to  one  state- 
ment. 

After  hi*  return   Locke  remained  faithful  to 


LOCKE.  — LIFE.  411 

his  patron  Shaftesbury,  who  had  become  deeply 
obnoxious  to  the  king,  and  who,  in  consequence, 
was  arrested  and  tried  for  treason,  but  acquitted, 
in  1681.  Being  discovered  in  a  conspiracy 
against  the  king  the  next  year,  this  restless  no- 
bleman, so  different  from  Locke,  was  compelled 
to  flee  to  Holland,  where  he  soon  died.  Thus 
our  quiet  philosopher  was  danced  up  and  down 
on  the  political  intrigues  of  the  time,  when  he  too 
became  an  object  of  suspicion.  The  following 
report  from  a  government  spy,  who  was  watch- 
ing him  at  Oxford,  has  been  published  in  recent 
years  :  "  John  Locke  lives  a  very  cunning  and  un- 
intelligible life  here,  being  two  days  in  town  and 
three  out,  and  no  one  knows  where  he  goes  or 
when  he  goes,  or  when  he  returns."  Evidently 
Locke  knew  his  man  and  was  on  his  guard. 
' '  Not  a  word  ever  drops  from  his  mouth  that 
discovers  anything  of  his  heart  within.  Now 
that  his  master  (Shaftesbury)  is  fled,  I  sup- 
pose we  shall  have  him  altogether."  Locke 
had  not  always  been  so  close-mouthed  at  Ox- 
ford. But  now,  though  the  suspicion  contin- 
ually hovers  about  him  «'  that  there  is  some 
Whig  intrigue  a  managing,"  he  cannot  be  in- 
veigled into  a  compromising  word.  Later,  in 
1684,  another  spy,  none  other  than  Doctor  Fell, 
Dean  of  Christ  Church  and  also  Bishop  of  Oxford, 
thus  reports  to  the  Government  concerning 
Locke:  *' I  have  for  divers  years  had  an  eye 


412         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

upon  him,  but  so  close  has  been  his  guard  on 
himself  that  after  strict  inquiries  I  may  confi- 
dently affirm  there  is  not  one  in  the  College, 
however  familiar  with  him,  who  has  heard  him 
speak  a  word  either  against  or  so  much  as  con- 
cerning the  Government. ' '  No  more  criticism,  no 
more  citation  of  the  king's  acts  to  the  bar  of  indi- 
vidual judgment ;  our  former  universal  critic  has 
become  so  foxy  that  he  cannot  be  trapped  by  the 
best-laid  snare  of  a  cunning  priest.  Listen  to 
the  following  confession  from  the  same  high- 
stationed  spy:  "  Very  frequently  both  in  public 
and  private  discourses  have  been  purposely 
introduced  to  the  disparagement  of  his  master, 
the  Earl  of  Shaftesbury ;  he  (Locke)  could  never 
be  provoked  to  take  any  notice  or  discover  in 
word  or  look  the  least  concern;  so  that  I  believe 
there  is  not  in  the  world  such  a  master  of  taci- 
turnity and  passion."  Can  this  be  the  Locke 
of  Anthony  Wood,  "  turbulent,  discontented, 
prating?  "  That  Goddess  of  his,  Prude ntia, 
seems  to  have  wrought  a  miracle  as  regards  his 
tongue.  All  of  which  seems  to  us  very  indicative 
of  what  is  going  on  internally  in  the  spiritual 
development  of  the  author  of  the  Essay. 

Though  Locke  gave  no  pretext  to  his  enemies, 
he  knew  that  they  would  soon  seize  him  without 
any  pretext.  The  terrors  of  a  prison  must  have 
been  doubly  redoubled  to  the  imagination  of  a 
valetudinarian.  If  he  could  hardly  meet  the  re- 


LOCKE.  — LIFE.  413 

quirements  of  his  health  when  in  freedom,  what 
would  he  do  when  in  jail?  The  very  idea  must 
have  made  him  shiver.  Accordingly  that  fickle 
mistress  of  his,  ever  to  be  wooed  and  never  to 
be  won,  gave  peremptorily  the  command  to  flee 
from  England.  So  in  1683  Locke  slips  off  and 
goes  to  Holland,  at  that  time  the  asylum  of 
fugitives  from  oppression.  There  he  stays  for 
the  next  six  years. 

This  is  so  large  a  fragment  of  human  life 
that  one  asks  what  influence  did  it  have  upon 
the  life  and  works  of  Locke?  First  he  there 
became  an  author  and  began  to  publish  his 
writings,  to  be  sure  in  a  timid,  anonymous 
fashion.  Says  he  in  a  letter  dated  December, 
1684:  "  Bating  these  (a  few  youthful  verses), 
I  do  solemnly  protest  that  I  am  not  the  author, 
not  only  of  any  libel,  but  not  of  any  pamphlet 
or  treatise  whatever,  good,  bad,  or  indifferent." 

The  chief  acquaintance  he  made  in  Holland 
was  Peter  van  Limborch,  a  theologian  belong- 
ing to  the  sect  of  Arminians  or  Remonstrants 
(this  name  comes  from  a  remonstrance  which 
they  presented  to  the  States-General  in  1610). 
They  had  been  condemned  at  the  Synod  of  Dort 
(1619)  and  had  been  persecuted  by  the  Calvin- 
ists ;  hence  they  too  favored  toleration,  and  they 
were  also  latitudinarians.  Still  they  had  sur- 
vived the  attacks  of  their  enemies  and  were  quite 
numerous  in  certain  parts  of  Holland.  It  was 


414        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

natural  that  Locke  should  sympathize  with  these 
people,  finding  in  them  his  counterpart  in  his 
new  home.  It  is  also  to  be  noted  that  Spinoza 
had  his  refuge  within  this  same  sect,  or  a  sect  of 
this  sect,  for  many  years  and  in  the  same  general 
locality.  But  Spinoza  lived  among  the  humble 
of  this  denomination,  while  Locke  was  the  friend 
of  their  greatest  man  and  leader.  Spinoza  was 
a  few  months  (three)  younger  than  Locke,  and 
had  died  some  six  years  before  the  latter 's 
arrival  in  Holland.  How  far  Locke  ever  became 
acquainted  with  the  writings  of  Spinoza,  which 
had  been  published  in  1677  and  were  making 
their  way  in  Holland  while  he  was  there,  does  not 
appear.  The  two  philosophers,  different  as  they 
were,  had  important  things  in  common;  both 
were  persecuted  for  opinion's  sake  and  both 
believed  in  toleration. 

In  1685  the  English  Government  demanded 
the  extradition  of  Locke  as  one  of  eighty-five 
dangerous  Englishmen  then  in  Holland.  For  a 
time  he  had  to  hide  himself  though  there  was 
probably  no  serious  attempt  to  catch  him  on  the 
part  of  the  Dutch  authorities.  Under  such 
circumstances  his  thoughts  naturally  turned  to 
Toleration,  upon  which  subject  he  had  already 
thought  at  Oxford.  Accordingly  in  his  hid- 
ing-place this  victim  of  intolerance  solaces  him- 
self by  composing  his  Epistola  de  Tolerantia, 


LOCKE.— LIFE.  415 

sometimes  said  to  be  his  most  original  pro- 
duction. 

Another  important  literary  acquaintance  of 
this  period  was  Jean  Le  Clerc,  who  was  certainly 
imbued  with  Spinozism,  and  in  biblical  interpre- 
tation followed  largely  the  doctrines  of  the 
Theologico- Political  Treatise.  What  Locke  got 
of  Spinoza  probably  came  through  Le  Clerc, 
who  stimulated  Locke  greatly,  and  induced  him 
to  write  articles  for  publication,  though  as  yet 
anonymously. 

Thus  Locke,  who  had  .written  privately  all  his 
life,  now  begins  to  print  and  publish  in  free  Hol- 
land. It  was  a  considerable  step  for  our  exceed- 
ingly cautious  and  indeed  timid  man  to  take. 
Moreover,  he  could  now  quietly  look  back  upon 
life  and  his  country's  history  during  the  stormy 
period  of  the  previous  half  century.  Locke  had 
reached  the  fifties,  and  had  experienced  much;  it 
was  time  that  he,  as  philosopher,  should  take  a 
survey.  So  it  resulted  that  all  his  chief  works 
during  his  Dutch  exile  began  coming  to  a  head. 
In  addition  he  seemed  to  acquire  a  new  power  of 
work,  the  climate  of  Holland  agreed  with  him 
better  than  the  English  or  French.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  Locke  had  to  separate  from  England 
in  order  to  look  back  and  see  it  and  himself  con- 
sciously and  philosophically,  and  then  formulate 
such  a  view.  The  Essay  was  probably  the  center 
of  thought  during  this  period,  and  his  other  writ- 


416         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ings  were  hardly  more  than  applications  and  illus- 
trations of  its  principle.  Lady  Mashani  remarks 
suggestively:  "  In  Holland  he  had  full  leisure 
to  prosecute  his  thoughts  on  the  subject  of  the 
Human  Understanding — a  work  which,  in  all 
probability,  he  would  never  have  finished,  had  he 
continued  to  live  in  England." 

The  last  year  or  even  two  years  of  Locke's 
stay  in  Holland  must  have  been  much  interrupted 
by  the  scheming  and  preparation  for  the  redemp- 
tion of  England  from  the  House  of  Stewart. 
James  the  Second  had  shown  himself  the  worst 
man  of  his  family.  Three  Stewarts  had  been 
tried  in  succession,  they  had  all  shown  them- 
selves hostile  to  the  deepest  demand  of  English 
spirit.  They  were  bent  on  absolutism,  they  were 
determined  not  to  give  any  account  of  their  ac- 
tion to  the  nation .  Another  K-e volution  was  clearly 
impending,  another  citation  of  the  king  to  the 
judgment  seat  of  the  people  would  have  to  take 
place.  Even  the  nobility  were  taking  part  in  such 
a  demand,  in  fact,  were  the  leaders.  The  Rev- 
olution of  1640  had  to  be  wrought  over,  if 
not  fought  over.  The  place  of  preparation  was 
Holland,  and  Locke  for  a  while  was  at  the 
storm  center.  At  last,  in  1688,  the  expedition 
of  William  of  Orange  sailed  and  accomplished 
the  new  Revolution  peaceably.  In  1689  Locke, 
in  the  retinue  of  Queen  Mary,  returned  to  En- 
gland. For  him,  and  indeed  for  the  people  of 


LOCKE.  —  LIFE .  417 

England,  the  so-called  Revolution  of  1688  was 
not  so  much  a  Revolution  as  a  Restoration. 
Locke  saw  his  principle  realized,  made  the  prin- 
ciple of  his  country's  Government. 

3.  Third  Period  (1689-1704).  This  is  es- 
sentially Locke's  Period  of  Publication.  He 
was  57  years  old  when  he  returned  to  England  in 
1689,  and  he  had  previously  published  almost 
nothing.  The  Revolution  gave  him  the  requi- 
site freedom  to  express  his  thought,  which 
under  the  Stewarts  had  been  held  down  in  silence. 
He  began  to  realize  his  life ;  his  return  to  En- 
gland was  in  the  deepest  sense  a  return  to  himself 
out  of  estrangement,  separation,  banishment, 
which  characterized  his  Second  Period.  The 
result  was  seen  in  his  work.  He  lived  fifteen 
years  more,  which  were  the  happy  time  of  his 
life  in  spite  of  increasing  age  and  his  chronic 
maladv- 

Moreover  he  became  a  public  man  again,  and 
was  handsomely  rewarded  by  King  William  for  the 
services  rendered  to  the  latter's  cause.  One  of  his 
offices  brought  him  a  thousand  pounds  a  year  with- 
out seriously  interfering  with  his  literary  work. 
He  took  an  interest  in  public  questions,  and  wrote 
several  small  tracts  in  reference  to  the  coinage. 

o 

He  was  consulted  by  statesmen  such  as  Somers 
and  Halifax. 

During  all  this  time  he  continued  to  propagate 
his    philosophical    doctrines.     He    entered   the 
27 


418         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

religious  field  also,  writing  on  miracles  and  on 
the  Bible.  He  was  likewise  drawn  into  several 
controversies  in  reference  to  both  his  religion 
and  his  philosophy.  His  death  took  place  Octo- 
ber 28th,  1704,  at  Gates  in  Essex. 

II.  LOCKE'S  WRITINGS.  —  It  has  been  already 
stated  that  Locke  published  his  Writings  dur- 
ing his  last  Period,  which  is  hardly  more  than  a 
record  of  his  literary  works.  Moreover  the  pub- 
lication of  his  chief  books  belongs  to  the  early 
years  of  the  last  period,  they  being  ready  in  the 
main  for  the  press  when  he  stepped  on  English 
soil  in  1689.  First  comes  the  English  transla- 
tion of  his  Epistola  de  Tolerantia,  or  his  first 
Letter  on  Toleration  (1689).  It  is  a  curious  fact 
that  Locke's  first  important  work  was  composed 
in  Latin,  the  study  of  which  tongue  he  had  so 
disparaged.  The  next  year  a  second  letter  on 
the  same  subject  followed,  and  in  1692  a  third. 
The  two  treatises  on  Government  appeared  in 
1690,  and  his  book  on  Education  in  1693. 

But  the  great  literary  event  of  Locke's  life  was 
the  publication  of  the  Essay  concerning  the 
Human  Understanding,  which  he  began  to  print 
early  in  1689,  but  which  was  not  ready  for  cir- 
culation till  March,  1690,  This  is  the  work 
which  contains  what  Locke  deemed  his  Philoso- 
phy, and  which  must  be  explained  and  analyzed 
in  its  own  right  and  under  its  own  name,  famil- 
iarly known  as  Locke's  Essay. 


LOCKE.  —  WEI  TINGS.  419 

In  one  sense  it  may  well  be  said  that  Locke's 
Philosophy  is  the  denial  of  Philosophy.  The 
search  for  the  Essence  of  Being  (the  ousia  of  the 
on)  is  declared  fruitless,  indeed  impossible  by  the 
English  philosopher,  wherein  he  expresses  his 
nation's  spirit.  But  in  his  denial  of  Philosophy 
Locke  is  still  philosophizing,  he  is  not  merely 
negative  to  the  old  conception  of  this  science, 
but  he  is  positive  also,  putting  into  it  anew  con- 
tent, and  giving  to  it  a  new  direction.  He  will 
endeavor  to  destroy  the  previous  metaphysical 
side  of  Philosophy,  and  make  it  face  toward 
Psychology. 

In  Locke  the  Self  (or  Ego)  begins  to  be  the 
point  of  departure,  and  starts  to  ordering  and 
classifying  its  own  activities  through  itself.  In 
the  movement  of  the  Seventeenth  Century  we 
have  always  found  this  Ego  and  even  its  pro- 
cess present  somewhere,  but  smothered  in  its 
metaphysical  wrappage,  as  was  noted  in  the 
Leibnizian  Monad.  Philosophy  is  now  to  give 
an  account  of  what  the  mind  does  when  stimu- 
lated to  its  process  by  the  external  world.  Thus 
two  very  different  elements  come  together  in  the 
Philosophy  of  Locke,  often  in  shrill  contradic- 
tion, yet  often  in  co-operation.  On  the  one 
hand  the  mind  or  Ego  is  the  source  of  its  own 
activities,  is  self-acting,  self-determined ;  on  the 
other  it  is  moved  to  this  activity  by  Nature,  by 
the  outside  world,  and  so  is  externally  determined. 


420         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Accordingly  we  shall  often  find  Locke  restlessly 
shifting  from  one  side  to  the  other  of  these 
contradictory  elements  in  what  he  says  of  both 
Intellect  and  Will.  He  asserts  strongly  liberty; 
with  equal  emphasis  he  asserts  determinism ; 
then  he  asserts  that  neither  has  anything  to  do 
with  the  other.  The  nut  is  really  too  hard  for 
him  to  crack.  Frequently  he  turns  with  a  male- 
diction upon  all  philosophic  thinking,  and  flings 
it  out  of  the  window.  And  yet  it  somehow  flies 
back  again  and  stands  before  him  with  its  riddle. 
Thus  Locke  sees  and  proclaims  that  th<?Ego  is 
self-active,  self-determined,  with  its  own  inner 
process  or  activities.  We  can  hardly  now 
realize  to  ourselves  how  great  a  step  this  was  in 
Locke's  day,  we  who  are  the  heirs  of  his 
thought,  and  to  whom  it  has  become  common- 
place. Philosophy  is  to  be  Egoized,  which 
means  democratized,  made  the  possession  of  all 
Egos,  of  the  people.  To  be  sure  this  result  lay 
not  in  the  design  of  Locke,  who  was  not  a  demo- 
crat, nor  an  aristocrat,  but  a  middle  class 
Englishman  believing  in  the  freedom  of  the  in- 
dividual as  granted  .and  secured  by  the  Limited 
Monarchy  of  the  English  Constitution.  Still  he 
summons  all  science,  all  the  past,  in  fact  the 
whole  objective  world  to  the  bar  of  his  private 
judgment.  To  be  sure,  Descartes  did  not  wholly 
but  partially  the  same  thing,  and  so  started 
Modern  Philosophy.  But  Locke  turns  the  light 


LOCKE  —  WRITINGS.  421 

upon  that  Ego  who  makes  the  citation  and  is  the 
judge  of  what  is  cited.  The  Seventeenth  Cen- 
tury made  God  determine  the  Ego  to  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  object,  but  Locke  begins  with  a 
self-determined  Ego,  not  a  God-determined  one, 
for  knowing  the  objective  world.  Thus  he  starts 
to  break  down  the  exclusive,  aristocratic,  author- 
itative character  of  all  previous  Philosophy. 
From  this  point  of  view  we  can  see  that  he  is 
indeed  revolutionary. 

He  opens  the  profoundly  separative,  analytic, 
negative  character  of  the  Eighteenth  Century 
by  his  destructive  act  of  freedom,  liberating 
the  Ego  from  the  domination  of  the  old  Meta- 
physics. The  philosophic  breach  between  the 
two  great  divisions  of  the  Teutonic  race,  the 
English  and  the  German,  though  already  mani- 
fested on  both  sides,  widens  and  becomes  two 
wholly  distinct  streams  which  flow  through  the 
entire  coming  Century  and  beyond.  In  the  total 
sweep  of  Modern  Philosophy  Locke  begins  its 
second  grand  act. 

It  is  significant  that  Locke  put  off  any  division 
of  the  sciences  to  the  last  chapter  of  his  Essay, 
which  is  in  no  sense  ordered  by  this  division. 
He  holds  that  there  are  three  grand  sciences, 
"  three  great  provinces  of  the  intellectual  world, 
wholly  separate  and  distinct  one  from  another." 
The  first  he  calls  Physical  Science  which  treats 
of  the  nature  of  things,  ««  as  they  are  in  them- 


422         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

selves."  Note  that  in  this  Science  he  would  in- 
clude not  only  Physics  but  Metaphysics,  "not 
only  matter  and  body,  but  spirits  also,"  and  even 
"  God  and  the  angels  ",  which  subjects  are 
usually  handed  over-  to  Theology.  "  This  in  a 
more  enlarged  sense  of  the  word  I  call  Physike. 
or  Natural  Philosophy,"  which  has  as  its  end 
"  bare  speculative  truth."  Locke  has  written  a 
little  book  which  he  calls  Elements  of  Natural 
Philosophy,  but  it  has  no  such  content  as  this, 
since  it  treats  only  of  the  phenomena  of  Nature. 
The  second  general  Science  in  Locke's  division 
is  Praktike,  or  Practical  Science,  "  the  skill  of 
right  applying  our  own  powers  and  actions  for 
the  attainment  of  things  good  and  useful." 
Here  lies  the  sphere  of  Ethics.  The  third  gen- 
eral Science  is  SemeiotikS,  or  the  doctrine  of 
Signs  to  which  language  belongs,  and  upon 
which  Locke  justly  puts  great  stress. 

This  division,  however,  is  not  followed  at  all 
by  Locke,  it  is  evidently  a  tiny  bit  of  speculation 
which  meant  little  or  nothing  to  him  and  for 
which  he  really  had  no  use.  Hence  he  throws 
it  in  at  the  end  where  it  can  do  not  hurt.  Its 
interest  is  chiefly  to  show  how  little  grasp  he  has 
consciously  upon  any  organization  of  Philosophy, 
even  of  his  own.  And  yet  Locke's  work  is  un- 
consciously and  remotely  directed  by  the  philo- 
sophic Norm  which  had  descended  to  him  from 
former  ages.  He  too  deals  with  Absolute  Being 


LOCKE.  —  WRITINGS.  423 

or  God,  Nature  or  the  World,  and  Man  or 
Mind  —  and  cannot  help  himself. 

The  three  great  division  of  Philosophy  —  Met- 
aphysics, Physics,  and  Ethics  —  now  begin  to 
assume  their  peculiar  English  form  and  name, 
being  known  to  us  all  through  school  and  college 
as  Mental,  Natural,  and  Moral  Philosophy,  which 
have  a  tendency  to  develop  separately  in  the 
separative  Eighteenth  Century,  particularly  in 
England.  After  this  spirit  they  are  taught  still 
to-day,  little  or  no  attention  is  paid  to  their  con- 
nection, ««  all  three  being  toto  coelo  different, 
three  provinces  wholly  separate  and  distinct," 
according  to  Locke. 

The  philosophic  Norm,  accordingly,  is  not  to 
be  wholly  left  out  of  the  Philosophy  of  Locke, 
though  it  drops  to  a  subordinate  place.  It  has 
in  the  main  controlled  the  organization  of  philo- 
sophic thought  hitherto,  but  the  attempt  now  is 
to  set  it  aside.  The  individual  book  of  the  phil- 
osopher at  present  organizes  his  thought  directly, 
the  transmitted  thought  of  the  Norm  does  not 
organize  his  book.  Against  any  such  authority 
is  the  great  revolt  of  the  time.  To  the  special 
consideration  of  Locke's  Essay  we  must  then 
address  ourselves. 


424        MODERN  E  UBOPEAN  PHIL OSOPHY. 


LOCKE'S  ESSAY. 

This  work  is  divided  into  four  Books,  which 
division  is  not  specially  explained  or  grounded  by 
the  author.  Still  the  reader  can  see  in  a  general 
way  that  the  different  Books  not  only  treat  of 
different  topics  but  show  a  difference  of  treat- 
ment, even  a  difference  of  mood.  The  First  Book 
is  a  negative  Book,  containing  one  determined 
assault  upon  the  doctrine  of  Innate  Ideas,  and  is 
written  in  a  destructive  temper.  The  Second 
Book  is  on  the  other  hand  a  positive,  construc- 
tive Book  and  unfolds  what  may  be  distinctly 
called  Locke's  Philosophy;  thus  it  is  altogether 
the  most  important  part  of  the  Essay.  Pass- 
ing over  the  Third  Book  which  is  chiefly  a 
discussion  of  language,  we  come  to  the  last  or 
Fourth  Book,  which  treats  especially  of  meta- 
physical points,  and  plainly  shows  a  relaxation 
of  the  attitude  of  the  First  Book,  if  not  a  sur- 
render in  certain  matters.  Locke  becomes  con- 
scious (in  this  last  Book)  of  the  difficulties  of 
his  doctrine  as  set  forth  in  his  Second  Book, 
and  recognizes  more  fully  than  before  the  Phi- 
losophy of  the  preceding  Century.  Thus  the 
Fourth  Book  is  a  turning-back  to  the  start- 
ing point,  and  a  new  working-over  of  the  whole 
problem  of  knowledge.  Upon  these  general 


LOCKED  ESSAY.  425 

lines  we  shall  seek  to  look  at  the  Essay  in  its 
main  details. 

A.  THE  FIRST  BOOK.  —  This  we  may  call  the 
negative  Book  of  the  whole  work,  its  spirit  being 
that  of  the  destroyer.  It  may  be  deemed  the 
revolutionary  overture  to  the  Eighteenth  Century 
in  its  philosophical  aspect.  It  is  thus  character- 
istic of  Locke  and  of  his  time  that  he  begins  his 
great  task  negatively,  with  a  denial  of  the  fun- 
damental world-view  of  the  preceding  Century. 
The  polemic  of  this  First  Book  is  not  by  any 
means  lukewarm,  and  it  is  carried  out  to  what 
seems  unnecessary  detail.  If  we  reach  to  the 
heart  of  this  attack,  we  find  that  it  is  the  God  of 
the  Seventeenth  Century  whom  Locke  denies, 
altogether  the  supreme  denial.  Then  he  proceeds 
to  establish  his  own  God  who  is  not  to  interfere 
with  man's  knowing  the  world  directly.  * 

It  has  been  already  stated  that  Locke's  main 
assault  was  upon  the  Metaphysics  handed  down 
from  the  past.  In  such  work,  however,  his  refuta- 
tion has  to  be  metaphysical.  The  point  of  attack 
he  calls  Innate  Ideas,  whose  existence  he  denies. 
These  Ideas  he  conceives  to  be  imprinted  on  the 
mind,  they  are  characters  stamped  on  its  sub- 
stance. Innate  Ideas  are  not  the  self-active 
processes  of  the  mind,  but  are  put  into  it  from 
the  outside  in  mechanical  fashion.  Moreover 
these  Ideas  as  innate  "  the  soul  receives  in  its 
very  first  being  and  brings  into  the  world  with 


426        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

it."  Still  further,  God  is  the  source  whence 
Innate  Ideas  are  implanted  in  the  soul  of  man. 
Such  is  Locke's  general  view  of  Innate  Ideas. 

At  the  start  (I.  2)  we  see  the  pith  of  Locke's 
objection.  He  proposes  to  * «  show  how  men  by  the 
bare  use  of  their  natural  faculties,  may  attain  to 
the  knowledge  of  all  they  have  without  the  help 
of  any  such  innate  impressions. ' '  Here  he  affirms 
that  mind  is  self-active,  even  self-developing. 
The  Idea  is  not  innate,  is  not  imprinted  upon 
the  Intellect  at  birth  by  a  superior  power.  That 
would  destroy  its  essence  for  Locke.  The  Idea 
is  not  God-created,  but  man-created,  or  at  least 
self-unfolding.  What,  then,  does  God  do  for 
us?  He  bestows  upon  us  our  powers  of  mind, 
our  self -activity.  "  God,  having  endued  man 
with  those  faculties  of  knowledge  which  he  hath, 
was  'no  more  obliged  by  his  goodness  to  plant 
these  innate  notions  in  his  mind  than  that,  hav- 
ing given  him  reason,  hands  and  materials,  he 
should  build  him  bridges  or  houses"  (I.  4,  12). 
Locke's  strong,  we  might  say,  warm  assertion  is 
that  the  Idea  is  not  imparted  to  man  at  birth  by 
God. 

The  reader,  begins  soon  to  ask:  Who  said 
otherwise?  At  whom  are  these  shafts  directed? 
Early  in  the  First  Book  of  the  Essay  (which 
book  deals  with  Innate  Ideas)  curiosity  starts  to 
groping  about  for  Locke's  enemy.  Finally  we 
come  upon  one  mentioned  name,  that  of  Lord 


LOCKE'S  ESSAY.  427 

Herbert,  whose  book  De  Veritate  is  cited  and 
examined.  But  we  soon  conclude  that  this  could 
not  have  been  Locke's  game.  The  artillery  is 
altogether  too  heavy  and  the  firing  too  hot.  Lord 
Herbert's  book  in  Locke's  citation  goes  back  to 
1656,  and  Locke  claims  to  have  written  his 
refutation,  in  part  at  least,  before  reading  it. 

We  may  well  believe  that  Locke  had  his  first 
tilt  at  Innate  Ideas  during  his  earlier  period  at  the 
University,  when  he  began  to  read  Descartes. 
We  must  also  believe  that  he  was  stimulated  to 
renewed  opposition  during  his  visit  to  France 
(1675-79),  where  the  Cartesian  Philosophy  was 
making  a  great  stir.  But  the  time  which  roused 
him  most  to  his  antagonism  against  Innate  Ideas 
was  his  stay  in  Holland  (1683-89),  which 
country  was  the  first  place  of  their  propagation, 
and  the  abode  of  Descartes  himself.  In  fact, 
Holland  was  substantially  the  home  of  the 
Philosophy  of  the  Seventeenth  Century,  the  soil 
in  which  it  first  grew  and  always  thrived  best. 
Now  that  Philosophy  from  beginning  to  end, 
through  all  its  expositors  great  and  small,  had 
as  one  of  its  fundamental  doctrines  what  Locke 
calls  Innate  Ideas,  something"  impressed  on  the 
original  substance  of  the  mind,  from  the  first 
moment  of  its  existence,  by  the  Creator." 

The  Ego  was  in  one  way  or  other  God-deter- 
mined, not  self-determined,  it  did  not  get  its 
knowledge  primarily  through  its  own  faculties, 


428        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

through  its  own  activity,  but  through  the  direct 
gift  of  God  in  some  form.  The  philosophic 
heroes  of  the  Seventeenth  Century — Descartes, 
Spinoza,  Leibniz  —  have  this  common  trait, 
though  in  different  ways  and  in  different  degrees. 
Against  their  principle  Locke  enters  the  lists  and 
therein  begins  a  wholly  new  turn  in  the  move- 
ment of  Philosophy,  making  the  transition  out 
of  the  Seventeenth  to  the  Eighteenth  Century, 
and  diverting  the  philosophic  stream  in  its  world- 
historical  import  from  the  Continent  to  England. 

We  may  accordingly  regard  this  polemic  of 
Locke's  against  Innate  Ideas  as  the  great  breakout 
of  the  old  into  the  new.  •  It  is  evident  that  Leib- 
niz regarded  it  as  such,  for  he  takes  up  the 
challenge  and  vindicates  the  Century  to  which  he 
properly  belongs  in  a  reply  keen  and  detailed. 
His  work,  the  Nouveaux  Essais,  as  a  whole  is  an 
attempt  to  arrest  the  Lockian  tendency.  In  vain ; 
Leibniz  declined  even  to  publish  his  book  against 
Locke,  for  which  declination  he  gives  an  excuse 
not  very  convincing.  We  have  already  stated 
that  Leibniz,  though  younger  than  Locke,  and 
outliving  him,  was  emphatically  a  man  of  the 
Seventeenth  Century ;  in  our  view  he  is  the  com- 
pletion of  its  philosophic  movement. 

There  is  often  a  warmth  and  directness,  as  well 
as  unnecessary  amplification  of  the  argument  in 
the  First  Book  of  Locke's  Essay,  which  can  only 
spring  from  personal  discussion.  Locke's  ac- 


LOCKE'S  ESSAY.  429 

quaintances  in  Holland  were  more  or  less  imbued 
with  Cartesianism.  His  special  friend,  Le  Clerc, 
who  did  so  much  for  him,  and  really  trained  him 
out  of  his  timidity  to  the  point  of  publication, 
was  more  than  tinged  with  Spinozism.  It  is  a 
curious  fact  that  the  epitome  of  the  Essay  which 
was  published  in  Le  Clerc's  Journal  in  1688  has 
no  First  Book.  Some  have  supposed  that  this 
was  the  portion  last  completed  of  the  Essay.  At 
any  rate  it  was  thoroughly  wrought  over  and  re- 
ceived its  point  in  Holland.  ButLocke  is  wholly 
silent  about  his  philosophic  antagonists,  they  were 
probably  his  best  friends  and  benefactors.  And 
then  Locke  grew  to  be  excessively  timid  and 
close-mouthed,  as  we  have  already  seen.  So  he 
projects  a  kind  of  phantom  antagonist  in  Lord 
Herbert  a  full  generation  backward  in  time,  as  an 
answer  to  his  reader,  who  is  sure  to  ask :  Whom 
are  you  fighting  so  hotly?  Locke,  however,  is 
doing  his  supreme  philosophical  task  in  his  battle 
against  Innate  Ideas,  and  that  is  the  main  interest 
for  us  of  the  present  day.  He  is  producing  an 
epoch-making  work  which  still  shows  best  the" 
movement  out  of  the  retiring  Seventeenth  into 
the  coming  Eighteenth  Century. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  see  the  insufficiency  of 
Locke's  argument  in  many  places.  The  keen 
thrusts  of  Leibniz  against  him  can  hardly  be 
parried  in  most  cases.  It  is  not  worth  our  while 
here  to  follow  the  details  of  Locke's  reasoning 


430         MODERN  E  UROPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

in  its  mistakes  and  contradictions ;  his  fatal  half- 
ness  of  statement  throughout  must  be  acknowl- 
edged and  guarded  against,  if  we  would  grasp 
him  in  his  totality.  His  best  known  compa- 
risons, as  those  which  liken  the  mind  to  a  white 
sheet  of  paper  or  to  an  empty  cabinet,  are  but 
one  side  or  a  half  of  his  doctrine.  If  to  the 
Lockian  view,  Nihil  est  in  intellectu  quod  non 
fuerit  in  sensu,  Leibniz  would  add  nisi  ipse  in- 
teUectus,  the  same  doctrine  can  be  vindicated  for 
Locke.  In  fact  Lebniz  only  saw  and  in  the 
nature  of  the  case  could  only  see  one  side  of 
Locke,  against  which  in  its  one-sidedness  he 
wins  his  point. 

Another  category  of  the  Philosophy  of  the 
Seventeenth  Century  is  Substance.  To  this 
also  Locke  is  not  friendly  in  spite  of  a  certain 
toleration.  He  would  clear  the  mind  of  the 
Innate  Idea,  and  the  world  of  Substance,  both 
being  a  hindrance  to  true  knowledge. 

Such  is  Locke's  negative  argument,  in  which, 
however,  lurks  his  positive  principle.  On  the 
.  whole  his  procedure  has  been  psychological : 
his  Ego  has  been  examining  his  Ego,  trying  to 
find  in  it  these  Innate  Ideas.  They  do  not  exist, 
is  his  verdict.  But  from  this  fruitless  result 
he  will  pass  in  the  Second  Book  of  the  Essay 
to  tell  us  what  does  exist  in  the  mind.  Thither 
we  shall  pass  with  him  and  glance  at  his  new 
substitute  for  the  old  Metaphysics. 


LOCKE'S  ESSAY.  431 

We  may  again  emphasize  the  fact  that  Locke 
asserts  the  immediate  relation  between  Mind  and 
Object,  rejecting  all  divine  interference  to  bring 
these  two  extremes  together  in  knowledge.  No 
correspondence,  no  con  substantiality,  no  Pre-es- 
tablished Harmony  between  Mind  and  Matter: 
we  are  in  a  new  world  of  thought,  a  new  Cen- 
tury. The  important  thing  to  ascertain  now  is: 
What  can  I  know  and  what  can  I  not  know? 
The  limit  of  knowledge  must  be  found.  This 
calls  for  a  positive  discussion  of  the  faculty  of 
knowing,  or,  in  general,  the  Human  Understand- 
ing. 

B.  SECOND  BOOK. —  Very  different  is  not  only 
the  content,  but  also  the  spirit  of  this-  Book 
from  the  preceding  one.  It  is  decidedly  con- 
structive, Locke  is  now  the  builder,  building  the 
edifice  of  Philosophy,  which  has  had  a  lasting 
effect.  Really,  however,  his  subject-matter  as 
well  as  his  procedure  is  psychological,  and  this 
Second  Book  may  well  be  deemed  the  special 
source  of  our  Anglo-Saxon  Mental  Philosophy. 
Thus  it  has  been  one  of  the  most  influential 
pieces  of  human  writing.  The  mind  looks  at 
itself,  takes  itself  to  pieces,  thus  finding  out 
itself,  and  making  this  the  important  knowledge. 
The  worth  of  the  Self  is  herein  distinctly  pro- 
claimed. In  such  an  investigation  we  must  pro- 
ceed to  take  an  inventory  of  mind,  or  of  what 
Locke  calls  the  Understanding.  Its  varied 


432        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

activities  we,  condensing  Locke,  may  divide  as 
follows:  (1)  the  Understanding  as  such,  as  that 
through  which  we  acquire  our  experience;  (2) 
the  Understanding  as  passive,  as  determined,  yet 
responding  to  such  determination;  (3)  the  Un- 
derstanding as  active,  as  working  over  its  ma- 
terials through  itself.  The  whole  moves  between 
two  unknown  and  unknowable  elements,  which 
at  present  we  may  name  the  Ego-in-itself  and 
the  Thing-in-itself .  More  will  have  to  be  said 
upon  this  topic  later. 

I.  The  Understanding  as  /Such.  Locke's 
work  is  concerning  the  Human  Understanding. 
We  seek  first  to  discover  what  he  embraces  in 
this  term.  Here  again  we  shall  find  Locke  vague 
and  contradictory  in  his  use  of  a  pivotal  word ; 
still  a  fair  and  not  too  critical  treatment  of  him 
will  reveal  his  general  meaning.  ««  The  Under- 
standing like  the  eye,  while  it  makes  us  see  and 
perceive  all  other  things,  takes  no  notice  of 
itself."  Thus  Locke  seems  at  the  start  to 
exclude  the  self-conscious  act  from  the  Under- 
standing; but  this  is  not  at  all  what  he  means, 
for  we  are  to  "  make  the  acquaintance  with  our 
own  Understandings ;  ' '  such  is  indeed  the  de- 
clared purpose  of  his  Essay.  The  Understand- 
ing is  to  turn  back  upon  itself  and  examine  itself 
in  all  its  activities  and  faculties.  Sometimes 
Locke  seems  to  exclude  Will  from  the  Under- 
standing, sometimes  Reflection;  then  both  are 


LOCKE'S  ESSAY.  433 

regarded  as  phases  or  activities  of  the  Under- 
standing. So  we  have  to  conclude  that  it  was 
a  tendency  of  mind  with  Locke  to  speak  of  any 
mental  faculty  as  being  outside  of  the  Un- 
derstanding to  which  it  belonged  when  it.  was 
separately  regarded  and  specialized.  His  in- 
tellectual constitution  was  inherently  separa- 
tive and  analytic,  with  almost  no  turn  for  grasp- 
ing processes. 

We  believe  that  the  modern  reader  on  the 
whole  will  find  the  best  equivalent  for  Locke's 
Understanding  in  the  word  Ego,  of  whose  self- 
conscious  development  his  Essay  is  a  very  im- 
portant stage.  In  the  main  it  is  a  discussion  of 
the  Intellect,  but  Will  and  Feeling  are  not 
excluded. 

1.  A  primal  or  potential  state  of  the  Under- 
standing hovered  darkly  in  the  background  of 
Locke's  thought.  It  is  "  a  darkroom,"  "  a 
closed  cabinet,  "hard  to  see  into;  "  methinks  the 
Understanding  is  not  much  unlike  a  closet  wholly 
shut  from  light,  with  only  some  little  opening 
left,  to  let  in  external  visible  resemblances,  or 
ideas  of  things"  (11.11,17).  This  is  of  course 
not  all  of  the  Understanding,  but  only  its  implicit 
or  potential  stage.  It  is  the  Intellectus  primus, 
which  Locke  sometimes  regards  as  a  kind  of  prim- 
itive mental  substance  upon  which  Ideas  are  to 
be  impressed  and  held.  Locke,  however,  is  very 
uncertain  about  this  First  Understanding,  saying 
28 


434        MODERN"  EUROPEAN"  PHILOSOPHY. 

among  other   modest   phrases,   "  these   are  my 
guesses.'' 

2.  Already  the  "  Ideas  of  things  "  which  the 
Understanding   "  lets  in  at  its    window,"    have 
been  noticed.     The  term  Idea  is   probably  the 
most  common  one  in  Locke ;   his  first  labor,  we 
recollect,  is  to  clear  the  Idea  of  innateness.    Thus 
purified,  it  becomes  his  favorite  category.    What 
does  it  mean?     "  It  is  that  term  which    serves 
best  to  stand  for  whatsoever  is  the  object  of  the 
Understanding."     (I.   1,  8).     Here  the  Under- 
standing looks  at  its  own  object  or  impression, 
which  is   an  Idea.     The  contents  of  the  mind, 
whatever   it   thinks  about,  must    be    classed  as 
Ideas.     These  are  what  Locke  is  going  to  examine 
in  his  book,  he  is  going  to  get  an  Idea  of  all 
Ideas. 

3.  The  next  question  is,  Whence  come  these 
Ideas?     Locke's    answer   is,    from  Experience, 
which  is  his  third  leading  term  or  category   in 
the    present  field.     Upon  Experience   "  all  our 
knowledge  is  founded,  and  from  that  it  is  ulti- 
mately derived  "  (II.  1,  2).     What  is  it?     "  Our 
observation,  employed  either  about  external  sen- 
sible objects  or  about  internal  operations  of  our 
minds,  perceived  and  reflected  on  by  ourselves, 
is  that  which  supplies  our  Understandings  with 
materials    of   thinking."     These    are    properly 
Ideas,  coming  from  Experience,  which  has  the 
two  windows  (called  external  and  internal  sen- 


LOCKWS  ESSAY.  435 

sation)  "by  which  light  is  let  into  this  dark 
room"  of  the  primal  Understanding.  Yet  the 
Understanding  is  all  there:  the  first  dark  room, 
its  contents  or  Ideas,  and  the  windows  letting  in 
the  light.  Underlying  Locke's  whole  thought  is 
the  fact  that  these  three  belong  together  and 
form  one  process.  But  of  this  he  seems  to  be 
completely  unconscious. 

In  regard  to  Experience  Locke  makes  it  of  two 
kinds,  from  without  and  from  within,  though  we 
shall  find  him  employing  three. 

(1)  The    first    is    /Sensation  or  those    Ideas 
coming  into  the  mind  through  the  channel  of  the 
senses,  such  as  the  sensible  qualities  of  objects. 
This  corresponds  pretty  nearly  to  what  is  now 
known  as  Sense-perception,  and   the  Ideas   de- 
rived from  it  are  essentially  Percepts.     Sensation 
is  very  important  in  the  Philosophy  of  Locke,  at 
times  he  regards  it  as  the   true   or  active   mind 
writing  upon  the  white  sheet  of  paper  (the  blank 
or  passive  mincf)  its  operations. 

(2)  The  second  is  Reflection,  which  is  "  the 
other  fountain  from  which  Experience  furnisheth 
the  Understanding  with  Ideas  "  (II.  1,4).     The 
reader  will  do  well  to  note  the  lurking  process  in 
these  words:  Experience  opens  its  window  and 
lets  the  Ideas  into  the  dark  room  of  the  Under- 
standing which  then  looks  at  them  and  gets  to 
know  them.     Such  a  manner  of  statement  is  very 
external,   is  a  kind  of  personification  of   mental 


436         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

activities,  and  is  a  work  of  the  imagination  rather 
than  of  thought.  Still  it  is  just  this  process 
which  time  will  evolve  into  its  purity  and  fullness 
out  of  Locke. 

Reflection  is  the  "  perception  of  the  operation 
of  our  minds  within  us  "  or  the  act  of  self -con- 
sciousness which  accompanies  mental  activity. 
But  reflection  in  Locke  is  something  more  than 
this:  it  "  affords"  or  produces  Ideas  through 
the  mind  "reflecting  on  its  own  operations 
within  itself "  (11.1,4).  Eeflection  here  has 
the  same  double  meaning  which  Locke's  thinking 
shows  generally :  it  is  determined  from  without, 
yet  is  also  self-determined. 

(3)  Sensation  and  Reflection  have  a  common 
power  of  producing  simple  Ideas.  For  instance 
the  Ideas  of  Pain  or  Pleasure  "join  themselves 
to  almost  all  our  Ideas  both  of  Sensation  and  of 
Reflection."  We  know  that  '<  Pain  is  often  pro- 
duced by  the  same  objects  and  ideas  that  produce 
Pleasure  in  us."  Locke  cites  a  number  of  those 
simple  Ideas  which  we  receive  from  either  Sensa- 
tion or  Reflection,  as  unity,  power,  succession. 

II.  The  Understanding  as  Passive.  Locke 
after  dividing  ideas  into  simple  and  complex, 
characterizes  simple  Ideas  as  those  which  the 
Understanding  receives  passively.  "  These 
simple  ideas  when  offered  to  the  mind,  the  Un- 
derstanding can  no  more  refuse  to  have-,  nor 
alter  when  imprinted,  than  a  mirror  can  its 


LOCKE'S  ESSAY.  437 

images  or  ideas"  (II.  1.25).  It  is  significant 
that  Locke  here  calls  the  images  in  a  mirror  its 
ideas  of  objects.  "  The  mind  is  forced  to  receive 
the  impressions,  and  cannot  avoid  the  perception 
of  those  Ideas  that  are  annexed  to  them." 

But   now  for  the  other  side.     "In  time  the 

mind   conies   to   reflect   on  its   own   operations 

about  the  ideas  got  by  Sensation,  and  thereby 

stores  itself   with  a  new  set  of  ideas,  which  I 

4call  Ideas  of  Reflection"  (II.  124). 

But  this  is  not  all.  These  impressions  of 
sense,  "proceeding  from  powers  intrinsical  and 
proper  to  the  mind  itself,"  are  reflected  on  by 
the  mind,  and,  "  becoming  also  the  objects  of 
its  contemplation,  are,  as  I  have  said,  the  origi- 
nal of  all  knowledge."  Here,  then,  we  seem  to 
have  not  only  Reflection  as  the  self-conscious  act 
in  response  to  Sensation,  but  Reflection  as  "  the 
original  of  all  knowledge."  This  sounds  very 
much  like  a  new  source  of  knowledge,  not  so 
much  determined  by,  as  determining  Experience. 
That  stream  flowing  from  the  fountain  Experi- 
ence seems  to  have  strangely  turned  about  and 
to  be  going  back  to  its  source. 

Under  the  present  head  Locke  puts  a  good 
deal  of  matter  in  his  Essay. 

1.  The  simple  Ideas  of  Sensation  he  divides 
into  the  primary  and  secondary  qualities  of 
bodies.  The  first  are  those  "  which  are  utterly 
inseparable  from  the  body,  in  what  state  soever 


438         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

itbe,"  as  solidity,  extension,  figure.  The  secon- 
dary qualities  are  *«  nothing  in  the  objects  them- 
selves," but  are.* 'powers  to  produce  various 
sensations  in  us  by  their  primary  qualities  "  as 
colors,  sounds,  tastes.  « «  To  these  might  be  added 
a  third  sort "  as  the  power  of  fire  "  to  produce 
a  new  color  or  consistency  in  wax  or  clay  by  its 
primary  qualities,  which  is  analogous  to  the 
secondary  qualities  produced  in  me  by  fire" 
(II.8). 

2.  The  simple  Ideas  of  Reflection  Locke 
declares  to  be  mainly  two,  Perception  and  Will. 
"The  two  great  and .  principal  actions  of  the 
mind,  which  are  most  frequently  considered,  and 
which  are  so  frequent  that  everyone  that  pleases 
may  take  notice  of  them  in  himself,  are  these 
two :  Perception  or  Thinking,  and  Volition  or 
Willing."  (II.  6.)  This  is. a  very  important 
passage  for  determining  the  Psychology  of 
Locke.  It  is  evident  that  the  two  great  divisions 
of  the  mind  for  him  are  Intellect  (or  Under- 
standing, named  also  Perception  by  him  at 
times)  and  Will.  "  The  power  of  thinking  is 
called  the  Understanding,  and  the  power  of 
volition  is  called  the  Will."  The  other  mental 
activities  he  seems  to  regard  as  subdivisions  of 
these  two,  being  "  modes  of  these  simple  Ideas 
of  Reflection  such  as  remembrance,  discerning, 
reasoning,  judging,  knowledge,  faith,  etc."  Of 
these  subordinate  activities,  modes  of  Thinking 


LOCKE'S  ESSAY.  439 

and  Willing,  he  will  have  a  good  deal  to  say  in 
the  rest  of  his  Essay. 

In  this  division  Locke  carries  forward  the 
development  of  Psychology  to  an  important  new 
stage  and  by  a  method  which  must  be  pronounced 
new  in  its  present  completeness.  The  Ego  now 
turns  directly  to  itself  as  self -active  and  describes 
its  own  activities.  This  is  Locke's  great  step  in 
advance  of  the  philosophers  of  the  Seventeenth 
Century  who,  even  if  they  gave  the  process  of  the 
Ego  correctly,  wrapped  it  up  in  Substance 
or  the  Monad,  and  attributed  this  process  to  the 
act  of  God.  All  such  metaphysical  wrappage  is 
cast  off  by  Locke,  who  therein  is  a  great  libera- 
tor of  the  Ego,  asserting  its  divine  right  to  see 
itself  directly  as  it  is,  and  to  know  itself  psycho- 
logically. 

3.  The  modern  reader  asks,  where  is  the  third 
element,  co-ordinate  with  Thought  and  Will, 
namely  Feeling?  It  is  present  in  one  form  or 
other  (pain,  pleasure,  etc.),  but  it  is  not  dis- 
tinctly ordered  by  Locke  alongside  of  the  other 
two  divisions. 

III.  The  Understanding  as  active.  Now  we 
pass  fro  m  the  Understanding  passively  receiving 
simple  Ideas  to  the  Understanding  actively  pro- 
ducing complex  Ideas  through  its  powers  of  com- 
bination, comparison,  and  abstraction,  working 
upon  materials  already  given  in  the  mind  by  Sen- 
sation and  Reflection.  This  sphere  especially  rep- 


440        MODEEN  E  UROPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

resents  the  intellect  as  self-active,  spontaneously 
responding  to  the  stimulation  from  the  outside 
world. 

Thus  we  enter  the  realm  of  Complex  Ideas 
built  by  the  Ego  out  of  furnished  materials, 
which  are  ultimately  Simple  Ideas.  "  These 
complex  Ideas,  however  compounded  and  decom- 
pounded, may  all  be  reduced  under  three  heads : 
Modes,  Substances,  Relations."  (II.  12.  3.) 

1.  Modes  are   those   complex   Ideas  "  which 
contain  not  in  them  the  supposition  of  subsist- 
ing by  themselves,   but   are   considered   as   de- 
pendencies on  or  affections  of  substances."     For 
instance,  gratitude  is  not  self-subsistent,  but  de-* 
pends  on  a  substance.    Furthermore  Locke  divides 
Modes  into  simple   and   mixed,   and   under  the 
first  head  discusses    Space,   Duration,    Infinity, 
Number,  etc.     These  simple  Modes  as  such  can 
only  be  subjective,    being    modifications    which 
the  Understanding   produces   from    given    ma- 
terials. 

2.  ^Substance  as  Idea  is  taken  "  to  represent  a 
distinct  particular   thing  as   self-subsistent,"  in 
which  thing  "the  supposed  or  confused  idea  of 
Substance  is    the    first    and  chief."     Here   we 
catch   a   decided    note  of    dissatisfaction    with 
Substance,      that      fundamental      category     of 
the     philosophers     of     the     Seventeenth    Cen- 
tury.    "  Those    who   first    ran  into  the  notion 
of   Accidents    as    a  sort   of    real    beings    that 


LOCKE'S  ESSAY.  441 

needed  something  to  inhere  in,  were  forced  to 
find  out  the  word  Substance  to  support  them  " 
(II.  13,  19).  Great  is  his  disgust,  and  he  con- 
temptuously cites  an  American  savage  to  give  a 
reply  to  "  our  European  philosophers  "  who  hold 
that  "  Substance,  without  knowing  what  it  is,  is 
that  which  supports  Accidents."  Possibly  we 
may  hear  echoes  of  his  discussions  in  Holland, 
the  home  of  modern  Substance,  which  is  a  great 
category  with  both  Cartesians  and  Spinozists. 
But  Locke  hotly  invokes  death  upon  this  un- 
known "  substrate  called  Substance,  wherein 
they  (Simple  Ideas  or  Accidents)  do  subsist, 
and  from  which  they  do  result."  (II.  23.  1.) 
For  if  any  one  "  will  examine  himself,"  and  not 
merely  swallow  the  category  prescript! vely,  **  he 
will  find  that  he  has  no  idea  of  it  at  all."  Why 
not  drop  the  thing?  Somehow  he  cannot,  and 
so  he  goes  on  through  many  pages  expressing  his 
impatience,  and  it  must  be  added,  his  ignorance, 
for  nowhere  in  his  book  does  he  show  more  clearly 
than  just  here  his  philosophical  limitations. 

3.  Relation  is  the  complex  Idea  which  is  ob- 
tained by  the  Understanding  through  compari- 
son of  things.  "  When  the  mind  so  considers 
one  thing  that  it  does,  as  it  were,  bring  it  to  and 
set  it  by  another,  and  carries  its  view  from  one 
to  another  —  this  is  Relation."  (II.  25.  1.)  So 
we  pass  from  the  Idea  "  of  things  as  they  are  in 
themselves  "  or  Substance  to  the  Idea  of  things 


442        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

gotten  "  from  their  comparison  one  with  an- 
other." Thus  Locke  brings  before  us  the  world 
of  Relation  with  its  manifold  categories,  such 
as  cause  and  effect,  identity  and  diversity,  moral 
relations ;  here  too  he  seems  to  place  the  related  or 
contrasted  qualities  of  Ideas,  as  clear  and  obscure, 
distinct  and  confused,  true  and  false,  etc.  This 
brings  him  to.  the  last  chapter  of  his  Second 
Book,  which  treats  of  the  Association  (or  Rela- 
tion) of  Ideas. 

Locke's  view  of  causality  has  had  a  famous 
history.  "  That  which  produces  any  simple  or 
complex  Idea  we  denote  by  the  general  name, 
cause;  and  that  which  is  produced,  effect" 
(II.  26.  1).  Heat  is  the  cause  and  fluidity  the 
effect,  in  relation  to  wax,  this  effect,  we  have 
observed  "  is  constantly  produced  by  the  appli- 
cation of  a  certain  degree  of  heat."  Yet  there 
is  something  far  deeper  in  the  thought  of  cause 
than  this  description  of  a  relation  between  two 
phenomena.  In  that  long  chapter  of  his  on 
Power  (II.  21),  we  see  his  struggles,  which 
carry  him  into  a  discussion  of  Will  as  the  orginal 
source  of  the  idea  of  Cause.  The  same  two- 
foldness  appears  here  as  elsewhere  in  the  phi- 
losophy of  Locke. 

So  much  for  the  three  main  divisions  of  Com- 
plex Ideas,  Mode,  Substance,  and  Relation,  in 
which  we  may  trace  a  progress  if  not  a  process. 
For  Mode  takes  the  thing  in  its  manifestation, 


L  OCK&  S  ESS  A  r.  443 

Substance  is  the  thing  in  itself,  Relation  is  a  bring- 
ing and  holding  of  the  two  things  together  in 
thought.  Locke  of  course  gives  no  ground  of 
these  three  divisions,  and  does  not  bring  out 
distinctly  the  connection  between  them.  Still  his 
reader  will  fetch  to  the  surface  these  latent  quali- 
ties of  his  work,  since  they  belong  to  the  future. 

Moreover,  in  these  three  terms,  Locke  as- 
sumes his  attitude  toward  previous  Philosophy, 
especially  toward  that  of  the  Seventeenth  Cen- 
tury. The  doctrines  of  Mode  and  Substance 
belong  particularly  to  Spinoza,  though  Locke 
quite  inverts  them  in  order  of  importance  and 
changes  their  meaning.  In  fact  Locke  is  decidedly 
inclined  to  question  the  knowledge  which  complex 
Ideas  give.  We  have  «*  but  some  few  superficial 
ideas  of  things  "  given  by  Sensation  and  Reflec- 
tion; we  have  no  knowledge  "  of  the  internal 
constitution  of  things,  being  destitute  of  the  fac- 
ulties to  attain  it."  This  would  quite  invalidate 
complex  Ideas.  Still  we  must  again  recollect 
that  this  is  but  one  side  of  Locke ;  he  keeps  his 
complex  Ideas  notwithstanding,  as  he  does  the 
self -activity  of  the  mind,  of  which  they  are  the 
product 

Such  is,  we  believe,  the  essential  movement 
of  the  Second  Book  of  Locke's  Essay,  though 
many  other  matters  of  interest  are  discussed. 
Next  he  devotes  a  Book  (the  Third)  chiefly,  to 
an  examination  of  words  or  categories  —  a  prac- 


444         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tical,  but  not  profound  performance.  This  we 
shall  have  to  omit,  and  pass  at  once  to  the  fol- 
lowing Book,  which  is  an  integral  part  of  Locke's 
task. 

C.  FOURTH  BOOK.  —  In  this  Book  our  philoso- 
pher may  be  seen  in  a  kind  of  reaction  against 
himself.  He  is  now  more  metaphysical  than 
psychological.  In  fact  he  begins  to  appreciate 
the  metaphysical  standpoint  better  than  ever  be- 
fore. Its  problem,  that  of  the  objective  validity 
of  knowledge,  he  has  to  grapple  with,  and  the 
result  is  a  more  subdued  tone  in  reference  to 
Metaphysics.  Thus  the  present  Book  has  a 
character  and  indeed  a  mood  of  its  own.  It  is 
not  so  negative  as  the  First  Book,  nor  so  posi- 
tive as  the  Second.  It  is  plain  that  Locke 
through  his  psychology,  has  to  return  to  the 
metaphysical  views  from  which  he  had  separated 
for  his  start. 

When  Locke,  accordingly,  reaches  the  Fourth 
Book  of  his  Essay,  the  difficulties  of  his  task 
begin  to  press  upon  him.  He  starts  to  asking, 
What  is  this  knowledge,  this  experience  of  which 
we  have  been  talking?  So  he  defines :  "  Knowl- 
edge is  the  perception  of  the  agreement  or  the 
disagreement  of  any  of  our  Ideas."  Moreover 
all  our  knowledge  "  is  conversant  about  our 
Ideas  "  in  our  Mind,  or  is  confined  to  the  Ego  or 
subject,  which  in  one  way  or  other  unites  or 
separates  its  varied  contents  called  Ideas.  This 


LOCKE'S  ESSAY.  445 

knowledge  with  its  manifold  limitation  internally 
Locke  sets  forth  quite  fully,  and  with  genuine 
relish,  as  this  is  his  favorite  theme. 

But  he  cannot  help  pressing  forward  to  the 
grand  limitation,  the  external  one,  which  is  in- 
volved in  the  question:  Has  this  knowledge 
objective  validity?  Or,  as  Locke  puts  it,  Has 
knowledge  any  reality?  (See  Book  IV.,  Chap. 
4.)  "  How  shall  the  mind  when  it  perceives 
nothing  but  its  own  Ideas,  know  that  they  agree 
with  the  things  themselves? "  So  Locke's 
psychology  (of  the  Second  Book)  has  brought 
him  face  to  face  with  the  hardest  problem  of 
ontology  —  the  objective  existence  or  reality  of 
knowledge.  The  problem  was  not  agreeable  to 
him  as  he  must  have  been  aware  of  the  insuffi- 
ciency of  his  answer. 

Moreover  Locke  must  have  felt  that  this  dif- 
ficulty was  a  direct  consequence  of  his  denial  of 
the  Philosophy  of  the  Seventeenth  Century. 
That  Philosophy  had  as  its  chief  task  the  know- 
ing of  the  object  by  the  subject,  to  be  sure, 
"  through  the  concourse  of  God  "  in  some 
form,  Cartesian,  Spinozan,  Leibnizian.  Now  it 
was  just  this  divine  interference  (invoked  to 
make  mind  and  matter  correspond),  which  Locke 
rejected  with  emphasis.  (Book  I.)  Henc^the 
question  comes  up  to  Locke  with  startling  vigor  : 
How  can  the  mind  now  know  that  its  ideas  of 
things  agree  with  those  things  as  real?  What 


446          MODEKN  E VKOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

will  make  mind  and  matter  correspond?  Locke 
says  in  regard  to  simple  Ideas:  These  "  must 
necessarily  be  the  product  of  things  operating 
on  the  mind  in  a  natural  way  and  producing 
therein  those  perceptions  which ,  by  the  wisdom  and 
will  of  our  Maker  they  (the  things)  are  ordained 
and  adapted  to."  How  far  is  this  from  the 
Leibnizian  Pre-established  Harmony,  which  also 
ordains  things  so  as  to  produce  the  corresponding 
perception  in  the  mind?  This  and  other  similar 
passages  show  that  Locke  at  times  suffered  a 
relapse  to  the  Seventeenth  Century. 

Still  we  find  Locke  hedging  as  if  aware,  par- 
tially at  least,  of  what  he  had  done.  Not  the 
full  reality  or  truth  of  things  is  given  to  us  in 
our  Ideas,  "but  all  the  conformity  which  is  in- 
tended (by  our  Maker)  or  which  our  state  re- 
quires." For  these  Ideas  "represent  to  us 
things  under  those  appearances  which  they  are 
fitted  to  produce  in  us."  Here  is  plainly  the 
distinction  between  things  and  their  appearances 
which  are  given  to  us  by  our  Ideas.  This  is 
properly  the  opinion  of  Locke ;  of  the  thing  in 
itself  we  have  no  knowledge,  but  only  of  its  ap- 
pearance which  is  represented  to  us  by  an  Idea. 
Note,  however,  for  the  sake  of  the  future,  that 
things  can  produce  or  cause  in  us  Ideas  in  con- 
formity with  themselves ;  but  what  if  this  causa- 
tive nexus  be  denied?  (This  is  what  Hume  will 
do.) 


LOCKE.  —  PHILOSOPHY.  447 

We  need  follow  Locke  no  further  on  this 
present  line.  His  two  extremes,  both  in  his 
view  unknowable,  have  shown  themselves  (and 
so  are  known,  in  spite  of  the  contradiction). 
These  are  the  Ego-in-itself,  which  we  have 
noted  in  treating  of  the  Understanding  as  such, 
on  a  previous  page;  but  here  we  have  come 
upon  the  other  extreme,  the  Thing-in-itself. 
Between  these  two  limits  lies  Locke's  do- 
main of  knowledge.  That  is,  the  phenomenal 
object  (appearance)  stirs  the  phenomenal  Ego 
to  the  production  of  the  knowledge  of  the 
objective  world.  What  a  skeptical  age  will  make 
out  of  such  a  doctrine  is  to  be  unfolded  here- 
after. It  may  be  said,  however,  that  the  grand 
separation  between  subject  and  object  is  now 
born,  with  a  prospect  of  a  mighty  growth  in  the 
future. 

In  this  same  Book  Fourth  Locke  considers 
our  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  God.  Already 
he  has  treated  of  Man  (Ego)  and  of  the  World 
(object).  Thus  our  philosopher,  seemingly  in 
spite  of  himself,  embraces  the  philosophical 
Norm  in  his  exposition  —  Man,  World,  and  God. 
From  this  point  e>f  view  he  has  reached  Philoso- 
phy in  its  transmitted  order,  in  which  light  we 
may  briefly  glance  at  him. 

Ill,  LOCKE'S  PHILOSOPHY. — Locke  begins  to 
get  philosophical  in  the  old  sense,  with  the 
introduction  of  the  Norm  ( in  the  Fourth  Book  of 


448        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  Essay).  The  result  is  a  number  of  changes 
and  adjustments  which  do  not  comport  with 
what  he  has  previously  said  (in  the  First  and 
Second  Books).  Here,  however,  we  shall  only 
mention  the  fact  that  he  completely  re-adjusts 
his  psychology  to  the  newly  appeared  Norm. 
For  now  we  have  three  kinds  of  knowledge : 
"  I  say,  then,  that  we  have  the  knowledge  of  our 
own  existence  by  Intuition;  of  the  existence 
of  God  by  Demonstration;  and,  of  other 
things  by  Sensation."  Thus  we  have  the 
threefold  Norm  of  all  Existence :  Ego  (Man), 
God  (the  Absolute),  and  Nature  (or  the  world 
of  things)  (Book  IV.  Chap.  9).  Moreover  our 
knowledge  is  here  ordered  according  to  this 
Norm;  it  is  no  longer  that  of  Sensation  and 
Eeflection  (Book  II.).  And  we  must  also  note 
the  complete  change  in  procedure :  an  external 
principle  of  ordering  knowledge  is  adopted,  the 
mind  no  longer  arranges  its  own  content  directly 
out  of  itself,  but  according  to  a  transmitted  Norm. 
This  is  not  the  Locke  of  the  First  and  Second 
Books  of  the  Essay,  not  the  revolutionary, 
epoch-making  Locke.  Still  we  may  take  a  short 
look  at  him  clothing  himself  in  the  old  vesture  of 
thought,  as  he  once  deemed  it. 

1.  Metaphysics.  Locke  was  aware  of  his  en- 
tering a  wholly  new  sphere  when  he  began  to 
grapple  with  the  metaphysical  problem  concern- 
ing **  the  reality  of  knowledge."  Having  gotten 


LOCKE.  —  PHILOSOPHY.  449 

this  Idea,  how  can  I  know  that  it  corresponds  to 
the  object  of  which  it  is  an  Idea?  A  hard,  in 
fact  a  disagreeable  question  for  Locke,  for  he 
has  tacitly  to  unsay  some  of  the  severe  things 
which  he  said  about  the  previous  Philosophy, 
specially  about  Innate  Ideas.  That  Intuition 
of  his  which  sees  immediately  existence  —  how 
far  is  it  from  the  clear  and  distinct  Idea  (innate) 
of  the  Seventeenth  Century?  In  fact  Locke 
uses  the  two  expressions  interchangeably:  "I 
think  it  is  beyond  question  that  man  has  a  clear 
Idea  of  his  own  being  ' '  which  he  also  calls  «  *  an 
Intuition  of  his  own  existence "  (Book  IV. 
Chap.  10).  Also  such  Intuition  Locke  holds  to  be 
a  God-given  faculty  of  mind.  All  of  which  shows 
a  decided  tendency  to  reversion,  to  fall  back 
upon  what  he  had  previously  abandoned. 

Locke,  having  constructed  his  Theory  of 
knowledge  (Book  II.),  shows  visible  signs  of 
trouble  in  the  following  passage  in  which  he 
projects  his  own  questionings  into  his  reader :  "I 
doubt  not  but  my  reader  (really  Locke  himself) 
by  this  time  may  be  apt  to  think  that  I  have  been 
building  all  this  while  only  a  castle  in  the  air?  " 
What  is  the  good  of  the  whole  thing  if  "  knowl- 
edge is  only  the  perception  of  the  agreement  or 
disagreement  of  our  Ideas?  "  For  thus  knowl- 
edge is  purely  subjective,  and  cannot  be  distin- 
guished from  the  chimeras  of  "  the  most  extrava- 
gant fancy  in  the  world."  Accordingly  Locke 
29 


450        MODERN  E UEOPEAN  PHILOSOPH  Y. 

braces  himself  up  for  a  desperate  tussle  with  the 
grand  metaphysical  problem  concerning  "  the 
reality  of  knowledge."  The  theme  is  not  to  his 
taste,  as  we  divine  him,  and  is  certainly  not 
adapted  to  his  genius.  Already  we  have  given 
his  solution  of  this  problem. 

2.  Physics.  There  is  a  realm  of  "  other 
things"  besides  God  and  the  human  Self,  the 
knowledge  of  which  is  given  by  Sensation 
according  to  Locke.  This  kind  ©f  knowledge 
is,  moreover,  not  intuitive,  not  demonstrative, 
but  only  probable.  Hence  our  philosopher  gets 
a^ain  into  a  congenial  field — human  limitation. 

o  o 

The  result  is  we  have  quite  a  long  discussion  of 
probability  as  opposed  to  certainty  (Book  IV. 
Chaps.  14,  15,  16,  etc.). 

It  is  declared  by  Locke  that  we  can  have  no 
certain  knowledge  concerning  natural  bodies. 
"  Every  man's  reasoning  and  knowledge  is  only 
about  the  ideas  existing  in  his  own  mind,  which 
are  truly,  every  one  of  them,  particular  exist- 
ences. The  perception  of  the  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement of  our  particular  ideas  is  the  whole 
and  utmost  of  all  our  knowledge  "  (IV.  17.  9). 
Properly  there  is  no  universality,  this  being 
simply  "  accidental  "  to  particular  knowledge, 
and  consisting  only  in  this  "that  the  particular 
ideas  about  which  it  is  are  such  as  more  than  one 
particular  thing  can  correspond  with  or  be 
represented  by."  The  universal  as  genus  or  as 


LOCKE.  —  PHILOSOPHY.  451 

creative   principle  of  the  object  is  thus  denied, 
or  rather  is  totally  unknown  to  Locke. 

Hence  the  truths  of  Nature  can  only  be  prob- 
able, and  Natural  Science  is  the  field  of  Probabil- 
ism.  The  induction  of  particulars,  out  of  which 
is  said  to  flow  a  general  principle,  cannot  give 
certainty.  But  the  immediate  sensation  of  the 
object  is  indubitable.  The  old  skeptics  doubted 
the  report  of  the  senses,  with  Locke  it  is  the 
only  sure  knowledge  of  the  objective  world. 
Certainty  "  extends  only  as  far  as  the  present  tes- 
timony of  the  senses  employed  about  partieu^ir 
objects."  The  whole  realm  of  the  laws,  princi- 
ples, universal  processes  of  Nature,  is  but  a  region 
of  Probabilities.  The  particular  is  the  true,  the 
certain,  is  indeed  the  universal. 

With  such  a  view  Locke  is  not  going  to  give 
a  Philosophy  of  Nature  in  the  old  sense  of  the 
word.  The  thought  which  is  creative  of  the 
Cosmos  and  which  is  really  its  principle,  is  alien 
to  Locke  who  starts  with  particulars  as  the  real 
truth  and  at  most  binds  them  in  a  dubious  gen- 
erality. To  connect  Physics  with  Metaphysics  in 
one  great  process  of  the  All,  as  in  Greek  and 
German  Philosophy,  is  not  simply  repugnant  to 
Locke,  but  lies  quite  outside  of  his  mental  hori- 
zon. Locke's  infinite  is  but  a  never-ending 
series  of  particulars  (infinitum  imaginationis) , 
not  the  infinite  of  self -returning  thought  (infini- 
turn  rationis).  Thus  he  is  separative,  analytic, 


452          MODERN-  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

particular.  He  has,  instead  of  creative  Thought, 
the  discursive  forms  Abstraction  and  General- 
ization, for  his  treatment  of  facts.  Herein  his 
influence  reaches  through  Anglo-Saxon  Psychol- 
ogy down  to  the  present,  for  its  text-books  still 
repeat  him  on  this  point. 

Locke  has  left  us  a  little  book  on  the  "  Elements 
of  Natural  Philosophy,"  in  which  he  follows  his 
procedure.  He  picks  up  the  particulars  of 
Nature  and  recounts  them,  beginning  with  Mat- 
ter and  Motion  which  have  given  so  much  trouble 
to  those  philosophers  who  ask  after  essence  and 
inner  principle.  Locke,  however,  is  satisfied  to 
set  down  certain  facts  about  them,  and  then  he 
passes  to  the  Universe,  which  with  him  is  the 
sensible  one.  We  need  not  follow  him  in  his 
details  which  he  carries  through  the  mineral, 
vegetable  and  animal  kingdoms,  ending  with  man 
who  has  Understanding,  of  which  our  philoso- 
pher gives  a  brief  abstract  connecting  with  his 
Essay.  Thus  he  connects  outwardly  his  Natural 
with  his  Mental  Philosophy. 

The  external  world  is  thus  called  to  the  bar  of 
"  private  judgment  "  which  makes  science  prob- 
able—  the  Ego  probabilizes  the  non-Ego.  Al- 
ready in  Ancient  Philosophy  we  have  seen  a  simi- 
lar event,  when  Carneades  of  the  Middle  Academy 
developed  his  doctrine  of  Probabilism  against  the 
dogmatic  Metaphysics  of  a  previous  period. 
This  doctrine  is  specially  fitted  for  a  people  of 


LOCKE.  —  PHILOSOPHY.  453 

the  will  (like  the  Romans  and  the  English)  who 
care  little  for  speculative  knowledge  in  itself. 
Science  will  help  me  to  act  successfully  if  it  will 
aid  me  in  finding  the  probabilities  of  a  course 
of  conduct,  in  fact  that  is  all  it  is  good  for. 

3.  Ethics.  Locke  has  no  distinct  idea  of  the 
connection  of  Ethics  with  the  other  two  stages 
of  the  Norm,  nor  does  he  show  any  articulated 
knowledge  of  the  total  ethical  sphere  taken  by 
itself.  Still  if  we  cared  to  select  judiciously  and 
put  together  all  of  Locke's  scattered  statements 
which  pertain  to  Ethics,  we  might  make  a  toler- 
able showing  for  this  stage  of  the  Norm.  But 
such  a  task  we  cannot  here  undertake,  even  if  it 
were  worth  the  while,  which  is  doubtful. 

At  present  we  can  only  note  the  institutional 
element  in  Locke,  which  is  dominantly  secular, 
even  if  he  has  a  good  deal  to  say  about  the 
Church  in  some  of  his  books.  He  dislikes 
sacerdotalism  and  the  transmitted  authority 
which  is  connected  with  a  religious  estab- 
lishment. Still  he  is  by  no  means  ready  to 
break  with  it,  in  spite  of  its  lack  of  Toleration 
(Locke's  great  category). 

But  when  Locke  comes  to  the  State  he  is  far 
more  at  home  and  has  produced  works  of  much 
greater  import.  His  "Treatises  on  Govern- 
ment ' '  have  a  high  place  in  the  history  of  politi- 
cal science.  He  is  truly  the  philosopher  of  the 
English  Revolution  of  1688.  One  point  is  of  spe- 


454         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

cial  interest  to  Americans :  he  formulated  the 
threefold  division  of  Government  into  the 
legislative,  executive  and  judicial  powers,  which 
was  realized  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  Locke,  however,  was  not  the  first  to 
make  this  division,  it  is  as  old  as  Aristotle.  But 
he  brought  it  home  to  the  Anglo-Saxon  con- 
sciousness, and  through  its  adoption  by  Montes- 
quieu (in  the  Spirit  of  the  Laws)  it  became  a 
matter  of  European  knowledge. 

Nor  must  we  omit  to  mention  in  this  connec- 
tion Locke's  works  on  Education,  which  are  still 
to  be  read  by  the  teacher  who  wishes  to  know 
the  history  of  his  profession.  Locke  has  no 
Public  School  in  the  modern  sense,  no  great 
Educative  Institution.  The  development  of  the 
individual  boy  has  the  stress,  and  this  boy  is 
conceived  as  the  English  gentleman's  son,  who  is 
to  acquire  useful  knowledge  in  order  to  make 
himself  useful.  The  purpose  of  Education  is 
not  information,  but  formation. 

Locke  was  a  mediocre  man,  he  knows  it  and 
hence  his  praise  of  mediocrity.  He  was  men- 
tally a  limited  man,  and  by  virtue  of  his  inner 
character  he  became  the  philosopher  of  limita- 
tion. His  pft-repeated  note  is,  I  cannot  under- 
stand this  word  and  that  principle.  This  we  may 
deem  modesty,  a  proper  appreciation  of  one's 
own  limits.  Still  Locke  had  sufficient  Egotism 
to  think  that  what  he  could  not  understand,  no 


LOCKE.  —  PHILOSOPHY.  455 

one  else  could.  Certain  words  which  have  meant 
much  to  other  thinkers  and  other  ages,  have  little 
or  no  meaning  for  him.  Descartes,  Spinoza, 
and  Leibniz  did  have  some  brains,  and  they  all 
employed  the  word  Substance  which  Locke  could 
not  really  understand  and  so  deemed  quite  idea- 
less,  though  he  picked  it  up  again  after  throwing 
it  away  with  contempt. 

Hence  it  conies  that  Locke  has  fared  hard  at 
the  hands  of  certain  critics.  But  the  people  have 
adopted  him,  and  he  is  the  most  popular  of  the 
great  philosophers.  In  fact  if  greatness  be 
measured  by  extent  and  persistence  of  influence, 
he  is  the  greatest  of  them.  all.  Just-through  his 
limitations  he  became  the  voice  of  his  age  and  of 
his  nation,  and  has  remained  to  this  day  the 
philosopher  of  Anglo-Saxondom.  In  lecture, 
sermon,  speech,  we  still  hear  Locke  with  his 
fundamental  view  of  human  limitation.  In  read- 
ing Locke's  Essay,  the  style  may  seem  a  little 
antiquated,  but  its  thoughts  are  modern,  famil- 
iar, in  fact  common-place.  They  have  been 
served  up  to  us  from  infancy,  at  home,  at  school, 
at  church,  in  numberless  books,  articles,  edi- 
torials, by  people  who  have  never  read  Locke, 
but  who  participate  in  that  consciousness  which 
has  so  completely  appropriated  him.  His  great- 
ness is  not  to  have  been  too  great  for  his  time 
and  his  nation. 


456        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 


2*  Ibume, 

We  have  now  reached  the  supreme  represen- 
tative of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Eighteenth  Cen- 
tury in  its  second  phase.  Of  this  the  great  fact 
is  Skepticism,  which  is  essentially  Philosophy 
denying  Philosophy,  and  yet  remaining  philo- 
sophical ;  or  Philosophy  as  negative  turns  upon 
its  positive  or  dogmatic  form,  undermining  the 
same  and  therewith  undermining  itself.  For 
when  Skepticism  has  done  its  work,  it  itself 
must  be  at  an  end,  as  the  fire  dies  which  has 
consumed  its  fuel.  Such  is  the  inherent  dialec- 
tical process  of  Skepticism,  since  it  finds  out 
that  it  is  as  dogmatic  in  negation  as  Dogmatism 
is  in  affirmation.  The  skeptic  cannot  help  get- 
ting skeptical  of  his  own  system  and  indeed  of 
himself;  he  denies  that  he  can  know  truth,  but 
therein  implies  the  truth  of  his  denial.  In  time 
he  becomes  conscious  of  this  implied  denial  of 
his  own  principle ;  in  fact  antagonists  will  not 
fail  to  point  it  out ;  then  he  will  seek  to  bolster 
up  his  negation  by  a  fresh  denial,  which  is, 
however,  the  denial  of  his  own  denial.  Such  is 
the  movement  that  lies  immanent  in  the  very 
nature  of  Skepticism,  which  movement  shows 
itself  in  full  reality  in  the  rise,  growth  and  out- 


HUME.  —  PHILOSOPHIC  CHARACTER.      457 

come  of  ancient  Greek  Skepticism,  as  it  unfolded 
itself  from  Pyrrho  to  Sextus  Empiricus. 

Now  the  great  and  abiding  interest  of  Philoso- 
phy in  Hume  is  that  he  repeated  this  skeptical 
process  for  modern  thought,  in  the  heart  of  the 
Eighteenth  Century.  Hume  was  a  Scotchman ; 
in  this  fact,  too,  we  would  believe,  lies  a  mean- 
ing. For  of  all  dogmatic  forms  of  Prostestant- 
ism,.  Scotch  Presbyterianism  was  the  most  dog- 
matic, and  it  has  by  no  means  yet  lost  its  love 
for  heresy-hunting.  Hume  is  primarily  a  Scotch 
reaction  against  Scotch  religious  dogmatism; 
but  his  skeptical  bent  soon  carried  him 
out  of  Religion  into  Philosophy,  in  which 
also  he  did  not  fail  to  uncover  the  nega- 
tion. To  the  end  of  his  life  Hume  was 
fond  of  baiting  the  Presbyterian  bear,  his 
next  neighbor.  His  chief  regret  for  the 
utter  failure  of  his  first  book,  the  Treatise  on 
Human  Nature,  seems  to  have  been  that  it  did 
not  reach  "  such  distinction  as  even  to  excite  a 
murmur'  among  the  zealots."  Modern  Philos- 
ophy is  essentially  a  Protestant  discipline  and  has 
a  religious  background ;  in  Hume  it  calls  up  its 
denier  and  becomes  the  Protestant  protest  not 
only  against  Protestantism,  but  against  all  Relig- 
ion and  Philosophy.  And  yet  Hume  in  his  uni- 
versal skeptical  protest  will  claim  to  remain  both 
religious  and  philosophical.  Herein  he  shows 
the  inner  contradiction  of  himself,  of  his  life, 


458        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  also  of  his  time.  For  just  this  skeptical 
spirit  is  the  true  dualistic  character  of  his  century . 
We  must  not,  therefore,  take  Hume  too  seri- 
ously. He  cannot  well  be  a  zealous  advocate 
of  the  truth  of  Skepticism,  when  Skepticism 
means  that  there  is  no  truth.  If  he  was  inclined 
to  such  a  folly  in  his  youth,  when  he  wrote  and 
published  his  Treatise,  he  will  get  over  it  with 
the  years.  For  he  must  come  to  see  that  if 
Skepticism  is  the  truth,  then  its  attainment  is 
its  destruction.  He  cannot  be  very  eager  to  form 
a  school  or  a  band  of  followers  for  the  propa- 
gation of  his  doctrine,  since  if  Skepticism  is 
really  believed,  that  is  the  end  of  Skepti- 
cism. Fervent  disciples  with  faith  in  their 
hearts  he  does  not  want;  their  enthusiasm 
would  annihilate  his  whole  business.  Hence 
we  shall  find  a  deep  characteristic  of  Hume  to 
be  his  hate  of  enthusiasm;  this  is  a  salient 
trait  of  his  Writings,  notable  of  his  History  of 
England.  Skepticism  cannot  be  enthusiastic 
about  anything,  least  of  all  about  itself;  to  be 
true  to  itself  it  must  be  skeptical  of  itself. 
Hence  the  leading  maxim  of  the  old  Skeptics 
was  to  keep  yourself  in  reserve  (Epoche),  do 
not  commit  yourself.  Still  the  cunning  foe  re- 
plied that  even  in  this  maxim  you  committed 
yourself  to  non-committal.  Thereupon  follows 
a  second  maxim:  Say  nothing  (Aphasia),  for 


HUME.  — PHILOSOPHIC    CHARACTEE        459 

the    word    in  and  of  itself  must  assert  and    so 
be    dogmatic. 

Such  consistency  lies  not  in  the  character  of 
Hume,  who  has  violated  these  two  skeptical 
maxims  on  all  sides.  He  has  not  held  his  tongue, 
as  we  see  by  his  numerous  books,  nor  has  he 
failed  to  commit  himself  on  many  topics,  partic- 
ularly on  Skepticism.  He  sees  the  inherent 
comedy  in  the  skeptical  attitude,  nevertheless  he 
assumes  it,  and  so  gives  to  his  entire  life  a  comic 
undertone,  which  often  breaks  out  into  a  jest  or 
laugh  at  himself.  In  his  Dialogues  concerning 
Natural  Religion  says  one  of  the  characters : 
"  I  shall  never  assent  to  so  harsh  an  opinion  as 
that  of  a  celebrated  writer  who  says  that  the 
skeptics  are  not  a  sect  of  philosophers :  they  are 
only  a  sect  of  liars.  I  may,  however,  affirm,  (I 
hope  without  offence)  that  they  are  a  sect  of 
jesters  or  ralliers.  A  comedy,  a  novel,  or  at 
most  a  history  seems  a  more  natural  recreation 
than  such  metaphysical  substitutes  and  abstrac- 
tions," but  every  one  according  to  his  liking. 
Hume  is  aware  that  his  Philosophy  is  self-de- 
stroying, that  its  fulfillment  is  its  annihilation, 
that  he  is  pursuing  a  nugatory,  self-undoing  end, 
that  he  is  a  comic  figure  in  such  pursuit.  Yet 
we  must  recollect  that  this  is  not  merely  a  per- 
sonal whim  of  his  own ;  he  is  the  truest  repre- 
sentative of  the  negative  spirit  of  his  own  age ; 
in  fact,  the  whole  Eighteenth  Century  sees  its 


460         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

own  Comedy  in  his  Philosophy,  which  is  inher- 
ently self -annulling  and  ridiculous  even  to  itself. 
Still  we  must  not  think  that  it  has  no  function  in 
the  movement  of  thought.  When  the  world  turns 
comic,  Philosophy  must  follow  and  turn  comic 
too,  in  order  to  let  that  world  see  itself  in  its 
essence.  Philosophy  brings  the  age  to  a  con- 
sciousness of  itself  most  adequately  in  its  pure 
forms  of  thinking.  Through  Hume  the  age 
looked  at  itself  and  raised  a  shout  of  laughter  or 
a  cry  of  anger,  according  to  the  character  of  the 
spectator ;  but  all  had  to  acknowledge  that  the 
picture  was  true  in  the  main,  and  come  at  last 
to  the  conclusion  that  there  should  be  a  profound 
change  in  the  soul  of  the  century.  Hume  in 
spite  of  himself  was  a  preacher  and  was  calling 
sinners  to  conversion,  and  this  was  the  uncon- 
scious part  of  his  Comedy.  This  was  the  part 
which  the  Spirit  of  the  Age  made  him  play  as  its 
instrument  for  its  purpose,  which  was  quite  the 
opposite  of  his  own  purpose. 

I.  HUME'S  LIFE.  —  Before  passing  to  the 
details  of  this  part  of  our  subject  it  is  well  to  take 
notice  of  Hume's  views  of  Life  (as  practical)  in 
its  opposition  to  Philosophy  (as  theoreti- 
cal). Says  he:  "The  great  subverter  of  the 
excessive  principles  of  Skepticism  (Pyrrhon- 
ism) is  action,  and  employment,  and  the 
occupations  of  common  life."  Such  is,  in 
Hume's  view,  the  inherent  dualism  between 


HUME,  — LIFE.  461 

Thought  and  Action :  the  one  leads  necessarily 
to  Skepticism,  the  other  corrects  it.  He  goes  on  : 
"  These  (skeptical)  principles  may  flourish  and 
triumph  in  the  schools,  where  it  is,  indeed,  diffi- 
cult, if  not  impossible,  to  refute  them.  But  as 
soon  as  they  leave  the  shade,  and  by  the  pres- 
ence of  real  objects  which  actuate  our  passions 
and  sentiments,  are  put  in  opposition  to  the  more 
powerful  principles  of  our  nature,  they  vanish 
like  smoke,  and  leave  the  most  determined 
skeptic  in  the  same  condition  as  other  mortals." 
This  is  Hume  the  skeptic,  who  furthermore  de- 
clares that  Skepticism  cannot  "  have  any  con- 
stant influence  on  the  mind,"  being  just  that 
uncertainty  which  is  uncertain  of  all  things,  and 
most  uncertain  of  itself.  "All  discourse,  all 
action  would  immediately  cease,  and  menVemain 
in  a  total  lethargy."  The  skeptic's  Thought 
must  destroy  his  Will;  that  is,  all  Philosophy 
being  Skepticism,  hamstrings  Action.  "  The 
first  and  most  trivial  event  in  Life  will  put  to 
flight  all  his  doubts  and  scruples,"  and  he  will 
become  like  any  other  sensible  man.  "When 
he  awakes  from  his  dream,  he  will  be  the  first 
to  join  in  the  laugh  against  himself,  and  to  con- 
fess that  all  his  objections  are  mere  amusement, 
and  can  have  no  other  tendency  than  to  show  the 
whimsical  condition  of  mankind."  Surely  this 
is  a  letting  of  the  cat  out  of  the  bag ;  Hume 
here  confesses  that  Skepticism  is  a  "dream,  its 


462        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

play  of  subtlety  a  mere  amusement;"  the  skeptic 
"  will  be  the  first  to  join  in  the  laugh  against 
himself,"  he  being  at  bottom  a  comic  character, 
and  consciously  comic  at  that. 

All  these  extracts  are  taken  from  a  Section 
(XII.  Part  II.)  of  An  Enquiry  concerning  the 
Human  Understanding,  in  which  Section  he  casts 
a  glance  back  at  Skepticism  generally  and  at 
himself  in  particular.  He  makes  a  distinction 
between  excessive  or  Pyrrhonian  Skepticism  (  to 
which  he  applies  the  previous  description),  and 
the  mitigated  or  Humian  Skepticism,  "  which 
may  be  both  durable  and  useful,"  though 
having  but  a  '*  small  tincture  of  Pyr- 
rhonism," if  this  be  "  corrected  by  common 
sense  and  reflection."  And  yet  Hume  is  a 
Pyrrhonist  theoretically,  and  cannot  help  him- 
self. Our  senses  do  not  give  us  any  certain 
knowledge  of  the  object,  says  Pyrrho.  Now 
listen  to  Hume:  "  Men  always  suppose  the  very 
images  presented  by  the  senses  to  be  the  external 
objects.  This  very  table  which  we  see  white, 
and  which  we  feel  hard,  is  believed  to  exist,  inde- 
pendent of  our  perception,  and  to  be  external  to 
our  mind  which  perceives  it.  But  this  universal 
and  primary  opinion  of  all  men  is  soon  destroyed 
by  the  slightest  philosophy,  which  teaches  us  that 
nothing  can  ever  be  present  to  the  mind  but  an 
image  or  perception,  and  that  the  senses  are  only 
the  inlets  through  which  these  images  are  con- 


HUME.  —  LIFE.  4G3 

veyed  without  being  able  to  produce  any  imme- 
diate intercourse  between  the  mind  and  the 
object."  (Enquiry,  XII.  Part  I.)  Tyrrhenian 
Skepticism  never  said  more,  never  could  say 
more  than  this.  But  when  we  add  Hume's 
denial  of  causation,  declaring  that  the  object  can 
never  be  known  as  the  cause  of  the  image,  he 
is  more  Pyrrhonian  than  Pyrrho  himself.  It  is 
true  that  he  does  not  always  maintain  this  posi- 
tion. But  here  he  does,  just  in  his  criticism  of 
Pyrrho,  whom  he  will  "  mitigate  ' '  and  make  use- 
ful by  the  addition  of  a  little  "  common  sense," 
of  which  Hume  has  such  an  abundance. 

A  word  upon  these  utilities  of  "  mitigated" 
Skepticism.  First,  it  "  might  abate  the  pride  " 
of  the  dogmatists,  since  "the  greater  part  of 
mankind  are  naturally  apt  to  be  affirmative  and 
dogmatical  in  their  opinion,"  and  ought  to  be 
taken  down  a  peg.  But  the  chief  advantage  is 
the  second:  thereby  we  would  be  brought  to 
limit  * '  our  inquiries  to  such  subjects  as  are  best 
adapted  to  the  narrow  capacity  of  human  under- 
standing." What,  then,  are  these  subjects? 
First,  "  abstract  reasoning  about  quantity  and 
number,"  that  is,  Mathematics.  Second,  "  ex- 
perimental reasoning  about  matter  of  fact  and 
existence,"  that  is,  empirical  science.  All  the 
rest  "commit  to  the  flames,  for  it  can  contain 
nothing  but  sophistry  and  illusion."  Suppose 
we  apply  this  test  to  David  Hume's  works.  Has 


46  4        MODE  EN  E  UEOPEAN  PHIL  OSOPH  T. 

he  written  anything  on  Mathematics?  Appar- 
ently not  a  page.  Has  he  devoted  his  pen  to 
the  empirical  sciences?  To  some  extent,  doubt- 
less; yet  this  part  of  his  work  has  a  tendency 
to  drop  into  the  background,  while  his  Philoso- 
phy keeps  advancing  in  importance,  though  con- 
taining '«  nothing  but  sophistry  and  illusion," 
according  to  his  own  judgment. 

Again  we  must  bethink  ourselves  and  not  take 
Hume  too  seriously,  not  more  seriously  than  he 
takes  himself.  We  have  already  seen  that  he 
deems  the  skeptic  not  a  liar  indeed,  but  a  rallicr, 
a  sort  of  world- joker.  The  matter  which  the 
rest  of  mankind  are  very  earnest  about,  namely, 
the  knowledge  of  Truth,  he  turns  into  a  self- 
contradiction,  the  pursuit  of  which  makes  life 
an  enjoyable  comedy.  What  has  such  a  man 
left  for  himself  but  to  gratify  his  senses?  Still 
Hume  did  not  indulge  his  appetites  to  excess ; 
though  a  born  voluptuary,  he  turned  his  nature 
into  philosophy,  and  advocated  that  which  he 
never  tried  to  realize.  Hume  seems  ancient  Epi- 
curus re-incarnated,  who  also  practiced  temper- 
ance, but  preached  indulgence.  Sensation  is  the 
man,  so  let  him  see  that  it  be  pleasant  while  he 
lasts.  To  be  sure  Hume  did  not  literally  follow 
any  such  doctrine  to  its  consequences  in  conduct. 
He  was  frugal,  sober,  industrious.  Still  the 
thing  lay  in  him  naturally  and  came  out  not 


HUME.  —  LIFE.  465 

through  his  body  but  through  his  brain,  not 
through  his  action  but  through  his  thought. 

And  yet  that  body  of  his  had  its  suggestion. 
The  following  bit  of  description  touches  this 
point,  and  has  been  selected  and  handed  down 
by  friendly  biographers:  "Nature.  I  believe, 
never  formed  any  man  more  unlike  his  real 
character  than  David  Hume.  The  powers  of 
physiognomy  were  baffled  by  his  countenance ; 
neither  could  the  most  skillful  in  that  science 
pretend  to  discern  the  smallest  trace  of  the 
faculties  of  his  mind  in  the  unmeaning  feature  of 
his  visage.  His  face  was  broad  and  flat,  his 
mouth  wide,  without  any  other  expression  than 
imbecility;  his  eyes  vacant  and  spiritless;  and 
the  corpulence  of  his  whole  person  was  far  better 
fitted  to  convey  the  idea  of  a  turtle-eating 
alderman  than  that  of  a  refined  philosopher. 
His  speech  in  English  was  rendered  ridiculous 
by  the  broadest  Scotch  accent,  and  his  French 
was,  if  possible,  still  more  laughable;  so  that 
wisdom  most  certainly  never  disguised  herself 
before  in  such  an  uncouth  garb."  (Written  by 
Lord  Charlemont  who  saw  Hume  at  Turin  in 
1748.) 

This  report  is  given  by  an  admirer,  and  may 
be  taken  as  trustworthy,  though  in  our  opinion, 
the  first  sentence  should  be  modified.  Nature 
knew  what  she  was  about  when  she  put  David 
Hume  into  such  a  body,  making  him  on  the  one 
30. 


466        MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

hand  a  great  flabby,  lubberly  fat  man,  and  on 
the  other  a  philosopher,  and  then  uniting  the  two 
in  one  person  whose  Philosophy  will  necessarily 
be  the  contradiction  of  all  Philosophy.  His 
picture  by  Allan  Ramsey  says  something  of  the 
kind.  A  contemporary  anecdote  of  him  cele- 
brates the  fact  "  that  even  David  Hume,  for  all 
his  great  figure  as  a  Philosopher  and  Historian, 
or  his  greater  as  a  fat  man,  was  obliged  to  make 
one  of  three  in  a  room  "  at  a  crowded  inn.  We 
understand  a  little  humorous  touch  of  self-de- 
scription in  the  same  way :  I  am  "  a  sober,  discreet, 
virtuous,  frugal,  regular,  quiet,  good-natured 
man,  of  a  bad  character."  Hume  never  dis- 
guised his  own  view  of  himself  and  of  his  part ; 
if  all  the  world  is  a  comedy,  he,  as  a  member  of 
the  troupe,  must  be  comic  also  even  to  himself, 
and  "  be  the  first  to  join  in  the  laugh  against  him- 
self." Let  the  philosopher  of  idealism  be  lean 
and  hollow-eyed ;  the  philosopher  of  sensism,  who 
holds  that  all  there  is  of  him  is  a  huge  periphery 
of  sensation,  should  be  a  fat  man  of  no  small 
diameter,  and  thus  truly  represent  his  Philoso- 
phy incarnate.  Report  makes  of  Hume  a  jolly, 
all-round,  good  fellow,  who  could  "  join  in  the 
laugh  against  himself."  Still  there  was  to  this 
a  limit  also,  in  the  nature  of  the  case.  Doubt- 
less a  chief  reason  why  Hume  did  not  like  the 
Londoners  was  their  excessive  merriment  at  the 
fat  philosopher;  his  puffing,  shuffling  manner, 


HUME.  -  LIFE.  467 

his  broad  Scotch  dialect,  his  provincial  ways 
amused  the  literary  cockneys  of  the  metropolis 
just  a  little  too  much  for  him  "to  join  in  the 
laugh  against  himself ;"  on  the  contrary,  twice 
at  least,  after  intending  to  settle  at  London,  he 
took  to  flight  from  that  unappreciative  city, 
speeding  sooner  or  later  back  to  auld  Scotland 
and  bonnie  Edinboro,  where  ruled  the  canny 
Scotch  accent,  and  where  he  was  easily  the 
chief  of  the  literary  clan. 

1.  On  the  whole  the  First  Period  of  Hume's 
Life  may  be  considered  to  conclude  with  the 
publication  of  his  first  and  greatest  philosophical 
work,  which  is  still  regarded  as  his  epoch-making 
production.  This  is  A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature, 
the  final  volume  of  which  was  given  to  the  world 
when  Hume  was  twenty-nine  years  old  (1740). 
It  is  one  of  the  very  rare  instances  in  which  a 
philosophical  work  is  composed  by  a  young  man, 
who  never  afterwards  equals  his  youthful  attempt. 
But  the  exception  is  only  apparent.  Hume's 
book  is  not  a  great  constructive  effort  of  philoso- 
phy, but  is  critical,  negative,  destructive.  Archi- 
tectonic power  of  thought  it  does  not  show ;  that 
is  always  a  later  fruit  of  philosophic  genius.  A 
young  fellow  usually  thinks  he  knows  better  than 
the  old  heads  around  him,  and  is  inclined  to  at- 
tack what  has  been  transmitted.  In  this  respect 
Hume  remained  young  as  long  as  he  philoso- 


468        MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

phized,  though  in  other  respects  he  toned  down 
not  a  little. 

David  Hume  was  born  in  Edinburg,  April  26th, 
1711  (O.  S.).  This  city  remained  all  his  life 
the  center  from  which  he  often  went  forth  and 
to  which  he  as  often  returned.  Of  his  early  edu- 
cation little  is  known.  In  his  autobiography 
he  merely  says:  "  I  passed  through  the  ordinary 
course  of  education  with  success."  But  the  chief 
fact  of  it  in  his  memory  is  that  ' «  I  was  seized 
with  a  passion  for  literature,  which  has  been  the 
ruling  passion  of  my  life."  His  people  intended 
him  for  the  law,  but  while  they  fancied  he  was 
poring  upon  jurisprudence,  "  Cicero  and  Virgil 
were  the  authors  I  was  secretly  devouring." 

From  these  hints  we  can  trace  certain  general 
lines  of  his  future  literary  tendencies.  His 
ancient  culture  was  Latin,  not  Greek  directly: 
that  is,  it  was  derived  from  the  Roman  reflection 
of  Hellenic  learning,  particularly  of  Hellenic 
Philosophy.  He  never  drank,  or  at  best  but 
very  little,  from  the  great  original  sources  of 
Greek  Thought,  Plato  and  Aristotle.  He  hardly 
knew  their  tongue  at  the  formative  period  of  his 
doctrine.  Not  till  after  he  had  published  his 
Treatise,  his  most  original  book,  and  the  first  part 
of  his  Essays,  when  he  was  already  past  thirty 
and  beyond  his  First  Period,  did  he  recover 
"the  knowledge  of  the  Greek  language  which  I 
had  too  much  neglected  in  my  early  youth," 


HUME.  —  LIFE.  469 

during  school  years.  His  model  and  his  moulder 
was  unquestionably  Cicero.  His  style  and  the 
attitude  of  his  mind  are  largely  though  not 
wholly  Ciceronian.  To  our  taste,  Hume's  philo- 
sophical style  is  in  the  main  an  improvement  on 
that  of  Cicero,  being  quite  devoid  of  the  wordy 
rhetorical  roll  of  the  thrice-repeating  Roman 
rhetorician. 

The  question  comes  up  whether  Hume  ever 
drew  anything  from  Sextus  Empiricus,  the  great 
fountain  of  learning  in  regard  to  Greek  Skepti- 
cism. From  the  frequent  mention  Hume  makes 
of  the  name  of  Pyrrho,  a  book  by  Sextus  is 
brought  to  mind,  called  the  Pyrrhonian  Hypoty- 
poseis.  But  the  Skepticism  of  Hume  (as  he  re- 
peatedly declares)  is  not  Pyrrhonian  and  Greek, 
but  Academic  and  Eclectic,  that  is  Ciceronian 
and  Roman.  At  least  such  he  claimed  and  in- 
tended it  to  be,  even  if  he  was  in  part  mistaken. 
The  Roman  age  of  Cicero  was  a  disbelieving, 
skeptical,  revolutionary  age  like  the  Eighteenth 
Century.  The  Romans,  Cicero's  audience,  were 
essentially  a  will-people  and  still  remained  Roman 
even  when  accepting  some  intellectual  varnish 
from  Greek  culture.  A  late  Greek,  Plutarch, 
has  specially  set  forth  this  fact  in  his  Parallel 
Lives,  and  the  same  fact  is  strongly  brought  out 
by  Shakespeare  in  his  Roman  play,  Julius  Ccesar. 
Now,  the  English  are  also  a  will-people,  and  have 
been  a  hundred  times  called  the  modern  Romans. 


470        MODEUN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

They  have,  likewise,  the  Eoman  trait  of  permit- 
ting a  little  philosophic  varnish  to  be  applied  to 
their  marvelous  active  life,  if  it  be  not  rubbed  m 
too  deep,  after  the  German  or  Greek  fashion, 
and  if  it  be  kept  strictly  within  the  limits  of  its 
decorative  purpose.  This  was  Hume's  audience, 
and  his  literary  function  was  similar  to  that  of 
Cicero,  with  a  similar  relation  to  his  age  and  na- 
ture. It  is  no  wonder,  then,  that  the  literary  Ro- 
man became  his  teacher,  from  whom  he  took  his 
skeptical  attitude  rather  than  from  Sextus  Empi- 
ricus  or  the  Greeks. 

To  this  Roman  source  we  must  add  the  Eng- 
lish influence  which  brought  him  philosophically 
into  his  own  century.  This  influence  was  Locke* 
whose  theory  of  knowledge  was  the  chief  means 
through  which  Hume's  Latin  culture  was  trans- 
formed into  the  philosophy  of  the  time.  Locke's 
psychological  forms  are  taken  by  *  Hume  and 
pushed  into  Skepticism,  which  is  not  by  any 
means  alien  to  them.  The  skeptical  bent  and 
training  of  Hume  easily  put  a  corresponding 
content  into  what  was  already  facing  in  that 
direction.  Such  are  the  two  main  sources  of  the 
Treatise  on  Human  Nature. 

Hume  wrote  this  book  after  some  struggles 
and  fluctuations.  His  means  being  limited,  he 
went  to  Bristol  to  try  a  mercantile  calling;  «'  but 
in  a  few  months  I  found  that  scene  totally  un- 
suitable to  me."  He  gave  it  up  forever;  thence 


HUME.  —  LIFE.  471 

he  passed  over  to  France  for  the  purpose  of 
study,  where  he  stayed  three  years,  chiefly  at 
La  Fleche,  the  scene  of  the  early  education  of 
Descartes  who  also  began  his  doubt  there,  his  de 
omnibus  dubitandum.  In  this  French  village 
the  most  of  Hume's  book  was  written.  Return- 
ing with  his  manuscript  to  London,  he  succeeded 
in  getting  a  publisher,  but  the  work  "  fell  dead- 
born  from  the  press,"  in  the  words  of  his  auto- 
biography. 

The  failure  of  Hume's  first  book  undoubtedly 
makes  a  turning-point  in  his  career.  Like  all 
young  authors,  and  some  old  ones,  he  dreamed 
that  his  production  was  the  greatest  of  its  time, 
and  that  it  would  at  once  bring  him  money  and 
fame.  The  first  part  of  the  dream  was  largely 
true,  the  second  part  was  totally  false.  Hume 
did  not  see  that  the  very  merit  of  his  book 
doomed  it  to  failure  at  the  start.  But  experi- 
ence teaches  him  the  lesson.  Moreover  he 
must  have  bread  to  satisfy  the  one  appetite,  and 
he  must  have  literary  success  to  satisfy  the 
other  appetite,  "  the  ruling  passion  of  my  life." 
He  starts  out  to  get  both  in  a  fresh  pursuit. 

2.  This  gives  the  Second  Period  (1740-1763), 
which  shows  him  succeeding  in  both  objects.  He 
will  put  abounding  cash  into  his  pocket,  and  will 
get  such  a  dose  of  fame,  particularly  at  Paris, 
that  even  his  enormous  greed  for  it  will  turn  to 
satiety;  at  least  he  will  say  so.  The  trend  of' 


472         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

his  life  now  is  the  practical.  He  will  not  re- 
nounce literature,  "his  ruling  passion,"  but  he 
will  adjust  it  to  his  audience.  He  takes  a  new 
measure  of  the  public,  and  carefully  spies  out  the 
way  to  capture  the  citadel  of  popular  applause. 
He  does  not  propose  to  run  his  head  against  its 
stone  walls  any  more.  The  failure  of  the  Trea- 
tise has  taught  him  the  important  practical 
principle  of  accommodation.  The  result  is  a 
significant  change  in  his  literary  attitude,  which 
extends  even  to  his  style.  Previously  (in  the 
First  Period)  his  standpoint  was  the  thing  to  be 
done,  now  (in  his  .Second  Period)  it  is  in  his 
audience,  to  which  he  intends  to  accommodate 
himself.  He  will  storm  the  fortress,  if  not  of 
Truth  at  least  of  Popularity,  and  for  the  rest  of 
his  life  he  will  revel  in  the  good  things  which  he 
finds  there  as  the  spoils  of  his  victory. 

The  Second  Period  will  show  two  strands  run- 
ning separately  and  yet  intertwining  in  a  double 
life-line.  These  two  strands  we  may  call  the 
speculative  and  the  practical,  the  turning  within 
and  the  turning  without,  the  realm  of  thought 
and  the  realm  of  affairs .  Hume  will  show  him- 
self doubly  successful  —  as  a  writer  of  books  and 
as  a  man  of  business.  His  books,  however, 
mean  business,  and  his  business  means  books. 

In  his  two  volumes  of  Essays,  published  in 
1741  and  in  1742,  he  began  to  win  that  literary 
renown  which  was  his  chief  ambition.  A  year 


HUME.  — LIFE.  473 

or  so  later  he  seems  to  have  been  spoken  of  for 
the  chair  of  Moral  Philosophy  in  the  University 
of  Edinburg,  but  the  plan  carne  to  naught,  and 
Hume,  like  the  four  great  modern  philosophers 
who  preceded  him,  did  his  work  outside  of  any 
University.  In  1745  he  went  to  live  with  the 
Marquis  of  Annandale,  a  crazy  young  nobleman 
of  great  wealth  who  had  been  "  charmed  with 
something  contained  in  the  Essays."  It  was  a 
melancholy  situation,  and  ended  in  a  lawsuit; 
still  Hume  records  that  "  my  appointments 
during  that  time  made  a  considerable  accession 
to  my  small  fortune."  He  then  received  an 
invitation  from  General  St.  Clair  to  attend  him 
as  a  secretary  to  his  expedition,  "  which  was  at 
first  meant  against  Canada,  but  ended  in  an 
incursion  on  the  coast  of  France  "  —  a  miserable 
business.  In  1747  he  attended  the  same  General 
on  an  embassy  to  the  courts  of  Vienna  and  Turin, 
during  which  "  I  wore  the  uniform  of  an  officer, 
and  was  introduced  at  these  courts  as  aide-de- 
camp to  the  General."  Thus  he  catches 
glimpses  of  high  life.  It  was  at  Turin  that 
Lord  Charlemont  saw  him  and  celebrated  his 
corpulence,  his  broad  Scotch  accent,  and  his 
ridiculous  French.  Hume,  however,  was  pro- 
foundly satisfied  with  himself  during  this  pe- 
riod, for,  besides  having  an  agreeable  time  and 
good  company,  "  my  appointments,  with  my 
frugality,  had  made  me  reach  a  fortune  which  I 


474        MODERN"  EUROPEAN'  PHILOSOPHY. 

called   independent ;    in  short  I  was  now  master 
of  near  a  thousand  pounds." 

At  the  end  of  this  tour  Hume  gravitates  back 
to  Scotland,  first  to  the  county  seat  of  his  family 
and  then  to  Edinburg.  In  1752  the  Faculty  of 
Advocates  chose  him  as  their  Librarian,  which 
office,  though  the  pay  was  small,  "gave  me  the 
command  of  a  large  library.  I  then  formed 
the  plan  of  writing  the  History  of  England," 
altogether  the  most  widely  read  of  Hume's 
literary  productions,  and  by  no  means  left  be- 
hind in  the  race  to-day,  as  the  numerous  popular 
editions  testify.  There  is  no  question  about  the 
abiding  charm  of  this  historical  work,  which  no 
amount  of  hostile  criticism  (certainly  justifiable 
in  many  ways)  can  seriously  affect  with  the 
great  public.  We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the 
fame  of  Hume  the  historian  has  decidedly 
helped  to  preserve  the  fame  of  Hume  the  phi- 
losopher. But  this  work  too  was  very  un- 
favorably received  on  its  appearance,  and  the 
failure  touched  Hume  deeply.  The  grapes  were 
indeed  very  sour,  if  we  may  judge  by  the  fol- 
lowing extract  from  a  letter  to  a  friend:  "As 
to  the  approbation  of  those  blockheads  who  call 
themselves  the  public  whom  a  bookseller,  a  lord, 
a  priest  or  a  party  can  guide,  I  do  most  heartily 
despise  it."  His  disgust  becomes  so  great,  that 
he  resolves  to  leave  Edinburg  and  go  to  London, 
"  probably  to  remain  there  during  life."  Yet 


HUME.— LIFE.  475 

his  dislike  of  Englishmen  was  too  deep,  and  Eng- 
lishmen had  no  great  love  for  the  thrifty  Scotch. 
Accordingly  he  is  soon  back  in  Edinburg  again, 
and  takes  a  house,  as  if  he  meant  now  to  stay. 
Meantime  his  books  have  been  selling  rapidly ; 
"  the  copy-money  given  me  by  the  booksellers 
much  exceeded  anything  formerly  known  in 
England ;  I  was  become  not  only  inde- 
pendent but  opulent."  He  has  attained  the 
object  of  his  ambition ;  he  is  famous  and 
rich.  Great  is  his  satisfaction;  "I  retired 
to  my  native  country  of  Scotland,  deter- 
mined never  more  to  set  foot  out  of  it ; " 
and  being  now  turned  of  fifty ,  *  *  I  thought  of 
passing  all  the  rest  of  my  life  in  this  philosophi- 
cal manner."  He  has  written  his  books,  having 
finished  his  History  of  England ;  he  has  carried, 
through  successfully  both  strands  of  life,  the 
practical  and  theoretical,  with  which  his  Second 
Period  started.  Those  two  great  antagonists, 
Philosophy  and  Business,  he  has  harmoniously 
combined  in  his  career,  in  spite  of  all  the  cap- 
rices of  fortune.  Let  him  enjoy  henceforth  his 
philosophic  leisure. 

But  a  voice  comes  to  him  in  his  retirement 
which  stirs  anew  "  my  ruling  passion,  my  love 
of  literary  fame."  He  is  invited  to  go  to  Paris, 
the  literary  center  of  Europe;  can  he  resist? 
Hardly. 

3,  So  a  Third  Period  (1763-1776)  of  Hume's 


476        MODERN  E UBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

life  opens,  lasting  till  his  death.  It  is  a  time  of 
fruition;  having  done  his  work,  he  will  enjoy 
the  rewards  of  fame  and  money,  these  being 
about  all  that  there  is  in  life  according  to  Hume. 
He  never  had  a  family  of  his  own,  no  wife  and 
children;  he  has  no  great  thought,  whose  truth 
he  wishes  to  propagate,  for  his  phil®sophy,  is 
that  there  is  no  truth.  Very  different  was 
Hume's  successor  in  the  philosophic  line,  Kant, 
who  wrote  his  greatest  book  at  fifty-seven,  and 
kept  up  the  battle  for  the  Idea  till  he  was  eighty. 
And  Locke,  Hume's  predecessor,  tilled  and 
sowed  to  the  last,  with  faith  in  his  heart.  One 
thing,  however,  will  rouse  Hume;  a  further 
opportunity  for  indulging  in  «'  my  ruling  pas- 
sion, the  love  of  literary  fame,"  with  some 
money  thrown  in. 

In  1763  Hume  "  received  an  invitation  from  the 
Earl  of  Hertford  to  attend  him  on  his  embassy 
to  Paris,  with  a  near  prospect  of  being  appointed 
secretary  to  the  embassy."  He  at  first  declined, 
but  then  accepted  "  on  his  lordship's  repeating 
the  invitation,"  evidently  with  the  addition  that 
the  uncertain  prospect  should  be  made  certain, 
for  we  soon  read  that  "  I  was  secretary  to  the 
Embassy."  But  here  again  trouble  arose.  The 
appointment  had  been  given  to  an  incapable  man, 
who  stayed  in  London,  but  drew  the  salary 
(1200  pounds).  From  this  fact  the  American 
politician  will  have  to  acknowledge  that  he  did 


HUME.  —  LIFE.  477 

not  originate  what  in  the  slang  of  to-day  is  called 
"  graft."  Poor  Hume  had  to  be  contented  with 
a  temporary  pension  of  200  pounds  and  a  prom- 
ise. It  is  no  wonder  that  his  letters  at  this  time 
show  an  increased  dislike  of  "  those  barbarians 
who  inhabit  the  banks  of  the  Thames." 

But  if  the  side  of  money  did  not  turn  out  as 
well  as  was  expected,  the  side  of  flattery,  the 
gratification  of  "  my  ruling  passion,"  transcended 
all  bounds.  At  Paris  the  first  question  usually 
addressed  to  an  Englishman  was,  "  Do  you  know 
Mr.  Hume?  "  With  truth  the  latter  might  now 
write  to  a  friend :  * '  Paris  is  the  place  I  have  al- 
ways admired  most, ' '  It  is  said  that  the  Dauphin 
at  Versailles  had  his  three  boys  recite  prepared 
speeches  praising  Hume  when  the  latter  visited 
the  royal  palace. 

But  even  the  colossal  appetite  of  Hume  began 
to  be  sated.  He  writes  to  Adam  Smith  :  "  Dur- 
ing two  days  at  Fontainebleau  I  have  suffered 
(the  expression  is  not  improper)  as  much  flattery 
as  almost  any  man  has  ever  done  in  the  same 
time."  So  the  deluge  kept  pouring,  pouring; 
royalty,  nobility,  the  ladies,  and  chiefly  the 
French  philosophers  and  literary  men,  went  wild 
with  enthusiasm  over  a  man  who  did  not  believe 
in  enthusiasm  unless  perchance  it  was  directed 
toward  himself.  We  hear  of  Diderot,  D'Alem- 
bert,  the  French  encyclopedists,  uniting  in  a  kind 
of  religious  procession  to  burn  incense  to  their 


478        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

God  who  8eems  suddenly  to    have  appeared  in 
person. 

What  is  the  meaning  of  it  all?  the  reader  of 
to-day  still  queries.  What  had  Hume  done  to 
call  forth  such  a  tremendous  outburst  of  recogni- 
tion at  Paris,  so  that  «*  no  author  ever  attained 
to  an  equal  degree  of  reputation  during  his  life- 
time?" In  order  to  get  an  answer  we  have  to 
look  into  what  was  then  simmering  and  ferment- 
ing in  the  spirit  of  the  French  people.  The  Revo- 
lution was  preparing  itself  for  an  outbreak  in 
the  heart  of  that  gay  fluttering  mass  which 
surged  around  Hume,  and  for  once  manifested 
something  like  worship.  The  greatest  European 
prophet  of  Negation  had  appeared  right  in  the 
center  of  his  fellow-believers  who  believed 
not.  The  result  was  a  mighty  shout  of  saluta- 
tion and  welcome  which  shook  that  Pari- 
sian Pandemonium  to  its  nethermost  depths, 
and  gave  to  all  who  could  look  into  the  seeds  of 
Time,  a  shiver  of  foreboding  at  the  deed  which 
was  rapidly  approaching.  The  negative,  de- 
structive Eighteenth  Century  celebrated  a  kind  of 
prelude  to  its  real  drama  in  this  reception  of 
Hume,  which  can  only  be  understood  by  taking 
into  account  the  state  of  France  at  that  time. 
Paris  was  the  scene  where  the  spectacle  was  to 
be  played  from  beginning  to  end,  and  Paris  now 
gives  a  greeting  to  the  foreign  philosopher  of 
her  coming  destiny,  which  not  only  illustrates  his 


HUME.  —  LIFE.  479 

doctrine  in  its  world-historical  meaning,  but 
vividly  reflects  that  city's  present  disposition  and 
future  possibilities.  In  some  such  fashion  we  may 
explain  to  ourselves  the  magnitude  of  Hume's 
reception;  it  was  a  symbol  of  the  time  and  a 
symptom  of  what  all  felt  to  be  about  to  break 
forth.  Hume  was  truly  recognized  as  the 
supreme  representative  of  the  Spirit  of  the  Age, 
as  the  very  soul  of  the  Eighteenth  Century  now 
marching  forward  to  its  last  act.  To  that  God- 
less set  he  appeared  as  the  God-destroying  God, 
and  was  at  once  hailed  with  divine  honors. 

But  how  is  it  across  the  Channel?  England 
looks  on  with  a  passive,  stolid  amazement;  one 
thing  is  clear,  she  is  not  going  to  travel  that 
Parisian  road  to  the  future,  and  she  will  not  take 
any  such  God.  Hume  feels  this,  and  it  is  the 
deepest  source  of  his  dislike  of  Englishmen, 
"  those  barbarians  who  inhabit  the  banks  of  the 
Thames,"  and  who  have  no  "  taste  for  litera- 
ture," at  least,  such  as  Paris  raves  over.  Hume 
shouts  across  the  water  (by  letter)  in  answer  to 
the  warnings  of  a  friend:  "  Am  I  an  English- 
man? I  am  a  citizen  of  the  world,  but  if  I  were 
to  adopt  any  country,  it  would  be  that  in  which 
I  live  at  present."  Hume  refused  to  follow  Lord 
Hertford  from  Paris  to  Dublin  in  the  position  of 
secretary.  That  were  **  like  stepping  out  of  light 
into  darkness."  France  was  Humian,  England 
was  not ;  France  was  pushing  forward  to  the  com- 


480        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

pletion  of  her  negative  thought, to  Revolution; 
England  was  not  going  in  that  direction.  She 
had  turned  down  another  road  at  the  dethrone- 
ment of  the  House  of  Stewart,  of  which  Hume 
had  made  himself  the  panegyrist  in  his  history. 
Just  in  this  separation  lay  the  profound  antago- 
nism between  Hume  and  the  English  conscious- 
ness which,  though  sensist  in  philosophy,  like 
Locke,  stops  short  with  him  at  its  negative  con- 
sequences. 

One  of  the  interesting  episodes  of  this  last 
Period  was  Hume's  connection  with  Rousseau, 
the  great  French  apostle  and  incarnation  of  the 
Eighteenth  Century,  whom  Hume  at  first  re- 
garded as  "  a  greater  genius  than  Socrates," 
but  afterwards  as  "  a  compound  of  wickedness 
and  madness."  The  story  cannot  be  told  here, 
but  it  may  fairly  be  said  that  Rousseau  brought 
home  to  Hume  in  person  a  considerable  foretaste 
of  the  consequences  of  the  latter 's  own  negative 
doctrine. 

The  philosophical  activity  of  Hume  was  now 
closed  and  he  had  attained  fame  and  wealth. 
These  he  enjoyed  till  the  end,  which  came  at 
Edinburg,  August  25th,  1776. 

II.  HUME'S  WRITINGS.  —  It  is  a  unique  fact 
in  the  literary  career  of  Hume  that  he  wrote  his 
great  philosophical  work  first  of  all  his  works ?  in 
young-manhood.  Thus  he  unfolds  out  of  a  cen- 
tral production  into  his  special  lines.  Locke  and 


HUME.— LIFE.  481 

Kant  develop  in  the  opposite  way  —  the  master- 
piece in  each  of  their  cases  ripens  late ;  they  un- 
fold into  it,  not  out  of  it,  making  it  the  end 
rather  than  the  beginning.  And  so  it  has  been 
with  quite  all  the  great  philosophers.  The 
Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  written  when  Hume 
was  between  twenty-one  and  twenty-five  years  of 
age,  is  his  greatest  book  in  the  eyes  of  the  pres- 
ent age,  and  has  required  the  longest  time  for  its 
appreciation. 

We  may  deem  it  an  explosive  book,  bursting 
outwards  from  a  pent-up  center,  a  kind  of  bomb, 
an  outbreak  like  that  of  a  Revolution.  Thus  the 
manner  of  its  production  is  characteristic  of  its 
theme  and  of  its  period.  This  is,  accordingly, 
the  book  of  Hume's  which  we  shall  specially 
single  out  in  the  present  connection.  It  is  more 
direct,  more  sincere,  than  any  later  book  of  his ; 
in  fact  he  never  afterward  forgave  his  own  sin- 
cerity in  the  writing  of  it.  It  abounds  in  self- 
reference,  in  a  naive  Egoism;  indeed  he  is  doing 
nothing  else  but  examining  his  own  Ego,  in 
which  lies  all  knowledge,  according  to  his  view. 

We  find  again  that  it  is  the  single  work  which 
we  are  to  study  and  analyze  in  order  to  acquire 
the  Philosophy  of  Hume,  who  goes  his  own  way 
without  any  conscious  regard  for  the  Norm .  This 
work  is  known  under  its  short  title  as 
31 


482        MODERN"  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 


HUME'S  TREATISE. 

In  the  introduction  we  see  our  philosopher 
seeking  for  some  principle  of  organizing  his 
theme.  This  pertains  to  what  he  calls  Hu- 
man Nature,  or  those  original  endowments 
which  Nature  (not  God)  has  conferred  upon 
man.  These  endowments  properly  ordered 
and  set  forth  would  constitute  "the  Science  of 
Man,"  which  Hume  deems  the  fundamental 
Science,  since  "  all  the  Sciences  have  a  relation 
greater  or  less  to  Human  Nature/'  and  ultimately 
"return  back  to  it  by  one  passage  or  other." 
They  are  "  dependent  on  the  Science  of  Man," 
inasmuch  as  they  "lie  under  the  cognizance  of  men 
and  are  judged  of  by  their  powers  and  faculties." 
Thus  Human  Nature  can  only  be  man's  Ego  with 
"its  powers  and  faculties,"  and  its  Science 
(which  is  properly  Psychology)  is  the  funda- 
mental one.  This  is  a  very  important  statement, 
even  if  Hume  sees  this  Science  as  merely  subjec- 
tive. 

Moreover  Hume  mentions  two  other  great  de- 
partments of  knowledge,  or,  as  we  may  say,  of 
Philosophy,  so  that  his  scheme  is  as  follows :  — 

(1)  Mathematics,  Natural  Philosophy,  and 
Natural  Religion  he  puts  together  as  farthest 
removed  from  the  Science  of  Man,  yet  going 
back  to  it  for  "  cognizance." 


HUME'S  TREATISE.  483 

(2)  Logic,  Morals,  Criticism  and  Politics  form 
another  class  of  Sciences  whose  "connexion  with 
Human  Nature  is  more  close  and  intimate." 

(3)  The  basic  Science  is  that  of  Human  Na- 
ture, and  this  is  just  the  Science  which  our  phi- 
losopher   proposes    to    set  forth  in  the   present 
Treatise  —  really   the   Science   of    all    Sciences, 
treated   in  a  new  way,  "  experimentally,"   that 
is,  by  the  self-analysis  of  the  Ego.     Hume  calls 
it  also  Metaphysics,  a  designation  for  Psychology 
or  Mental   Science  which  reaches  down  to  the 
present  time. 

Hume  will  pay  small  «attention  to  this  classifi- 
cation, but  it  has  an  interest  for  us  as  it  shows 
a  dim  consciousness  of  the  philosophical  Norm. 
Here  is  the  threefold  division  of  the  normative 
Sciences  which  suggest  from  afar  the  trans- 
mitted division  into  Metaphysics,  Physics,  and 
Ethics.  So  we  have  the  right  to  say  that  Hume 
also  shows  remotely  the  influence  of  the  Norm. 
In  fact,  he  cannot  well  help  himself  if  he  is 
going  to  philosophize  at  all. 

But  in  the  present  book  Hume  proposes  to  deal 
with  the  Science  of  Human  Nature  (his  Meta- 
physics). So  we  seek  for  his  division  of  this 
subject,  and  are  at  first  surprised  that  he  gives 
none  at  the  start.  But  looking  through  his  en- 
tire book,  and  observing  its  main  topics,  we  find 
that  he  has  primarily  a  threefold  division,  as 
follows :  — 


484         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

A.  The  Understanding. 

B.  The  Passions. 

C.  Morals. 

He  does  not  deem  it  necessary  to  give  any  justi- 
fication of  this  division,  he  simply  finds  it  in  his 
mind  "  experimentally  "  and  that  is  enough.  Of 
course  the  analysis  of  the  book  must  proceed  on 
these  same  lines. 

A.  The  Understanding.  Hume  now  begins 
classifying,  of  which  there  gets  to  be  an  excess, 
for  he  does  not  use  all  the  divisions  which  he 
makes.  The  result  is  confusion,  for  Hume  is 
not  an  easy  writer  to  organize,  his  much-praised 
clearness  is  on  the  surface,  but  underneath  he 
often  grows  turbid. 

He  starts  with  "Perceptions  of  the  mind," 
which  are  of  two  kinds  —  Impressions  and  Ideas. 
The  Idea  is  "a  faint  Impression,"  primarily, 
but  it  is  also  called  "a  faint  image"  of  an 
Impression. 

Each  of  these  two  divisions  is  sub-divided. 
Impressions  are  of  two  kinds,  Sensation  and  Re- 
flection. Sensation  is  immediate,  is  an  Impres- 
sion which  "  strikes  upon  the  senses;  "  but  this 
Sensation  becomes  an  image  which  in  its  turn 
produces  a  new  Impression  which  Hume  calls  an 
Impression  of  Reflection  or  Passion.  The  Idea 
as  Image  is  repeated  by  the  mind  in  two  ways  — 
the  more  lively  and  immediate  is  Memory,  the 
less  vivacious  is  the  Imagination.  To  these  two 


HUME'S  TREATISE.  485 

is  added  the  uniting  principle  of  the  separate 
Ideas  in  the  mind,  which  principle  is  the  Asso- 
ciation of  Ideas. 

We  notice  in  this  inventory  that  Hume  does 
not  deduce  or  introduce  directly  the  faculty  of 
which  he  is  treating,  the  Understanding,  though 
it  is  spoken  of  by  the  way.  Still  less  does  he 
attempt  to  formulate  the  nature  of  Reason.  We 
notice  also  that  back  of  his  procedure  lurks  the 
mind  which  is,  however,  not  brought  to  the  sur- 
face and  shown  making  all  these  distinctions  and 
separate  '«  faculties  "  of  itself. 

We  shall,  however,  proceed  at  once  to  the 
nerve  of  Hume's  treatment  of  the  Understanding : 
his  doctrine  of  causation.  The  idea  of  cause  (a 
priori)  in  the  mind  is  an  illusion,  since  there  is 
no  impression  of  sense  from  which  it  can  be 
derived  as  image.  The  relation  of  cause  and 
effect  in  the  object  is  also  an  illusion,  since  it  is 
inconceivable  that  cause  should  produce  effect. 
How  then  do  we  come  by  the  notion  of  cause? 
Simply  by  custom;  we  are  accustomed  to  see 
two  particular  things  or  events  in  succession  or 
conjunction,  and  so  we  get  into  the  habit  of  say- 
ing that  one  causes  the  other.  All  that  we  can 
see  or  is,  is  the  particular;  anything  universal  or 
necessary  like  cause  is  a  figment  of  the  mind. 

Such  is  Hume's  denial  of  causation  which,  if 
carried  out  strictly,  would  destroy  both  physical 
and  mental  Science.  We  could  not  even  have 


486         MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  Impression,  which  Hume  himself  declares  to 
be  caused  by  something  unknown.  It  is  mani- 
fest that  Hume,  starting  with  Locke's  limited 
sphere  of  knowledge,  that  of  the  phenomenal 
Ego  knowing  the  phenomenal  object,  has  run 
his  dividing  line  between  these  two  sides  of  it 
and  separated  them  entirely.  Having  accom- 
plished this  negative  feat  which  completely  un- 
does the  Understanding  of  which  he  has  been 
treating,  he  passes  to  his  next  leading  division. 

B.  The  Passions.  To  this  subject  the  Second 
Book  of  the  Treatise  is  devoted.  Hume  derives 
the  Passion  from  the  original  or  immediate  Im- 
pression. He  conceives  the  Passion  to  spring 
from  a  reflective  activity  of  the  Impression, 
«'  either  immediately  or  by  the  interposition  of 
its  Idea."  That  is,  the  original  Impression  is  a 
sensation  (say  a  pain),  while  the  secondary  Im- 
pression is  a  reflection  of  the  original  one  (say, 
fear,  which  is  a  reflection  of  the  pain,  in  Hume's 
technique).  Thus  Passion  has  a  double  ele- 
ment, it  is  an  Impression  of  an  Impression,  or 
an  inner  sensation  responding  to  an  outer  one. 

Of  these  Passions  or  reflected  Impressions 
Hume  gives  three  main  divisions :  — 

(1)  Pride  and  Humility.  These,  "though 
directly  contrary,  have  the  same  object."  More- 
over "this  object  is  the  Self"  which  Hume 
defines  as  "  a  succession  of  related  ideas  and  im- 
pressions of  which  we  have  an  intimate  memory 


TREATISE.  487 


and  consciousness"  (Treatise  Bk.  II.  Pt.  I. 
Sect.  II.).  These  two  Passions  Hume  calls 
natural,  being  "  original  qualities  of  the  mind  " 
belonging  to  Human  Nature  of  which  he  is  here 
treating. 

(2)  Love  and  Hatred.  These  are  still  reflected 
Impressions    or    inner    sensations,    but  with    a 
changed  object  which  is  no  longer  our  own  self, 
but    another  -self,    "  some    other   person,"    or 
"some  sensible  being  external  to  us." 

(3)  The     Will  and   direct   Passions.       (The 
preceding  are  indirect  Passions,  as  arising  from 
pain  or  pleasure,  not  purely,  but  "by  the  con- 
junction  of   other  qualities.")  Direct   Passions 
are   "  the   Impressions  which  arise  immediately 
from  good  and  evil,  from  pain  and  pleasure  '  '  (Bk. 
II.  Pt.  III.   Sec.  I.).     Here   Hume  places   the 
Will,  which  with  him  is  "  the  internal  Impression 
we  feel  and  are  conscious  of  when  we  knowingly 
give  rise  to  any  new  motion  of  the  body,  or  new 
perception  of  our  mind."     It  is  well  to  note  the 
declaration,  "  we  give  rise  "  to  the  movement  of 
the  body  and  of  the  mind  ;  for  Hume  also  holds 
that  there  is  the  same  necessity  '  '  in  all  the  op- 
erations of  the  mind,"  as  is  seen  "  in  the  actions 
of  matter."     Reason  cannot  control  Passion,  but 
*«  is,  and  ought  to  be,  the  slave  of  the  Passions," 
in   which    statement   we   can   see   the   germ  of 
Hume's  Morals  on  its  negative  side.      Moreover, 


488        MODERN  E  UBOPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

"Passion  is  an  original  existence,"  and  cannot 
be  subject  to  Reason. 

C.  Morals.  Hume  deemed  this  work  (in  the 
later  form  of  the  Inquiry)  as  **  incomparably 
the  best  of  all  my  writings,  historical,  philo- 
sophical, or  literary."  This  judgment  posterity 
has  not  confirmed.  In  fact,  if  we  compare  the 
first  section  of  the  Treatise  with  the  first  section 
of  the  Inquiry  on  the  subject  of  Morals,  we 
can  see  how  much  the  former  surpasses  the 
latter  in  force  of  statement  and  sincerity  of 
purpose,  and  how  much  Hume  (in  his  Second 
Period)  could  water  his  style  and  even  his  con- 
viction for  the  sake  of  popularity. 

The  next  question  is,  What  kind  of  an  Im- 
pression is  the  moral  one?  "  Here  we  cannot 
remain  long  in  suspense,  but  must  pronounce  the 
Impression  arising  from  virtue  to  be  agreeable 
and  that  proceeding  from  vice  to  be  uneasy  ' 
(Bk.  III.  Pt.  I.  Sect.  II.).  We  call  an  action 
virtuous  if  it  produces  a  pleasant  impression; 
vice  on  the  contrary  makes  us  uneasy.  A  sense 
of  duty  or  morality  cannot  of  itself  be  a  motive 
to  virtuous  conduct.  By  nature  we  are  so  con- 
stituted that  we  praise  certain  deeds,  and  blame 
others.  Such  «is  the  moral  sense  or  sentiment, 
original,  natural,  subjective,  a  feeling  or  impres- 
sion. 

The  Third  Book  (on  Morals)  opens  with  a 
strong  attack  on  Reason  as  the  source  of  moral 


HUME.  —  PHILOSOPHY.  489 

distinctions.  Passion  is  not  and  cannot  be  sub- 
ordinated to  Reason,  as  writers  on  Morals  have 
said  from  old  Greek  times  down  to  the  present. 
Reason  can  at  most  compare  and  put  together 
Ideas,  whereas  Morality  is  an  Impression  prima- 
rily, and  "  excites  passions  and  produces  or  pre- 
vents actions."  Hence  it  is  "an  original  fact 
and  reality,  complete  in  itself,"  without  compari- 
son or  any  relation.  In  this  way  Morality  is 
brought  back  to  Impression,  with  which  the 
Understanding  also  started. 

Thus  Hume  has  reduced  mind  to  Impression 
or  Feeling.  Knowledge^comes  from  Impression, 
so  does  Passion,  so  does  Morality.  These  Im- 
pressions are  an  original  endowment  of  Human 
Nature,  the  given,  the  presupposed,  really  the 
transmitted.  The  immediate  spontaneous  activ- 
ity of  Feeling  is  the  true  original  thing  in  man, 
being  the  basic  fact  of  Human  Nature.  Even 
the  conflict  of  duty  is  the  conflict  of  pain  and 
pleasure.  In  a  number  of  points  Hume  is  the 
forerunner  of  the  recent  Physiological  Psy- 
chology. 

III.  HUME'S  PHILOSOPHY.  —  Already  we  have 
noted  that  in  the  introduction  to  his  Treatise 
Hume  shows  a  faint  glimmer  of  the  philosophi- 
cal Norm.  Moreover,  if  we  put  together  his 
writings,  he  would  furnish  a  good  deal  of  mate- 
rial for  Metaphysics  and  Ethics,  or,  in  the 


490        MODERN  E UROPEA N  PHILOSOPHY. 

language  of  the  time,  Mental  and  Moral 
Philosophy. 

On  the  other  hand  Hume  would  furnish  little 
or  nothing  for  Physics  or  Natural  Philosophy, 
though  he  claims  to  have  derived  his  method  of 
treating  mind  or  Human  Nature  (as  distinct  from 
Material  Nature)  from  the  new  natural  Science. 
In  fact  Hume  proceeds  chemically  in  his  Treatise. 
He  takes  all  the  varied  complex  phenomena  of 
mind,  and  reduces  them  to  certain  simple  irre- 
ducible elements  called  Impressions  or  Feelings. 
To  decompound  this  composite  Human  Nature, 
to  analyze  it  into  its  final  units,  is  his  procedure, 
showing  him  to  belong  in  the  heart  of  the  chem- 
ical Century. 

Thus  Hume  seeks  to  get  back  to  the  primary 
immediate  act  of  Human  Nature  as  Impression  or 
Feeling,  which  can  only  be  subjective  and  par- 
ticular. Any  objective  universal  truth  he  denies. 
His  rejection  of  causation  cuts  the  mind  off  from 
any  knowledge  of  the  object,  even  of  the  phe- 
nomenal object.  And  yet  the  mind  (according  to 
Hume)  must  accept  the  object,  accept  the  very 
thing  which  it  rejects,  know  the  very  thing  which 
it  cannot  know.  Thus  the  mind  as  knowledge 
dwells  in  a  perpetual  contradiction  with  itself ; 
cognition  has  to  cognize  the  very  thing  which  it 
cannot  cognize.  Intelligence  is  completely  cleft 
in  twain,  separated  within  itself  from  itself  by 
an  impassable  chasm.  To  such  an  inner  dualism 


HUME.  —  PHILOSOPHY.  491 

the  Century  of  Negation  has  brought  itself. 
All  mind  is  so  deeply  self-divided  that  it  cannot 
get  back  to  itself.  There  is  no  return  within, 
no  reconciliation  of  the  two  sides;  the  divided 
consciousness  we  may  call  it,  the  age's  own 
consciousness  reflected  in  its  representative  phi- 
losopher, who  here  commits  philosophical  suicide. 
For  Philosophy  denies  the  possibility  of  our 
knowing  the  object  which  nevertheless  we  know. 
To  think  is  simply  to  annihilate  thought. 

We  have  already  seen  that  Locke  has  left  us  a 
circumscribed  sphere  of  knowledge,  beyond 
which  the  mind  cannot  pass.  But  through  this 
limited  sphere  Hume  has  run  a  second  line  of 
division,  a  diametral  line,  as  it  were,  which  cuts 
off  all  knowledge  of  the  object  and  confines  our 
knowing  to  the  subject,  and  even  this  is  reduced 
to  Impression  or  Feeling. 

Now  it  is  at  this  point  that  our  next  great 
philosopher  of  the  Century,  Kant,  begins  to 
wake  up  and  to  stir  himself,  having  been  shaken 
out  of  his  "  dogmatic  slumber  "  by  the  negation 
of  Hume.  Kant's  question  is,  How  can  I  save 
knowledge?  In  what  way  can  I  rescue  experience, 
or  at  least  some  fragment  of  it?  Kant  will  still  re- 
main inside  the  circumscribed  sphere  marked  out 
by  Locke,  to  whom  he  is  a  return,  though  not  a 
relapse.  By  a  new  and  thorough  analysis  of  the 
process  of  knowledge  he  will  seek  to  break  down 


492         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

or  rather  break  over  (through  his  Ego)  that  dia- 
metral line  drawn  so  remorselessly  by  Hume 
against  all  cognition  of  the  objective  world, 
and  also  to  vindicate  by  the  way  very  impor- 
tant powers  for  the  subject.  At  the  same  time 
Kant  will  have  his  negative  side,  which  in  one 
direction  will  be  even  deeper  than  that  of  Hume. 


KANT.  — PHILOSOPHIC  CHARACTER.        493 


3*  IRant, 

The  Philosophy  of  the  Eighteenth  Century 
now  passes  back  from  England  to  the  Teutonic 
Continent,  where  we  saw  Modern  Philosophy  in 
its  supreme  representatives  start  and  stay  during 
the  Seventeenth  Century.  But  this  return  is  not 
to  Holland  or  to  the  Western  branch  of  the  Conti- 
nental Teutons ;  it  reaches  to  the  extreme  Eastern 
border  where  the  Teutonic  race  touches  and  is 
intermingled  with  the  Slavonic.  Thus,  Philoso- 
phy seems  to  turn  back  to  the  primal  boundary 
of  its  present  racial  supporter  and  propagator,  as 
if  to  embrace  the  entire  kindred,  Anglo-Saxon 
and  Germanic.  We  have  already  called  this  the 
grand  philosophic  arch  of  the  Eighteenth  Century 
bending  over  the  whole  Teutonic  world  from  the 
birthplace  of  John  Locke  in  Western  England  to 
the  birthplace  of  Irnmanuel  Kant  in  Eastern 
Prussia.  The  extreme  European  limits  of  the 
great  migration  of  the  Teutons  are  thus  joined 
together  by  the  supreme  Teutonic  discipline, 
Modern  Philosophy.  In  such  fashion  the  Eight- 
eenth Century  rounds  itself  out  even  topograph- 
ically in  an  all-embracing  act  of  consanguine 
thought. 

And  here  we  may  state  that  the  connection 
between  Locke  and  Kant  is  far  more  direct  and 


494         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

complete  than  is  usually  supposed  by  the  Ger- 
man expositors  of  Kant,  who  are  remarkably 
neglectful  of  this  relation.  They  dwell  upon  the 
influence  of  Hume  over  Kant,  chiefly  because  Kant 
himself  has  emphasized  it;  but  first  of  all,  what 
is  Hume  without  Locke?  At  present  we  may 
point  out  one  fundamental  fact:  Kant's  demar- 
cation of  the  sphere  of  knowledge  as  lying 
between  the  Ego-in-itself  and  the  Thing-in-itself 
is  that  of  Locke,  though,  of  course,  the  two 
Philosophers  differ  as  to  the  process  of  knowl- 
edge within  these  circumscribed  limits.  Putting 
Locke  and  Kant  together  we  may  say  that  in  the 
Eighteenth  Century  Teutonia  draws  her  boundary 
lines  both  externally  and  internally,  both  in 
space  and  in  thought. 

In  Kant  Philosophy  makes  another  noticeable 
transition :  It  goes  to  the  University  for  its  culti- 
vation, and  even  for  its  origination,  in  which 
environment  it  will  stay  during  the  next  Century 
and  attain  its  supreme  modern  development. 
This  is  in  striking  contrast  to  what  has  preceded. 
For  the  five  greatest  modern  philosophers  of  the 
antecedent  time  were  not  professors,  and  did  their 
original  work  outside  of  Universities ;  some  of 
them  declined  professorships  as  unfavorable  to 
freedom  of  thought.  The  prescribed  routine  with 
its  ever-recurring  formalism  weighs  down  creative 
thought;  moreover,  the  first  function  of  the 
University  professor  is  to  impart  and  to  transmit 


KANT.  — PHILOSOPHIC  CHAEAGTEE.       495 

the  culture  of  the  past,  in  whose  erudition  he 
always  runs  the  danger  of  getting  ossified.  And 
we  can  see  that  Kant,  in  his  chief  work,  has  be- 
come formal  and  schematic  to  excess,  and  finally 
is  overwhelmed  and  enslaved  by  his  own  system. 
Very  different  is  the  philosophic  manner  of  those 
non-professorial  philosophers,  Locke  and  Hume. 

Already  we  have  found  that  England  has  com- 
pelled Philosophy,  the  most  aristocratic  and  ex- 
clusive of  Sciences,  to  drop  the  Latin  and  to  talk 
the  vernacular.  This  trait  Kant  will  inherit  and 
will  make  Philosophy  speak  German  altogether. 
Kant  has  no  Latin  works  of  importance.  The 
basic  Teutonic  discipline  is  now  to  speak  the 
mother-tongue,  the  pure  Teutonic,  not  a  Latin- 
ized Teutonic  like  English.  Undoubtedly  the 
custom  of  using  the  vulgar  tongue  for  philo- 
sophic discourse  had  been  growing.  But  Kant, 
through  the  greatness  of  his  works  and  their 
widespread  study,  will  establish  German  philo- 
sophic speech,  even  if  his  style  be  imperfect, 
somewhat  as  Luther  established  the  literary 
tongue  of  Germany  by  his  translation  of  the 
Bible. 

This  we  may  take  as  an  instance  of  his  gen- 
eral breach  with  the  traditions  of  the  past.  He 
reflected  the  spirit  of  his  century  in  his  sympathy 
with  all  sorts  of  Revolution.  He  defended 
warmly  the  revolt  of  the  American  Colonies  from 
Great  Britain.  When  he  heard  of  the  formation 


496        MODERN  EUEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  French  Republic,  he  is  reported  to  have 
said  with  tears  in  his  eyes :  "  I  can  now  say  like 
Simeon:  Lord,  let  thy  servant  depart  in  peace, 
for  mine  eyes  have  seen  thy  salvation."  He 
seemed  to  be  in  an  inner  revolt  against  whatever 
was  established.  He  would  have  nothing  to  do 
with  the  transmitted  forms  of  religion ;  it  is  said 
that  he  never  entered  a  church  after  reaching 
manhood.  Law  and  medicine  as  formulated  and 
practiced  were  the  objects  of  his  dislike.  He 
was  his  own  doctor  and  elaborated  a  system  of 
hygiene  upon  which  he  loved  to  talk.  When 
we  learn  that  Rousseau  was  his  favorite  French 
author  and  that  the  Emile  was  the  only  book 
that  ever  kept  him  from  taking  his  customary 
walk,  we  can  understand  how  deeply  he  drank  of 
the  spirit  of  the  revolutionary  Century. 

Kant,  like  Locke,  was  a  valetudinarian  all  his 
life.  He  was  born  a  weakling  physically,  a  kind 
of  dwarf,  being  barely  five  feet  in  height,  and 
partially  deformed ;  he  was  never  well  yet  never 
seriously  ill;  to  understand  his  body  was  his 
first  care,  and  he  evidently  learned  his  lesson 
well.  Heine  and  others  have  made  fun  of  his 
regularity,  but  this  was  the  very  condition  not 
only  of  his  working  but  of  his  living  at  all. 
He  knew  his  physical  limits,  which  knowledge 
had  been  burned  into  his  soul  by  suffering.  He 
had  to  watch  every  little  transgression  of  his 
hygienic  conscience,  otherwise  the  penalty  was 


KANT.— LIFE.  497 

upon  him  for  violating  the  categorical  imperative 
of  his  body.  Astonishing  was  the  result. 
Though  his  life  was  one  continued  fight  for  life, 
he  nevertheless  lived  till  he  was  quite  eighty 
years  old,  and  did  a  very  considerable  amount  of 
work. 

We  cannot  help  thinking  that  these  bodily  con- 
ditions emphasized,  even  if  they  did  not  produce, 
certain  mental  tendencies.  The  limits  of  his 
physical  being  were  so  ground  into  him  that  they 
left  a  corresponding  impress  upon  the  mind, 
whose  limits  Kant  has  fixed  with  such  remorse- 
less precision  and  force.  We  feel  that  in  the 
conditions  which  he  draws  around  experience  lies 
a  deep  experience  of  his  own,  as  we  may  also  find 
in  the  similar  case  of  Locke. 

Kant  and  his  Philosophy  have  a  profound  con- 
nection with  Frederick  the  Great  and  the  rise 
of  the  Prussian  State  on  the  Eastern  side  of  the 
Teutonic  world.  The  rejuvenation  of  German 
spirit  finds  expression  in  the  new  institution  and 
in  the  new  philosophy.  Other  similar  manifesta- 
tions in  the  literary  sphere  are  seen  in  Lessing  and 
Goethe.  Kant  is,  therefore,  by  no  means  an 
isolated  phenomenon.  He  is  part  of  a  great 
European  palingenesis,  which  at  first  shows  itself 
in  the  form  of  Revolution. 

I.  KANT'S  LIFE. — Kant  was  born  April  22d, 
1724,  at  Konigsberg,  Prussia,  and  died  in  the 
same  city  February  12th,  1804.  He  supposed 

32 


498         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

himself  to  be  of  Scotch  descent  on  his  father's 
side,  but  his  accuracy  on  this  point  has  recently 
been  questioned. 

Every  biographer  points  out  a  very  significant 
change  in  the  spiritual  development  of  our  phi- 
lospher  which  hovers  about  his  fortieth  year, 
before  and  after.  It  was  slow,  not  without  re- 
actions and  even  relapses.  In  general,  this  was 
Kant's  break  with  the  past,  with  the  established, 
the  transmitted  —  his  awakening  from  his  "dog- 
matic slumber."  He  had  been  in  philosophy 
mainly  a  follower  of  Wolff,  he  had  studied  pro- 
foundly the  physical  doctrines  of  Newton,  he  had 
appropriated  the  erudition  of  preceding  times 
after  the  manner  of  the  University.  What  now 
causes  the  separation  ? 

First  of  all,  we  are  to  look  at  what  was  going 
on  in  the  institutional  world  that  environed  Kant. 
The  Seven  Years'  War  (1756-63)  with  the  career 
of  Frederick  the  Great,  could  not  help  having 
a  strong  influence  on  Kant  who  was  a  Prussian 
subject.  He  saw  the  conflict  near  at  hand, 
Konigsberg  was  occupied  by  the  Russians  for 
several  years  during  the  war.  As  already  said, 
the  right  of  legitimacy  was  substantially  annulled 
by  the  Prussian  monarch  who  asserted  another 
and  deeper  right.  The  title  to  rule  transmitted 
from  the  past  was  assailed  by  a  king  and  broken 
down  after  a  tremendous  conflict  in  which  853,000 
fighting  men  are  said  to  have  perished.  Berlin,  the 


KANT.  — LIFE.  499 

Prussian  capital,  was  captured  by  the  enemy,  and 
still  Frederick  triumphed  in  the  end.  His  was 
the  assertion  of  WILL  above  all  the  mazes  which 
the  Intellect  of  the  time  sought  to  throw  in  his 
way  by  means  of  old  claims,  established  rights,  in- 
herited titles.  Well  may  one  say  that  Frederick 
the  Great  was  the  arch  revolutionist  of  the  Cen- 
tury, whose  spirit  he  represented  in  its  deep- 
est depths.  The  receptive  Kant  could  not 
help  catching  this  spirit  in  his  own  way,  and 
becoming  the  philosophic  counterpart  of  Fred- 
erick, who  indeed  may  never  have  heard  of  him, 
and  who,  moreover,  tried  to  be  his  own  phi- 
losopher after  the  French  distillation  of  English 
philosophy  (Locke).  To  our  mind  the  French 
Revolution  is  an  historic  development  and  ful- 
fillment of  the  spirit  underlying  the  Seven  Years' 
War,  through  both  of  which  events  Kant  lived, 
seeing  the  outcome  of  both  in  the  Primacy  of 
Will  of  two  great  rulers,  Frederick  and  Napoleon. 
Still  Kant  was  too  old  to  represent  philosophically 
the  concrete  French  Revolution,  that  belongs  to 
the  generation  of  philosophers  who  succeeded 
him. 

The  European  Literature  of  the  time,  specially 
in  its  French  and  English  sources,  profoundly 
stirred  our  philosopher.  We  have  already  men- 
tioned Rousseau  and  Hume,  both  of  them  giving 
a  literary  expression  to  the  revolutionary  spirit 
of  the  age.  So  Kant  far  off:  to  one  side  of  Eu- 


500         MODERN'  E UEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

rope  was  the  chosen  man  to  give  a  philosophical 
expression  to  this  same  spirit. 

1.  First  Period.     In  the  sixties  of  the  Eight- 
eenth   Century    Kant  was  undergoing  a  change 
from  being  a  receptive  vessel  for  the  erudition  of 
the  past  into  becoming  a  source  of  ideas  in  him- 
self ;  he  was  getting  possession  of  his  ownv  genius. 
In  the  year  1763  the  Seven  Years'  War  closed, 
and  a  time  of  peace    and   reflection  set   in.     In 
1770  he  was  elevated  from  a  tutorship  to  a  pro- 
fessorship in  the  University  of  Konigsberg.     On 
this  occasion  he  wrote  a  dissertation  bearing  the 
title,  "Concerning  the  Form  and  Principles  of 
the  Sensible  and  Intelligible  World."     He  shows 
that  he  has  reached   his  philosophic  standpoint 
and  has  only  to  develop  it  to  completeness. 

We  feel  a  hesitation  about  setting  exact  dates 
in  this  matter  of  slow  evolution.  Still  the  need 
of  something  fixed  for  the  mental  grip  is  great. 
The  reader  will  not  be  far  out  of  the  way  if  he 
takes  Kant's  fortieth  year  (1764)  as  the  land- 
mark of  his  great  transition  to  his  conscious  task, 
which  continues  to  develop  during  his  whole 
middle  life,  till  old  age  begins  to  show  his  decline. 

2.  Second  Period.  Kant  is  now  fairly  launched 
on  his  philosophic   career;    he  has  passed  from 
the    Macrocosm    (Newton)    to    the   Microcosm 
(Kousseau),  from  the  World  to  his  Ego,  whose 
limits  he  is  now  to  subject  to  his  criticism,  and 
thus  his  philosophy  is  named  the  critical.      It  is 


KANT.  —  LIFE.  '  501 

manifest  that  the  Lockian  boundary  of  cognition 
is  still  with  him,  but  he  is  going  to  overhaul 
what  lies  within  that  boundary.  In  such  an 
overhauling  he  starts  from  Hume's  negation, 
which  on  one  side  he  accepts,  but  on  another  he 
denies.  He  proposes  to  rescue  Locke's  experience 
of  the  object,  yet  not  after  Locke's  manner. 

His  Second  Period  would  accordingly  begin 
about  1764,  and  last  for  some  twenty-four  years, 
ending  with  the  publication  of  the  Critique  of 
the  Practical  Reason  in  1788,  after  which  Kant's 
writings  begin  to  show  diminished  power. 

Of  course  the  culmination  of  this  Second 
Period  as  well  as  of  Kant's  life  is  thb  publication 
of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  in  1781,  when 
the  author  was  57  years  old.  This  is  the  work 
to  which  we  shall  have  to  pay  special  attention 
as  the  central  statement  of  Kant's  philosophy  as 
well  as  the  profoundest  outcome  of  the  thought 
of  his  age. 

3.  Third  Period.  With  this  part  of  Kant's 
life  (from  1789  till  his  death  in  1804)  we  can 
have  little  to  do  in  the  present  account,  since  the 
philosopher  has  already  in  the  preceding  Period 
accomplished  his  epoch-making  task,  which  gives 
him  his  supreme  place  in  the  intellectual  devel- 
opment of  the  Eighteenth  Century. 

Of  a  single  matter,  however,  mention  should 
be  made.  After  the  publication  of  his  work  on 
Religion  within  the  bounds  of  Pure  Reason, 


502        MODERN  E UROPEAtf  PHILOSOPHY. 

there  reached  him  one  day  a  cabinet  order  from 
Berlin  dated  October  1st,  1794,  which  ran  as 
follows:  "  Our  highest  person  has  been  greatly 
displeased  to  observe  how  you  misuse  your  phi- 
losophy to  undermine  and  destroy  "  the  Christian 
Religion.  Then  came  the  command  that  "  in 
the  future  you  give  no  such  cause  of  offence," 
and  that  you  write  hereafter  in  due  accord  with 
"our  paternal  purpose,"  otherwise  "  you  may 
expect  unpleasant  consequences  to  yourself." 
We  must  recollect  that  Frederick  the  Great,  the 
scoffer  and  priest-hater,  had  been  dead  several 
years  and  the  new  king  had  introduced  the 
reign  of  so-called  pietism. 

Kant  has_  attained  just  the  age  of  the  dying 
Socrates,  being  seventy  years  old,  and  here  is 
the  modern  cup  of  hemlock  offered  him,  not  by 
a  democracy  but  by  an  absolute  government. 
Will  he  drink  it?  Not  a  bit  of  it.  At  first  he 
was  full  of  fight,  and  thought  of  defending  him- 
self against  the  charges  which  impugned  his 
Christianity;  then  he  would  maintain  the  right 
of  the  philosopher  to  think  what  he  pleased  and 
to  say  what  he  thought ;  but  he  ended  by  pro- 
claiming himself  "his  Majesty's  most  faithful 
servant,"  and  by  promising  "  I  shall  refrain 
in  the  future  from  all  public  lecturing  and 
writing  on  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed." 

The  incident  leaves   a  painful,  degrading  im- 


KANT.  —  WRITINGS.  503 

pression  of  Kant.  But  apart  from  all  motives 
of  fear,  what  else  could  he  logically  do,  ac- 
cording to  his  own  Philosophy?  Here  was  the 
Ego  of  the  absolute  Monarch  issuing  his  uncon- 
ditional imperative  to  a  subject.  From  the 
Kantian  standpoint  there  was  no  questioning  the 
right.  Kant  could  only  behold  the  gigantesque 
image  of  his  own  doctrine  smiting  him  to  the 
earth.  Really  he  had  no  inner  means  of  defend- 
ing himself.  With  this  picture  of  the  aged 
Kant  crouching  under  the  blow  of  his  own 
principle  returning  upon  him,  we  may  close  the 
book  of  his  life. 

II.  KANT'S  WRITINGS.  — These  are  quite 
numerous  and  belong  to  all  three  Periods .  In  a 
general  way  .Kant  writes  during  the  First  Period 
after  a  literary  fashion,  he  cultivates  the  graces 
of  style,  and  pays  less  attention  to  the  formal 
order.  Herein  |he  follows  his  models,  English 
and  French,  Hume  and  Rousseau,  who  never 
failed  to  put  into  their  writings  a  literary  quality, 
which  often  dominates  the  purely  philosophic 
element. 

But  in  the  Second  Period  the  style  of  Kant 
changes,  his  exposition  becomes  more  involved  and 
rigidly  formulated.  He  passes  from  his  literary 
to  his  schematic  manner  and  therewith  from  imi- 
tation into  originality.  For  there  is  no  denying 
that  his  great  original  works  are  schematic,  in 


504         MODERN-  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

fact  this  is  the  standing  literary  objection  to 
them.  But  Kant  is  not  Kant  without  his  strictly 
tabulated  scheme,  which,  being  an  integral  part 
of  his  genius,  cannot  be  left  out  in  any  complete 
exposition  of  his  doctrine.  We  are  not  to  for- 
get that  Kant  never  came  to  his  true  self  by  any 
other  road  than  through  his  scheme.  It  is  true 
that  in  his  Third  Period  his  adherence  to  his 
scheme  becomes  painfully  external,  he  forces  his 
content  into  it  with  a  kind  of  violence.  This, 
however,  is  one  indication  of  his  decline,  in 
which  the  Primacy  of  the  Will  over  Intellect 
gets  to  be  purely  arbitrary. 

The  monumental  structure  to  which  all  the 
earlier  Writings  of  Kant  lead  up  and  from  which 
all  his  later  Writings  recede,  is  built  .of  the  three 
Critiques — of  Pure  Reason,  of  Practical  Reason, 
and  of  Judgment,  and  of  these  three  there  is  one 
supreme  central  edifice,  the  Critique  of  Pure  Rea- 
son. And  of  this  one  work  there  is  a  central 
portion  with  many  outlying  divisions.  The 
century  since  Kant  has  very  decidedly  selected 
the  kernel  of  his  greatest  book,  which  is 
indeed  the  kernel  of  all  his  writings  and  of  his 
life,  and  has  in  many  ways  appropriated  and  de- 
veloped it.  In  our  exposition  we  shall  in  the 
main  confine  ourselves  to  this  kernel  as  the  truly 
original  creative  element  of  Kant. 


KANT.  —  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON,       505 


A.  THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON. 

In  accord  with  our  method  of  treating  the 
philosophers  of  the  Eighteenth  Century,  we 
select  the  greatest  work  of  Kant  for  analysis  and 
interpretation.  It  would  be  a  violent  treatment 
to  force  the  book  into  the  philosophic  Norm 
which  it  is  seeking  to  destroy,  even  if  it  has  to 
recognize  this  Norm  in  the  act  of  destruction. 
Undoubtedly  Kant  himself  deemed  the  present 
work  as  a  preparatory  training  (propaedeutic) 
for  his  new  system  of  Philosophy,  but  in  this 
case  the  vestibule  becomes  emphatically  the 
temple.  The  student  of  Kant  is,  therefore,  to 
grapple  with  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  first 
of  all,  and  from  it  pass  in  thought  to  that  which 
comes  after  and  also  to  that  which  goes  before. 
For  the  whole  is  a  growth ;  Kant  must  be  con- 
ceived as  gradually  growing  into  it  and  producing 
it,  when  the  work  itself  becomes  the  source  of 
new  growths  not  only  for  Kant  himself,  but  for 
all  future  Philosophy.  It  is  thus  one  of  the 
great  germinal  centers  in  which  the  Thought  of 
the  Ages  gathers  itself  together  and  formulates 
itself  anew,  thence  spreading  forth  throughout 
the  world. 

The  actual  name  of  the  book,  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason,  is  said  to  be  first  mentioned  in  a 
letter  of  Kant's  to  Herz  dated  Feb.  21st,  1772. 


506         MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

But  indications  of  it  under  other  titles  and 
descriptions  appear  before  this  date.  There  is 
no  doubt  that  Kant  was  working  upon  it  chiefly 
during  the  greater  part  of  his  Second  Period. 
In  a  letter  to  Mendelssohn  he  says  that  it  was  * '  the 
product  of  twelve  years'  reflection  at  least" 
(being  published  in  1781),  but  that  it  was  "  put 
into  shape  in  about  four  or  five  months,"  which 
can  only  mean  that  large  portions  were  already 
written,  and  were  inserted  into  the  Whole,  of 
course  after  revision  and  elaboration.  It  grew 
in  parts  and  from  several  independent  centers  till 
boundaries  came  together,  or  in  repeated  in- 
stances were  brought  together  by  a  kind  of 
external  force.  Still  the  sutures  may  be  traced 
where  the  parts  are  intergrown,  and  gaps  may  be 
observed  which  the  author  was  unable  to  fill. 
Hence  come  the  repetitions  as  well  as  omissions, 
the  decided  independence  of  its  leading  divisions, 
the  inner  separation  in  the  outer  unity. 

For  these  reasons  the  book  has  been  subjected 
to  a  dissecting  process  very  similar  to  what  has 
happened  to  another  great  constructive  work  of 
this  same  period,  Goethe's  Faust,  which  was  like- 
wise the  growth  of  many  years  of  the  poet's  life. 
As  the  literary  critic  has  separated  the  poem  into 
a  series  of  layers  in  chronological  order,  so  the 
philosophical  critic  has  separated  this  Critique 
into  successive  sections,  arranged  according  to 
their  origin  in  time.  Indeed  old  Homer  himself 


KANT.  —  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  EEASON.      507 

has  (in  his  two  poems)  been  cut  up  into  strata 
by  the  Germans.  Now  the  curious  fact  comes 
to  light  that  the  source  of  all  this  dissection  and 
stratification  applied  to  literature  by  the  German 
mind  goes  back  chiefly  to  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason,  which  is  thus  having  its  own  doctrine 
served  up  to  itself.  The  Prolegomena  of  Wolf, 
the  fountain  of  the  whole  Homeric  controversy, 
has  its  thought  in  Kant's  book,  though  of  course 
this  critical  separative  spirit  lay  in  the  age,  in  the 
entire  Eighteenth  Century.  It  is,  therefore,  not 
surprising  to  hear  that  attempts  have  been  made 
in  Germany  to  trace  the  chronological  order  of 
the  individual  sections  of  the  work,  as  they  arose 
in  the  mind  of  the  author.  Such  an  effort 
springs  out  of  the  evolutionary  spirit  pervading 
the  Nineteenth  Century. 

Kant  also  says  in  the  letter  above  cited  that 
his  chief  attention  was  given  to  the  subject-mat- 
ter, while  "  little  care  was  bestowed  upon  the  style, 
or  upon  making  it  easy  for  the  reader."  Well 
may  he  make  some  apology  for  the  composition  of 
the  book,  which  is  not  good.  It  has  often  the 
long  involved  sentences,  so  much  complained  of 
in  German  writing;  he  is  careless  of  grammar, 
especially  of  his  pronouns,  and  his  exposition 
is  not  seldom  disorderly.  His  style  has  little  or 
no  relief  from  a  certain  rigid  procedure,  a  sort 
of  metallic  hardness  is  felt  in  it,  which  must  have 
belonged  to  Kant's  character,  and  which  sug- 


508        MODERN  E  UROPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

gests  his  imperious  unbending  disposition.  The 
categorical  imperative  we  can  feel  in  his- very 
phrasing,  and  the  postulate  of  his  Ego  as  Will 
sounds  out  of  every  sentence.  When  we  read 
these  Critiques  we  seem  to  hear  the  stern, 
almost  rude  word  of  individual  authority  which 
brooks  no  questioning  of  its  judgments.  This 
Kantian  style  is  peculiarly  German,  being  found 
with  varying  degrees  of  intensity  in  many  literary 
and  historical  productions  of  Germany,  and 
comes,  in  part  at  least,  from  the  deep  study  and 
appropriation  of  Kant's  work  by  the  German 
mind. 

The  title  is  suggestive.  The  word  Critique 
is  derived  from  a  Greek  verb  with  two  mean- 
ings :  to  separate  and  to  judge,  or  to  dis- 
tinguish and  to  subsume.  Both  these  meanings 
seem  to  be  interlinked  in  Kant's  usage.  There 

o 

is  the  primal  separation  from  the  sense-world 
which  calls  forth  the  world  of  Ideas,  and  with 
this  latter  world  (as  that  of  Pure  Reason)  the 
Critique  specially  deals,  analyzing  it  and  making 
in  it  many  distinctions.  But  all  this  demands 
continuously  the  act  of  judging,  and  Kant  is  the 
judge.  It  is  he  (or  his  Ego)  who  furnishes 
the  criterion  or  law,  who  makes  the  analysis, 
and  who  finally  renders  the  decision.  This 
judicial  process  is  called  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason;  that  is,  Pure  Reason  as  a  sort  of  cul- 
prit, at  least  as  one  making  many  claims  not 


KANT.  — CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.      509 

valid,  is  called  to  the  bar  of  the  judge,  Kant 
himself  and  none  other,  who  examines  these 
claims  and  sets  many  of  them  aside  as  fraudulent 
but  establishes  others.  Now  the  fundamental 
claim  of  Pure  Reason  is  that  it  can  know  the 
object  as  it  is,  or  the  thing  in  itself;  this  claim, 
however,  though  propounded  and  asserted  since 
the  beginning  of  Philosophy,  Judge  Kant  throws 
out  of  court  with  no  little  emphasis.  Such  is 
the  primal  'act.  of  criticism,  an  act  in  every  way 
famous  and  full  of  significance  for  the  future. 
Substantially  it  negatives  the  question  which 
started  Philosophy  into  existence  in  the  old 
Greek  world,  which  question  is :  What  is  the 
essence  of  Being?  It  can't  be  known,  answers 
Kant  (with  a  punning  negative  echo  in  English, 
which  may  also  be  heard  in  German). 

It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  this  Pure  Rea- 
son which  Kant  calls  to  the  judgment  seat  is 
really  his  own,  is  himself.  Kant  summons  him- 
self as  claiming  to  know  the  world  of  reality, 
before  himself,  and  then  in  his  own  presence- 
chamber  arbitrates  and  decides  this  claim  of  his 
in  the  negative.  In  such  procedure  we  see  two 
opposite  characteristics  which  reveal  the  deeply 
dualistic  nature  of  Kant :  on  the  one  hand  a  pro- 
digious act  of  self-assertion,  and  on  the  other  a 
prodigious  act  of  self-denial.  He  makes  the  claim 
of  being  the  absolute  judge  in  his  own  case  and 
then  decides  his  own  case  against  himself. 


510        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

After  making  himself  the  arbiter  of  knowing 
the  objective  world,  he  then  affirms  that  he 
cannot  know  it.  Though  he  denies  his  own 
Intellect,  he  asserts  his  own  Will.  To  such  an 
inner  self -opposition  has  the  philosopher  attained, 
and  with  him  all  philosophy,  whose  dualism  he 
reflects  in  its  latest  and  most  intense  phase. 

Scheme.  Throughout  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason  we  find  a  scheme  or  plan  according  to 
which  it  is  constructed.  Evidently  Kant  deemed 
this  Scheme  of  great  importance,  since  it  is  em- 
ployed with  little  variation  in  the  other  two  Crit- 
iques, and  may  be  traced  in  different  writings  of 
his,  especially  those  which  are  later.  It  is  a  just 
surmise  that  he  gradually  unfolded  into  a  con- 
sciousness of  his  Scheme,  as  he  progressed  with 
the  present  work.  One  often  thinks  that  his 
Scheme  came  last  as  the  framework  for  holding 
his  various  essays  and  treatises  together  and  con- 
joining them  into  a  book.  To  be  sure  Kant  de- 
rived the  Scheme  largely  from  the  Logic  which  he 
lectured  upon  at  the  University,  so  that  it  may  be 
deemed  the  logical  skeleton  upon  which  he  hangs 
his  thoughts. 

To  get  a  clear  notion  of  this  Scheme,  at  least 
in  outline,  is  the  first  step  in  a  serious  study  of 
Kant.  The  fundamental  division  of  the  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason  is  into  two  parts :  Transcend- 
ental Doctrine  of  Elements  and  Transcendental 
Doctrine  of  Method,  both  of  which  divisions  are 


KAN T.  —  CEITiq UE  OF  PURE  REASON.       5 1 1 

taken  from  the  traditional  Formal  Logic  used  by 
Kant.  But  the  second  division  is  inclined  to  fall 
away  ;  it  is  by  no  means  as  important  as  the  first, 
which  occupies  more  than  five  times  as  many 
pages.  All  the  great  problems  introduced  by 
Kant  into  Philosophy  are  discussed  in  the  first 
division. 

Kant  is  the  most  German,  the  most  Gothic  of 
all  philosophers.  The  infinite  division  of  the 
Schematism  of  this  Critique  is  like  the  Gothic 
Cathedral ;  its  divisions  often  seem  to  lose  them- 
selves in  infinite  details,  yet  with  a  certain  sym- 
metrical proportion,  even  if  sometimes  a  part 
breaks  loose  and  reveals  its  capricious  independ- 
ence. This  Schematism  is  an  integral  part  of 
the  study  of  Kant ;  it  belongs  to  German  Black- 
Letter  Teutonic,  not  to  the  clean-cut  English 
Latinized  Teutonic,  such  as  we  see  in  Locke  and 
Hume.  Such  a  Scheme  seems  to  belong  to  the 
German  Spirit. 

In  the  tabular  statement  we  have  by  no  means 
given  all  the  manifold  divisions  and  sub-divisions 
of  the  Kantian  edifice.  We  have  omitted  a  good 
deal,  and  have  abbreviated  other  minor  parts. 
Still  the  reader  can  see  at  a  glance  how  minutely 
organized  the  Scheme  is,  and  can  feel  the  Gothi- 
cism  of  its  structure,  which  is  an  element  not  to 
be  left  out  of  its  consideration. 


512          MODERN  E  UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 


A  TRANSCENDENTAL  DOCTRINE  OF  ELEMENTS, 
FIRST  PART.  —  Transcendental  Aesthetic, 
I.  Space. 
II.  Time. 

SECOND  PART.  —Transcendental  Logic. 

FIRST  DIVISION.  — Transcendental  Analytic. 
First  Book  —  Analytic  of  ConceptSc 
I.  Clue  to  discovery  of  Concepts. 

1.  Logical  use  of  Understanding. 

2.  Logical  Function  of  Understanding. 

3.  Categories. 

II.  Deduction  of  Pure  Concepts, 

1.  Principles. 

2.  Transcendental  Deduction. 
Second  Book  —  Analytic  of  PrinciplGSc 

I.  Schematism  of  Concepts, 
II.  System  of  all  principles  of  the  Understanding, 

1.  Highest  principle  of  analytic  judgments. 

2.  Highest  principle  of  synthetic  judgments. 

3.  Systematic  representation,  etc. 

(1)  Axioms  of  Intuition, 

(2)  Anticipations  of  Perception. 

(3)  Analogies  of  Experience. 

A.  Principle    of    Persistence  of 

substance, 

B.  Time-Succession  according  to 

Law  of  Causality. 

C.  Principle  of  Co-existence,  etc. 

(4)  Postulates  of  empirical  thought. 
III.  Ground  for  distinguishing  Phenomena  and 

Noumena. 


KANT.  —  CRITIQ UE  OF  PURE  E EASON.      5 1 3 


SECOND  DIVISION  —  Transcendental  Dialectic. 
First  Book  —  Of  the  Ideas  of  Pure  Reason. 
I,  Of  Ideas  in  general. 
II.  Of  transcendental  Ideas. 
III.  System  of  transcendental  Ideas. 
Second  Book — Dialectical    Conclusions    of    Pure 

Reason. 

I,  Paralogisms  of  Pure  Reason. 
II.  Antinomies  of  Pure  Reason. 

1.  System  of  cosmological  Ideas. 

2.  Conflict  of  Pure  Reason. 

(1)  First  Antinomies. 

(2)  Second  Antinomies. 

(3)  Third  Antinomies. 

(4)  Fourth  Antinomies. 

3.  Interest  of  Reason  in  the  Conflict. 

Ten  other  divisions. 
III.  The  Ideal  of  Pure  Reason. 

1.  Of  the  Ideal  in  general. 

2.  Of  the  Transcendental  Ideal. 

3.  Of  Arguments  for  proving  God. 

4.  Impossibility  of  Ontological  Proof. 

5.  Impossibility  of  Cosmological  Proof. 

6-  Impossibility     of      Physico-Theological 

proof. 
7.  Critique  of  all  Theology. 

B.  TRANSCENDENTAL    DOCTRINE    OF   METHOD. 
Four  main  divisions  with  numerous  sub-diyisions. 
33 


514        MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  first  reflection  to  be  made  upon  the  preced- 
ing Scheme  is  its  fundamental  classification  by 
twos.  Its  main  divisions  run  into  dyads,  and 
show  most  strikingly  in  an  external  form  the 
dualistic  character  of  Kant's  philosophizing. 
Even  if  he  obtained  most  of  these  divisions  from 
an  outside  source,  he  certainly  adopted  them  and 
increased  them.  The  bare  inspection  of  the 
foregoing  table  gives  us  a  glimpse  into  the  inner- 
most workings  of  Kant's  mind,  and  reveals  its 
inherently  separative  character.  Still  we  may 
observe  reactions  in  which  the  total  Ego  of  the 
philosopher  asserts  itself  more  or  less  instinct- 
ively, and  not  simply  its  separative  stage.  For 
in  spite  of  and  underneath  all  these  dyads  runs 
quite  unconsciously  a  threefold  division  which  is 
fundamental,  and  which  is  the  real  process  of 
the  book.  This  is  the  division  into  Aesthetic, 
Analytic,  and  Dialectic.  Whoever  deals  with  the 
book  in  its  essential  movement  has  in  mind  these 
three  elements  of  it,  either  singly  or  in  a  process 
together.  Every  citation  or  discussion  going  to 
the  heart  of  the  theme  will  be  found  to  involve 
one  or  all  of  these  three  divisions.  An  exami- 
nation will  show  that  Kant  himself,  when  in  the 
full  and  free  swing  of  his  spirit,  throws  overboard 
his  formal  dyadal  distinctions,  and  becomes  un- 
consciously triadal  in  the  procedure  of  his 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  In  like  manner  his 
best  critics,  striking  home  to  the  basic  thought 


KANT.  —  CEITIQUE  OF  PUEE  REASON*     515 

of  the  work,  circle  about  the  Aesthetic,  the  Ana- 
lytic, and  the  Dialectic  in  their  exposition  of 
the  Kantian  doctrine.  This  fact  the  reader 
should  know  at  the  start,  as  it  may  save  him 
from  much  wandering  and  possibly  from  losing 
himself  in  the  mazes  of  Kant's  complicated 
Scheme,  which  of  itself  is  so  deeply  separative. 

It  may  be  here  observed  that  Kant  became 
aware,  or  at  least  more  fully  aware  of  this 
deeply  separative  tendency  in  himself  and 
sought  to  correct  it  in  some  of  his  later  writ- 
ings. To  our  mind  his  third  Critique,  that  of 
Judgment,  is  such  a  correction.  For  the  primal 
inner  movement  of  Kant's  thought  is  seen  in  his 
two  Critiques,  of  Pure  Reason  and  of  Practical 
Reason,  or  of  Intellect  and  Will,  which  divide 
the  Ego  into  two  wholly  antithetic  activities,  and 
which  move  in  just  opposite  directions.  It  was  a 
later  idea  that  there  must  be  a  mediating  third 
placed  with  or  between  these  two,  that  the  mind, 
to  be  complete,  must  also  have  Feeling  as  well  as 
Intellect  and  Will.  Still  Kant  re  mains  essentially 
a  judge,  not  an  arbitrator  (as  he  is  sometimes 
called)  or  mediator. 

Another  thought  arises  in  the  present  con- 
nection: the  preceding  Scheme  is  not  organic, 
does  not  grow  out  of  the  subject-matter,  but  is 
largely  though  not  wholly  foisted  upon  it  from 
the  outside,  through  metaphysical  categories  taken 
from  Formal  Logic.  This  fact  can  be  historically 


516          MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

verified  by  an  inspection  of  Kant's  Logic,  edited 
by  one  of  his  pupils  (Jasche)  from  notes  to  a 
book  on  Logic,  during  the  author's  lifetime. 
Here  we  find  it  that  Logic  is  *'  a  science  of 
reason,  not  according  to  matter  but  according  to 
form;  "  that  is,  the  content  of  Reason  must  be 
subjected  to  the  logical  form.  Moreover  Logic 
is  "  a  science,  a-priori,  of  the  necessary  laws  of 
thought,"  and  shows  "the  right  use  of  the 
Reason  and  of  the  Understanding . ' '  Still  further 
it  is  "  divided  into  Analytic  and  Dialectic,"  of 
which  the  former  "  reveals  through  separation  all 
the  activities  of  Reason,"  while  the  latter  "is 
the  Logic  of  Appearance  which  springs  from 
a  misuse  of  the  Analytic"  by  producing  "a 
merely  false  show  of  true  knowledge."  Other 
leading  categories  and  divisions  found  in  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason  we  come  upon  in  this 
book  on  Logic.  It  furnishes  essentially  the 
Scheme  of  the  Critique  apart  from  its  content . 
Thus  we  mark  a  decided  separation  between  Form 
and  Matter,  the  first  being  superposed  upon  the 
second. 

This  fact  has  been  recognized  and  often  re- 
gretted by  commentators  on  Kant.  Still  we. 
cannot  help  thinking  that  it  belongs  naturally 
to  the  man's  work,  that  it  is  a  phase  of  the 
Kantian  dualism.  Indeed  these  abstract  cate- 
gories dominating  the  free  activity  of  the  Ego 
make  the  procedure  in  all  Philosophy.  So  the 


KANT.  —  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.     517 

foregoing  logical  forms  rule  more  or  less  ex- 
ternally all  three  of  Kant's  Critiques,  which  in 
themselves  have  a  psychical  origin. 

We  may,  therefore,  say  that  Kant's  Schema- 
tism is  not  altogether  happy,  is  not  perfect. 
The  result  is  that  some  writers  cry  out  against 
any  Scheme  whatever.  This  is  a  mistake  in  just 
the  opposite  direction.  The  Scheme  may  be  in- 
adequate, let  it  be  improved,  but  not  thrown 
away.  It  is  subject  to  evolution,  like  everything 
else.  In  fact  it  cannot  be  dispensed  with, 
especially  in  any  systematic  thin'king.  It  may 
be  imperfect,  still  thera  is  a  movement  toward 
the  perfect  Scheme,  as  there  is  toward  the  per- 
fect man  or  toward  the  highest  good,  and  toward 
the  supreme  thought.  The  Kantian  Scheme  has 
its  own  sins,  but  also  its  own  merits;  its  chief 
merit  is  that  it  orders,  even  if  externally  and 
autocratically,  a  great  complex,  refractory  book, 
whose  recalcitrant  materials  have  a  tendency,  if 
left  to  themselves,  to  pitch  into  chaos.  More- 
over every  philosophic  Scheme  is  absolutistic  and 
Kant  is  a  philosopher  in  a  very  decided  sense, 
having  as  his  deepest  principle  the  categorical 
imperative,  which  makes  him  in  his  sphere  an 
imperator.  So  his  logical  Scheme  projected  by 
himself  into  a  dominating  order  is  imperious  and 
imperial  (kaiserlich)  and  so  national,  he  being 
the  philosophus  leutonicus  of  his  time  as  truly 
as  was  old  Jacob  Boehnie. 


518          MODERN  EUBOPE AN  PHILOSOPHY. 

So  Kant,  in  his  hostility  to  the  transmitted  Phi- 
losophy, throws  overboard  its  Norm,  and  makes 
one  of  its  own,  which  is  the  preceding  Scheme. 
Something  similar  we  have  already  seen  in  the 
other  philosophers  of  the  Eighteenth  Century; 
each  asserts  his  philosophic  freedom  by  making 
his  own  Norm,  which  thus  becomes  an  individual 
Scheme,  and  is  no  longer  the  universal  Norm  of 
Philosophy.  Herein  too  we  see  Thought  turning 
against  itself  and  assailing  its  own  transmitted 
order,  in  the  true  revolutionary  spirit.  It  is, 
therefore,  a  significant  fact  that  Kant  dethrones 
the  Norm  and  sets  up  the:Scheme  as  the  govern- 
ing principle  of  his  all  thinking. 

We  must,  however,  not  fail  to  appreciate  the 
positive,  and  not  merely  the  negative,  signifi- 
cance of  such  an  act  in  the  greatest  philosopher 
of  the  Century.  The  old  Norm  with  its  corre- 
sponding Discipline  is  indeed  coming  to  an  end, 
its  own  followers  (the  philosophers)  are  destroy- 
ing it.  The  new  Norm  with  its  corresponding 
new  Discipline  (Psychology)  is  in  the  process  of 
being  born,  and  is  the  real  cause  of  all  these 
painful  throes  convulsing  the  ancient  formulas 
of  venerable  Philosophy.  This  psychological 
infant,  as  yet  unborn  but  lustily  struggling  to 
come  to  light,  is  the  secret  demonic  energy, 
which  is  all  unconsciously  driving  Kant  forward 
to  his  supremely  negative  deed,  undoing  Philoso- 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  AESTHETIC.     519 

phy  with  its  Norm,  but  with  the  same  blow 
undoing  himself,  for  he  is  still  the  philosopher. 

Our  exposition  will,  therefore,  have  to  abandon 
the  Kantian  Scheme  and  proceed  on  the  lines 
which  time  has  shown  to  underlie  its  movement. 
As  already  indicated,  the  three  fundamental  and 
internally  connected  divisions  of  the  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason  are:  (I.)  The  Transcendental 
Aesthetic,  (II.)  The  Transcendental  Analytic, 
(III.)  The  Transcendental  Dialectic.  These 
three  themes  we  shall  discuss  in  order,  not  neg- 
lecting to  cast  often  a  glance  back  at  the 
Scheme  of  which  Kant  deemed  them  integral 
portions. 

I.  TRANSCENDENTAL  AESTHETIC.  —  It  is  called 
Aesthetic ,  because  it  pertains  to  knowledge 
through  the  senses.  It  is  transcendental,  be- 
cause it  pertains  to  principles  given  a-priori  (not 
through  the  Senses  but  from  the  Ego  directly). 
These  are  the  non-empirical  (transcendental) 
principles  of  empiricism  (sensism).  Hence 
Kant's  definition:  "  I  call  Transcendental  Aes- 
thetic a  science  of  all  a-priori  principles  of  sen- 
sism (  Sinnlichkeil) ."  Or  we  may  call  it  a 
science  of  the  ideal  elements  of  reality,  that  is  a 
science  of  the  supersensible  Forms  through 
which  we  know  the  sensible  world.  Thus  the 
old  Platonic  dualism  of  two  worlds  emerges 
again,  though  in  a  new  shape  and  with  a  new 
problem,  (mundus  intelligibilis  et  sensibilis). 


520          MODERN  E  UEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  question  is,  How  can  I,  with  the  one  world 
in  me,  know  the  other  world  outside  of  me? 

It  is  evident  that  the  first  thing  to  be  looked 
into  is  the  nature  of  that  "  world  outside  of 
me,"  in  general  the  object  (  Gegenstand).  Ac- 
cordingly this  is  what  Kant  grapples  with  at  the 
start,  in  his  very  first  sentence  pertaining  to  the 
present  topic.  When  we  are  impressed  or 
affected  by  the  object,  this  affection  of  our 
Ego  (Gemiith)  is  called  a  Sensation.  On  the 
other  hand  the  object  as  affected  or  changed  by 
our  Ego  in  sensation  is  an  Appearance  or  Phe- 
nomenon (JZrscheinung).  Here  again  we  have 
two  opposing  but  interrelated  terms,  which  will 
often  be  used  in  the  course  of  the  discussion. 

At  once  there  begins  to  spin  around  this 
phenomenon  a  number  of  new  difficulties,  which 
can  only  be  allayed  by  new  divisions  and  defi- 
nitions. Is  the  object  as  phenomenon  a  mere 
appearance  without  objective  validity?  Again 
and  again  this  question  comes  up  to  bother  Kant 
and  his  reader;  the  latter  it  has  not  ceased  to 
bother  to  this  day .  At  present  it  need  only  be 
said  that  Kant  does  not  deny  reality  to  his 
phenomenon,  yet  he  is  not  able  to  assure  this 
reality;  he  affirms  it  indeed,  but  cannot  confirm 
his  affirmation. 

Still  further,  at  this  point  begins  another 
and  even  more  virulent  dualism :  the  phe- 
nomenon splits  wide  open,  and  becomes 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  AESTHETIC.     521 

twofold;  on  the  one  side  as  related  to 
the  Ego,  it  is  the  phenomenal  thing;  on 
the  other  side  as  beyond  the  Ego,  it  is  the 
Thing-in-itself,  which  cannot  be  known  or 
even  sensed.  This  is  the  most  galling  contradic- 
tion probably  in  the  whole  Critique,  causing  the 
reader  to  hesitate  and  halt  and  hobble  over  the 
rough  pathway,  with  mind  bouncing  from  this 
side  to  that  in  a  state  of  never  ending  dubitation. 
For  it  is  just  this  unknown  Thing-in-itself  which 
sets  the  machinery  to  moving,  first  stimulating 
the  Ego  to  sensation  and  then  to  the  construc- 
tion of  the  entire  vast  superstructure  of  Pure 
Reason,  the  whole  being  erected  ostensibly  in 
order  to  know  this  unknown  Thing-in-itself. 
And  the  outcome  is  seemingly  a  drawn  battle,  if 
not  defeat.  Still  very  wonderful  results  are 
dropped  by  the  way  in  the  course  of  this  re- 
sultless  expedition. 

Coming  back  from  these  more  remote  outlooks 
pertaining  to  the  Phenomenon,  we  may  next 
glance  at  another  distinction  concerning  it  which 
is  of  imuieidate  use.  Says  Kant:  "In  the 
Phenomenon  I  call  that  which  corresponds  to  sen- 
sation the  Matter  thereof,  while  that  which 
renders  the  multiplicity  of  the  Phenomenon 
capable  of  being  ordered  I  call  the  Form." 
Hence  comes  the  important  distinction  that  the 
Matter  of  the  Phenomenon  in  sensation  "is 
given  a  posteriori ,"  that  is  empirically,  while 


522        MODERN'  EUROPEAN-  PHILOSOPHY. 

"the  Form  of  the  Phenomenon  in  sensation 
must  lie  ready  in  the  Ego  (Gemiith)  a-priori." 
Thus  in  the  Phenomenon  or  sensed  object  the 
Ego  determines  the  Form  out  of  itself,  but  is 
determined  by  the  Matter  out  of  the  object. 
This  is  the  source  of  the  a-priori  or  ideal  Forms 
of  sensation  or  sense-perception  which  soon 
come  into  play. 

Such  is  the  general  purport  of  the  introduction 
to  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic  which  deals  spe- 
cially with  these  a-priori  Forms  of  the  Phenomenon 
in  sensation.  These  he  calls  for  the  most  part 
Pure  Forms  of  Intuition  (Anschauung)  or  Sense- 
perception,  and  declares  that  there  are  two  and 
only  two,  Space  and  Time.  He  gives  an  exposi- 
tion of  both  according  to  the  Scheme  on  a  pre- 
vious page,  which  we  shall  here  follow. 

1.  /Space.  This  is  the  first  theme  of  the 
Transcendental  Aesthetic  and  the  first  fact  of 
the  sensible  world.  Says  Kant:  "  By  means  of 
the  external  sense  (a  property  of  our  Ego, 
Gemiith)  we  bring  before  ourselves  objects 
which  are  outside  of  us,  these  being  all  in  Space 
and  having  a  certain  form,  size  and  relation  to 
one  another."  Such  is  the  first  appeal  to 
experience  in  which  we  notice  that  an  external 
(or  spatial)  sense  is  assumed  by  the  author, 
which  has  its  counterpart  in  the  internal  sense, 
whereby  we  represent  to  ourselves  Time.  Thus 
the  Ego  is  endowed  for  its  present  work  with 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  AESTHETIC.     523 

two  senses,  a  Space-sense  (external)  and  a  Time- 
sense  (internal)  each  of  which  has  a  central  part 
to  perform,  though  Kant  introduces  them  simply 
by  the  way. 

Externally  we  cannot  perceive  Space  as  such, 
yet  we  perceive  things  in  Space.  Hence  rise 
the  questions,  What  is  it  and  how  do  we  get  it? 
Is  it  an  actual  object  out  yonder  in  the  world,  or 
is  it  some  relation  between  objects?  Kant's 
answer  is,  Space  is  not  an  object,  not  a  percept, 
but  a  Form  of  perceiving  existent  in  the  mind, 
hence  a  Form  ideal,  a-priori,  coming  from  the 
Ego  and  imposed  upon  the  object.  I  cannot 
sense  the  object  except  by  means  of  the  inner 
Space-Form  of  my  Ego,  which  co-operates  with 
my  external  sensation  in  making  the  object  ap- 
pear to  me,  thus  producing  the  Phenomenon 
already  mentioned.  To  show  the  existence  of 
this  Space-Form  of  Sense-perception  Kant  gives 
two  kinds  of  exposition  which  he  calls  metaphys- 
ical and  transcendental. 

(a)  The  exposition  is  metaphysical  when  it 
deals  with  those  points  which  show  the  concept 
of  Space  as  given  a-priori.  (1)  When  I  refer 
my  sensation  to  an  object  outside  of  me,  and  in  a 
different  place  from  that  in  which  I  am,  I  must 
have  the  Idea  of  Space  beforehand,  in  order  to 
perceive  and  bring  together  these  two  separate 
places.  (2)  It  is  impossible  for  me  to  conceive 
Space  not  to  be,  though  I  can  conceive  spatial 


524         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

objects  not  to  be,  that  is,  a  pure  or  empty  space. 
Hence  the  Idea  of  Space  does  not  spring  from  or 
depend  upon  sensible  objects,  but  these  depend 
upon  it.  (3)  Space  is  a  pure  Sense-perception 
(or  Intuition)  given  as  a-priori,  one  and  homo- 
geneous, conceived  as  infinite  in  magnitude,  since 
no  spatial  limit  is  valid  against  Space  itself. 

(6)  Kant  calls  his  exposition  transcendental 
when  from  this  science  (or  cognition)  of  Space 
as  a  subjective  Form  of  Sense-perception,  uni- 
versal and  necessary,  are  derived  other  sciences 
(or  cognitions)  of  Space  universal  and  neces- 
sary, that  is,  not  empirical.  Herein  an  ex- 
ample is  Geometry  as  the  Science  of  the 
Pure  Forms  of  Space,  derived  a-priori,  pro- 
jected by  the  Ego  out  of  itself,  and  made  by  it 
into  a  Science  which  controls  the  entire  material 
realm.  T  hus  the  Ego  by  means  of  its  pure  Ideas 
of  Sense-perception  pre-constructs  a  Form-world 
which  determines  the  Sense-world,  and  is  not 
determined  by  it,  or  empirically.  This  a-priori 
Form-world  determining  all  matter  is  Mathemat- 
ics, and  can  only  originate  in  a  subject  (or  Ego) 
possessing  in  its  own  right  the  pure  Form  of  ex- 
ternal Sensation  which  is  stimulated  to  activity 
by  the  object. 

With  this  thought  of  Mathematics  rises  an- 
other and  much  more  comprehensive  thought:  If 
there  is  one  limited  science  in  which  the  ideal 
Forms  of  Space  show  themselves  valid  in  the 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  AESTHETIC.     525 

realm  of  reality,  may  there  not  be  a  far  wider 
science  in  which  other  or  all  transcendental  Ideas 
can  be  shown  as  having  objective  validity?  In  other 
words,  is  a  Transcendental  Metaphysics  possible? 
In  fact  this  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  is  the  pro- 
paedeutic or  preliminary  investigation  for  such 
a  science,  which  would  embrace  all  necessary  and 
universal  truths.  Though  Kant  busied  himself 
a  great  deal  about  such  a  work,  he  never  wrote  it, 
indeed  could  not  write  from  his  subjective  point 
of  view. 

II.  Time.  Corresponding  to  the  external 
sense,  by  means  of  which  we  get  Space,  is  the 
internal  Sense  *'  by  means  of  which  the  Ego 
(  Gemuth)  beholds  itself  or  its  inner  condition, 
but  which  gives  no  perception  of  the  soul  itself 
as  an  object.  Still  it  is  a  determinate  Form 
under  which  the  perception  of  the  inner  condi- 
tion of  the  soul  is  alone  possible  so  that  every- 
thing which  belongs  to  our  inner  activities,  is 
represented  in  the  relations  of  Time."  Time  is 
not,  therefore,  a  sensed  object,  is  not  something 
which  can  be  seen,  being  in  this  respect  like 
Space.  Thus  Kant  endows  the  Ego  with  a 
Time-sense  which  is  its  power  of  self-beholding 
or  self -consciousness,  whereby  we  get  the  idea  of 
succession  pure  and  simple,  or  Time.  Of  this 
there  are  also  two  kinds  of  exposition,  meta- 
physical and  transcendental. 

(a)  The  metaphysical  exposition  of  Time  sets 


526         MODERN  E  UEOPEAN  PHIL O SOPHY. 

forth  the  arguments  for  the  a-priori  character  of 
Time:  (1)  You  cannot  represent  things  exist- 
ing at  the  same  time  (cotemporaneously)  or  at 
different  times  (successively),  without  the  pre- 
existent  idea  of  time,  which  is  not,  accordingly, 
an  empirical  concept  derived  from  temporal 
experiences.  (2)  You  cannot  obliterate  Time 
itself,  though  you  can  obliterate  (mentally) 
things  and  events  in  Time.  This  shows  it  to  be 
a  necessary  Form  of  the  Ego  in  all  perception,  a 
universal  condition  of  the  possibility  of  Phe- 
nomena. (3)  Upon  this  necessity  are  founded 
the  axioms  of  Time  as  universal  and  necessary, 
for  example  that  different  times  must  be  succes- 
sive. (4)  Time  is  no  general  concept  (of  the 
Understanding),  but  a  pure  Form  of  Sense-per- 
ception. (5)  The  infinity  of  Time  means  that 
Time  is  at  once  beyond  any  limit  put  upon  it. 
Thus  there  is  the  one  Time,  the  condition  under- 
lying all  times. 

(b)  The  transcendental  exposition  of  Time 
ought  to  show  the  science  or  sciences  which  spring 
from  the  a-priori  conception  of  Time.  But  here 
Kant  gives  no  exposition  at  all,  he  can  only  refer 
us  back  to  a  part  of  the  metaphysical  exposition, 
with  a  vague  allusion  to  the  concepts  of  change 
and  motion,  "  which  are  possible  only  through 
the  idea  of  Time."  There  is  no  doubt  that 
Kant's  Scheme  at  this  point  shows  a  big  hole. 
Possibly,  we  might  expect  the  science  of  Number 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  AESTHETIC.     527 

(Arithmetic)  as  correlative  to  the  science  of 
Form  (Geometry)  to  be  given  in  this  connection, 
but  it  does  not  appear. 

So  much  for  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic, 
which  is  one  of  the  most  prominent  and  original 
portions  of  the  Kantian  Philosophy.  The  doctrine 
that  Space  and  Time  are  not  objective,  but  are 
pure  Forms  of  the  percipient  Ego,  was  a  very 
striking  and  novel  view,  which  soon  took  hold  of 
the  age  already  predisposed  to  subjectivity.  As 
this  portion  occurs  early  in  the  Critique,  being 
really  its  first  note,  the  reader  became  curious  to 
explore  further  in  the  difficult  book  whose  good 
fortune  was  to  give  forth  its  most  peculiar  and 
stunning  idea  at  the  start .  To  be  sure  it  main- 
tained its  originality  in  other  portions  which  fol- 
lowed, though  this  first  portion  has  continued  to 
be  the  favorite  with  many  readers. 

We  must,  however,  understand  that  Kant  does 
not  deny  the  empirical  reality  of  Time  as  belong- 
ing to  the  object.  In  our  experience  which  is 
sensuous,  there  can  be  no  object  which  is  not  in 
Time.  In  regard  to  the  Phenomenon  Time  has 
objective  validity  but  not  in  itself,  as  absolute, 
as  abstracted  from  the  Phenomenon.  The  object 
in  Time  is,  therefore,  very  different  from  Time 
itself,  which  belongs  to  the  Ego  perceiving  the 
object,  which  has,  accordingly,  no  sensuous 
reality,  but  in  Kant's  phrase,  possesses  transcen- 
dental ideality.  Through  its  own  Forms  of  Sen- 


528        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

sation,  Space  and  Time,  the  Ego  can  sense  its  own 
other,  its  opposite,  which  is  the  material  object. 

Observations  on  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic. — 
An  inspection  of  Kant's  discussion  shows  that 
his  appeal  is  almost  entirely  to  the  Ego  and  its 
processes.  It  is  really  the  fundamental  pre- 
supposition or  postulate  to  which  every  deduc- 
tion goes  back  ultimately.  If  we  look  closely  at 
the  so-called  metaphysical  exposition  of  Space 
and  Time,  we  shall  find  it  to  be  essentially  intro- 
spective, while  the  transcendental  exposition 
seeks  to  derive  mathematical  science  through 
such  introspection.  In  general,  the  terms  are 
not  happy,  for  is  not  transcendental  also  meta- 
physical? According  to  Kant  himself  this 
whole  book  of  transcendental  principles  is  only 
a  part  of  a  total  science  of  Metaphysics.  \\7e 
should  call  both  these  discussions  psychological, 
as  being  really  spun  out  of  the  process  of  the 
Ego. 

Another  pre-supposition  which  Kant  intro- 
duces from  the  outside  is  the  two  senses,  exter- 
nal and  internal,  or  the  Space-sense  and  the 
Time-sense.  These  are  not  a  mentioned  portion 
of  Kant's  Scheme,  still  they  have  a  very  impor- 
tant part  in  his  discussion,  so  important  that 
they  ought  to  take  an  organic  place  in  the  expo- 
sition. They  are  special  activities  of  the  Ego, 
which  we  have  already  seen  to  be  the  center 
from  which  everything  rays  out.  Kant  intro- 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  AESTHE TIC.     529 

duces  it  somewhat  covertly  by  calling  it  "we," 
"the  mind,"  etc.;  especially  the  word  Gemuth 
whose  counterpart  is  hard  to  find  in  English,  he 
uses  for  Ego,  as  we  have  tried  to  bring  out  in 
several  preceding  passages.  So  we  have  in  this 
Transcendental  Aesthetic  to  dig  out  and  hold  up 
the  Ego  as  the  implicit  source  of  two  explicit 
senses,  the  external  and  internal. 

Herewith  we  begin  to  find  a  new  process  or 
rather  series  of  processes  underlying  Kant's  pro- 
cedure. His  Scheme  is  openly  dyadal,  but  it  is 
not  complete  till  it  is  supplemented  by  another 
phase  (which  he  gives  indirectly),  whereby  it  be- 
comes triadal.  Thus,  however,  the  Scheme  is 
psychological,  following  the  movement  of  the 
Ego.  It  is  true  that  Kant  would  consciously 
reject  such  a  Scheme,  as  he  holds  that  the  Ego 
in  itself  or  as  object  cannot  be  known,  being  like 
the  Thing-in-itself .  Still  he  unconsciously  im- 
plies its  process  all  the  while ;  indeed  the  internal 
sense,  by  which  the  idea  of  Time  is  obtained,  is 
that  activity  "  through  which  the  Ego  (  Gemiith) 
or  mind  views  itself  or  its  inner  States,"  that  is, 
possesses  self -consciousness.  Still,  after  making 
this  declaration,  he  begins  to  suspect  its  conse- 
quences, and  makes  haste  to  add,  that  this  in- 
ternal sense  "can  give  no  view  of  the  soul  (Ego) 
as  object,"  as  if  the  soul  or  Ego  were  not  by 
its  very  nature  self-viewing,  self-conscious. 
Herein  Kant  shows  himself  still  the  philosopher, 


530         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

unable  to  conceive  the  soul  as  pure  self -activity 
without  a  metaphysical  substrate.  Yet  what  can 
be  plainer  than  that  the  Ego  called  Kant  is  look- 
ing at  itself  and  determining  itself  through  itself 
without  any  such  substrate?  In  the  Ego  as  in- 
ternal unknown  Thing-in-itself  the  contradiction 
is  far  louder  and  more  insistent  than  in  the 
object  as  external  unknown  Thing-in-itself,  since 
the  Ego  in  the  former  case  has  to  see  itself  and 
to  tell  about  itself,  and  still  remain  unknown  to 
itself  in  all  this  knowing  of  itself. 

It  is  not  our  purpose  to  elaborate  these  pre- 
suppositions and  implications  of  Kant's  treat- 
ment ;  still  we  shall  briefly  note  the  three  pro- 
cesses, which  seem  to  underlie  it,  and  which  now 
and  then  rise  to  the  surface  of  it  in  fragmentary 
statements . 

1.  The  immediate  process,  which  shows   the 
elements   implied   in   order   to    make   a    start: 
(a)  the  Ego  as  sensory  or  potential  sensation,  the 
possibility   of   it  as    special  sensation;   (6)  the 
extevnal  object  as  opposite  of  the  Ego,  as  Thing- 
in-itself;    (c)  the  Percept  or  the  Phenomenon, 
which   appears   to  the   Ego,  being  generated  by 
the  external    object    stimulating    the    Ego    to 
activity,  which  is  sensation. 

2.  The  separative  process,  which  shows   the 
Ego  externalizing  itself  and   becoming   spatial : 
(a)  the  external  sensation  as  the  Ego's  activity 
determined  by  the  object ;  (6)  The  object  appears 


KANT.  -  TRANSCENDENTAL  AESTHETIC.      531 

to  the  Ego  as  extended  or  in  extension  (Space), 
hence  as  real,  empirical,  a-posteriori ;  (c)  This 
extension  is  separated  from  the  sensed  object, 
and  regarded  alone  by  itself,  as  it  is  in  itself, 
hence  is  ideal,  subjective,  a-priori.  Thus  it  is 
pure  Space,  not  something  in  Space,  but  the 
Ego's  pre-existing  Form  of  external  sensation, 
by  which  it  sensed  the  object. 

3.  The  self-returning  process  which  shows  the 
Ego  internalizing  itself  and  thus  becoming  in 
itself  successive  or  temporal:  (a)  the  internal 
sensation  as  the  Ego's  activity  determined  by 
the  object  to  determine  itself  or  "to  see  itself 
and  its  states ;"  (&)  The  object  appears  to  the 
Ego  as  in  succession  or  in  a  line  of  changing  con- 
ditions (in  Time)  which  are  real,  empirical, 
a-posteriori;  (c)  This  succession  is  separated 
from  the  sensed  object,  and  regarded  alone  by 
itself,  as  it  is  in  itself,  hence  is  ideal,  subjective, 
a-priori.  This  is  pure  Time,  not  something  in 
Time,  but  the  Ego's  pre-existent  Form  of  in- 
ternal sensation  by  which  it  sensed  the  object 
changing  or  in  motion. 

Such  is  the  threefold  (or  indeed  thrice  three- 
fold) psychical  process  which  we  find  in  Kant's 
discussion  of  Space  and  Time,  if  we  bring  to  light 
and  order  all  its  pre-suppositions. 

But  in  Kant's  view  Space  and  Time  are  two 
primordial  general  senses  found  a-priori  in  the 
mind,  and  mediating  the  external  world  with  the 


532          MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY, 

particular  senses.  The  Ego  has  to  look  through 
its  own  Space  and  Time  before  it  can  see  any 
spatial  or  temporal  object.  Still  there  remains 
the  mysterious  object  starting  this  movement,  or 
the  cause  of  it  all,  which  cause  Kant  takes  for 
granted  as  a  power  or  property  of  the  unknown- 
able  object.  Thus  in  spite  of  all  denials  causa- 
tion is  at  work  from  the  beginning,  is  indeed 
just  the  beginning  which  renders  any  sensation 
of  the  object  possible. 

The  mediational  power  of  Space  and  Time, 
which  was  Kant's  main  object,  does  not  mediate 
therefore,  does  not  bridge  the  chasm  between  the 
external  world  and  Ego,  which  Hume's  skepticism 
rent  in  twain  and  declared  to  be  impassible. 
Locke  held  that  the  knowledge  of  the  object  by 
the  Ego  was  immediate;  but  Hume  easily  showed 
this  to  be  impossible,  wliich  fact  drives  Kant  to 
make  such  knowledge  mediated,  primarily  through 
Space  and  Time.  These  three  points  of  view, 
connected  together  as  stages  of  one  process,  con- 
stitute the  main  philosophical  movement  of  the 
Eighteenth  Century. 

By  making  Space  and  Time  subjective,  Kant 
rescues  the  a-priori  nature  of  pure  Mathematics, 
which,  therefore  are  not  derived  from  experience. 
But  these  mathematical  forms  control  the  natural 
world;  so  the  old  question  conies  up,  though  in 
inverse  order.  For  we  now  must  ask :  How  can 
these  pure  forms  of  subjective  knowledge  reach 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  ANAL  YTIC.     533 

the  object  in  order  to  determine  it?  The  only 
answer  which  Kant  is  able  to  give  is  :  they  do  so, 
try  it  and  see.  Here  we  can  observe  why  Kant 
deems  the  ultimate  fact  of  his  Ego  to  be  will, 
pure,  absolute  will,  which  solves  the  difficulties 
which  knowledge  or  intellect  throws  across  our 
path.  But  Kant  is  not  yet  done  with  his  criti- 
cism of  intellect,  and  so  we  pass  to  the  next  grand 
division  of  his  Critique. 

II.  TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC.  —  If  we  look 
at  Kant's  Scheme  we  observe  that  the  Transcen- 
dental Analytic  is  the  first  division  of  the  Tran- 
scendental Logic.  But  it  conduces  to  clearness  of 
exposition,  and  we  follow  Kant's  inner  movement 
of  thought  better,  if  we  regard  the  present  division 
as  on  a  line  with  the  preceding  Transcendental 
Aesthetic,  and  the  succeeding  Transcendental 
Dialectic.  Thus  it  is  properly  the  second  stage 
of  the  grand  transcendental  process  —  Aesthetic, 
Analytic,  and  Dialectic  —  which  is  the  very  soul 
of  this  whole  work,  The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason. 
Note  again  that  these  three  divisions  or  stages 

o  o 

belong  together  in  one  process  even  in  Kant's 
underlying  conception  though  he  in  our  judgment 
forces  them  asunder  into  artificial  and  alien  parts* 
of  his  Scheme. 

Also  a  new  activity  of  the  Mind  is  now  intro- 
duced and  specially  emphasized,  the  Understand- 
ing (  Verstand)  with  its  Concepts  on  the  one 
hand  and  its  Categories  on  the  other.  This  is 


534         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY,  ',    Y 

the  second  great  faculty  employed  by  Kant,  on  a 
line  with  Sense-perception  (Anschauung)  below 
and  with  Reason  (  Vernunft)  above.  The  Under- 
standing through  its  Concepts  elaborates  the  Per- 
cepts of  Sense-perception  into  the  Categories,  the 
great  implements  of  Intelligence.  The  act  of 
categorizing  the  world  in  order  that  it  may  be 
known  is  the  work  of  the  Understanding. 

The  chief  object  then  of  the  Transcendental 
Analytic  is  to  categorize  the  world  in  order  that 
man  may  know  it  in  so  far  as  it  can  be  known. 
For  this  purpose  there  must  be  the  existent 
categories  (1)  which  Kant  will  put  into  a  table 
or  ordered  Scheme;  (2)  the  object  or  phenom- 
enon must  be  given  as  that  which  is  to  be  duly  cate- 
gorized and  so  known;  (3)  the  mediating  princi- 
ple must  be  found  between  these  two  sides  —  the 
categories  of  the  Understanding  and  the  sensuous 
object — which  principle  with  Kant  is  Time. 

I.  The  Table  of  Categories.  From  the  be- 
ginning Philosophy  has  expressed  itself  in  ab- 
stract Categories,  that  is,  words  or  terms  which 
utter  in  speech  its  principle.  To  this  fact  Aris- 
totle specially  called  attention,  and  gave  a  list  of 
the  fundamental  Categories  of  his  Logic.  But 
if  we  look  into  his  Metaphysics  we  find  that  it  can 
be  reduced  to  a  discussion  of  philosophical  Cate- 
gories, of  which  also  he  gives  a  list,  some -thirty 
in  number  (Met.  Book  IV.).  The  Categories 
may  be  deemed  the  counters  which  human  Intel- 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  ANAL  YTIC.     5 35 

ligence  makes  for  imparting,  exchanging,  and 
transmitting  Thought.  They  are  the  circulating 
medium  of  Mind  between  man  and  man,  and 
also  from  age  to  age.  We  still  use  some  of 
Plato's  and  Aristotle's  mental  coinage  in  the  form 
of  Categories. 

Now  this  fact  attracted  the  attention  of  Kant 
as  a  philosopher.  He  proposed  to  give  a  new 
list  of  the  basic  Categories  which  man  employs 
in  his  thinking.  Moreover  this  list  must  be  an 
ordered  list  after  the  fashion  of  a  scheme  or  table. 

(1)  The  starting-point  is  the  act  of  judgment, 
that  is,  of  subsuming  a  subject  under  a  predi- 
cate. Says  Kant:  "  The  Understanding  can  in 
general  be  represented  as  the  faculty  of  judg- 
ing.'* The  next  question:  What  are  the  funda- 
mental judgments?  Kant  finds  (finden  wir) 
twelve;  four  "  titles  "  have  each  "  three  move- 
ments;" that  is,  the  four  subjects,  Quantity, 
Quality,  Relation,  Modality,  have  each  three 
predicates,  making  the  twelve  fundamental  judg- 
ments. These  are  what  Kant  finds  ready-made 
for  him  in  Formal  Logic. 

(  2)  The  next  step  is  to  transform  these  twelve 
Predicates  into  twelve  Categories  —  three  under 
each  of  the  four  titles.  It  is  essentially  the 
same  act  of  mind  which  we  saw  in  judgment. 
'*  The  same  function  which  unifies  in  one  judg- 
ment its  different  constituents  also  unifies  in 
one  percept  its  different  constituents,"  and  thus 


536  MODERN  E  UEOPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

forms  the  Categories.  "  This  unity  of  the 
manifold  in  Sense-perception  introduces  a  tran- 
scendental content"  which  comes  from  the 
Understanding  and  which  is  applied  to  objects. 
The  explicit  act  of  subsumption  in  a  judg- 
ment, is  implicit  in  a  Category,  subsuming  in 
one  word  the  various  elements  of  a  Sense- 
perception.  Thus  we  come  to  know  the  object, 
in  so  far  as  it  can  be  known.  The  stamp 
of  unity  upon  the  multiplicity  of  sensations  is 
derived  from  the  Understanding,  and  is  tran- 
scendental, in  Kantian  phrase. 

(3)  The  final  step  is  to  give  the  number  and 
order  of  the  Categories.  By  the  same  necessity 
which  produces  just  twelve  judgments  (taken 
for  granted  by  Kant  from  Formal  Logic),  there 
must  be  just  twelve  Categories  under  the  four 
given  titles:  Quantity,  Quality,  Relation,  Mo- 
dality. Accordingly  we  can  construct  a  table  of 
the  pure  or  basic  Categories,  "  which  are  all  that 
the  Understanding  contains  in  itself  a-priori,  and 
through  which  it  is  the  pure  Understanding." 

I.  Quantity. 

(1)  Unity  (oneness.) 

(2)  Multiplicity  (manyness). 

(3)  Totality(allness). 

II.  Quality. 

(1)  Eeality. 

(2)  Negation. 

(3)  Limitation. 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  ANAL  YT1C.     537 

III.  Relation. 

(1)  Inherence  and  Substance. 

(2)  Cause  and  Effect  (Dependence). 

(3)  Reciprocal  Action. 

IV.  Modality. 

(1)  Possibility  and  Impossibility. 

(2)  Being  and  Non-being. 

(3)  Necessity  and  Chance. 

Such  is  Kant's  attempt  to  set  forth  and  to 
order  the  fundamental  Categories  of  all  know- 
ing, for  "  only  through  them  can  the  Under- 
standing understand  —  think  an  object  given  in 
Sense-perception."  Of  course  this  table  has 
been  exposed  to  much  criticism.  Some  think 
that  the  Categories  are  too  many,  some  too  few. 
Very  naturally  their  derivation  from  Formal  Logic 
is  objected  to  as  being  no  proper  derivation.  But 
for  the  present  we  shall  pass  by  their  further 
discussion,  remarking  that  by  Kant  it  seems  to 
have  been  regarded  as  a  kind  of  universal  frame- 
work for  organizing  his  thoughts. 

2.  The  Object  in  Sense-perception.  This  is  in 
general  the  material  which  the  Understanding 
through  its  Categories  is  to  appropriate,  that  is, 
to  know.  Already  we  have  had  to  deal  with 
this  object  as  phenomenon  in  Transcendental 
Aesthetic.  There  we  found  that  the  Ego  cannot 
even  sense  the  thing  as  it  is  in  itself,  but  imposes 
upon  it  a-priori  forms  of  its  own  (Space  and 
Time) .  Thus  the  Object  in  Sense-perception 


538        MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

has  been  already  transformed  by  the  Ego,  in 
order  to  be  Phenomenon,  in  order  to  exist  at  all 
for  us.  Such  is  the  mental  condition  which  the 
Understanding  finds  already  prepared  as  its 
material :  the  mind  is  full  of  Phenomena,  single 
percepts,  in  a  state  of  separation.  On  the  other 
hand  we  have  seen  the  Understanding  fitted  out 
with  its  ordered  store  of  Categories.  But  behind 
both  these  extremes,  the  Phenomena  and  the 
-Categories,  lies  the  unifying  principle  common 
to  both,  the  Ego  as  self-consciousness.  Accom- 
panying Sense-perception  on  one  side,  and 
the  Understanding  on  the  other  side  is  the 
principle  which  binds  together  both  sides,  which 
Kant  calls  the  original  unity  of  Apperception, 
11  because  it  is  the  self -consciousness  which  calls 
forth  the  mental  act  /  think,  and  which  accom- 
panies all  mental  acts,  but  is  itself  accompanied 
by  none."  Hence  it  is  transcendental,  remaining 
always  one  and  the  same  in  the  diversity  of  the 
mind's  activity.  Such  is  "  the  transcendental 
unity  of  self -consciousness,"  nothing  less  than 
the  Ego  with  its  ever-present  self-returning  and 
hence  unifying  power  in  all  its  infinitely  varied 
functions.  As  here  the  philosopher  begins  to 
touch  bottom,  in  fact  to  reach  beyond  himself, 
it  is  worth  while  to  see  the  process  in  the  fore- 
going discursive  statements. 

(1)  First  we  are  to  grasp  the  store  of  mani- 
fold Phenomena,  or  Percepts,   which  have  come 


KAN  T.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  ANAL  YTIC.     539 

into  the  Ego  as  depository  by  way  of  Sense- 
perception.  Here  they  are  not  ordered,  as  they 
have  no  ordering  principle  according  to  Kant. 

(2)  Next  we  are  to  grasp  the  store  of  mani- 
fold Categories,  which  stand   over   against   the 
Phenomena — in  which  fact  we  see  the  stage  of 
separation  in  this  sphere,  the  Phenomena  versus 
the   Categories,  or   Sense-perception  versus  the 
Understanding.     The    Categories,    however,  are 
ordered,  even  if  externally,  by  Kant,  and  at  the 
same  time  they  are  to  be  the  orderers  of  the  dis- 
ordered Phenomena. 

(3)  Lastly  comes  the  unitary  principle  lying 
back  of  and  connecting  both  sides,  the  self -con- 
sciousness of  the  Self  itself,  always  one  and  the 
same,  accompanying  every  mental  activity,  but 
accompanied  by  none  but  itself.     It  is  both  the 
attendant  and  the  unifying  power  of  Sense-per- 
ception and  of  the  Understanding.     This  self-con- 
sciousness Kant  deems    the   original  (ursprung- 
lich)  unity,  or  that  which  properly  makes  or  cre- 
ates unification  of  the  separative  activities  of  the 
mind.     An  act  of  pure  Spontaneity  of  the  Ego 
he  declares  it,  or  pure  Apperception  in  contrast 
to    sensuous    Perception,    hence    transcendental 
and   not     empirical.     This    thought  as  well   as 
the  term  Apperception  Kant  takes  from  Leibniz. 

One  thinks  that  our  philosopher  has  reached 
his  truly  genetic  principle,  creative  of  all  unity 
amid  the  multiplicity  of  human  faculties.  But 


540          MODEBN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

now  follows  a  most  astonishing  fact :  Kant, 
having  formulated  the  self -active  Ego  in  its 
purity  (actus  purus)  as  the  generative  unit  out 
of  which  unfold  all  the  diverse  special  activities, 
of  which  Sense-perception  and  Understanding 
are  but  two,  drops  suddenly  his  principle  which 
is  profoundly  psychological,  and  picks  up  another 
which  is  essentially  metaphysical,  taking  it  from 
his  Scheme  of  Transcendental  Aesthetic.  This 
principle  we  must  briefly  note. 

3.  Time  as  the  unifying  principle.  That  is, 
the  synthesis  of  Phenomena  and  Categories  is 
brought  about  chiefly  through  the  idea  of  Time, 
though  Kant  not  infrequently  adds  that  of  Space. 
Still  it  is  the  inner  sense  (that  of  Time)  which 
naturally  controls  this  inner  movement.  .  Time  is 
connected  with  Sense-perception  and  so  with  the 
sensuous  object  on  the  one  side,  yet  it  is  also  a 
pure  a-priori  form  on  the  other.  Thus  Kant 
deems  it  the  supreme  mediating  element  between 
the  opposites,  the  Phenomenon  and  the  Cate- 
gory, in  both  of  which  it  to  a  degree  participates. 
In  this  way  too  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic  is 
interlinked  with  the  Transcendental  Analytic; 
the  inner  separation  of  the  latter  is  mediated  by 
the  former  into  unity. 

Kant  felt  the  externality  of  this  solution.  To 
make  Time  bridge  over  the  chasm  from  Object 
to  the  Category,  as  it  were  from  the  outside,  is 
an  explanation  which  sorely  needs  an  explana- 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  ANAL  YTIC.     541 

tion.  The  question  rises :  By  what  means  does 
Time  perform  this  act  of  synthesis?  Through  its 
capacity  of  being  an  image  of  every  thing  sensed. 
Says  Kant:  «'  The  pure  image  of  all  objects  of 
the  senses  is  Time."  Thus  Time  is  the  a-priori 
image,  the  counterpart  to  all  images  of  sense  or 
a-posteriori ;  indeed  Time  is  now  made  by  Kant  a 
pure  form  of  Representation  (or  Imagination),  as 
it  was  a  pure  Form  of  Intuition  (or  Sense-percep- 
tion) in  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic.  The  re- 
sult, however,  is  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  im- 
ages, and  the  dualism  is  still  present.  The  one  he 
calls  a  scheme  (form),  the  other  is  the  true 
image,  being  a  picture  of  some  individual  object. 
Both  are  products  of  the  Imagination,  yet  even 
this  faculty  he  dualizes  into  the  empirical  Imagi- 
nation producing  images,  and  the  pure  transcen- 
dental Imagination  producing  the  scheme,  which 
is  very  near  to  the  Categories. 

It  is  useless  to  pursue  Kant  further  through 
his  vain  and  intricate  struggles  to  unite  Object 
and  Category,  which  he  can  never  effect  by  the 
means  which  he  employs.  The  gap  remains 
between  scheme  and  image  as  between  Category 
and  Object.  And  the  reason  is  evident.  The 
free  process  of  the  Ego  he  subjects  to  his 
metaphysical  forms,  which,  being  alien,  are  soon 
shivered  to  pieces  by  the  secret  energy  they  seek 
to  subordinate.  Still  Kant,  seeing  his  structure 
falling  asunder,  strives  to  patch  it  up  and  splice 


542  MODERN  E UEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

it  together  by  some  new  contrivance  which  never 
fails  to  show  the  same  old  trouble.  To  our 
mind  he  reveals  the  struggle  between  the  vanish- 
ing metaphysical  and  the  rising  psychological 
principles,  the  former  of  which  he  in  part  at 
least  would  save. 

For  we  must  note  that  throughout  his  whole 
exposition  the  psychological  element  is  present, 
and  is  employed,  though  not  in  its  own  right, 
but  to  help  the  philosopher  out  of  his  metaphys- 
ical difficulties.  Note  how  he  introduces  the 
Imagination  in  this  last  exposition,  in  order  to 
assist  Time  in  mediating  the  difference  between 
Object  and  Category.  Thus  a  power  or  activity 
of  the  Ego  is  made  to  serve  the  metaphysical 
idea  of  Time,  instead  of  being  allowed  to  do  its 
work  in  its  freedom.  Kant  even  calls  its  func- 
tion the  transcendental  synthesis  of  the  Imagina- 
tion ,  but  he  still  employs  it  as  a  means  and  the 
word  transcendental  is  a  badge  of  its  servitude. 

Nevertheless  we  should  carefully  observe  what 
he  has  done  psychologically,  since  herein  lies  the 
meaning  of  his  work  for  the  future.  Between 
Sense-perception  and  Understanding,  which  before 
stood  apart,  he  has  interjected  the  mediating 
activity  of  the  Imagination  (Representation). 
Quite  unintentionally  is  the  thing  done,  but 
really  he  has  designated  the  three  stages  of  Intel- 
lect, and  has  furthermore  implied  (though  not 
expressly  stated)  that  these  three  stages  form  a 


KANT.  —  TEANSCENDENTAL  ANAL  TTIC.     543 

process  together  which  makes  a  unity.  And 
he  does  not  fail  to  hint  that  behind  them  all  and 
containing  them  all  is  the  Ego,  or  the  primordial 
unity  of  Apperception,  as  he  calls  it.  Thus  we 
find  lurking  in  this  whole  Kantian  development 
of  the  Transcendental  Analytic  the  psycho- 
logical process  of  Intellect — Sense-perception, 
Imagination  (Representation),  and  Understand- 
ing ( Thought  as  abstract) .  This  underlying  psy- 
chological element  the  philosopher  evokes  for 
the  support  of  his  metaphysical  superstructure 
which,  however,  is  secretly  undermined  and 
destroyed  by  it,  since  it  is  the  new  principle 
evolving  itself  out  of  its  old  metaphysical 
shell. 

Another  significant  fact  should  be  mentioned 
in  this  connection.  In  the  first  edition  of  this 
Critique,  Kant  elaborates  fully  these  three 
stages  of  Intellect  which  he  directly  names  «'  the 
threefold  synthesis  which  necessarily  takes  place 
in  every  act  of  knowing."  While  he  calls  the 
whole  a  synthesis,  yet  he  also  names  each  of  the 
three  stages  a  synthesis,  as  follows;  "(1)  the 
synthesis  of  Apprehension  in  Sense-perception ; 
(2)  the  synthesis  of  Reproduction  in  Imagi- 
nation; (3)  the  synthesis  of  Recognition  in 
Thought  (Begriff)  '  It  is  well  to  observe 
specially  that  in  the  third  stage  the  principle  of 
Recognition  is  declared  to  be  that  of  Thought. 
Morever  this  whole  synthesis  is  carried  back 


544          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

to  "  the  unity  of   consciousness"    or  to    "the 
function  of  the  Ego  "  expressly. 

Now  comes  the  surprising  fact  that  Kant  threw 
out  of  his  second  edition  of  the  present  Critique 
(1787)  this  entire  psychological  development  as 
it  had  been  presented  in  the  first  edition  (1781). 
What  was  his  true  motive  in' doing  so?  This  has 
been  a  question  with  all  the  commentators,  who  * 
have  answered  it  variously.  Kant  himself  im- 
plies in  his  Preface  that  he  cut  .the  passage  out 
in  order  "  to  prevent  his  book  from  getting  too 
voluminous,"  which  is  of  course  a  mere  pretext, 
since  the  passage  is  not  very  long  and  since  he 
does  not  show  the  same  anxiety  to  abridge  irrele- 
vant portions  elsewhere  in  his  work. 

Our  own  opinion  is  that  Kant  begins  to  feel, 
if  not  to  see,  that  just  "this  synthesis  of  the 
Ego"  meant  a  complete  reconstruction  of  his 
whole  system.  The  play  of  discussion  for  six 
years  upon  his  book  as  well  as  his  own  inner  re- 
flections had  revealed  to  him  where  lay  the 
germinal  principle  which  was  destined  to  out- 
grow and  even  to  swallow  up  his  painfully  elab- 
orated structure.  Kant  was  not  ready,  internally 
no$  externally,  to  abandon  his  philosophic  house 
and  to  build  a  new  one  at  his  time  of  life.  He 
was  going  to  live  in  it  to  the  end,  eliminating  only 
those  parts  which  opened  a  vista  to  its  evanish- 
ment  in  an  entirely  new  edifice.  Who  can  have 
the  heart  to  blame  the  old  man? 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  ANAL  YTIC.     545 

Soon  Fichte  began  the  work  of  the  inner 
metamorphosis  of  the  Kantian  Philosophy  by 
bringing  out  and  putting  to  the  front  just  that 
Ego  which  Kant  had  tried  so  hard  to  limit,  if 
not  to  suppress.  Fichte  obliterated  at  a  blow 
the  Thing-in-itself  which  cannot  be  known,  yet 
is  the  starting-point  according  to  Kant.  Really 
this  is  the  Ego,  which  alone  is,  declares  Fichte, 
and  thus  wipes  out  the  Kantian  dualism  be- 
tween subject  and  object,  by  turning  the  latter 
back  into  the  former  as  its  true  source  and 
reality.  But  of  course  Fichte  will  not  be  the 
end  of  this  movement. 

So  Kant  issues  forth  from  his  Transcendental 
Analytic  with  his  ordered  table  of  Categories, 
through  which  he  is  to  subsume  and  thus  unify 
all  the  multiplicity  of  the  sensuous  object  as  given 
in  Sense-perception.  It  is  a  great  and  fecund 
thought  whose  mightiest  progeny  will  be  Hegel, 
whose  Logic  is  a  new  discussion  and  ordering  of  the 
Categories  as  the  fundamental  problem  of  Philo- 
sophy. But  Hegel  goes  back  and  reconstructs 
that  Logic  from  which  Kant  adopted  his  Categor- 
ies ready-made,  in  this  case  accepting  the  trans- 
mitted system  (that  of  Formal  Logic)  contrary  to 
his  revolutionary  wont.  Hegel  is,  therefore,  the 
greatest  pupil  of  the  Transcendental  Analytic, 
getting  back  of  its  pre-suppositions,  and  rebuild- 
ing the  whole  edifice  after  an  entirely  new  prin- 
ciple. To  this  he  is  seemingly  driven  by  the 

35 


546         MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

limits  which  Kant  puts  upon  the  present  sphere. 
For  Kant  will  next  proceed  to  circumscribe  a  field 
of  knowledge  to  which  the  preceding  Categories 
do  not  apply.  That  is,  there  is  a  domain  of 
knowledge  or  intellect  which  the  Categories  can- 
not categorize.  Now  we  are  to  see  what  this  is. 

III.  TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.  —  This  is 
gi  ven  in  the  Scheme  as  the  second  Divisionof  Trans- 
cendental Logic,  which  is  itself  a  subordinate  part 
of  a  still  higher  Division  of  the  entire  Critique. 
This  Kantian  Gothicism  we  have  felt  compelled 
to  throw  aside,  as  already  noted,  and  to  drop 
back  upon  what  we  deem  the  simple  innermost 
movement  of  the  book,  whereof  the  present  is 
the  third  stage.  As  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic 
deals  with  the  Phenomena  of  Sense-Perception, 
and  the  Transcendental  Analytic  with  the  Cate- 
gories of  the  Understanding,  now  the  Transcen- 
dental Dialectic  is  to  deal  with  the  Ideas  of 
Reason.  Moreover  if  we  may  judge  by  the  title 
of  his  book  (Critique  of  Pure  Reason),  the 
author  has  now  come  to  that  portion  which  was 
the  real  purpose  and  aim  of  his  whole  work. 

What  are  these  Ideas  of  Pure  Reason?  In 
general  they  are  expressed  by  the  Infinite,  the 
Unconditioned,  the  Whole  or  Totality.  The 
Understanding  gives  only  the  Finite,  the  Condi- 
tioned, the  Particular;  the  result  is  the  Mind  or 
Ego  drives  it  beyond  itself  with  its  limitation  into 
some  form  of  the  Unlimited.  Such  a  function 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.     547 

of  the  mind  is  called  by  Kant  Eeason,  which  is 
thus  the  limit-transcending  principle,  and  posits 
its  forms  named  Ideas  of  Reason.  It  is  hence  the 
faculty  of  the  supreme  unity  over  against  the 
faculty  of  separation  which. is  the  Understanding. 
Or  we  may  say  that  Reason  is  the  faculty  of  the 
Infinite,  while  the  Understanding  is  the  faculty 
of  the  Finite.  Reason  calls  up  the  Universe,  the 
Understanding  calls  up  a  portion  thereof,  which 
of  course  is  limited  by  another  portion. 

Reason,  then,  must  have  its  Categories  likewise, 
which,  however,  mean  the  one  thing,  and  are 
really  but  one  Category.  Hence  these  Ideas  of 
Reason,  even  if  differently  applied,  are  at  bottom 
one  Idea,  which  is  the  Idea  of  the  All,  the  Uni- 
verse. Still  this  Idea  of  the  Universe  unfolds 
itself  into  three  fundamental  forms  —  God, 
World,  and  Man,  —  with  which  Philosophy  has 
occupied  itself  from  the  beginning. 

But  now  comes  the  trouble  which  calls  forth 
the  negative  soul  of  Kant  in  its  full  intensity. 
The  Ideas  of  Reason  are  simply  regulative  prin- 
ciples for  the  Categories  of  the  Understanding, 
lying  back  of  them  and  unifying  them,  but  not 
subject  to  them,  not  regulated  by  them.  Now, 
when  the  Understanding  applies  its  Categories, 
conditioned,  finite,  derived  from  experience,  to 
the  Ideas  of  Reason,  unconditioned,  infinite,  the 
Totality  (properly  just  one  Idea  and  that  is  the 
All),  there  rises  the  deepest  contradiction  of 


548          MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Philosophy.  Two  wholly  opposite  predicates 
are  affirmed  of  every  form  of  these  Ideas  of 
Reason,  and  the  Universe  itself  is  split  asunder 
with  two  completely  diverse  meanings,  whose 
conflict  produces  the-Transcendenta]  Dialectic. 

Kant's  procedure  will  give  in  three  separate 
discussions  the  three  elements  or  stages  —  Soul 
(Ego),  World,  God  —  to  each  of  which  the 
Understanding  will  apply  (or  rather  has  applied 
in  the  old  Metaphysics)  its  Categories,  for  the 
purpose  of  bringing  these  three  subjects  into  the 
realm  of  scientific  knowledge.  But  thus  springs 
up  the  contradiction  with  Reason  and  its  Ideas, 
which  are  always  present  in  the  mind  with  their 
Totality  or  Universe. 

Accordingly  we  shall  now  have  the  following 
order :  — 

A.  The  Ego  (Soul)  as  the  source  of  conflict 
between  Reason  and  Understanding,  giving  rise 
to  the  Paralogisms  of  Pure  Reason. 

B.  The  World  as  the  source  of  conflict  between 
Reason    and  Understanding,  giving   rise    to  the 
Antinomies  of  Pure  Reason. 

C.  God   as   the   source   of    conflict    between 
Reason  and  Understanding,  giving  rise   to  the 
conflicting  Ideal  of  Pure  Reason. 

On  these  lines  we  shall  unfold  this  part,  doubt- 
less the  most  important  and  influential  of  Kant's 
Philosophy. 

A.  Ego — Paralogisms  of  Pure  Reason.     In 


KANT.—  TEANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.     549 

the  Kantian  Scheme  this  is  the  first  head  under 
the  Second  Book  of  Transcendental  Dialectic. 
The  word  Paralogism  is  applied  by  Kant  to 
the  contradictions  of  this  sphere,  which  is  that 
of  the  old  Rational  Psychology  coming  down 
through  Wolff  from  Leibniz  and  the  Seventeenth 
Century.  It  is  the  Psychology  dominated  by 
Metaphysics,  and  this  domination  is  the  central 
point  of  Kant's  assault. 

The  theme  is  now  the  Ego  or  Soul,  as  think- 
ing or  self-conscious.  "  I  (Ego)  as  thinking 
am  an  object  of  the  inner  Sense  and  am  called 
Soul."  That  is,  I  cognize  myself  to  be  self- 
conscious.  This  is  also  expressed  in  the  sen- 
tence I  think,  "  which  is  the  single  text  of 
Rational  Psychology,  out  of  which  all  its  wisdom 
is  to  be  developed."  Moreover  it  is  "  the 
simple  Apperception  (self-conscious  act)  which 
makes  all  transcendental  concepts  possible," 
for  I  (my  Ego)  must  think  Substance,  Cause, 
aud  the  rest.  This  Ego,  then,  by  its  very 
nature  is  the  source  of  all  the  illusions  of  the 
Idea,  being  itself  double.  It  has  an  object,  but 
this  object  is  only  apparent,  since  it  is  itself  or 
subject.  The  content  of  Rational  Psychology 
or  the  Science  of  the  Self  is  "  what  can  be  in- 
ferred, independent  of  all  experience,  from  the 
concept  Ego  in  so  far  as  this  manifests  itself  in 
thinking."  The  empirical  element  is  to  be 
strictly  excluded;  the  Self  is  to  look  at  itself 


550          M  ODEE  N  EUR  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

EN   .  %  - 

purely  and  turn  away  from  all  content  given 
from  the  outside,  telling  what  it  is  accord- 
ing to  its  stock  of  categories.  At  this  point 
the  difficulty  begins,  since  these  categories 
apply  to  concepts  of  the  Understanding,  which  are 
derived  from  experience.  But  now  they  are 
applied  to  what  is  beyond  experience,  to  the 
pure  Ego,  which  in  Kantian  phrase  is  transcen- 
dent. Or,  the  knowledge  of  the  Conditioned  is 
transferred  to  the  Unconditioned,  and  thus  pro- 
duces a  mere  show  of  knowledge  —  which  state 
of  things  was  the  untruth  inherent  in  the  old 
Metaphysics,  according  to  Kant.  When  Ego  as 
subject  applies  to  itself  categories  which  belong 
to  it  as  object  in  experience,  it  commits  the 
Kantian  Paralogism.  The  mistake  of  Rational 
Psychology  was  to  take  subject  for  object  and 
to  name  it  thing  or  substance.  This  gives  rise 
to  the  Transcendental  Dialectic,  based  upon  a 
finite  or  conditioned  category  applied  to  an 
unconditioned  content. 

Our  first  effort  must  be  to  grasp  Kant's  view 
of  the  Ego.  "  It  is  not  even  a  concept  of  the 
Understanding,  but  a  mere  consciousness  which 
accompanies  all  concepts/'  Very  disparaging 
toward  the  Ego  is  such  a  remark;  Kant  almost 
shows  impatience  with  this  accompanying  Self, 
whose  presence  is  indeed  not  to  be  gotten  rid  of 
by  calling  it  hard  names,  by  designating  it  as 
'*  an  utterly  empty  idea,  without  any  content." 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.      551 

Our  philosopher  seems  to  have  a  premonition 
that  just  from  this  Ego  is  to  come  his  chief 
trouble.  He  goes  on :  "  Through  this  Ego  (or 
thing)  which  thinks  there  is  nothing  conceived 
but  a  transcendental  subject  (an  unknown  x)  of 
which  we  cannot  have  the  least  notion  apart 
from  the  thoughts  which  are  its  predicates." 
The  Ego,  therefore,  as  thinking  thing  (res  cogi- 
tans)  cannot  be  known  as  it  is  itself.  Still  it  is 
always  present  in  thinking  and  at  work,  returning 
upon  itself  "  in  a  continuous  circle,"  which 
gives  positive  discomfort  (  Unb^quemlichlceit)  to 
Kant,  who  seems  to  be  dimly  aware  that  he  does 
not  grasp  it  in  its  complete,  self -re  turning  pro- 
cess. For  it  is  quite  impossible  for  even  him  to 
escape  "  turning  around  in  the  everlasting  cir- 
cle "  when  Le  wishes  "  to  form  any  judgment 
about  it."  Thus  his»Ego  has  to  take  his  Ego  as 
its  content,  though  it  is  "  utterly  empty  and 
without  content  "  in  such  an  act.  Very  plainly 
does  Kant  give  evidence  of  wrestling  with  a  great 
difficulty  in  his  own  doctrine. 

In  fact  is  he  not  unconsciously  denying  all  that 
he  consciously  says?  Does  not  his  Ego,  in  the 
preceding  account  of  itself,  turn  back  upon  itself 
and  tell  a  great  deal  about  itself,  which  it  was 
not  supposed  to  be  able  to  know?  Is  it  so  utterly 
devoid  of  content  when  it  has  itself  as  content? 
And  is  it  not  a  very  important  item  of  self- 
knowledge  when  Kant  says  that  his  Ego  can- 


552        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

not  know  what  it  is  in  itself?  Thus  Kant's 
negation  comes  back  to  himself  though  after 
slaying  the  enemy.  His  negative  argument  is 
directed  against  the  old  Rational  Psychology, 
but  it  is  equally  good  against  himself.  And  if 
we  study  his  text  and  his  temper,  we  cannot  help 
believing  that  he  was  at  times  half  aware  of  the 
fact. 

Kant  persists,  however,  in  maintaining  openly 
that  the  Ego  cannot  separate  itself  from  its  con- 
cepts or  categories  and  conceive  and  categorize 
itself.  "The  subject  (Ego)  of  the  categories 
cannot,  through  the  fact  that  it  thinks  these,  ob- 
tain a  concept  of  itself  as  an  object  of  the  cate- 
gories." The  Ego  cannot  turn  around  and  apply 
to  itself  the  categories  which  it  thinks  (these 
being  derived  from  experience),  without  commit- 
ting a  Paralogism.  Rational  Psychology  applies 
the  category  of  substance  to  the  Ego,  as  if  this 
were  perceived  like  an  object,  whereas  the  Ego 
cannot  be  known  according  to  Kant,  who  in  the 
main  denies  the  Ego's  power  of  separating  itself 
from  its  thoughts,  and  making  itself  its  own  con- 
cept. Yet  Kant  is  doing  this  very  thing  all  the 
time,  even  while  he  says  it  cannot  be  done.  He 
does  not  recognize  the  self-separation  of  the  Ego ; 
he  would  have  only  the  immediate  •«  unity  of 
consciousness  which  lies  at  the  basis  of  the  cate- 
gories," and  which  properly  cannot  be  known  at 
all.  The  Ego  as  fully  functional  or  as  complete 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.     553 

process  is  as  little  employed  by  Kant  as  by  the 
older  metaphysicians  whom  he  assails.  He  holds 
that  the  Ego  cannot  judge  of  the  Ego,  since  it  is 
the  Ego  who  is  the  judge;  that  is,  I  cannot  be 
judge  and  litigant  also.  But  the  fact  is,  this  is 
just  the  nature  of  the  Ego,  this  act  of  self -divi- 
sion and  self -judgment.  Indeed,  is  not  Kant's 
Ego  in  the  present  discussion,  playing  the  part  of 
a  judge  of  itself,  and  laying  down  the  law  in  its 
own  case,  even  while  deny  ing  its  own  jurisdiction? 

To  our  mind,  then,  Kant's  own  treatment  of 
the  Dialectic  of  these  Ideas  of  the  transcendental 
Ego  is  itself  dialectical,  and  his  own  negative  con- 
clusion comes  faack  to  itself,  negating  itself  as 
well  as  the  notion  of  the  soul's  substance.  What 
is  the  outcome  of  this  double  negative?  Some- 
thing positive,  we  may  be  sure;  as  we  think,  the 
positive  Ego  with  its  true  process,  is  pretty  cer- 
tain to  emerge,  as  it  is  really  what  is  underlying 
and  fermenting  in  all  these  struggles,  we  might 
almost  say  at  times,  convulsions  of  the  phi- 
losopher. 

The  leading  Categories  of  the  Soul  as  tran- 
scendental are  next  investigated  and  denied. 
These  Kant  makes  four  in  accordance  with  his 
scheme  of  the  four  fundamental  Categories.  So 
the  four  chief  predicates  of  Rational  Psychology 
are  the  soul's  immateriality,  simplicity,  self- 
identity  (personality),  and  immortality.  The 
same  difficulty  inheres  in  all  these  predicates : 


554        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

• 

they,  derived  from  experience,  are  made  to  apply 
to  that  which  is  beyond  experience,  which  is  in 
fact  unknown.  For  instance  to  say  that  the 
soul  is  an  immaterial  substance  is  to  be  guilty  of 
a  Paralogism,  and  is  equivalent  to  declaring 
matter  to  be  immaterial. 

It  ought  to  be  added,  however,  that  really 
there  are  not  four  but  three  predicates  in  the 
preceding  list,  Kant  adding  the  fourth  in  order 
to  force  the  treatment  into  his  scheme.  These 
are  (1)  the  Soul  or  Ego  as  immaterial,  not  ex- 
tended; (2)  the  Soul  as  not  ^divided  or  divisible, 
hence  not  limited  from  without  or  within,  and 
thus  immortal;  (3)  the  Soul  as  self-identical, 
or  as  Person  —  the  self -re  turning  principle  which 
Kant  denies  but  employs  even  in  his  denial. 
Particularly  this  last  principle  is  Kant's  boom- 
erang—  the  missile  with  which  he  smites  the 
enemy,  but  which  is  certain  to  come  back  to 
himself,  it  being  just  the  self-returning  princi- 
ple which  he  is  employing  all  the  time,  but 
which  his  whole  proof  declares  to  be  an  illusion. 

Observations.  —  We  shall  emphasize  separately 
several  points  in  the  foregoing  exposition,  as 
Kant  here  touches  the  very  germ  of  the  future 
of  his  science. 

1.  He  sees  that  the  Ego  is  the  source  of  this 
Transcendental  Dialectic,  and  affirms  it  to  be 
source  of  all  illusions  in  this  field.  Hence  he 
places  it  first,  dwelling  .upon  its  double  nature 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.     555 

as  subject  and  object.  Yet  Kant's  Ego  (the 
source  of  illusion)  is  doing  this  and  declaring  it 
to  be  truth. 

2.  Kant's  view  is  that  there    can  be  no  pos- 
sible category  for  the  self -returning  Ego.    For 
every    category    of   the    Understanding,     being 
derived    from    experience,    can   only    apply  to 
objects  which  are   without    any  self -return,    or 
are  without  consciousness. 

3.  Every    attempt    of  the  Ego   to  categorize 
itself  metaphysically  must  be  paralogistic,    ap- 
plying  to  the   unconditioned  what  belongs  only 
to  the  conditioned.     There  results  a  double  con- 
tradiction:  (a)  I,  declaring   (for  example)   the 
Soul   to  be  substance,  take  that   as    an  experi- 
ential object  which  is  beyond  experience,      (b)  I, 
having  affirmed   the    soul   to   be  an  immaterial 
object,  give  to  it   two   contradictory  predicates, 
like  immaterial  matter.     But  both  these  contra- 
dictions go  back  to  the  one  source :  the  attempt 
of  the  Ego  to  formulate  itself  through  the   cate- 
gories of  the  Understanding. 

4.  Kant's  criticism  holds  of  the  Ego  as  meta- 
physical (as  distinct  from  the  psychical).      One 
cannot  apply  to  the  self-returning,  self-conscious 
Ego  the   categories  derived  from  the  object  or 
thing  not  self -returning,  not  self-conscious.    Thus 
Kant   destroys  not  only  the  old,  but  all  meta- 
physical Psychology,   even  those  systems  of   it 
which  come  after  him  are  slain  in  advance. 


556        M 0 DEBN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

5.  The  negation  of  Kant,  however,  reaches  all 
introspection,  and  assails  the  very   principle  of 
the  self-return.     At  this  point  we  can  see  how 
completely  our  philosopher  undoes  himself,  for 
his  Ego  is  looking  at  itself  while  denying  that  it 
can  look  at  itself,  or  while  declaring  that  such 
introspection  is  the  source  of  illusion .     According 
to    his  own  logic,  then,  his  very  negation  is  an 
illusion — which  it  is. 

6.  The    positive   outcome  of  Kant's  negative 
criticism   is   that  the  Ego  must  make    its    own 
categories    applicable   to   itself   and   to  its  own 
processes.     It  has  already  formulated  the  object 
in  categories,  why  should  it  not  formulate  itself, 
being     just     the    self -returning,    self-conscious 
principle?      Then  we  shall   have   the  psychical 
categories  of  the  Ego  versus  the   metaphysical 
ones  of  the  Understanding,  which  Kant  seems  to 
think  the;  only  possible  ones.     Indeed  if  he  had 
ever  come  upon  the  other  set  (the  psychical),  his 
whole  Scheme  would  have  been  capsized,  and  he 
would  have   been  compelled  to  re-construct  his 
entire   Philosophy.     We  may  note  here  by  the 
way,   that  it  is  the  new  Psychology    (not  the 
rational  or  the  empirical)  which  is  lurking  in  these 
negative  throes  of  Kant,  and  is  seeking  to  get  rid 
of  its  old  metaphysical  fetters  in  order  to  be  born, 
and  to  speak  in  its  own  name  and  with  its  own 
categories. 

7 .  The  Ego  is  the  source  of  all  the  contradic- 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.     557 

tions  which  Kant  will  seek  to  show  in  the  following 
Antinomies  and  in  the  Ideal  of  the  Pure  Reason. 
They  all  go  back  to  that  self -returning  principle 
which  cannot  be  categorized  metaphysically  with- 
out involving  a  contradiction,  and  which  has  its 
primordial  starting-point  in  the  Ego.  The  at- 
tempt to  apply  the  Categories  of  the  Understand- 
ing (derived  from  Experience)  to  the  World  and 
to  God  will  bring  to  light  the  same  fundamental 
difficulty. 

B.  The  World  —  The  Antinomies  of  Pure 
Reason.  Such  is  the  second  head  under  the 
Second  Book  of  Transcendental  Dialectic  (see 
Scheme).  Here  Kant  passes  from  the  science 
of  the  Ego  as  Substance  (Rational  Psychology) 
to  the  science  of  the  World  or  Nature  (Rational 
Cosmology).  The  theme  embraces,  therefore, 
the  second  stage  of  the  philosophical  Norm, 
whose  traditional  treatment  in  Philosophy  is  now 
to  be  subjected  to  the  fire  of  Kantian  criticism. 

As  in  the  preceding  case  of  the  Ego,  so  now 
the  difficulty  arises  when  the  categories  of  expe- 
rience are  applied  to  the  Ideas  of  Reason,  or 
when  the  conditioned  is  predicated  of  the  un- 
conditioned. "It  is  the  Understanding  which 
produces  pure  and  transcendental  concepts,"  not 
the  Reason  which  has  merely  a  regulative 
power  over  them,  seeking  "  to  extend  them 
beyond  the  limits  of  experience  yet  in  connection 
with  the  same,"  and  thus  projecting  them  into  a 


558         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

series.  Kant  makes  much  of  the  distinction 
between  Reason  and  Understanding.  "  If  the 
conditioned  is  given  (by  the  Understanding),  so 
is  the  whole  sum  of  conditions  given  also  (by 
the  Reason),"  which  is  simply  the  unconditioned, 
whereby  the  conditioned  is  possible.  There 
would  be  no  movement  of  the  Understanding  out 
of  its  limits  unless  it  were  spurred  up  by  Reason 
to  transcend  them  and  to  take  another  step.  It 
is  the  function  of  the  Understanding  to  form 
concepts  from  the  percepts  of  sense,  and  to  ex- 
press such  concepts  in  categories.  But  if  the 
Understanding  turns  back  and  undertakes  to 
formulate  the  Reason  propelling  it  always  beyond 
itself  in  these  categories  derived  by  it  from 
experience,  there  rises  what  Kant  calls  the  Dia- 
lectic of  the  Ideas  of  Reason,  of  which  we  have 
already  seen  the  first  stage,  that  of  the  Soul  or 
Ego. 

The  Ideas  bf  Pure  Reason  now  produce  in  the 
realm  of  Cosmology  a  new  kind  of  difficulty. 
We  have  Antinomies  instead  of  Paralogisms 
which,  as  we  have  just  seen,  arise  from  the  Ego 
applying  to  itself  categories  taken  from  the 
object,  and  thus  contradicting  its  own  nature. 

But  the  Antinomy  doubles  this  contradiction, 
making  it  two-sided  instead  of  one-sided.  It  is 
11  a  conflict  of  the  laws  (anti,  nomos)  of  Pure 
Reason,"  of  which  there  are  two;  each  is  valid 
before  Reason,  yet  each  is  the  opposite  of  the 


KANT.— TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.      559 

other.  What  is  poor  Reason  to  do?  Each  prin- 
ciple (or  law)  receives  her  assent,  yet  each  con- 
tradicts the  other.  For  instance,  if  it  is  said 
that  the  World  has  a  beginning  in  Time,  Reason 
assents ;  but  if  it  is  also  said  that  the  World  has 
no  beginning  in  Time,  Reason  is  unable  to  deny 
the  proposition.  This  is  the  Kantian  Antinomy 
which  has  a  different  subject-matter  from  the 
Paralogism,  namely  the  World  or  the  Universe 
as  the  totality  of  all  things,  of  which  two  oppo- 
site predicates  are  affirmable  before  Reason. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  Paralogism  is 
different  from,  yet  closely  related  to,  the  Anti- 
nomy. In  the  first  the  contradiction  lies  in  a 
single  proposition  between  subject  and  predicate, 
and  thus  is  implicit;  in  the  second,  the  contradic- 
tion lies  between  the  two  propositions  themselves, 
and  thus  is  explicit.  We  may,  therefore,  say  that 
the  Ego  (as  metaphysical)  is  paralogistic,  while 
the  World  (as  metaphysical)  is  antinomian. 

And  now  we  shall  seek  to  grasp  the  ground  of 
the  cosmological  contradiction  or  Antinomy. 
The  subject  throughout  is  the  World,  which  is 
declared  to  have  two  contradictory  predicates, 
each  of  which  is  affirmed  to  be  true  by  Reason. 
But  if  we  note  carefully  we  shall  find  that  this 
subject,  the  World,  is  used  by  Kant  in  two 
contradictory  senses,  which  fact  is  simply  de- 
clared in  the  predicate.  In  one  case  it  means  the 
Whole,  in  the  other  a  part  of  the  Whole.  When 


560          MODERN  EUROPEAN-  PHILOSOPHY. 

it  is  said  that  ''the  World  has  no  beginning  in 
Time,"  the  World  is  the  Universe  and  includes 
Time ;  but  when  it  is  said  that  "  the  World  has  a 
beginning  in  Time,"  it  is  manifestly  a  part  of 
the  Universe  and  does  not  include  Time.  The 
Antinomies  or  contradictory  predicates  really 
spring  from  a  double  meaning  of  the  one  subject. 
The  first  question,  then,  must  be  in  the  given 
case :  Does  the  World  mean  the  Universe  or 
only  a  part  of  it,  or  perchance  a  stage  of  its 
process? 

A  further  question  at  once  springs  up :  How 
does  it  happen  that  these  two  meanings  of  the 
World  are  so  intimately  bound  together  in  the 
mind?  A  full  answer  cannot  at  present  be 
given;  in  fact  such  an  answer  would  lead  us 
beyond  Kant.  The  main  point  now  is  to  take 
notice  of  this  double  meaning,  or,  as  we  may  call 
it,  this  Double  World  which  underlies  the 
Kantian  Antinomies,  with  the  hope  of  finding 
the  clew  later. 

The  Antinomies  are  four  according  to  Kant, 
who  here  applies  to  them  the  four  kinds  of  judg- 
ment taken  from  his  logical  scheme  (Quantity, 
Quality,  Modality,  Relation).  Such  a  schematic 
application  is  unquestionably  forced,  though  the 
Antinomies  be  real.  These  we  .may  proceed  to 
consider  at  once  in  their  order,  the  contradictory 
propositions  being  indicated  by  the  terms  Thesis 
and  Antithesis. 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.     561 

I.  The  first  Antinomy,  or  "  the  first  conflict 
of  transcendental  Ideas.'' 

(1)  Thesis.  The  World   has    a   beginning   in 
Time  and  a  limit   in  Space. —  If  there  were  no 
limit  in  Time,  there  would  be  no  Now;  if  there 
were  no  limit  in  Space  there  would  be  no  complete 
World. 

(2)  Antithesis.  The  World  has  no  beginning 
in  Time,  and  no  limit  in  Space. — If  it  had  such 
limits,  it  would  not  be  the  World,  the  all-including 
totality  of  existence  (the  Universe). 

Thus  these  two  contradictory  principles,  or 
universal  laws  (nomoi)  seem  equally  valid  for 
the  Reason,  even  while  saying  opposite  things. 
We  must  look  carefully  at  the  subject  of  these 
propositions,  the  World,  for  in  it  lies  the  chief 
difficulty.  By  means  of  it  Kant  summons  before 
himself  the  absolute  Totality,  the  All,  the  One 
as  unconditioned,  in  fine  the  Universe.  Such  is 
properly  not  only  the  subject  but  the  subject- 
matter  of  these  Antinomies.  In  such  case  Space 
and  Time  must  be  inside  the  world.  And  yet 
on  the  other  hand  the  World  as  created,  or  as 
beginning  or  begun,  is  conceived  as  in  Space 
and  Time,  is  here  and  now,  is  a  reality  present 
to  me  immediately,  empirically,  while  the  World 
as  the  absolute  totality  is  not  thus  present. 

One  asks :  Over  what  is  all  this  mental  strug- 
gle? Ultimately  over  the  creation  of  the  World 
and  its  Creator.  Is  He  inside  the  Universe  He 

36 


562        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

creates  or  outside?  In  other  words,  is  He  im- 
manent or  transcendent?  Is  He  a  creative  part 
of  the  Whole  or  is  He  the  Whole  creative?  To 
be  sure  the  theological  question  is  as  yet  implicit, 
but  we  shall  find  it  becoming  explicit  in  a  later 
portion  of  the  Transcendental  Dialectic. 

Moreover  the  World  is  seen  here  with  its  two 
meanings.  In  the  one  case  it  is  contained  in 
Time  and  Space,  in  the  other  it  is  "  the  absolute 
Totality"  and  contains  Time  and  Space. 

II.  The  second  Antinomy  Kant  makes  quali- 
tative, as  the  first  was  quantitative. 

(1)  Thesis.    Everything      composite     in   the 
World  consists    of   or   is   divisible  into    simple 
parts  (atoms). — Otherwise  it  would  be  c.omposed 
of  vvhat  is  not  simple  or  what  is  itself  composite. 

(2)  Antithesis.    Nothing    composite     in    the 
World   consists  of   or   is    divisible   into    simple 
parts.  —  For  the  simplest  part  or  atom  must  be 
extended,  and  so  divisible,  hence  composite. 

The  World  as  material  is  the  subject  of  this 
Antinomy.  Matter  is  extended  and  thus  com- 
posite. Of  what  is  it  composed?  Primarily  of 
ultimate  particles  which  are  simple  and  indi- 
visible. But  thus  these  particles  would  not  be 
extended  and  so  not  material ;  out  of  the  unex- 
tended  we  cannot  compose  the  extended.  Hence 
the  World  as  material  is  infinitely  divisible. 

If  the  atom  or  ultimate  particle  be  truly  in- 
divisible, it  must  exclude  all  difference  from 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.     563 

• 

itself,  not  only  quantitative  but  also  qualitative. 
Then  all  atoms  are  finally  of  the  same  kind, 
or  homogeneous,  and  are  the  one  constituent 
element  to  which  all  the  variety  of  the  world 
can  be  reduced.  Thus  the  Atom  has  become 
the  principle  of  Natural  Science,  which,  however, 
is  troubled  with  the  Antinomy  of  making  what 
is  extended  indivisible. 

Here  again  we  find  two  meanings  of  the 
World  or  specially  of  the  World  as  composite. 
As  a  part  or  stage,  it  can  have  division  from  the 
outside,  and  so  is  divisible ;  but  as  the  Universe, 
it  cannot  have  external  division  or  divisibility. 
Its  only  division  is  division  from  within  or  self- 
division,  which  is  at  the  same  time  one  and  itself. 
The  second  Antimony  thus  shows  the  Double 
World;  first  as  partial  and  so  divisible,  secondly 
as  Whole  and  so  one  or  rather  one  process  which 
includes  division  with  the  return  to  unity.  This 
we  shall  find  to  be  the  psychical  process,  that  of 
the  Ego,  which  Kant  notices  in  connection  with 
present  Antinomy,  though  he  persists  in  denying 
its  self-dividing  power. 

III.  The  third  Antinomy  pertains  to  the  con- 
flict between  Causation  and  Freedom. 

(1)  Thesis.  The  world  with  its  phenomena 
is  governed  not  only  by  natural  causes,  but  by  a 
free  cause,  or  self -cause.  —  Each  natural  cause 
is  itself  an  effect  produced  by  a  preceding  cause, 
and  so  on  in  a  series.  But  there  must  be  a 


5C4         MODERN  E UEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

• 

cause  which  is  not  effect  for  starting  the  series, 
this  is  the  free  cause,  called  by  Kant  "  spon- 
taneity of  causes."  The  dependent  depends  on 
the  self-dependent,  the  determined  on  the  self- 
determined. 

(2)  Antithesis.  The  world  with  its  phenom- 
ena is  governed  only  by  natural  laws,  and  there 
is  no  free  cause.  —  For  if  the  world  has  a  cause 
different  from  it,  or  outside  of  it,  then  it  is  not 
the  world  as  absolute  Totality,  or  the  Whole. 

Here  rises  another  phase  of  the  creative  prin- 
ciple of  the  Universe :  Is  it  transcendent  or  im- 
manent? A  free-acting  First  Cause  which  origi- 
nates the  World  with  its  phenomena  is  conceived 
as  outside  that  World.  On  the  other  hand  the 
idea  of  the  World  demands  that  everything,  even 
the  cause  be  included  in  itself.  Thus  all  causa- 
tion must  be  construed  as  immanent. 

More  plainly  than  in  the  previous  Antinomies 
does  the  Double  World  now  show  itself.  The 
World  as  a  part,  or  the  caused  or  created,  has  its 
cause  outside  of  itself.  On  the  other  hand  the 
World  as  the  All  must  have  its  cause  inside  itself, 
or  immanent.  Moreover,  it  again  becomes  ap- 
parent that  this  total  world  or  Universe  is  a  pro- 
cess made  up  of  three  stages,  Cause,  Caused, 
and  Self -Cause.  Here  we  can  see  that  the  World 
as  caused,  in  which  "  everything  happens 
simply  according  to  natural  laws,"  is  properly 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.     565 

the    second    stage    of    the    total  process  of  the 
Universe. 

IV.  The  fourth  Antinomy  treats  of  the  conflict 
which  lies  in  the  idea  of  a  necessary  being. 

(1)  Thesis.  To  the  world  belongs    something 
which  as  a  part  of  it  (inside)  or  as  cause  of  it 
(outside)  is  a  purely  necessary   being.  —  Every 
conditioned  thing  pre-supposes  a  complete  series 
of  conditions  up  to  the  Unconditioned  which  is 
the  necessary. 

(2)  Antithesis.  There  exists  no  purely  neces- 
sary being,  neither  in  the  World  nor  outside  the 
World  as  a  cause.  —  If  there  was  a  necessary  or 
unconditioned   Being  in  the  conditioned  World, 
it  would  lie  outside  of  this  World,  which  would 
thus    not  be  the    Whole.     So  also  with    neces- 
sary   Being   as  cause    of    the   World.     In   his 
remarks   on  this     Antinomy     Kant    seems    for 
a  moment  to  see  that  it  is  a  double  view  of  the 
World  which  produces  the  contradictory  predi- 
cates.    "  The  first  argument   regards  solely  the 
absolute  Totality  of  the  series  of  conditions  and 
thereby  reaches  an  unconditioned  and  necessary." 
On   the   other     hand    "  the   second   Argument 
regards    only  the  contingency  of  everything  in 
the  series,"  from  which  can  arise  nothing  uncon- 
ditioned and  necessary,  since  each  is  conditioned 
through  the  other.     That  is,  the  Totality  is  con- 
sidered in  the  one  case  and  the  Part  in  the  other. 

It  is  evident   that   the   last   two    Antinomies 


566        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY, 

belong  together,  being  only  slight  variations  of 
the  same  theme.  We  see  that  Kant's  fourfold 
scheme  of  the  Categories  is  the  machine  which 
compels  him  to  duplicate  the  last  Antinomy.  In 
strictness,  then,  there  are  here  but  three  Antino- 
mies., and  these  show  themselves  related  together 
as  a  process  of  the  Ego  (Psychosis).  We  shall 
have,  then,  the  following  three  stages :  — 

(a)  The  Double  World  as  immediate  (in Time 
and  Space  ) .     Both  limited  and  unlimited  in  each . 

(b)  The  Double  World  as  divisive  (the  mate- 
rial  World).     Both   divisible    (from   without), 
and  indivisible  (self-divided). 

(c)  The  Double  World  as  determined  (caused, 
created).       Both    determined    (conditioned    or 
necessitated)    and  not  determined  (which  means 
self-determined,  though  Kant  does  not  directly 
say  so). 

Such  is  the  true  outcome  of  the  process  of 
the  Antinomies:  we  are  made  conscious  of  the 
World  as  Universe,  self-determined,  positing 
within  itself  it  own  divisions  and  conditions, 
which  World  Kant,  even  when  calling  it  by 
such  names  as  Absolute  Totality,  could  never 
fully  separate  from  an  externally  conditioned 
World,  and  grasp  in  its  own  process.  The 
source  of  his  failure  lies  in  his  not  seeing  the 
process  of  the  Ego  as  self -separating  and  self- 
returning,  thus  having  within  itself  and  creating 
ideally  all  division  and  all  unity.  The  World  in 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.     567 

its  truth  is  just  this  process  of  the  Ego  realized, 
or,  as  we  have  elsewhere  called  it,  the  Pampsy- 
chosis.  Now  this  Pampsychosis  (or  the  Uni- 
verse as  psychical  process)  hovers  dimly  before 
Kant;  it  is  in  fact  the  thing  which  he  seeks  to 
grasp  and  to  formulate.  But  he  cannot  get  out 
of  his  own  separative  stage  (which  is  supremely 
that  of  his  Century)  and  return  to  the  unity 
of  the  All  or  Universe,  thus  reproducing 
the  complete  movement  of  his  Self  in  that 
of  the  Universe.  His  own  inner  division  he 
carries  over  into  the  World,  which  thus 
becomes  as  dualistic  as  he  is.  Still  we  must  not 
forget  the  great  service  of  Kant :  he  has  com- 
pelled the  philosophy  of  his  age  to  grapple  with 
this  lurking  process  both  in  the  Ego  and  in  the 
Universe,  so  that  what  in  him  is  as  yet  but 
implicit  will  become  explicit  with  time. 

Moreover,  Kant  has  in  these  Antinomies 
brought  to  light  the  World's  Dialectic,  which 
is  verily  of  far-reaching  import.  The  incessant 
struggle  between  the  Finite  and  the  Infinite,  the 
Particular  and  the  Universal,  the  Many  and  the 
One,  in  their  thousand  transformations,  he  has 
here  seized  with  a  giant's  hand  and  held  up 
before  all  coming  generations. 

Thus  we  have  the  World's  Antinomies,  as  pre- 
viously we  had  the  Ego's  Paralogisms.  The 
reader  now  begins  to  see  that  Kant's  negative 
procedure  is  following  the  philosophic  Norm, 


568        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

whose  third  member,  the  Absolute  or  God,  he 
next  proceeds  to  consider. 

C.  God,  —  The  Ideal  of  Pure  Reason.  This  is 
the  title  which  Kant  gives  to  the  third  head 
(Hauptstiick)  of  the  Second  Book  of  the  Tran- 
scendental Dialectic.  Corresponding,  then,  to 
the  Paralogism  and  the  Antinomy,  is  the  Ideal 
of  Pure  Reason,  which  is  now  to  be  discussed. 
This  Ideal  will  also  show  an  inner  contradiction 
between  Reason  and  Experience  which  makes  it 
dialectical.  But  its  content  or  subject-matter  is 
a  new  Totality,  nothing  less  than  God  Himself, 
the  sum  total  of  all  things  (omnitudo  realitatis, 
or  the  Allness  of  reality) ,  truly  the  Whole  of  all 
wholes. 

Thus  we  come  to  the  third  Whole,  God,  in  a 
line  of  succession  with  the  two  preceding 
Wholes,  the  Ego  and  the  World.  Moreover  the 
Kantian  battery  is  turned  against  the  metaphysi- 
cal science  of  this  Whole  or  of  God  which  in  the 
philosopher's  time  went  under  the  name  of 
Rational  Theology.  Note  again  that  the  idea  of 
the  Whole  or  of  the  absolute  Totality  is  the  source 
of  the  entire  dialectical  trouble  from  the  begin- 
ning. For  it  is  the  idea  given  by  Reason  and 
unattainable  by  Experience ;  yet  to  this  idea 
entirely  beyond  the  Understanding  the  latter 
will  apply  the  categories  derived  from  Experience, 
making  it  thereby  dialectical. 

The  reader  of  to-day,  who  studies  Kant  to  see 


KANT.— TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.     569 

that  which  lies  potential  in  him,  and  which 
is  to  come  out  of  him,  will  take  note  of  the 
fact  that  he  is  moving  in  this  dialectical  pro- 
cedure on  the  lines  of  the  philosophical  Norm, 
whose  three  stages  he  employs  in  the  following 
order:  Ego,  World,  and  God.  It  is  likewise  to 
be  observed  that  Kant  is  assailing  the  metaphy- 
sical view  of  this  Norm  in  all  three  of  its  stages,  by 
showing  that  their  concepts  in  the  previous  Phi- 
losophy was  dialectical,  giving  rise  to  an  inner 
contradiction.  Thus  we  shall  find  that  Kant 
quite  unconsciously  is  following  the  philosophic 
Norm ;  and  if  we  look  more  deeply  into  him,  we 
shall  find  that  he  employs  it  as  a  process,  in  fact 
as  an  implicit  psychicial  process.  To  be  sure, 
these  things  lie  not  distinctly  in  the  Kantian 
Scheme,  but  they  often  break  up  into  it,  and  often 
control  his  exposition,  as  it  were,  from  under- 
neath. 

Kant  seeks  to  explain  his  new  term,  the  Ideal. 
It  is,  of  course,  derived  from  Idea,  but  is  one 
step  further  removed  from  Experience  than 
Idea.  He  conceives  his  supersensible  world 
in  three  gradations  from  the  sensible  world. 
First  are  "the  Concepts  of  the  Understanding, 
which,  though  a  mere  form  of  thinking,  can  be 
represented  concretely,"  by  a  real  object.  Sec- 
ond are  the  Ideas  "  which  are  still  more  distant 
from  the  objective  reality  than  the  Concepts, 
inasmuch  as  no  phenomenon  can  be  found  which 


570        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY 

can  represent  them  concretely."  Thus  we  have 
a  World  of  Ideas,  the  realm  of  Pure  Reason. 
But  now  this  World  of  Ideas  must  be  united  and 
concentrated  in  one  Supreme  Idea,  the  Ideal 
"  which  is  yet  further  removed  from  the  object- 
ive reality,"  lying,  in  fact,  just  on  the  other  side 
of  the  Universe.  Thus  according  to  Kant  the 
Idea  is  individualized  (in  individuo),  is  the 
Whole  in  all  Wholes,  which  Wholes  we  have 
already  seen  as  given  by  Reason  in  its  Ideas,  and 
producing  the  dialectical  conflict  of  the  Antino- 
mies. Now  these  Wholes  are  likewise  dialecti- 
cal in  their  sphere  (though  Kant  does  not 
apparently  see  this),  and  reduce  themselves  to 
one  Whole,  which  is  their  essence,  the  Whole  in 
all  Wholes,  the  Allness  of  the  Universe  (omnitudo 
realitatis).  Such  is  the  absolute  Ideal  (not 
simply  Idea)  of  Pure  Reason,  or  God  conceived 
metaphysically  in  His  essence. 

It  is  this  new  Whole  in  which  Kant  proposes 
to  uncover  the  contradiction,  and  thus  show  to 
be  dialectical.  The  question  is,  Does  it  exist? 
Is  it  real?  At  once  we  begin  to  spy  trouble  in 
this  predicate  real,  as  here  applied  to  the  new 
Totality.  In  fact,  if  we  look  into  the  above 
cited  Kantian  phrase,  Allness  (Omnitudo)  of 
reality  (realitatis),  we  find  its  two  words  drop- 
ping into  complete  self-opposition  and  dualism, 
flashing  their  antagonism  across  the  whole  diam- 
eter of  the  Universe.  Can  the  category  taken 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  .DIALECTIC.     571 

from  the  sense-world  apply  to  the  All-in- All, 
God?  Emphatically  not,  according  to  the  fore- 
going Kantian  doctrine.  But  on  the  other  hand 
are  you  going  to  deny  God's  existence  and  thus 
shiver  the  whole  fabric  of  Theology  from  Anselm 
down  to  the  present?  The  situation  shakes  Kant 
up  from  the  bottom,  and  he  squares  himself  for 
a  prodigious  effort.  He  well  knows  the  colossal 
edifice  which  he  proposes  to  batter  to  pieces. 
Accordingly  he  will  here  go  into  details  and  show 
the  inherent  Dialectic  in  all  the  proofs  of  the 
Existence  of  God  descending  from  the  old  Meta- 
physics. 

Again  appears  the  same  ambiguity  which  we 
noticed  in  treating  of  the  Paralogism  and  the 
Antinomy.  Kant  has  two  meanings  of  the 
word  God,  one  of  which  takes  God  as  the  total- 
ity of  the  Universe  and  the  other  as  a  part  or 
stage  thereof.  Hence  He  becomes  the  subject 
of  two  opposite  predications .  As  the  Omnitudo 
realitatis  he  must  be  the  All,  the  Universe,  in- 
cluding the  World  and  Man  (or  Ego).  But,  as 
the  distinctive  Creator  or  the  individual  divine 
Spirit,  he  must  be  different  from  the  World  and 
Man.  Hence  we  observe  here  in  Kant  a  Double 
God,  as  we  saw  a  Double  Wol-ld,  and  also  a 
Double  Ego.  Upon  this  doubleness  the  Dia- 
lectic of  the  Ideal  (God)  of  Pure  Reason  hinges. 
On  the  one  hand  if  we  think  God  as  the  totality 
of  the  Universe,  he  must  exist;  but  if  we  think 


572        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

him  as  a  part,  then  existence  does  not  follow 
from  conception. 

These  Proofs  of  God's  existence  are  three, 
according  to  Kant,  which  he  sets  forth  in  the 
following  order — Ontological,  Cosmological,  and 
Physico-theological  (Teleological).  Let  the 
alert  reader  again  note  the  threefold  division, 
and  observe  that  Kant  now  drops  his  Scheme 
with  its  fourfold  division  which  he  applied  so 
rigidly  to  the  Paralogisms  and  the  Antinomies. 
Possibly  too  an  underlying  psychical  process 
may  again  be  lurking  in  the  order  of  these  three 
Proofs. 

I.  The  ontological  Proof  infers  the  existence 
of  God  from  my  (the  Ego's)  conception  of  Him 
as  the  most  real  Being  (ens  realissimum,  or 
better  ens  perfectissimum) .  The  unreality  of  the 
most  real,  or  the  limitation  of  the  most  perfect 
Being  contradicts  itself  directly  in  thought,  and 
so  cannot  be. 

Kant  denies  the  inference.  From  the  concep- 
tion of  anything  real,  its  existence  does  not  follow. 
44  If  I  conceive  of  a  Being  possessing  the  highest 
reality  (without  defect),  there  still  remains  the 
question  whether  it  exists  or  not."  Anyhow,  to 
say  a  thing  exists  "  is  a  mere  tautology  "  for 
existence  adds  nothing  to  reality.  "  Existence 
(/SWn)  is  no  real  predicate."  Hence  Kant 
makes  his  famous  statement  that  «'  a  hundred 
actual  (existent)  dollars  contain  no  more  than  a 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.     573 

hundred  possible  (conceived) "  dollars."  The 
real  thing  cannot  be  gotten  from  the  concept, 
but  only  from  sense-perception.  God  as  "  the 
most  real  Being  "  can  only  be  obtained  through 
immediate  experience. 

Most  people  would  answer:  "  Our  God  is  not 
that  sort  of  a  reality.'*  The  existence  of  God 
as  sought  to  be  proved  by  the  ontological  argu- 
ment does  not  mean  that  He  is  present  to  the 
senses.  Kant  thus  assumes  his  own  meaning  for 
the  term  real,  and  then  says  the  argument  is  not 
valid .  Who  said  it  was  valid  to  prove  any  such 
reality?  Certainly  not  Anselrn,  not  Descartes, 
the  latter  of  whom  Kant  seems  specially  to  have 
had  in  mind.  His  objection,  however,  is  old, 
going  back  to  the  monk  Gaunilo,  who  pertinently 
asks  Anselm :  From  my  conception  of  an  en- 
chanted island  in  the  middle  of  the  ocean,  am  I 
to  infer  its  existence?  To  this  question  Anselm 
would  have  his  answer:  the  conception  of  finite 
sensible  objects  in  no  way  corresponds  to  the 
conception  of  God,  the  supersensible  and  infinite 
One  of  the  Universe. 

The  weakness  of  Kant  in  the  refutation  of  this 
ontological  argument  has  always  excited  sur- 
prise. It  betrays  not  only  a  lack  of  acumen  (in 
which  Kant  was  certainly  not  deficient),  but  also 
a  strange  ignorance  of  the  History  of  Philosophy. 
Various  reasons  have  been  assigned  for  Kant's 
drop  at  this  point :  one  is  that  he  really  believed 


571        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  ontological  proof  and  yet  he  had  to  refute  it 
to  complete  the  negative  sweep  of  his  system. 
That  is,  he  disbelieved  his  own  refutation,  and 
may  have  been  convinced  of  the  opposite  by 
the  weakness  of  his  own  argument  (a  very  doubt- 
ful ground). 

It  is  evident  that  Kant  in  his  refutation  does 
not  grasp  God  simply  as  the  Alluess  of  reality, 
but  also  as  a  stage  of  this  reality,  as  a  real  thing. 
Properly  he  recognizes  both  meanings  and  hence 
comes  the  Dialectic.  (This  might  be  called  the 
psychological  Proof  instead  of  ontological,  since 
it  springs  from  the  Ego's  conception  of  God,) 

II.  The  cosmological  Proof  of  God's  existence 
comes  through  the  medium  of  the  World 
(Cosmos).  Through  a  series  of  causes  and 
effects,  which  latter  are  again  causes,  the  World 
shows  itself  to  be  conditioned,  contingent.  But 
such  a  series  presupposes  a  First  Cause  or  neces- 
sary Being,  on  which  all  depends.  Thus  we 
reach  the  unconditioned  necessary  Being  which 
is  through  itself  or  self-subsistent.  This  same 
argument  has  already  been  given  in  the  fourth 
Antinomy,  But  the  cosmological  addition  in 
the  present  argument  is:  Such  a  necessary 
Being  is  God. 

Kant  has  already  shown  to  his  satisfaction 
that  an  unconditional  necessary  Being  cannot 
be  inferred  from  a  conditioned  World  (fourth 
Antinomy).  There  remains  for  him  to  deny 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.     575 

the  second  inference  which  grounds  the  cosino- 
logical  argument.  Hence  he  declares  that  even 
if  we  grant  the  reality  of  such  a  necessary 
Being,  it  does  not  follow  that  this  Being  is  the 
personal  God  of  Theology. 

III.  The  third  proof  of  the  existence  of  God. 
Kant  calls  the  Physico-theological,  since  it  starts 
out  with  something  in  Nature  given  us  by  expe- 
rience. This  is  the  order  and  design  which  we 
behold  in  the  physical  world  about  us,  and  from 
which  we  rise  to  the  conception  of  God  as  the 
source  of  such  order  and  design. 

Kant  again  denies  the  inference  which  leaps 
from  a  matter  of  experience  to  an  entity  be- 
yond experience.  Even  if  we  should  grant  all 
these  evidences  of  design  in  the  world  (and  they 
may  be  questioned)  we  are  not  justified  in  con- 
cluding from  them  the  existence  of  a  personal 
God.  At  best  this  argument,  usually  called  the 
teleologic,  shows  an  order  of  the  world,  an  archi- 
tect who  finds  his  material  ready  at  hand  and 
shapes  it  and  puts  it  into  place.  But  the  Chris- 
tian God  is  not  simply  a  world -builder  or  demi- 
urge, but  a  world-creator,  creating  all,  even  his 
material.  The  fact  is,  the  teleologic  argument 
here  employed  is  heathen,  is  old  Greek,  and  was 
first  used  by  a  Greek  philosopher,  ancient  Anaxa- 
goras.  It  implies  the  eternity  of  matter,  a  doc- 
trine which  gave  much  trouble  to  the  early  Chris- 
tian Church  before  getting  rid  of  it.  Hence, 


576         MODERN'  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Theology  must  go  forward  to  the  ontological 
argument  for  proving  the  existence  of  God  as 
the  all-creative,  which  it  did  in  the  history  of  the 
Church  through  Anselm.  But  in  the  present  case 
it  must  go  back  to  that  argument. 

Such,  then,  is  the  negative  outcome  of  the 
Ideal  of  Pure  Eeason  when  the  attempt  is  made 
through  it  to  prove  the  existence  of  God.  The 
reader  will  again  observe  that  the  three  Proofs 
follow  in  the  given  order — Ego,  World,  God. 
The  first  Proof  starts  immediately  with  the  Ego 
conceiving  the  most  real  Being  within  itself  and 
thence  rising  to  God.  The  second  Proof  starts 
with  the  World  as  contingent  and  conditioned, 
and  thence  rises  to  God  (through  the  idea  of  a 
necessary  Being).  The  third  Proof  starts  with 
God  as  manifested  in  the  order  and  purpose  of 
the  World,  and  thence  rises  to  his  separate  ex- 
istence. But  this  Proof  (as  Kant  observes) 
must  go  back  for  its  confirmation  to  the  onto- 
logical Proof,  that  is  to  the  Ego  conceiving,  and 
so  realizing  God.  And  it  is  also  the  Ego  which 
has  to  conceive  of  necessary  Being  and  thereby 
elevate  God  out  the  conditioned  World.  Thus 
underneath  all  these  Proofs  lies  the  process  of 
Ego  formulating  God  out  of  itself  immediately, 
out  of  the  World  as  contingent,  and  out  of  God 
in  the  World  as  ordered. 

Moreover  we  have  now  reached  the  conclusion 
of  the  total  movement  of  the  Transcendental 


KANT.  —  TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.     577 

Dialectic  which  we  find  has  been  dealing  with 
three  leading  themes  —  Ego,  World,  and  God. 
These  we  have  observed  through  the  whole  His- 
tory of  Philosophy  as  constituting  the  philosophi- 
cal Norm  and  forming  together  the  absolute  pro- 
cess of  Universe,  which  is  the  fundamental 
subject  of  Philosophy.  Thus  we  can  rightly  say 
that  Kant  is  grappling  with  the  profoundest 
matter  that  has  occupied  human  thought. 
What  is  his  treatment  of  it? 

This  we  may  summarize  as  follows :  (a)  First 
of  all,  the  Norm,  though  present  and  determin- 
ing his  work,  is  not  always  explicitly  and  con- 
sciously present  to  Kant's  mind.  Hence  his 
exposition  seems  often  wandering  and  uncertain 
of  its  purpose,  (b)  He  changes  the  order  of  the 
Norm  as  transmitted  (God,  World,  Man)  into 
his  own  separative  arrangement  (Man,  World, 
God),  which  is  an  inversion  of  the  order,  (c) 
The  reason  of  this  is  because  he  does  not  con- 
sciously grasp  the  process  of  these  three  elements 
of  the  Norm,  which  really  constitute  the  basic 
movement  of  the  Universe  or  the  "  Absolute 
Totality."  (d)  From  this  same  lack  of  grasp- 
ing the  process  of  the  All  comes  the  double 
nature  of  his  Dialectic,  namely,  the  two  mean- 
ings which  he  gives  respectively  to  Self,  World, 
and  God.  (e)  Hence  he  seeks  to  invalidate 
Self,  World,  and  God  as  double  and  inherently 
37 


578         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

contradictory,  as  being  merely  the  illusion  of 
knowledge. 

Thus  we  see  that  Kant's  result  is  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  philosophic  Norm  and  with  it  of 
Philosophy  as  a  Discipline  which  has  been  pro- 
duced by  this  Norm.  Such  is  the  extreme  nega- 
tive outcome  of  the  revolutionary  Eighteenth 
Century  in  its  philosophic  aspect,  which,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  has  its  correspondence  in  the 
institutional  world.  To  be  sure,  Kant  saves  a 
limited  sphere  of  knowledge  for  man,  but  in  that 
sphere  the  Norm  is  not  included. 

Still  the  Norm  is  just  what  underlies  all  of 
Kant's  efforts,  and  is  pushing  forward  to  a  new 
birth.  Kant  does  not  really  destroy  the  Norm, 
for  that  is  indestructible,  but  the  old  metaphy- 
sical incumbrances  of  the  Norm,  which  is  to 
appear  in  its  own  native  form,  that  is,  to  become 
psychical.  All  along  we  have  found  hints  of  this 
psychical  process  bursting  up  through  Kant's 
oppressive  schematic  wrappage  of  Metaphysics. 
It  was  observed  how  his  discussion  of  the  Para- 
logism and  of  the  Antinomy  became  secretly 
psychical  in  spite  of  his  fourfold  scheme  clapped 
on  from  the  outside.  Really  he  is  calling  not 
for  a  new  Philosophy  to  answer  his  difficulties, 
but  for  a  new  Discipline,  the  truly  psychical 
Discipline,  which  will  bring  to  light  and  order 
that  secret  process  of  the  Ego  which  gives  him 
so  much  trouble. 


KANT.  —  CRITIQ  UE  OF  PEA  C  TICAL  BE  AS  ON.    579 

Still  another  and  greater  sweep  is  here  con- 
cluded :  that  which  embraces  essentially  this 
whole  Critique  in  its  three  fundamental  divi- 
sions, namely  the  Aesthetic,  the  Analytic,  and 
the  Dialectic.  These  constitute  the  three  main 
stages  in  the  Kantian  process  of  knowing  the 
objective  world.  This  is  first  taken  up  by  Sense- 
perception,  after  being  put  under  its  forms, 
Space  and  Time;  these  given  percepts  the  Under- 
standing then  elaborates  into  its  Categories,  while 
Reason  unifies  the  latter  into  its  Ideas,  which  in 
one  way  or  other  express  the  Universe  in  its 
threefold  elements  of  Ego,  World,  and  God  (or 
subject,  object,  and  subject-object  as  absolute). 

Kant  treats  of  many  other  topics  in  his  Crit- 
ique of  Pure  Reason,  but  these  we  cannot  attempt 
to  discuss. 

B.  THE  CRITIQUE  or  PRACTICAL  REASON. 

This  is  the  second  of  the  Three  Critiques  which 
best  represent  Kant's  Philosophy.  It  appeared 
in  1788,  seven  years  after  the  publication  of  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  of  which  it  is  in  a 
manner  the  counterpart,  though  decidedly  in- 
ferior. In  the  preceding  year  (1787)  a  new 
edition  of  the  first  Critique  had  been  published 
in  which  is  seen  Kant's  tendency  to  tone  down  a 
number  of  the  extreme  views  which  he  had  ex- 
pressed in  the  first  edition.  This  same  tendency 


580        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  far  more  decided  in  the  present  second 
Critique,  which  shows  the  philosopher  in  a  con- 
siderable reaction  on  a  number  of  points  against 
his  earlier  self. 

The  mood  of  the  book  is,  therefore,  of  a  rela- 
tively positive  cast;  by  an  act  of  Will  which 
seems  almost  violent  Kant  proposes  to  put  a  stop 
to  the  destructive  work  of  his  previous  book. 
The  motives  assigned  for  this  change  in  Kant 
have  been  stated  variously.  Some  say  that  he 
got  scared  at  the  wrecks  strewn  about  him  as  the 
consequences  of  his  own  work.  Others  think 
that  the  changed  attitude  of  the  State  (Prussia) 
influenced  him.  Frederick  the  Great,  who  had 
declared  that  during  his  reign  everybody  should 
be  permitted  to  get  to  Heaven  in  his  own  fashion, 
had  died  in  1786,  and  had  been  succeeded  by  Fred- 
erick William  II,  whose  reign  was  to  be  pietistic, 
as  the  Germans  call  it,  with  a  strict  religious 
surveillance  over  doctrinal  matters.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that  Kant  felt  far  freer  to  say  what 
he  thought  in  1781  than  he  did  in  1788.  He 
could  hardly  help  having  much  respect  for,  if 
not  fear  of  that  Will  in  the  State,  which  in  him- 
self he  regarded  as  final.  We  are  not  to  forget 
his  later  submission  to  governmental  authority 
and  humiliating  promise  of  silence  in  matters  of 
religion. 

The  Critique  of  Practical  Reason  deals  with 
what  is  usually  called  Ethics,  but  properly  it  is 


KANT.  —  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  581 

a  treatise  on  Morals  as  subjective.  A  work  on 
Ethics  in  the  old  Greek  and  wider  sense  it  is 
not,  for  it  excludes  institutions.  In  this  respect 
the  example  of  Kant  has  been  unfortunate  for 
the  present  science.  The  truth  is  that  in  him 
appear  the  pronounced  dualism  and  mutual  op- 
position between  the  moral  and  institutional, 
which  went  over  into  the  following  (nineteenth) 
Century  with  such  power.  Though  Kant  treats 
of  both  Church  and  State  in  his  writings,  those 
institutions  are  not  organically  connected  with 
his  fundamental  thought.  His  freedom  remains 
subjective,  individual,  moral;  that  the  State,  for 
instance,  is  ideally  a  Free-Will  whose  end  is  to 
secure  Free- Will,  lies  not  in  his  horizon.  The 
categorical  Imperative  of  the  Ego  has  the  pri- 
macy, which  is  sure  to  beget  a  conflict  with 
other  Egos  and  their  categorical  Imperatives, 
which  conflict  the  State  can  only  solve  externally 
by  law.  Kant's  freedom  is  not  institutional,  but 
moral ;  in  which  fact  he  represents  his  country 
and  his  age.  It  was  his  Century  that  made  the 
fiercest  attack  on  institutions  as  the  established 
and  transmitted,  which  has  ever  been  known  in 
history.  The  individual  Ego  of  that  time  showed 
its  deepest  breach  with  its  environing  social 
order,  and  Kant  was  the  philosopher  of  that 
revolutionary  Ego,  placing  supreme  stress  upon 
the  Imperative  of  the  inner  Self. 

It   is  of  the  greatest  interest  to  the  student 


582         MODEEN  E UROPEAN  PHIL OSOPHY. 

of  the  History  of  Philosophy  to  see  how  Kant 
turns  to  the  Will  and  emphasizes  it  in  his 
Practical  Reason.  From  this  point  of  view  the 
work  shows  a  psychical  advance.  In  the  inter- 
vening years  Kant  has  decisively  experienced  that 
in  his  first  Critique  he  has  not  considered  one 
supreme  activity  of  the  mind — Volition.  He 
has  dealt  only  with  Intellect,  which  he  has 
limited  on  all  sides.  To  be  sure  he  calls  his 
book  a  Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason,  but  it  is 
really  a  Critique  of  the  Intellect,  and  embraces 
Sense-perception,  Imagination  (or  Representa- 
tion),  Understanding,  besides  Keason.  When 
he  takes  up  the  Will  and  correlates  it  with  his 
preceding  work,  we  can  see  that  his  own  spirit- 
ual evolution  is  becoming  psychical,  which  fact 
we  deem  decided  progress  and  a  pointing  toward 
the  future. 

When  we  look  into  this  second  Critique,  we 
observe  that  its  procedure  is  anything  but  a  real- 
ization of  Kant's  Will  as  absolute  spontaneity. 
In  the  first  place  it  is  not  strictly  a  Critique 
at  all,  as  Kant  acknowledges;  in  the  next  place 
it  lies  not  in  the  sphere  of  Reason.  Still  Kant 
forces  this  title  upon  his  book  to  make  it  seem 
parallel  with  his  first  Critique.  Then  the  divi- 
sions of  it  into  Analytic  and  Dialectic  are  equally 
violent,  being  dragged  in  from  his  first  Critique, 
and  hammered  into  a  kind  of  uniformity.  Thus 
his  exposition  of  freedom  is  about  as  unfree  as 


KANT.  —  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.   583 

can  be  conceived.  There  is  no  inner  spontane- 
ous development  of  his  theme,  but  its  adjust- 
ment to  a  predetermined  scheme  contradictory 
to  its  very  nature. 

And  yet  even  in  this  matter  Kant  reflects  his 
world,  or  rather  his  nature  and  his  age.  This 
Kantian  dualism  between  inner  freedom  and 
outer  determinism  was  the  Germany  of  his  time, 
and  is  the  Germany  of  to-day:  an  unlimited  lib- 
erty within,  privately,  for  yourself;  but  an 
unlimited  absolutism  without,  publicly,  for  the 
world.  Here  lies  the  fundamental  difference 
between  the  two  great  branches  of  the  Teutonic 
race.  The  Anglo-Saxon  is  going  to  have  public, 
institutional  freedom,  or  die ;  the  German  is  going 
to  have  private,  subjective  freedom,  and  is  will- 
ing to  let  himself  be  determined  in  public  rela- 
tions by  authority,  which  he  has  no  hand  in 
selecting.  For  this  and  other  reasons  Kant  is 
supremely  the  philosopher  of  his  people,  is  so 
to-day;  he  never  has  been  and  never  can  be 
the  philosopher  of  Anglo-Saxondom  though  of 
course  we  can  all  learn  much  from  him. 

What  the  Intellect  cannot  know,  the  Will 
postulates,  namely,  God,  Freedom,  Immortality. 
If  I  undertake  to  think  the  Universe  as  real,  I 
commit  a  contradiction,  I  apply  to  the  Infinite  a 
finite  predicate.  But  I  CSLU  postulate  the  Universe 
with  its  process,  which  I  can  never  know.  In 
other  words,  I  must  make  or  remake  God  in 


584         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

order  to  possess  Him.  This  is  a  valid  thought, 
but  Kant  leaves  out  the  other  side :  God  must 
create  me  as  creative  ere  I  can  re-create  Him. 
Primarily,  then,  Kant  simply  assumes  the  Ego 
and  its  freedom  as  something  given,  as  an  ultimate 
fact  of  consciousness.  But  the  Ego  will  ask  of 
itself:  whence  this  postulating  power  of  mine, 
which  can  even  postulate  my  Maker?  The  answer 
to  this  question  lies  outside  of  Kant's  horizon. 

Will  thus  takes  possession  of  the  whole  Ego, 
and  sets  to  one  side  the  Intellect.  The  primacy 
of  the  Will  it  is  called ;  herein  we  see  the  origin 
of  the  doctrine  of  Voluntarism,  which  has 
recently  been  held  up  as  the  final  word  of  Phi- 
losophy. But  Will  and  Intellect  are  equally  valid 
stages  in  the  process  of  the  complete  mind ;  there 
is  properly  no  primacy  of  one  or  of  the  other. 
The  Kantian  dualism  between  Intellect  and  Will, 
belongs  specially  to  the  Eighteenth  Century,  and 
is  already  stated  by  Hume  explicitly,  who  says 
that  action  gives  the  lie  direct  to  all  that  theory 
holds.  A  similar  view,  though  more  implicit, 
we  can  trace  in  Locke . 

We  may  now  see  that  Will  has  been  the 
secret  hostile  demiurge  who  has  been  destroy- 
ing the  a-priori  element  of  Intellect,  till  at  last 
it  comes  to  itself  and  then  it  proceeds  despot- 
ically to  postulate  itself  as  the  true  a-priori 
principle  which  postulates  the  other  a-priori 
principles  —  God,  Freedom,  Immortality.  Thus 


KANT.  —  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON*  585 

Will  not  only  postulates  itself  as  primordial, 
bat  postulates  itself  as  the  postulator  of 
all  that  it  has  denied  to  Intellect.  This  looks 
as  if  our  Free- Will  had  become  an  intoler- 
ant tyrant  in  the  citadel  of  liberty.  How 
very  similar  to  the  movement  of  the  French 
Revolution!  The  Will,  assailing  the  Intellect 
for  the  tyranny  of  its  transmitted  doctrines, 
destroys  its  foe  in  the  name  of  freedom,  and 
then  seizes  absolute  power  with  its  own  hands. 
It  may  be  said  that  Kant  gets  his  Freedom  by 
violence,  in  true  revolutionary  fashion,  wrench- 
ing it  through  postulation  from  the  Ego,  which 
knows  it  not,  as  he  supposes. 

The  Will  postulates  Freedom  immediately,  as 
the  primordial  essence  of  the  Ego,  Then  it  postu- 
lates Immortality  through  the  ideal  of  perfect  Vir- 
tue which  an  imperfect  being  can  realize  only  in 
an  endless  continuance  of  Time.  Finally  it  postu- 
lates God  through  the  ideal  of  perfect  Happiness 
which  an  imperfect  being  can  realize  only  through 
an  absolute  Being  or  God.  You  are  to  act  as  if 
you  had  immortal  life  for  attaining  perfect  Vir- 
tue, though  you  can  have  no  knowledge  of  such 
a  life.  You  are  to  act  as  if  there  were  a  God  for 
securing  your  perfect  Happiness,  though  you  can 
never  know  that  there  is  a  God.  But  especially 
you  are  to  act  as  if  you.  were  a  free  man,  though 
you  cannot  know  that  you  are  really  free.  Is  it 
a  wonder  that  the  ardent  student  of  Kant,  Schop- 


586         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

euhauer,  sucked  out  of  this  doctrine  his  pessimistic 
conclusion  that  this  was  the  worst  of  all  possible 
worlds?  One  may  sum  up  Kant's  Critique  of 
the  Practical  Reasoni  Go  it  with  all  your  might, 
but  you  will  have  to  go  it  blindly. 

«  C.  THE  CRITIQUE  or  JUDGMENT. 

We  have  now  reached  the  third  of  the  three 
Critiques,  in  a  descending  order.  The  present 
Critique  was  published  in  1790,  two  years  after 
the  second  one,  and  is  distinctly  to  be  placed  in 
the  period  of  Kant's  decline.  Again  the  title  is 
arbitrary  and  misleading,  for  the  faculty  of 
Judgment  is  here  essentially  Feeling.  Again  the 
scheme  of  the  first  Critique  is  clapped  upon  the 
content  in  a  violent  and  external  manner.  The 
formalism  appears  to  be  more  crushing  and 
capricious  in  this  than  in  the  last  Critique. 

Still  we  are  to  note  what  may  well  be  deemed 
an  advance.  Kant  sees  or  feels  that  there  is 
still  another  stage  or  faculty  of  the  Ego  which 
he  has  not  accounted  for,  namely  Feeling.  As 
he  puts  it,  there  was  a  gulf  between  the  specu- 
lative and  the  practical  Reason,  which  had  to  be 
bridged  over  by  a  new  activity  of  mind. 
This  he  calls  the  Faculty  of  Judgment  which 
deals  with  the  laws  for  the  feelings  of  Pleasure 
and  Pain.  Thus  he  seeks  to  find  a  middle  link 
for  overcoming  the  deep  dualism  which  he  has 
made  between  Intellect  and  Will. 


KANT.  —  CRITIQUE  OF  JUDGMENT.          587 

Kant  divides  his  subject  into  two  faculties, 
which  he  names  the  Aesthetic  and  Teleologic 
Faculties  of  Judgment.  Each  of  these  he  fur- 
nishes with  an  Analytic  and  a  Dialectic,  derived 
of  course  from  the  scheme  of  the  first  Critique. 
But  into  his  detailed  discussion  of  these  various 
parts  we  cannot  follow  him. 

Thus  Kant  has  reached  the  three  fundamental 
forms  of  the  psychical  Ego,  one  after  the  other, 
in  his  Three  Critiques.  But  he  inverts  their 
order  and  does  not  see  them  in  their  true  pro- 
cess. He  places  Intellect  first,  whereas  it  ought 
to  be  third  as  the  self -returning,  self-conscious 
stage.  Then  he  places  Feeling  last  whereas  it 
ought  to  be  first  or  the  implicit  unconscious 
stage.  Finally  the  three  are  to  be  seen  as  a 
psychical  process  together,  which  we  have  called 
the  Psychosis,  and  which  is  the  real  genetic 
principle  of  mind  and  its  science. 

Thus  we  may  say  that  Kant  at  the  end  of  his 
life-work  has  properly  reached  the  starting- 
point  for  organizing  the  Thought  of  the  Uni- 
verse. The  final  thing  which  has  been  born  of 
his  long  travail  is  the  threefold  movement  of 
mind.  This  is  really  what  has  been  lurking  in 
his  struggles  from  the  beginning  —  the  principle 
of  the  new  epoch,  which  is  to  be  psychological, 
not  philosophical,  as  he  still  imagines.  Thus  his 
unconscious  and  unintended  result  is  much  more 
significant  than  his  conscious  and  intended. 


588         MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

We  should  also  see  that  Kant  is  right  in  seek- 
ing for  a  scheme  or  plan  common  to  his  three 
Critiques.  It  is  true  that  his  scheme  is  a  mis- 
take, is  not  unfolded  from  within,  but  is  exter- 
nally applied  to  a  content  far  greater  and  deeper 
than  it  is.  Still  from  such  a  wrong  application 
of  the  scheme  we  are  not  to  reject  all  schema- 
tism ;  that  would  be  more  negative  than  Kant 
himself,  and  leave  us  in  blank  chaos.  The  great 
object  in  this  field  -is  to  find  the  right  scheme, 
which  has  to  evolve  along  with  its  content  or 
thought.  Hence  though  we  reject  Kant's  scheme 
as  such,  we  fully  acknowledge  his  principle  of 
having  a  scheme  as  the  very  nerve  of  all  organized 
thought. 

Here  we  must  bring  to  an  end  our  view  of 
Kant's  Three  Critiques.  *  Again  we  cannot  help 
remarking  how  our  philosopher  unconsciously 
runs  everywhere  into  triadism  in  spite  of  his 
conscious  and  purposed  dyadism.  The  latter 
connects  him  with  his  own  Century,  the  former 
joins  him  to  the  future.  Even  if  he  did  develop 
backward  or  downward  in  his  psychical  evolution, 
he  nevertheless  reached  bottom  at  last,  so  that  he 
gives  us  the  three  stages  of  the  Psychosis 
though  inverted  —  Intellect,  Will,  Feeling.  This 
we  may  well  regard  as  the  final  deposit  of  Kant's 
thought. 

III.  KANT'S  PHILOSOPHY. — In  the  preceding 
Three  Critiques  we  have  given  the  fundamental 


KANT.  —  PHILOSOPHY.  589 

» 

movement  of  the  Philosophy  of  Kant  in  accord 
with  the  author's  own  development.  Still  we 
might  apply  the  Norm  —  Metaphysics,  Physics, 
and  Ethics  —  to  Kant's  Writings,  though  such  an 
application  of  it  would  be  somewhat  external. 
Kant's  negation  of  the  Norm  is  the  deepest  phi- 
losophical fact  of  him ;  he  made  his  own  Norm 
in  the  Three  Critiques,  rejecting  the  transmitted 
one,  and  this  is  his  revolutionary  spirit  in  Philos- 
ophy. Nevertheless  the  transmitted  Norm  lurks 
unconsciously  in  his  thought  while  consciously 
denying  it,  and  he  cannot  well  help  himself. 

The  traditional  Philosophy  came  to  him  chiefly 
through  Wolff  from  Leibniz.  We  have  already 
noted  how  Teutonic  thought  in  the  Eighteenth 
Century  bifurcated  into  two  streams,  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  and  the  German;  the  former  through 
Locke  and  Hume  became  the  dominant  Euro- 
pean Philosophy.  But  the  latter  continued  in 
an  undercurrent  down  to  Kant,  who  assailed 
it  as  dogmatic,  and  proceeded  to  weave  into 
German  thinking  the  Anglo-Saxon  thread,  which 
then  lost  its  European  supremacy,  and  vanished 
through  Kant  into  the  German  movement. 

The  most  common  statement  concerning 
Kant's  Philosophy  is  that  it  destroyed  dogmatism 
and  established  in  its  place  criticism.  Both  these 
assertions  must  be  modified.  Kant  may  have 
destroyed  the  old  dogmatism,  but  he  left  his  own, 
for  Kant  is  as  dogmatic  as  any  philosopher  that 


590        MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY, 

ever  lived.  In  fact  his  doctrine  of  Will  is  the 
very  apotheosis  of  the  dogmatic  Self.  If  he 
sought  to  curtail  and  to  limit  the  arrogance  of 
the  Intellect,  he  turns  loose  the  arrogance  of  the 
Will,  which  is  certainly  worse,  because  more 
tyrannical.  Kant  shows  these  two  contradictory 
elements  in  his  personal  character ;  they  can  also 
be  seen  in  the  Germany  of  his  time,  and  even 
of  to-day.  Is  not  Voluntarism  or  the  primacy 
of  the  Will  its  present  leading  Philosophy,  in  so 
far  as  it  has  any  at  all? 

It  is  likewise  said  that  Kant  established  criti- 
cism instead  of  skepticism.  But  he  holds 
through  all" his  ins  and  outs  that  man  cannot 
know  the  truth  of  the  object.  How  far  is  such 
a  doctrine  from  the  Humian  skepticism?  Hume's 
chief  assault  is  upon  the  cause  or  the  essence 
of  the  thing  (the  ousia  of  the  on,  with  which 
Greek  Philosophy  started).  Kant's  chief  as- 
sault is  upon  the  essence  or  being  of  the  Ego 
(the  Cartesian  I  think,  there 'fore  1 am ,  with  which 
modern  Philosophy  started).  Thus  the  Eight- 
eenth Century  ends  in  the  voice  of  Kant  de- 
nying the  content  of  both  ancient  and  modern 
Philosophy. 

Still  we  should  not  forget  that  both  Hume 
and  Kant  deny  their  denial  and  thus  make  their 
own  self-contradiction  complete.  Kant  claims 
to  be  the  grand  rescuer  of  knowledge ;  this 
rescue  is  accomplished  by  making  it  ignorant 


KANT.  — PHILOSOPHY.  591 

of  truth.  What  is  such  a  rescue  worth?  The 
supreme  act  of  philosophical  salvation  is  to  save 
a  knowledge  which  does  not  know  anything,  or 
perchance  knows  only  the  lie. 

Yet  we  are  to  see  the  positive  implication  in 
all  this  negative  work.  When  Immanuel  Kant 
says  that  we  cannot  know  God  in  Himself,  he 
tells  us  something  about  God  which  we  are  to 
know,  and  also  about  his  own  Ego.  Really  he 
presupposes  that  he  can  know  God,  and  is  cate- 
gorizing Him  in  and  through  thought.  Kant  is 
in  his  way  re-creating  God  who  created  him. 
The  underlying  implication  of  Kant's  negative 
formula  is  that  God  as  creative  must  create  a 
being  or  an  Ego  who  can  re-create  Him  in  thought. 
Such  an  unfolding  of  the  implicit  Kant,  however, 
lies  ahead  even  of  the  coming  Century,  whose 
answer  to  Kant's  denial  is  Evolution,  the  devel- 
opment of  the  Being  of  the  Ego  or  of  man.  For 
Kant  denies  that  thought  is  Being,  but  Evolution 
shows  the  rise  of  Being  to  Thought  which  re- 
turns upon  itself  and  thinks  its  own  rise  as  its 
true  Being. 

Transition.  What  is  the  essential  line  of 
transition  out  of  the  Eighteenth  into  the  Nine- 
teenth Century?  The  Philosophy  of  Limitation 
is  peculiarly  that  of  the  former ;  Locke,  Hume, 
and  Kant  all  press  home  to  human  -Intellect  its 
limits,  beyond  which  it  cannot  go  without  com- 
mitting a  spiritual  transgression  somewhat  like 


592         MODERN-  E  UEOPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

original  sin.  To  tamper  with  the  thought 
of  the  Absolute  Kant  considers  to  be  the 
eating  of  the  forbidden  fruit  of  the  tree 
of  Knowledge  —  Kant  himself  laying  upon  the 
Ego  his  divine  prohibition  as  if  he  might 
be  God's  vicegerent.  The  general  formula 
of  the  Eighteenth  Century  runs :  The  Ego-in- 
itself  cannot  be  known,  nor  can  the  Thing-in- 
itself;  only  the  phenomenal  Ego  can  know  the 
phenomenal  Thing.  God,  Freedom,  and  Im- 
mortality are  outside  the  limits  of  the  Intellect, 
they  are  the  forbidden  fruit  of  Philosophy. 

Now  it  lies  in  human  nature  old  as  Adam,  that 
man  will  hanker  after  just  this  forbidden  fruit, 
and  the  philosopher  is  no  exception.  Mind,  the 
self -limited,  will  begin  to  kick  against  its  limits 
and  insist  on  climbing  over  the  wall,  though  it  be 
the  wall  of  Paradise.  So  it  will  happen  that 
already  during  Kant's  life  philosophers  will  break 
over  the  bounds  so  imperiously  laid  down  in  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  Such  is  the  line  of 
transition  which  will  form  a  process  shared  in  by 
three  eminent  thinkers,  each  of  whom  finds  his 
starting-point  in  one  of  the  Three  Critiques,  be- 
ginning with  the  last  or  at  the  bottom. 

1 .  Jacobi  asserts  the  validity  of  Peeling  against 
the  Kantian  negation.  He  accepts  Kant  in  part ; 
the  Ideas  of  Reason  —  God,  Freedom,  Immortal- 
ity— cannot  be  demonstrated,  but  they  can  be 
felt,  and  that  is  the  final  and  all-sufficient  test  of 


KANT  -  PHILOSOPHY.  593 

their  validity.  They  are  to  be  gotten  not  medi- 
ately, through  Intellect,  but  immediately,  through 
Feeling  in  the  form  of  Faith. 

2.  Fickle  asserts  the  validity  of  Will  against 
the  negative  results  of  Kant's  treatment  of  In- 
tellect.    The  Thing-in-itself  can  be   known  by 
the  Ego,  for  it  is  really   the    product    of    the 
Ego.     Here  Fichte  uncovers   Kant's  contradic- 
tion :  if  you  cannot   know  the    Thing-in-itself, 
how  can  you  say  that  it  is  the  producer  or  the 
cause  of  sensations?      Moreover,  how  can  you 
apply  to  it  the   category    of  cause,  which    can 
be    properly    applied    only    to  phenomena  and 
not  to  the  Thing-in-itself?     The  latter  must  be 
known,  cannot  lie  outside  of  the  Ego  of  which 
it  is  a  creation.     It  is  posited,  therefore,  by  an 
act  of  Will   of   which  Fichte   asserts   the   true 
primacy,  since  it  must  go  before  and  create  the 
object   of  Intellect.     Thus  he  breaks  down  the 
barrier   of  Intellect  through  Will,  which  is  the 
starting-point   of   Kant's  Critique  of  Practical 
Reason. 

3.  ScheUing  asserts  the   validity  of  Intellect 
(in  the  form  of  Intellectual   Intuition)    against 
Kant's  liminations   of  the  Intellect.     Schelling 
in  this  way  reaches  his  Absolute  as  the  identity  of 
subject  and  object,  or  of  the  Ego  and  non-Ego, 
which  identity  is  above  both  and  produces  both. 
Such  an  Absolute  is  the  impersonal  One  or  sub- 
stance, which,    however,    posits  or  creates  both 


594        MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Man  (Ego)  and  the  World  (non-Ego).  Intel- 
lect thus  breaks  down  the  Kantian  limitation 
through  itself  (intuitively  or  immediately),  and 
grasps  the  unconditioned. 

This  is,  of  course,  a  very  brief  account  of  these 
three  philosophers,  each  of  whom  has  carried  out 
his  fundamental  thought  into  extensive  works. 
At  present  we  wish  to  see  them  in  their  common 
character  of  transcending  Kant  through  Kant, 
and  forming  a  kind  of  three-arched  bridge  out 
of  the  Eighteenth  into  the  Nineteenth  Century. 
Moreover,  they  as  a  whole  turn  Kant's  psychical 
descent  in  the  Three  Critiques  through  Intellect, 
Will,  and  Feeling  into  a  corresponding  psychical 
ascent  through  Feeling,  Will,  and  Intellect. 
But  this  psychical  element  is  not  pronounced,  is 
not  explicit  as  a  process  in  their  case. 

The  next  great  philosopher  is  Hegel,  who  puts 
the  process  inside  the  Absolute  which  is  also  the 
result  of  a  process.  Hence  with  him  arises  the 
idea  of  development,  of  evolution  as  an  integral 
element  of  the  Absolute.  With  the  dawning  of 
such  an  idea,  in  which  the  Absolute  or  the  All 
must  go  back  upon  itself  and  take  up  its  own 
self -unfolding,  we  have  passed  out  of  the  revo- 
lutionary Eighteenth  into  the  evolutionary  Nine- 
teenth Century. 


latt  ftfeirb* 


THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY— 
EVOLUTION. 

If  we  seek  to  express  the  general  tendency  of 
the  spirit  of  the  Nineteenth  Century,  we  shall 
have  to  call  it  evolutionary.  It  dwells  upon  the 
rise,  the  process,  the  history  of  things;  its  car- 
dinal word  is  Development,  and  its  chief  de- 
mand is  to  see  the  ascending  side  of  the  Universe. 
Man,  looking  into  the  past,  has  been  made  aware 
of  his  own  self-unfolding  as  well  as  that  of 
everything  else.  His  institutions  have  become 
what  they  are  through  a  progressive  series  of 
forms  or  stages,  each  of  which,  though  no  longer 
existent  singly,  has  still  its  validity  in  the  total 

(595) 


596        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

order.  What  is  immediately  present  cannot  be 
understood  except  through  its  genesis  in  the 
past. 

This  is  in  decided  contrast  with  the  preced- 
ing Century,  which  we  have  designated  as  the 
revolutionary  Century,  which  has  broken  with 
the  past,  reacted  against  everything  transmitted, 
destroyed  the  established.  Thus  the  Eighteenth 
Century  assails  its  own  origin,  rejects  as  utterly 
worthless  its  own  parentage,  and  so  in  the  end 
undoes  itself.  But  the  Nineteenth  Century  takes 
the  opposite  trend  :  it  goes  back  and  fraternizes 
with  all  antecedent  stages  of  man  and  his  insti- 
tutions, as  being  the  source  of  itself.  Thus  it 
is  a  period  of  reconciliation,  not  of  separation; 
it  is  a  return  to  its  own  ancestry  and  a  re-estab- 
lishment of  its  progenitors,  putting  into  its  own 
new  home  all  that  had  begotten  it,  rearward  to 
the  remotest  ages.  The  Eighteenth  Century 
may  be  deemed  a  descending  movement,  it  goes 
back  to  Nature  in  order  to  get  rid  of  the  civil- 
ized world  in  which  it  exists.  The  Nineteenth 
Century  shows  an  ascending  and  returning  move- 
ment ;  it  seeks  to  rise  out  of  Nature  to  itself, 
and  to  give  due  validity  to  every  intervening 
stage.  Down  to  the  bottom  and  up  from  the 
bottom  back  again  are  the  two  complementary 
sweeps  of  the  two  Centuries. 

I.  If  we  look  into  the  historical  setting  of  Eu- 
rope during  the  Nineteenth  Century,  we  find  at 


THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY.  597 

its  beginning  that  Revolution  is  passing  into 
Evolution  whose  colossal  product  is  Napoleon. 
France,  the  creative  center  of  this  revolution- 
ary epoch,  had  begotten  the  new  absolute 
monarch  by  destroying  the  old  order.  Even 
authority  has  to  be  evolved  afresh  ;  if  transmit- 
ted, it  will  not  be  accepted.  Napoleon  was  cer- 
tainly as  despotic  as  the  Bourbons.  Absolutism 
is  to  receive  its  seal  from  Revolution,  not  from 
Legitimacy.  In  the  world  of  thought  the 
German  philosopher  of  this  time  was  seeking 
to  evolve  the  Absolute  which  had  so  strikingly 
manifested  itself  in  the  French  Emperor  on  the 
practical  side.  We  shall  see  that  Hegel  on 
several  different  lines  projects  an  evolution  of 
the  Absolute  in  deep  correspondence  with  his 
age  and  its  occurrences.  But  he  was  not  alone, 
all  Philosophy  of  the  period  went  forth  to 
search  in  the  supersensible  world  for  the  ideal 
counterpart  of  the  mighty  phenomenon  in  the 
sensible  world. 

Then  came  the  Restoration  of  the  old  order,  the 
culmination  of  the  anti-revolutionary  movement. 
The  Bourbons  were  brought  back  to  France 
by  outside  power,  chiefly  by  the  Teutonic 
nations,  Germany  and  England,  which  had 
become  the  great  supporters  of  Legitimacy, 
though  in  the  previous  Century  they  had  defied 
it  and  had  given  to  it  the  hardest  blows.  We 
recollect  that  England  in  1688  had  set  aside  the 


598        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

dynastic  right  of  inheritance,  and  that  Prussia 
had  done  the  same  thing  in  the  case  of  Silesia. 
The  Teutonic  and  the  Latin  nations  were  still 
arrayed  against  each  other,  but  they  had  quite 
changed  sides.  France,  the  Latin  absolutist  of 
the  Seventeenth  Century,  had  sought  to  destroy 
the  national  freedom  of  Holland,  and  even  of 
England.  But  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  the 
Teutonic  peoples  interfere  with  the  national 
freedom  of  France  by  reinstating  the  Legiti- 
macy which  she  had  cast  off,  and  which  she 
persists  in  casting  off  till  after  more  than  two 
generations  of  struggle  she  gets  her  Republic 
permanently. 

Now  this  Restoration  will  also  find  its  expression 
in  Philosophy.  There  will  be  a  going  back  to 
former  systems  of  thought,  a  taking  up  of  previous 
points  of  view,  a  study  of  all  the  transmitted 
formulations  of  the  universe.  Spirit  asserts  its 
worth,  not  in  denying  and  destroying  its  anteced- 
ents, but  in  seeking  for  and  appropriating  them. 
It  finds  the  truth  of  what  it  is  in  the  whole  line 
of  its  becoming.  It  returns  upon  itself  from  the 
very  beginning,  and  will  know  itself  gen'etically. 
Philosophy  really  starts  Evolution,  not  natural 
science,  though  the  latter  will  not  be  slow  to  do 
its  part  in  realizing  the  principle  of  the  Century. 

II.  Philosophy  remains  essentially  a  Teutonic 
discipline  during  the  Nineteenth  Century,  and 
in  its  most  original  manifestations  it  is  still  Prot- 


TEE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY.  599 

estant.  As  long  as  the  Latin  Church  has  a  pre- 
scribed Philosophy,  it  will  feel  no  supreme  need 
of  independent  philosophizing.  Accordingly  the 
two  chief  utterances  of  the  thought  of  the 
Century  come  from  the  two  chief  Teutonic  peo- 
ples, the  German  and  the  Anglo-Saxon.  Each 
of  them  will  give  its  own  formulation  of  the  one 
underlying  doctrine  of  Evolution,  and  each  will 
manifest  therein  its  characteristic  national  ten- 
dency . 

The  Teutonic  race  having  substantially  united 
in  the  grand  act  of  putting  down  Eevolution  and 
of  restoring  the  old  order  as  far  as  possible, 
proceeds  next  to  separate  into  its  two  leading 
branches,  each  of  which  has  its  own  distinct 
sphere  of  activity  for  the  rest  of  the  Century. 
Germany  will  develop  its  inner  strength,  restore 
the  old  imperial  authority,  and  become  the  first 
power  of  continental  Europe.  It  will  realize 
the  Absolute  of  its  great  thinkers.  But  the 
Anglo-Saxon  branch  will  choose  its  field  of  action 
outside  of  Europe,  revealing  its  limit-transcend- 
ing character  by  taking  the  whole  globe  as  the 
arena  of  its  Will.  Its  call  is  to  go  beyond 
the  pale  of  civilization  and  deal  with  the 
backward  man.  Cette  vieille  Europe  m'ennuie, 
is  a  reported  saying  of  Napoleon,  but  it 
seems  to  be  specially  true  of  the  English- 
man. He  pushes  forth  to  the  less  advanced 
extra-European  races,  which  he  develops  or 


600        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

destroys.  Both  in  the  Orient  and  in  the  Oc- 
cident he  has  gone  back  to  the  primitive  human 
being  and  to  primitive  society,  broken  up  their 
isolation,  and  connected  them  with  the  world's 
total  movement. 

The  scientific  Evolution  of  man  as  a  creature  of 
Nature  was  properly  the  work  of  an  Englishman. 
The  German  thinker  confining  himself  to  Europe 
for  the  most  part,  will  set  forth  the  Evolution  of 
the  Spirit  and  its  works,  since  these  are  the 
supreme  facts  before  him  and  his  nation.  But 
physical  Evolution  lies  not  so  compellingly  in  his 
experience,  while  it  may  be  deemed  a  national 
question  with  the  Anglo-Saxon  governing  men 
in  Asia,  Africa,  and  America.  Not  without  good 
reason  was  Darwin  an  Englishman. 

Ill .  In  this  Century  of  Kestoration  we  naturally 
ask:  Will  the  philosophical  Norm  be  restored? 
We  see  that  the  previous  Century  neglected  or 
denied  it  along  with  quite  everything  trans- 
mitted from  the  past.  The  answer  is,  the  Nine- 
teenth Century  will  restore  the  philosophical 
Norm,  but  in  its  own  special  way.  It  will  inject 
into  the  different  stages  of  the  Norm  its  prin- 
ciple of  Evolution.  The  Absolute  (Metaphysics), 
Nature  (Physics),  and  Man  (as  Soul)  will  be 
unfolded  separately  and  distinctly  in  an  evolu- 
tionary procedure.  Thus  we  see  the  old  Norm 
restored  but  filled  with  the  new  thought  of  the 
Century.  There  is  a  return  to  the  old  philosoph- 


i 


THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY.  601 


ical  order,  but  this  order  is  made  the  bearer  of  a 
new  content. 

Let  us  note  another  distinction.  The  great 
Greek  philosophers  as  well  as  those  of  the  Seven- 
teenth Century  embodied  in  their  work  the  total 
Norm  in  its  three  stages,  formulating  in  gen- 
eral the  Universe  of  God  or  the  Absolute,  Nature, 
and  Man.  But  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  we 
shall  find  the  supreme  thinker  developing  simply 
one  stage  of  the  Norm;  for  instance  Hegel 
evolves  the  Absolute  (or  Logos),  while  Darwin 
evolves  Nature  (or  the  Cosmos) ;  both  being 
evolutionary  in  their  procedure.  Previously  the 
individual  philosopher  possessed  the  Norm,  now 
the  Norm  possesses  the  individual  philosopher. 
Thus  the  Century  itself  posits  the  Norm  with 
decided  emphasis,  taking  it  out  of  the  hands  of 
the  philosopher  who  in  the  preceding  Century 
had  thrown  it  aside  and  sought  to  destroy  it.  The 
basic  movement  of  the  philosophy  of  the  Nine- 
teenth Century  in  its  threefold  process  will 
therefore  show  the  Evolution  of  the  three 
stages  of  the  philosophic  Norm,  each  of  which 
will  have  its  own  distinctive  philosopher.  This 
is  the  grand  philosophic  restoration  after  the 
age  of  revolution  and  destruction,  the  truly 
spiritual  restoration  corresponding  to  that  which 
takes  place  in  the  political  and  social  world. 

In  this  way  Philosophy  has  come  to  its  com- 
plete outward  expression,  has  made  itself  fully 


602          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

explicit.  Its  fundamental  process  is  no  longer 
inside  the  individual  Ego  merely,  from  which  it 
is  thrown  out  into  external  existence,  but  the 
time,  not  the  man,  has  become  the  process  and 
follows  the  lines  of  the  philosophical  Norm  in  its 
highest  spiritual  utterance.  The  Century  itself 
turns  philosopher  when  the  individual  philoso- 
pher has  renounced  his  philosophic  birthright. 
The  triple  movement  of  the  universe  (the  Pam- 
psychosis)  which  it  is  the  function  of  Philosophy 
to  reveal  to  the  age,  now  seizes  upon  a  cycle  of 
Time  and  fills  the  same  with  itself  and  thereby 
makes  itself  an  outer  historic  reality. 

IV.  The  great  fact,  then,  of  theNineteenth  Cen- 
tury, is  that  man  has  become  aware  that  he  must 
return  upon  himself  for  his  starting-point  and 
take  up  into  his  thought  and  life  all  that  he  has 
passed  through ;  the  Ego  is  to  go  back  to  its  be- 
ginning and  find  its  total  inheritance  of  the  past ; 
in  order  to  know  itself  it  must  know  its  growth, 
its  Evolution.  Not  what  the  man  is  immediately, 
here  and  now,  is  the  true  reality  of  him,  but 
what  he  has  made  of  himself  from  the  beginning ; 
this  is  what  shows  his  true  worth.  This  princi- 
ple holds  valid  not  only  of  the  Ego,  but  of  every- 
thing ;  we  can  know  the  object  aright  only  by 
knowing  its  history.  Thus  the  Nineteenth  Cen- 
tury is  still  dealing  with  the  cognition  of  the 
object,  whose  truth  however  can  be  grasped  only 
by  seeing  its  Evolution,  which  has  now  become 


THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY.  603 

the  essence  of  all  Being.  We  have  often  noted 
that  all  modern  Philosophy  during  its  three  cen- 
turies from  Descartes  largely  turns  upon  this 
problem  of  cognition.  The  Seventeenth  Cen- 
tury made  my  knowing  of  the  object  a  divine 
act.  The  Eighteenth  Century  took  it  out  of 
God's  hands  and  put  it  into  the  Ego,  which  soon 
discovered  that  it  could  not  know  the  object  im- 
mediately, as  it  is  in  itself,  in  its  truth.  But  the 
Nineteenth  Century  declares :  You  can  know  the 
object,  perchance  not  immediately  but  mediately, 
as  evolved ;  cognition  of  the  truth  now  comes 
through  Evolution ;  you  are  to  hunt  up  in  every 
case  the  history  of  the  past  and  see  what  the 
record  of  the  thing  has  been.  Thus  you  get 
back  of  what  merely  appears  here  and  now  into 
the  essence,  which  has  revealed  itself  unfolding. 
The  present  may  be  only  the  phenomenon,  but 
the  past  in  its  development  shows  the  reality. 

So  the  Nineteenth  Century  will  seek  to  seize 
the  process  in  so  far  as  this  is  manifested  in  Evo- 
lution. Of  course  Evolution  has  long  been  at 
work  and  in  a  manner  known,  even  if  not  con- 
sciously formulated.  If  we  turn  back  to  the 
Aryan  race,  or  at  least  to  the  West-Aryan  por- 
tion of  it,  we  find  that  it  has  moved  both  exter- 
nally and  internally  through  a  long  series  of 
stages  out  of  Asia,  through  Europe,  to  America. 
An  unconscious  impulse  to  push  on,  to  be  pro- 
gressive, to  go  West  has  now  become  conscious, 


604  MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  principle  of  the  Century,  the  formula  of  its 
Philosophy.  One  may  well  ask :  Why  just  now 
does  this  principle  of  Evolution  break  through 
into  universal  consciousness?  Primarily  on 
account  of  an  inner  necessity,  which  we  have 
already  tried  to  trace.  But  we  may  add  that 
this  mighty  Aryan  migration  westward  has  seem- 
ingly reached  the  limit  which  Nature  has  placed 
upon  it,  having  struck  the  Rocky  Mountains  and 
the  Pacific,  which  barrier  has  halted  it,  deflected 
it,  turned  it  back  upon  itself.  The  fact  may  well 
be  deemed  a  racial  crisis ;  having  surged  forward 
several  thousand  years  at  least  and  run  up  against 
the  obstructing  wall  of  Nature,  the  whole  race 
can  well  turn  back  and  look  at  its  entire  career 
of  development,  thereby  becoming  conscious  of 
its  own  innermost  spirit  of  Evolution  and  formu- 
lating the  same  in  its  fundamental  thought 
expressed  by  Philosophy.  In  all  the  great 
philosophic  movements  of  the  past  we  have  gen- 
erally found  an  outer  necessity  corresponding 
with  the  inner  compelling  power  of  the  Spirit. 
So  the  Aryan  man  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  has 
to  return  upon  himself  within  and  without,  has 
to  discover  and  formulate  for  himself  what  he 
really  is  through  seeing  what  he  has  been,  quite 
from  the  beginning  not  only  of  human  but  of 
animal  existence. 

Thus   the   Nineteenth  Century    must  be    not 
simply   evolutionary,     but   consciously    so.      It 


THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY.  605 

reveals  the  Evolution  of  Evolution ;  the  process 
of  the  ages  is  no  longer  implicit,  the  soul  of  the 
race  is  no  longer  unconscious  in  its  profoundest 
movement ,  but  self -knowing.  Not  without  draw- 
ing from  the  deepest  fountain  of  his  race's  spirit 
did  the  greatest  philosopher  of  the  Century  pro- 
claim the  Absolute  to  be  self-knowing. 

V.  The  philosophic  movement  of  the  Nine- 
teenth Century  is  dominated  by  three  leading 
thoughts,  which,  though  distinct,  make  a  process 
together.  That  is,  the  one  principle  of  Evolu- 
tion shows  itself  in  three  main  forms,  which  are 
at  bottom  psychical .  The  same  general  fact  we 
noticed  in  the  two  preceding  Centuries.  In  each 
of  them  also  the  fundamental  process  of  Thought 
embodied  itself  in  a  personal  Triad  of  the  greatest 
philosophers.  In  the  Nineteenth  Century  Hegel 
and  Darwin  are  the  supreme  heroes  of  Evolution ; 
but  the  third  person  of  the  process  is  not  so 
manifest  at  present.  Perhaps  the  sifting  of  Tim§ 
will  bring  him  out.  The  third,  and  latest  doc- 
trine, however,  has  undoubtedly  appeared,  and 
is  to  be  assigned  its  true  place.  Its  name,  how- 
ever, is  still  fluctuating;  we  shall  call  it  Physio- 
psychism,  though  a  more  common  designation  is 
Physiological  Psychology. 

The  Nineteenth  Century  may  be  said,  there- 
fore, to  manifest  its  chief  philosophic  function  in 
evolving  Evolution  through  the  three  stages  of 
the  Norm  —  the  Absolute,  Nature,  and  Man. 


606         MODERN  E  UROPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

These  stages  we  shall  briefly  designate  in  advance 
as  follows :  — 

1.  Hegel  —  representing  metaphysical  Evolu- 
tion, though  he  calls  it  logical,  the  Evolution  of  the 
Logos  or  of  Eeason  both  in  itself  and  in  every- 
thing else.     This  also  is  named  the  Evolution  of 
the  Absolute,  or  Spirit  evolving  itself  through 
itself.     That  is,    Mind    or   Intelligence  unfolds 
itself  into  and  through  its  own  forms  expressed 
in  categories. 

2 .  Darwin  —  representing  physical  Evolution , 
which  has  quite  monopolized  the  use  of  the  word. 
In  this  stage  Evolution  becomes  visible,  explicit 
in  an  ascending  order  which  is  manifest  to  the 
senses,  and  is  outwardly   separated  into  a  vast 
multitude   of   shapes.     The   Logos   now   really 
appears  (particularly  in  Biology  or  in  the  forms 
of  organic  existence),  throwing  itself  out  into  the 
natural  world.     This  stage  (Darwinism)  is  thus 
the  separative  one  in  the  total  sweep  of  the  Cen- 
tury's Psychosis,    and  deals    specially  with  the 
second  stage  of  the  philosophic  Norm,  namely 
Nature.  :  . 

3.  Physio-psychism — representing  the   Evo- 
lution of  the   Soul  (or  Ego)    in    its   reactions 
against  the  determination  of  Nature.     An  inner 
energy  of  an  organism  is    seen  unfolding  itself 
through  outer  manifestations  which  arise  from 
external  stimulation.     This  hints  a  return,  even 
if  partial   and   imperfect,  out  of  Nature  toward 


TEE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY.  607 

self-conscious  Reason.  Thus  it  suggests,  as  far 
as  it  goes,  the  third  stage  of  the  philosophic 
Norm.  Physio-psychism.  gives  in  its  way  the 
rise  of  the  soul  through  its  past  inherited  forms 
which  can  often  be  made  to  show  themselves  by 
experiment.  This  can  also  be  called  Evolution- 
ary Psychology  and  may  well  be  deemed  the 
preparation  for  the  completer  Psychology  which 
has  in  it  not  merely  the  ascent  but  the  self- 
returning  principle  of  the  Ego. 

In  the  sphere  of  Natural  Science,  therefore, 
the  Nineteenth  must  be  deemed  creatively  the 
biological  Century,  as  we  have  had  hitherto  the 
mechanical  (Seventeenth)  and  the  chemical 
(Eighteenth)  Centuries.  The  three  in  them- 
selves form  an  evolutionary  process,  in  which 
we  behold  the  third  stage  making  Evolution  its 
principle,  which  shows  the  Science  of  Nature  re- 
turning upon  itself  and  tracing  its  forms  from 
the  beginning,  and  therein  striking  mightily  the 
fundamental  note  of  the  Century.  More  em- 
phatically than  even  before  does  this  Science  of 
Nature  now  assert  itself  as  a  necessary  stage  of 
the  philosophic  Norm,  and  proceed  to  rival  if 
not  to  outstrip  its  metaphysical  brother  in  affirm- 
ing and  formulating  Evolution  as  the  Century's 
principle. 

VI.  Evolution  takes  for  granted  an  immanent 
principle  in  Spirit  and  in  Nature  which  unfolds 
through  itself  and  projects  its  manifold  forms 


608        MODERN  E UTtOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

in  gradation.  The  question  rises,  whence  comes 
this  principle,  this  formative  energy?  Evolution 
does  not  answer  such  a  question,  but  assumes 
the  mentioned  principle  and  points  out  its  trans- 
formations. Thus  something  lies  back  of  Evo- 
lution and  sets  it  going,  propelling  it  into  its 
onward  career.  Evolution  therefore  cannot 
fully  evolve  itself ;  given  its  start  it  moves  ahead 
to  its  end  which  somehow  must  get  back  to  the 
beginning.  When  Evolution  has  evolved  that 
which  can  return  and  evolve  its  starting-point  or 
its  principle,  a  new  sphere  is  reached  beyond 
Evolution,  beyond  the  Nineteenth  Century. 
For  we  must  see  that  Evolution,  of  its  own  in- 
herent nature,  has  to  evolve  out  of  Evolution; 
it  cannot  stay  with  itself  but  must  push  beyond, 
till  by  its  own  inner  movement  it  pushes  beyond 
itself  and  then  it  is  no  longer  strictly  Evolution. 
When  it  reaches  the  end  which  returns  to  and 
makes  the  beginning,  when  it  has  evolved  the 
principle  which  it  starts  with,  then  it  is  no 
longer  an  ascending  evolutionary  line  but  the 
total  circle.  Evolution  is  therefore,  dialectical. 
When  it  has  evolved  that  which  evolves  it  as  a 
conscious  process,  it  has  passed  into  a  higher 
principle  of  which  it  is  but  a  part,  a  stage,  a 
moment. 

What  is  this  higher  principle  which  Evolution, 
working  in  the  Nineteenth  Century,  has  forced 
into  existence,  and  which,  after  being  thus 


THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY.  609 

brought  forth,  has  swallowed  its  own  parent?  We 
have  often  said  in  a  general  way  that  the  Nine- 
teenth Century  evolves  Evolution ;  but  what  is 
it  that  evolves  itself  evolving  Evolution?  Evi- 
dently the  evolutionary  Ego  in  its  supreme  creat- 
ive act  has  unfolded  itself  unfolding  everything 
else,  has  evolved  itself  evolving  Evolution,  and 
has  become  conscious  of  itself  as  an  integral  part 
of  this  total  process  of  Self-evolution.  Where- 
with we  have  landed  beyond  the  Nineteenth 
Century  into  the  new  order  of  which  the  careful 
reader  has  noted  hitherto  many  an  indication. 

Such  is,  however,  the  secret  unconscious  germ 
sprouting,  growing,  evolving  in  Evolution  itself, 
which  must  at  last,  if  it  be  true  to  its  principle, 
show  itself  to  be  an  evolutionary  stage  in  its  own 
complete  Evolution.  But  we  have  already  indi- 
cated that  this  Century  of  Evolution  has  several 
stages,  the  study  of  which  must  be  our  next 
object. 

39 


610        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY, 


I.  1be0eL 

The  Nineteenth  Century  has  closed,  and  Hegel 
still  remains  its  greatest  philosopher.  It  is 
declared  that  he  is  completely  dethroned  in  his 
own  country,  but  certainly  no  other  man  there 
has  taken  his  place.  Moreover  his  influence  has 
gone  beyond  national  limits,  even  beyond  Euro- 
pean limits,  and  his  thought  has  shown  itself  to 
be  universal.  Of  course  his  doctrine*  has  met 
with  strong,  often  bitter  opposition;  but  just  this 
opposition  indicates  its  strength.  In  a  supreme 
sense  he  is  the  last  philosopher  of  Europe.  To 
be  sure,  since  his  time  it  has  produced  more 
philosophers  than  ever  before,  but  no  peer  of 
Hegel.  One  of  the  interesting  facts  of  the  time 
is  that  when  he  was  rejected  by  his  own  people 
his  spirit  seemed  to  pass  over  to  the  practical 
Anglo-Saxon,  both  in  England  and  in  America, 
with  whom  it  has  found  a  new  birth.  Accord- 
ing to  a  recent  estimate  taken  from  the  opinions 
of  a  number  of  competent  and  unbiased  judges, 
Hegel  is  still  the  most  influential  philosophic 
thinker  of  our  time. 

Hegel  is,  however,  but  a  stage  of  the  greater 
cycle  of  the  Nineteenth  Century,  of  which  he 
was  not  conscious.  He  could  not  know  what 
was  to  come  after  him  and  was  to  make  him  an 


HEGEUSLIFE.  611 

element  of  a  larger  process.  Still  less  could  he 
be  aware  that  his  whole  Century,  after  develop- 
ing into  its  entirety,  was  to  show  itself  but  a 
part  of  the  complete  movement  of  Modern  Phi- 
losophy. 

Yet  Hegel,  more  adequately  than  any  other 
philosopher,  has  developed  the  idea  of  the  cycle 
both  in  his  own  system  and  in  all  systems  of 
thought.  To  be  true  to  him  in  the  deepest 
sense  we  shall  have  to  unfold  him  as  a  portion 
of  a  vaster  sweep  than  lay  in  his  consciousness. 
Yet  really  we  are  thus  applying  to  him  his  own 
principle.  On  the  other  hand,  such  a  treatment 
militates  with  his  claim  of  being  the  absolute 
philosopher.  But  this  dualism  lay  in  Hegel,  in- 
deed it  lies  in  ail  philosophy,  of  which  Hegel  is 
in  one  way  the  last  expression.  Underneath  him 
and  often  controlling  his  thought  unconsciously, 
was  working  the  deeper  principle  of  the  coming 
time  and  the  new  world.  This  deeper  principle, 
unknown  to  the  author  yet  determining  and 
finally  breaking  up  his  system,  is  what  the  ex- 
positor of  to-day,  looking  back  through  a  vista  of 
quite  one  hundred  years,  is  chiefly  to  bring  forth 
to  the  light. 

Hegel  was  conscious  of  the  philosophic  Norm, 
and  embodied  it  after  his  manner  in  his  system ; 
but  he  was  not  conscious  that  his  whole  sys- 
tem was  only  the  first  stage  of  the  vaster  and 
profounder  evolution  of  the  philosophic 


612         M  ODERN  E  UR  OPE  AX  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

which  the  total  Century  was  working  out  to  its 
conclusion.  For  this  Norm  is  no  longer  simply 
inside  the  thought  of  the  individual  philosopher, 
but  his  thought  is  inside  of  it,  since  it  is  the 
movement  of  the  Century  itself,  which  has  now 
turned  philosopher,  and  is  philosophizing  after 
the  pattern  of  the  philosophic  Norm.  When  the 
Eighteenth  Century  in  its  thinkers  had  denied  the 
truth  of  God,  Nature  and  Man,  the  Nineteenth 
Century  takes  up  the  theme  afresh,  and  estab- 
lishes it  through  its  new  principle  of  Evolution. 
This  opens  with  Hegel.  We  must,  therefore, 
keep  in  mind  that  the  evolutionary  idea  of  the 
total  Century  is  afar  vaster  thing  than  Darwin- 
ism, which,  however,  is  a  very  important  stage 
of  it. 

We  shall  next  seek  to  give  an  exposition  of 
Hegel  as  Whole  in  himself,  for  this  he  was  too, 
though  he  was  likewise  but  a  part  or  a  stage  of  a 
totality  greater  than  himself.  Three  forms  of 
utterance,  the  philosopher  has:  his  Life  connected 
with  his  Time  —  his  most  immediate,  instinctive 
expression;  his  Writings,  which  demand  a  sepa- 
ration of  himself  within  and  an  external  projec- 
tion of  his  thought  into  outward  forms;  his 
Philosophy  which  is  his  deepest  Self  organized 
along  with  his  Time  more  or  less  distinctly  after 
the  philosophic  Norm. 

I.  HEGEL'S  LIFE. — About  one-half  of  Hegel's 
years  belonged  to  the  Eighteenth  Century,  the 


HEGEL'S  LIFE.  613 

other  half  reach  nearly  a  generation  into  the 
Nineteenth  Century.  The  latter  is  of  course  his 
mature  period,  the  time  of  fruitage  and  fulfillment. 
But  the  former  is  his  stage  of  acquisition  and 
inner  development.  His  growth  moves  on  a  line 
with  a  great,  perhaps  the  greatest  modern  epoch, 
the  French  Revolution,  which  seems  to  have 
mirrored  itself  with  all  its  changes  in  his  youth- 
ful soul.  As  his  life  in  Time  makes  the  grand 
transition  out  of  the  Eighteenth  into  the  Nine- 
teenth Century,  so  does  his  thought  in  Philoso- 
phy. 

Though  Hegel's  life  is  cut  in  twain  by  the  in- 
coming Century,  we  shall  find  that  the  second 
half,  which  is  the  time  of  ,his  active,  ripened  spirit, 
contains  two  very  distinct  epochs.  Hence  we 
shall  divide  his  life  as  a  whole  into  three  sepa- 
rate Periods,  through  which  every  complete, 
rounded-off  career  seems  to  pass,  in  one  form 
or  other. 

I.  First  Period  (1770-1801).  Most  biog- 
raphers of  Hegel  have  emphasized  the  impor- 
tance of  his  transition  to  Jena  where  he  arrived 
in  January,  1801.  It  was  a  great  external  change, 
and  with  it  corresponded  an  internal  change 
which  soon  began  to  show  itself.  From  a  pri- 
vate tutorship  which  brought  him  into  con- 
tact chiefly  with  immature  mindk  or  left  him 
wholly  to  himself,  he  passes  to  being  a  public 
instructor  in  a  University,  whose  society  and 


614         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

work  call  forth  all  his  latent  powers.  He  has 
had  a  long  time  of  apprenticeship,  of  appro- 
priation; now  begins  a  time  of  creation,  of  for- 
mulating, organizing  and  imparting  what  he  has 
won  from  others  and  from  himself.  The  main 
points  of  this  First  Period  we  shall  briefly  note. 
George  William  Frederick  Hegel  was  born  the 
27th  of  August,  1770,  at  Stuttgart,  the  capital  of 
Wiirternberg.  His  father  was  an  official  of  State 
and  seems  to  have  had  little  influence  upon  the 
son.  More  interesting  is  the  fact  that  an  ances- 
tor some  two  hundred  years  before  had  left  his 
native  country,  Carinthia,  on  account  of  religion, 
and  had  settled  in  Suabia  which  had  become  Prot- 
estant at  the  Reformation.  Many  of  his  descend- 
ants were  clergymen  ;  we  see  that  our  philosopher 
had  inherited  a  religious  strand,  which,  however, 
had  in  it  the  original  dissent  of  Protestantism. 
Hegel  will  hear  the  new  protest  of  the  age,  not 
religious  but  political,  and  will  not  fail  to  give 
his  response.  In  his  seventh  year  Hegel  was 
sent  to  the  Gymnasium  of  his  native  town,  where 
he  remained  till  he  was  eighteen.  He  there  made 
his  first  acquaintance  with  the  Greek  world  which 
was  destined  to  exercise  so  great  an  influence 
over  him  during  his  whole  life.  Particularly  the 
works  of  Sophocles  he  read  and  absorbed ;  from 
'them  he  seems  to  have  drawn  his  first  concep- 
tion of  the  spirit  of  Hellas.  Hegel  may  well  be 
deemed  a  re-incarnated  Greek;  no  other  modern 


HEGEL'S  LIFE.  615 

man,  not  even  Goethe,  has  so  deeply  penetrated 
the  Hellenic  view  of  the  world.  This  became 
an  anchor  to  him  throughout  all  his  later  fluctu- 
ations. He  also  read  books  belonging  to  the  new 
German  literature  then  arising ;  he  partook  of 
the  spirit  of  the  time  with  its  revolutionary 
tendencies,  quite  the  opposite  of  the  classical 
repose  of  the  old  Greek.  This  dual  culture, 
implanted  in  him  already  at  the  Gymnasium,  he 
will  retain  to  the  end  of  his  career. 

During  this  early  period  also  his  teachers 
noticed  a  hesitation  in  his  speech,  a  mumbling 
and  stammering  over  words  in  his  delivery,  as  if 
there  was  something  in  him  that  refused  to  come 
out  clearly,  something  deeper  than  language, 
which  persisted  in  remaining  within  his  spirit. 
It  is  recorded  by  his  friendly  biographer  (Rosen- 
kranz)  that  Hegel  not  only  spoke  but  wrote  with 
difficulty  to  the  last.  His  industry  sought  to 
conquer  this  obstacle  by  making  extensive  ex- 
cerpts from  the  authors  whom  he  read,  a  habit 
which  began  with  him  in  the  Gymnasium. 
Hegel's  books  often  show  this  primal  struggle 
with  human  speech,  which  compels  him  to  resort 
to  the  strangest  compounds  and  combinations 
for  the  utterance  of  unutterable  thought. 

At  the  age  of  eighteen  Hegel  went  to  the 
University  of  Tubingen,  for  the  purpose  of 
studying  Theology.  Little  satisfaction  he  ob- 
tained from  the  direct  instruction  of  his  teachers. 


616         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

But  he  kept  up  his  Greek  studies,  and  started  to 
work  seriously  upon  Kant.  Indeed,  Philosophy 
began  secretly  to  get  the  upper  hand,  and  to  take 
the  place  of  Theology,  which  he  will  philosophize 
in  time.  Hegel  as  a  student  could  be  jovial,  he 
could  upon  occasion  do  his  share  of  drinking, 
fencing,  riding ;  but  on  the  whole  he  was  not  up 
to  the  mark,  since  his  comrades  nicknamed  him 
the  old  man  on  account  of  his  sedateness.  Still 
he  was  not  too  old  to  be  inaccessible  to  the  tender 
passion,  and  to  break  into  poetry  over  beautiful 
Fraulein  Hegelmeier,  daughter  of  a  former 
professor.  But  it  seems  that  he  could  not  per- 
suade the  German  maiden  to  cut  off  the  uncomely 
queue  to  her  name  and  be  called  simply  Hegel, 
and  so  was  condemned  to  a  long  bachelorhood, 
the  poor  fellow ! 

During  this  time  another  instructor  entered 
the  University  of  Tubingen  and  roused  the 
students  to  the  highest  pitch  of  enthusiam  — 
nothing  less  than  the  French  Revolution.  The 
year  after  Hegel's  entrance,  the  States-General 
met  in  Paris  and  opened  the  series  of  events 
which  constitute  a  new  epoch  in  the  World's 
History,  and  which  are  deeply  interwoven  with 
the  life  and  thought  of  our  philosopher.  In 
1790  trees  of  liberty  were  planted  throughout 
France;  the  fashion  crossed  the  Rhine  and 
appeared  among  the  students  of  Tubingen. 
It  is  said,  though  the  report  is  not  adequately 


HEGEL'S  LIFE,  617 

authenticated,  that  Hegel  and  his  friend  Schelling, 
also  a  student  of  Tubingen,  planted  a  tree  of 
liberty  in  German  soil.  One  thing  is  certain : 
Hegel,  already  in  a  protest  against  the  established 
Theology,  becomes  revolutionary;  he  reads 
French  newspapers,  French  patriotic  literature, 
especially  he  devours  Eousseau.  The  Eevolution 
rushes  on  apace;  in  1792  occurs  the  battle  of 
Valmy,  in  which  republican  France  hurls  back 
her  Teutonic  invaders,  and  which  Goethe  marks 
as  the  dawn  of  a  new  era.  In  1793  Hegel  ends' 
his  course  at  the  University  ;* this  same  year  saw 
the  French  king  beheaded  and  the  Eeign  of  Ter- 
ror, the  character  of  which  left  its  traces  upon 
him  through  life.  It  is  recorded  that  he  was  a 
member  of  a  political  club  and  did  not  fail  to 
express  his  sentiments  in  favor  of  liberty,  equality 
and  fraternity  for  all  mankind. 

The  training  of  such  an  epoch  is  greater  than 
that  of  any  University.  Through  his  strong 
sympathy  with  the  French  Revolution,  Hegel 
transcends  the  limits  of  nationality  and  makes 
himself  European.  It  is  an  instance  of  the  dis- 
cipline of  self -estrangement ;  spiritually  he  sepa- 
rates from  his  own  immediate  environment  and 
becomes  French  and  republican,  for  a  time  at 
least.  It  is  a  preliminary  schooling  to  that  uni- 
versality which  he  is  to  formulate  in  thought. 
The  negative  Eighteenth  Century,  with  its  assault 
upon  the  established  and  transmitted,  he  is  to 


618        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY 

experience  in  its  final  supreme,  destructive  out- 
come. The  past,  with  all  its  forms,  is  to  be 
reduced  to  an  appearance,  to  become  a  line 
of  phenomena,  of  which  Hegel  will  hereafter 
write  the  science  (in  his  Phenomenology).  He 
becomes  himself  the  negative  process  of  the 
French  Revolution ;  its  Dialectic  seizes  him  and 
whirls  him  through  its  remorseless  stages  till  he 
turns  and  seizes  it,  making  himself  its  master  in 
his  thought.  Thus  he  will  pass  out  of  Revo- 
lution into  Evolution,  out  of  the  Eighteenth  into 
the  Nineteenth  Century,  out  of  Kant  into  Hegel. 
To  this  point  in  his  career  we  have  not  yet 
come,  though  we  must  now  emphasize  the  revo- 
lutionary Hegel  and  his  experience  at  Tubingen. 

In  1793  he  enters  upon  a  new  phase  of  his 
First  Period,  the  tutorial,  which  lasts  seven 
years  or  more,  till  he  reaches  Jena.  He  goes  to 
Switzerland,  where  he  remains  three  years  as 
tutor  in  a  high-born  family.  During  this  time 
he  studies  zealously,  his  chief  topics  being  The- 
ology and  History.  Nor  is  Philosophy  neglected. 
In  fact,  he  is  philosophizing  Theology.  But  he 
grows  tired  of  his  solitary  life  in  Switzerland ; 
he  wishes  for  more  books,  for  literary  and 
philosophical  intercourse.  Accordingly,  in  1796, 
he  quits  Berne  and  returns  to  his  native  Stuttgart 
for  a  brief  visit. 

Once  more  he  takes  the  position  of  tutor  in  a 
private  family.  To  this  end  he  goes  to  Frank- 


HEGEL'S  LIFE.  619 

fort  in  1797,  where  he  finds  congenial  com- 
panions, and  stays  another  three  years  and  more. 
Here  also  he  devotes  himself  to  study.  Espe- 
cially he  works  at  the  thought  of  the  State. 
He  writes  a  political  pamphlet  pertaining  to  the 
constitution  of  his  native  Wiirteinberg.  In  this 
pamphlet  he  distinctly  shows  the  two  opposite 
principles  struggling  within  him.  On  the  one 
side  is  the  Social  Contract  of  Rousseau  with  its 
stress  upon  the  individual;  on  the  other  is  the 
Republic  of  Plato  (which  he  studied  at  Frank- 
fort) with  its  absorption  of  the  individual  into 
the  State.  The  modern  French  and  the  ancient 
Greek  principles  are  both  present  and  at  work 
in  Hegel  who  thus  reveals  the  dualism  in  him 
at  this  time.  He  is  still  revolutionary,  but  with 
a  growing  conservative  reaction.  In  this  he 
follows  instinctively  the  movement  of  the  period ; 
at  the  excesses  of  the  Revolution  all  Europe 
and  France  herself  had  grown  reactionary. 
These  excesses  were  simply  the  final  outcome 
of  the  Eighteenth  Century  which  in  them  was 
manifesting  its  negative  character  to  the  point 
of  self -negation.  In  the  depths  of  his  own  spirit 
Hegel  was  working  through  this  experience 
of  the  age,  whose  inner  movement  he  will  here- 
after grasp  and  formulate  in  writing  as  the 
Dialectic. 

But  the  distinctive  fact  of  his  stay  at  Frank- 
fort is  that  he  definitely   works  out  and  appro- 


620         MODEBX  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

priates  the  philosophic  Norm.  Undoubtedly  this 
came  chiefly  from  his  study  of  Greek  Philosophy. 
Plato  and  Aristotle  show  the  threefold  Norm  — 
Metaphysics,  Physics,  and  Ethics  —  and  after 
them  it  becomes  the  conscious  possession  of  the 
Greek  thinkers.  How  it  dominates  the  Philos- 
ophy of  the  Seventeenth  Century  has  been 
shown  in  the  First  Part  of  the  present  work. 
How  it  was  lost  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  and 
was  assailed  by  Kant  has  also  been  set  forth. 
But  now  comes  the  philosopher  who  recovers  it 
and  will  make  use  of  it  hereafter.  To  be  sure, 
Hegel  will  not  simply  go  back  to  the  old  Norm 
and  reproduce  that;  on  the  contrary,  he  will  fill 
it  with  the  new  thought  of  the  age,  after  a  good 
long  struggle,  however.  The  protesting,  revolu- 
tionary Ego  on  one  side,  on  the  other  the  trans- 
mitted Norm  are  the  two  recalcitrant  elements 
which  it  is  his  philosophic  function  to  unite. 

Rosenkranz  has  given  a  pretty  full  account 
(see  his  Hegel's  Leben,  s.  99  et  seq.)  of  this 
Norm,  which  he  calls  Hegel's  System.  The  out- 
lines are  as  follows :  — 

I.  Logic  and  Metaphysic.  These  Hegel  has 
not  yet  brought  into  complete  unity,  which  he 
will  do  later.  But  through  the  mass  of  thoughts 
struggling  to  organize  themselves  we  can  see 
many  a  coming  category  and  even  triads  of  cate- 
gories taking  their  permanent  position  in  the 
future  order.  It  is  surprising  how  much  of  his 


HEGEL'S  LIFE.  621 

later  work  can  be  found  here  arranging  itself  by 
a  kind  of  inner  evolution  around  independent 
centers  of  development. 

II.  Nature  (Physics).   Another  surprise  meets 
us  when  we  find  what  an  elaborate  Philosophy  of 
Nature  Hegel   has   wrought  out  so  early  in  his 
career.  He  has  already  its  later  main  divisions  into 
Mechanics,  Physics,  and  Organics.     This  sounds 
modern,  but  the  old  Greek  thinkers   here  also 
furnish  their  contingent;  especially  do  we  catch 
the  note  of  Plato  in  his  Timceus   (as  Rosenkranz 
observes). 

III.  Spirit  (Geist).  This  is  really  a  system  of 
Ethics  in  the  large  Greek  sense,  embracing  both 
the  moral  and  institutional  principles.     It  is  what 
he  will  call  later  (in  the  Encyclopedia)   Objective 
Spirit.     In  this  sphere  will  occur  some  of  Hegel's 
grandest  results.     Already  he  has  begun  to  see 
and  to  formulate    the    meaning  of  Institutions 
(Family,    Society,    State),    and   to    incorporate 
them  in  his  Philosophy.     Here  lies  largely  his 
vast     positive    contribution   to    the    Nineteenth 
Century,  for  it  was  the  distinctive  character  of 
the  Eighteenth  Century  to  deny  and  to  destroy 
Institutions. 

Such  is  Hegel's  first  appropriation  of  the 
Norm  which  makes  him  a  philosopher,  and  which 
runs  through  all  his  works.  It  had  been  evolv- 
ing slowly  for  a  long  time,  especially  from  his 
study  of  the  History  of  Greek  Philosophy.  Now 


622         MODERN  E UROPEA N  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

he  has  seized  it  and  uttered  it,  at  Frankfort  about 
1798-9.  Hereafter  he  will  write  out  two  other 
explicit  statements  of  the  Norm — ten  years  later 
in  the  Propaedeutic,  and  then  after  another  nine 
or  ten  years  in  the  Encyclopedia. 

With  this  Norm  his  soul,  deeply  fermenting, 
and  partially  expressed  but  longing  for  still 
completer  expression,  Hegel  feels  that  he  has 
something  to  add  to  the  Philosophy  of  his  time. 
Accordingly  he  prepares  to  quit  Frankfort  and 
the  tutorial  business  forever.  A  small  sum  of 
money  left  him  by  his  father,  who  had  died  in 
1799,  will  fortify  him  against  want  for  a  time. 
In  his  crisis  he  writes  a  very  suggestive  letter 
(which  is  still  extant)  to  his  friend  Schelling 
who  has  acquired  great  fame  at  Jena.  The  pur- 
pose of  this  letter  as  we  make  it  out  (see  it  in 
Rosenkranz  Hegel's  Leben,  s.  142)  is  that  Hegel 
wishes  to  come  to  Jena,  for  he  too  has  been 
"  driven  forward  to  Philosophy,"  and  has 
"  transformed  the  ideal  of  his  youth  into  a  sys- 
tem," which  he  evidently  wants  the  opportunity 
to  propagate.  To  be  sure  Hegel  says  not  a  word 
about  coming  to  Jena,  on  the  contrary  he  speaks 
of  going  to  Bamberg  and  asks  his  friend  for 
some  addresses  there.  But  Schelling  manifestly 
reads  the  letter  aright  between  the  lines;  the  re- 
sult is,  Hegel  appears  at  the  University  of  Jena 
in  January,  1801,  and  enters  upon  a  new  epoch  of 
his  philosophical  career. 


HEGEL'S  LIFE.  623 

2.  Second  Period  (1801-1818).  These  seven- 
teen years  are  the  creative  time  of  Hegel,  who 
now  writes  his  main  works  and  goes  through  the 
various  stages  of  his  inner  philosophical  develop- 
ment. He  brings  to  Jena  his  revolutionary  Ego, 
though  much  toned  down  from  his  Tubingen 
days,  for  he  has  also  appropriated  something 
transmitted,  notably  the  philosophic  Norm.  Thus 
he  shows  two  tendencies  quite  opposite,  which  are, 
however,  to  seek  reconciliation  in  the  coming 
Period.  That  revolutionary  Ego  of  his,  first  of 
all,  is  to  become  evolutionary,  to  which  it  has 
already  some  inner  leanings,  especially  through 
his  study  of  the  History  of  Philosophy. 

Let  us  first  note  that  Jena  when  Hegel  entered 
it  in  1801,  was  the  center  of  a  great  intellectual 
movement,  the  most  original  in  Europe.  Fichte 
was  already  gone,  but  had  left  his  influence ; 
Schelling  was  there  in  the  bloom  of  his  philo- 
sophic power;  and  now  Hegel  comes.  Nor  must 
we  forget  that  in  Weimar  not  far  distant  Goethe 
and  Schiller  were  in  the  full  splendor  of  their 
genius.  The  Romantic  school  in  the  two  preced- 
ing years  had  concentrated  at  Jena,  and  then  had 
gone  forth  to  conquer  Germany  and  even  Europe. 
But  the  philosopher  of  Romanticism,  Schelling, 
was  still  on  hand,  and  with  him  Hegel  at  once 
formed  a  close  alliance. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Hegel  at  first  absorbed 
deeply  this  Romantic  movement.  It  gave 


624        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

validity  to  the  Ego  and  nourished  the  same  for 
the  wildest  flights ;  it.  also  went  back  to  the 
past  and  sympathized  with  the  Art,  Literature, 
and  Philosophy  of  former  ages,  reconstructing 
the  Medieval  Period,  translating  Shakespeare, 
Calderon,  Plato,  and  even  digging  up  the  old 
Hindoo  world  in  the  Valley  of  the  Ganges.  This 
historic  sympathy  Hegel  shared,  and  Romanti- 
cism was  one  of  the  currents  (but  not  the  only 
one)  which  carried  him  over  into  his  evolu- 
tionary stage  whose  presence  soon  began  to  show 
itself  in  his  work  at  Jena. 

The  transition  of  Hegel  to  Jena  was  not  a 
mere  -individual  act  of  his,  but  was  in  a  way 
representative  of  the  time.  The  new-born 
German  spirit  was  collecting  itself  for  a  great 
coming  effort  of  expansion.  Kant  on  the  north- 
eastern border  of  Germany,  had  begun  the  reju- 
venation of  Philosophy,  which  through  his  chief 
disciple,  Fichte,  had  come  to  Jena,  the  heart 
of  the  country.  From  the  opposite  direction, 
.from  the  southwestern  portion,  the  two  young 
Swabian  philosophers,  Schelling  and  Hegel, 
had  now  reached  the  same  center.  From  the 
periphery  of  all  Germany  there  was  a  gathering 
of  the  intellectual  heroes  of  the  age  in  one 
spot  —  that  spot  was  the  little  territory  of  Jena 
and  Weimar.  Hegel  felt  the  pulsation  of  time, 
and  joined  the  stirring  centripetal  movement  of 
the  spirit,  which  surged  inwardly  and  outwardly 


HEGEVS  LIFE.  625 

through  the  land.  Of  course  all  this  multitude 
of  great  men  could  not  stay  long  in  the  little 
University.  They  came  there  and  drank  of  the 
fountain  which  had  burst  up  to  the  surface  at 
that  point  from  the  deepest  hidden  sources  of 
the  Teutonic  spirit.  Then  they  went  away  to 
impart  what  they  had  received.  As  before 
stated,  the  leading  Romanticists  (the  Schlegels 
and  Tieck)  were  already  gone;  two  years  after 
the  arrival  of  Hegel  (1803)  Schelhng  took  his 
departure.  Hegel  himself  held  out  till  1807, 
winding  up  his  career  there  with  the  publication 
of  the  Phenomenology  of  Spirit,  in  which  he 
not  only  abjures  but  undoes  Romanticism. 

During  the  six  years  Hegel  passed  through  a 
variety  of  subordinate  phases.  At  first  he  was  the 
disciple  of  Schelling,  and  the  two  in  conjunction 
established  the  Critical  Journal  of  Philosophy, 
which  published  a  number  of  Hegel's  earlier 
writings.  There  was,  however,  a  deep  difference 
between  them.  They  might  agree  upon  the  doc- 
trine that  there  was  an  "Absolute,  but  concerning 
the  nature  of  this  Absolute  they  disagreed 
fundamentally.  Schelling  makes  it  a  processless 
identity  above  all  separation ;  Hegel  sees  every- 
where the  process,  even  in  the  Absolute.  Hegel 
is  becoming  more  and  more  evolutionary,  while 
Schelling  postulates  dogmatically  his  first  princi- 
ple, out  of  which  everything  flows,  or  emanates 
in  a  Neo-Platonic  way.  Moreover  the  characters 
40 


626         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  two  men  are  quite  opposite.  Hegel  ma- 
tured slowly,  step  by  step,  in  a  true  evolutionary 
manner;  he  had  reached  middle  age  before  his 
first  original  book  was  published.  On  the  other 
hand  Schelling  was  suddenly  ripe,  before  he  was 
twenty-one;  his  philosophic  precocity  is,  we 
believe,  without  a  parallel.  He  was  a  dynamic, 
explosive  genius,  not  a  gradually  developing  one, 
emanative  like  his  Philosophy.  Five  years 
younger  than  Hegel,  he  had  already  done  his 
chief  work  in  Philosophy,  when  the  two  began 
their  co-operation  at  Jena.  The  two  souls  had 
to  separate,  going  in  opposite  directions:  the  one 
being  emanative  (descending),  and  the  other 
evolutionary  (ascending).  Schelling  leaves  Jena 
in  1803  whereby  the  spiritual  separation  becomes 
spatial,  and  their  journalistic  union  is  also  dis- 
solved. 

Four  years  more  Hegel  remained  at  Jena, 
working  out  his  philosophical  problem.  He  gave 
courses  of  lectures  to  the  students  of  the  Uni- 
versity, the  number  of  hearers  being  small. 
Rosenkranz  has  published  the  topics  of  some  of 
these  lectures  (Hegel's  Leben,  s.  159),  which 
evidently  circled  about  the  philosophic  Norm  — 
Logic  and  Metaphysics,  Philosophy  of  Nature, 
Philosophy  of  Mind.  We  also  hear  of  other 
subjects,  for  instance  the  Aesthetic  (1802),  and 
the  History  of  Philosophy  (1805),  and  the 
Phenomenology  (1806). 


HEGEUS  LIFE.  627 

This  last  title  gives  the  clew  to  what  he  had 
been  chiefly  doing  ever  since  his  separation  from 
Schelling.  The  Norm  which  he  had  brought 
from  Frankfort  had  furnished  the  main  material 
for  his  formal  lectures,  but  his  mind  and  his 
heart  had  been  occupied  with  an  evolutionary 
work,  the  Phenomenology  of  Spirit,  which 
appeared  in  1807,  showing  all  the  stages  of  the 
evolution  of  Spirit  to  the  culmination  in  the 
Absolute.  Development  (Entwickelung)  is  the 
pivotal  world  which  Hegel  himself  employs  to 
designate  this  work,  its  whole  movement  being 
in  the  form  of  an  ascent  from  the  lowest  stage 
of  human  consciousness  .to  the  highest.  It  is 
thus  a  kind  of  overture  to  the  coming  Century 
whose  key-note  it  strikes  from  the  start.  More- 
over it  is  deeply  connected  with  the  condition  of 
Europe  at  the  time  of  its  composition,  especially 
with  the  career  of  Napoleon,  who  seemed  to 
Hegel  during  these  years  as  the  incarnation  of 
the  Absolute. 

After  leaving  Jena  in  1807  Hegel  became 
editor  of  a  newspaper  at  Bamberg.  •  Hardly  a 
greater  change  can  be  conceived  for  the  author 
of  the  Phenomenology  which  is  spun  out  of  the 
finest  gossamer  threads  of  thought,  so  fine  that 
it  requires  a  subtle  mind  to  see  them  at  all. 
Napoleon  kept  his  hand  upon  the  journalism  of 
Southern  Germany ;  no  editorials  or  reflections 
were  allowed.  Hegel  had  simply  to  gather  items 


628         MODERN  E UEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  write  them  out.  But  imagine  him  springing 
at  a  leap  from  the  Absolute  to  an  item  in  a  news- 
paper. As  he  once  treated  reality  as  an  appear- 
ance, so  now  he  has  to  treat  appearance  as  a 
reality.  And  he  himself  is  now  hardly  more 
than  an  appearance.  During  this  time  he  like- 
wise began  to  formulate  a  constitution  for  Ger- 
many, in  which  his  political  interest  is  at  least 
indicated.  But  after  a  year's  service  he  obtained 
a  new  place  which  comported  better  with  his 
genius. 

In  1808  he  received  a  call  to  go  to  Niirnberg  as 
rector  of  its  Gymnasium,  in  which  position  he 
remained  eight  years.  Hegel  now  found  the 
quiet  which  enabled  him  to  think  out  and  for- 
mulate his  Philosophy.  During  this  time  he 
produced  two  main  works.  One  was  the  Propae- 
deutic, in  which  he  gave  a  brief  summary  of 
Philosophy  for  his  pupils,  following  the  phi- 
losophic Norm  which  he  had  already  elaborated  at 
Frankfort.  The  other  was  his  Logic,  doubtless 
his  greatest  production.  This  also  is  essentially 
the  Evolution  of  the  Absolute,  as  we  shall  see 
later.  The  work  is  in  three  volumes,  the  first  of 
which  appeared  in  1812,  the  last  in  1816.  Thus 
it  starts  when  Napoleon  was  at  the  height  of  his 
power  and  concludes  with  his  fall  and  evanish- 
ment  from  Europe.  Such  was  the  fate  of  the 
incarnate  Absolute,  "  the  World-Spirit  on  horse- 
back." 


HEGEL'S  LIFE.  629 

While  at  Niirnberg  our  philosopher  got 
married,  aged  41.  Marie  von  Tucher,  a  daugh- 
ter of  one  of  the  patrician  families  of  the  city, 
accepted  the  hand  of  the  schoolmaster,  who 
thereupon  overflowed  again  into  verse,  sweet 
enough  in  words  but  often  pretty  rough  in  meter 
(see  some  of  it  in  Rosenkranz'  Life  of  Hegel). 
A  well-bred,  cultured  lady,  a  friend  of  Jean 
Paul,  and  somewhat  addicted  to  romanticism, 
which  Hegel  disliked ;  it  was  probably  this  topic 
upon  which  they  once  had  a  little  spat,  for 
which  we  read  a  humble  apology  made  to  her  by 
Hegel,  humbler  than  he  ever  made  afterwards  to 
any  man,  for  the  absolute  philosopher  actually 
confesses  to  a  failing.  But  let  us  celebrate  the 
glorious  event ;  it  is  the  first  wedding  which  the 
reader  has  been  present  at  among  all  these  great- 
est modern  philosophers;  Descartes,  Spinoza 
and  Leibniz  of  the  Seventeenth  Century,  Locke, 
Hume  and  Kant  of  the  Eighteenth  Century — 
not  one  of  the  whole  set  was  ever  married,  but 
kept  Philosophy  tainted  with  a  kind  of  monkish 
celibacy.  Hegel,  however,  starts  a  new  era  for 
Philosophers  by  his  marriage,  though  a  little 
tardy  about  it  (possibly  on  account  of  that  first 
set-back  from  Miss  Hegelmeier).  But  now  he 
goes  to  work  philosophizing  mightily ;  the  next 
year  the  first  volume^ of  his  Logic  is  finished  and 
printed,  a  book  not  to  be  read  like  a  love 
romance. 


630          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

No  Formal  Logic  of  the  Schools  is  this  of 
Hegel;  it  deals  not  merely  with  the  Form  of 
Thought,  but  with  the  inherent  movement  of  the 
Matter  or  Content.  Not  the  abstract  Forms  but 
the  Pure  Essences  (reine  Wesenheiten)  which 
produce  reality  are  the  theme,  showing  "  an 
immanent  development"  or  inner  evolution 
ascending  to  the  Absolute.  Hegel  calls  his 
Logic  "the  exposition  of  God  as  He  is  in  His 
eternal  essence  before  the  creation  of  the 
world."  This  statement  shows  his  transition 
from  the  Theology  to  Philosophy,  his  great 
struggle  being  to  define  "  God  or  Absolute 
Spirit."  To  this  supreme  goal  we  shall  find 
him,  when  we  come  to  his  written  works,  taking 
three  different  roads,  each  of  which  is  laid  down 
in  a  book. 

Such  was  the  noiseless  inner  development  of 
Hegel  at  Niirnberg.  It  was  not  his  nature  to  get 
into  conflict  with  the  existent  order,  being 
therein  different  from  Socrates,-  even  from 
Fichte.  He  was  inclined  at  present  to  accept 
the  established  institutions  and  to  account 
for  their  existence  in  the  world  —  no  longer 
revolutionary  but  evolutionary.  He,  the  abso- 
lute idealist  so-called,  is  also  supremely  the 
philosopher  of  reality.  His  attempt  is  to 
bridge  this  widest  and  deepest  chasm  of  Spirit, 
whose  dualism  has  plagued  Philosophy  from  the 
beginning.  Has  he  made  the  nexus?  A  ques- 


HEGEL'S  LIFE.  631 

tion  not  to  be  answered  now,  but  in  the  end  we 
shall  see. 

Hegel  was  hostile  to  the  use  of  tobacco,  he 
would  declaim  to  his  pupils  on  the  danger  and 
filth  of  the  weed,  but  would  take  a  pinch  of  snuff 
during  his  tirade.  His  papers  lay  scattered  upon 
his  desk  in  utter  confusion  to  the  eye  of  the 
housekeeper,  though  in  his  vision  they  must 
have  constituted  an  image  of  the  cosmos,  con- 
sidering what  an  universal  order  came  out  of 
them  afterwards  into  printed  books.  Hegel 
could  also  drink  his  quota  of  wine,  and  one  of 
his  questions  concerning  a  city  to  which  he 
thought  of  moving,  was,  Has  it  good  beer?  We 
should  also  note  that  at  Niirnberg  Hegel  passed 
for  a  friend  of  Napoleonic  domination,  and  he 
sought  to  break  up  anti-French  agitation  among 
his  pupils  by  turning  their  German  patriotism 
back  into  old  Greek  Homer  and  the  Trojan  War 
for  an  outlet. 

Chiefly  in  consequence  of  the  fame  of  his 
Logic  Hegel  obtains  three  calls  to  Universities  — 
Erlangen,  Heidelberg,  Berlin.  Inasmuch  as  the 
call  to  Berlin  was  coupled  with  a  doubt  concern- 
ing his  delivery  (  Vortrag)  and  a  request  to  rec- 
ommend himself,  our  philosopher  took  a  fit  of 
spleen  and  answered  somewhat  gruffly :  "I  am 
already  engaged  in  Heidelberg."  This  on  the 
whole  was  a  good  move  for  Hegel.  He  was  not 
yet  quite  ready  to  go  to  the  center  of  philosophic 


632        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Germany,  not  till  he  had  written  his  Encyclo- 
pedia. For  at  Berlin  he  is  destined  to  turn 
down  an  entirely  new  road  of  life,  for  which  he 
ought  to  have  a  little  more  quiet  preparation. 
Not  yet,  cry  the  Fates  of  existence,  two  years 
more  of  inner  development  in  this  placid  South 
Germany,  and  then  we  shall  snip  in  twain  every 
thread  which  holds  thee  back. 

Consequently  Hegel  becomes  professor  at 
Heidelberg  (1816-1818),  where  according  to  one 
of  his  letters  the  rule  was,  «'  Every  one  for  him- 
self and  the  Lord  for  us  all."  Not  brilliant  was 
the  beginning:  "  At  one  lecture  I  had  only  four 
hearers."  But  the  number  gradually  increased. 
Probably  Hegel  reached  at  Heidelberg  the  depth 
of  his  introspective  nature,  since  "  he  often  for- 
got entirely  the  external  world."  Students  pass- 
ing by  his  house  would  usually  see  him  "  at  the 
window  gazing  toward  the  distant  mountains  and 
forests  as  they  swam  in  the  hazy  atmospbere." 
Crossing  the  street  after  a  shower  he  left  his 
shoe  sticking  in  the  mud  and  went  home  without 
noticing  h<is  loss.  Evidently  he  is  being  whirled 
through  that  circular  movement  of  his  Encyclo- 
pedia, from  whose  theoretical  abysses  he  is  next 
to  rise  into  practical  life  at  Berlin.  We  must  add, 
however,  that  while  yet  in  Heidelberg  he  took 
part  in  editing  its  Jahrbucher,  a  periodical  for 
which  he  also  wrote  an  important  article  on 


HEGEHS  LIFE.  633 

Jacobi.       A    journalistic    thread    ran    through 
Hegel's  whole  career. 

But  the  incarnate  Absolute,  "  the  World-Spirit 
on  horseback,"  what  has  become  of  him,  Na- 
poleon Bonaparte,  from  whose  destroying  might 
Hegel  barely  saved  the  last  pages  of  his  Phenom- 
enology, a  book  devoted  to  evolving  just  that 
Absolute?  On  the  small  island  of  Saint  Helena, 
far  from  Europe,  confined  to  a  little  speck  of 
earth  rising  out  of  the  Ocean  he  consumes  his 
heart  guarded  by  his  inveterate  foe.  So  he  in 
his  turn  has  become  the  victim  of  that  remorse- 
less Dialectic  of  Evolution  of  which  he  so  long 
was  the  mighty  wielder.  The  colossal  human 
Reality  which  reduced  the  world  to  an  Appear- 
ance has  himself  become  an  Appearance  in  the 
presence  of  a  mightier  Reality.  The  pyramids 
themselves  seem  to  be  capsized  in  this  grand 
overturn  of  the  Absolute  in  person.  What  will 
the  philosopher  of  Reality  do,  our  Hegel?  Ad- 
just himself  to  the  new  order ;  what  else  can  he 
do?  The  Reality  knows  better  than  any  philoso- 
pher unless  the  philosopher  knows  the  Reality. 
The  hour  strikes  for  this  change,  the  grand  re- 
adjustment in  his  career  which  is  accompanied 
by  a  change  of  place  in  deepest  correspondence 
with  the  new  demand  of  his  spirit  and  of  the 
time.  Hegel  is  now  to  pass  to  that  center 
whence  chiefly  proceeded  the  overthrow  of 


634          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Napoleon,  and  his  coming  function  is  to  philoso- 
phize the  new  World-Spirit  there  arisen. 

3.  Third  Period  (1818-1831).  At  last  came 
the  unconditioned  call  to  the  University  of  Ber- 
lin, and  Hegel  leaves  his  limited  field  at  Heidel- 
berg for  the  central  institution  of  learning  in 
Germany.  He  was  48  years  old,  he  had  laid  the 
deep  foundations  of  his  system  theoretically ; 
now  he  is  to  realize  practically  his  Philosophy, 
not  only  propagating  it  and  making  it  the  prin- 
ciple of  a  great  School,  but  even  embodying  it  in 
the  State.  Before  the  Berlin  Period  he  had  few, 
if  any,  followers;  his  thought  was  a  conception; 
but  now  it  is  to  put  on  reality,  and  is  to  become 
a  great  power  in  the  world.  It  nor  he  will  fail 
to  manifest  its  inherent  character.  The  Phi- 
losophy of  the  Absolute  will  show  itself  the 
Absolute  Philosophy ;  the  original  love  of  wis- 
dom (Philosophia)  will  become  wisdom  herself, 
divinely  appearing  unto  men  in  person.  In  true 
accord  the  Philosopher  of  the  Absolute  will 
assert  himself  the  Absolute  Philosopher,  auto- 
cratic, imperial,  Philosopher  over  all  other  phi- 
losophers (Philosopharch),  and  for  a  while 
will  influence  the  spirit  of  the  existing  State, 
converting  it  into  a  government  through  Phi- 
losophy (  Philosopharchy  ) . 

The  key-note  of  this  Third  Period  he  sounds 
distinctly  in  his  opening  address  at  Berlin,  dated 
Oct.  22,  1818.  "  The  World-Spirit  has  been  so 


HEGEL'S  LIFE.  635 

much  occupied  and  turned  outward  "  in  putting 
down  Napoleon  and  re-ad  justing  Europe  that  "  it 
has  been  restrained  from  turning  inward  and  en- 
joying itself  in  its  own  peculiar  home. ' '  But  now 
all  this  is  changed,  and  "  the  time  has  come  when 
in  the  State  the  realm  of  thought  also  is  to 
flourish  alongside  of  the  government  of  the  actual 
world."  What  State  is  it?  «  This  State  which 
has  taken  me  up  into  itself,"  this  Prussia  has 
risen  to  the  great  new  height  of  incorporating 
Philosophy  as  "  an  essential  element  of  its  politi- 
cal life."  Moreover  the  work  is  to  be  done  at 
this  University  of  Berlin,  truly  ««  the  University 
of  the  center  "  of  all  Germany,  at  which  center 
Hegel  the  philosopher  has  now  arrived,  being  the 
voice  of  that  World-Spirit  "  turned  inward" 
with  profound  self -contemplation.  In  such  lofty 
consciousness  of  his  present  position  Hegel 
speaks  throughout  this  brief  discourse,  feeling 
his  harmony  with  the  time  and  the  country  ;  after 
much  wandering  he  has  at  last  reached  the  cen- 
ter and  recognizes  the  fact.  *•  Philosophy  has 
fled  to  the  Germans  "  from  the  rest  of  Europe; 
then  from  the  periphery  of  Germany  it  has  con- 
centrated itself  at  Berlin,  quite  as  we  saw  in 
antiquity  its  centripetal  sweep  from  the  rim  of 
Hellas  to  the  central  Athenian  city,  culminating 
in  Aristotle  who  also  had  his  affiliations  with  the 
dominant  Macedonian  State. 

How  much  Hegel  has  changed  his  former  atti- 


636         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tude,  we  may  see  by  what  he  now  says  of  Napo- 
leon, whose  "  foreign  soulless  tyranny"  has 
been  destroyed  by  "  the  mighty  struggle  of 
the  people  in  conjunction  with  their  Prince." 
Yet  that  was  the  Napoleon  whom  only  a  dozen 
years  ago  Hegel  saluted  as  "  the  World-Spirit  on 
horseback  "  scattering  the  wretched  Prussians 
from  the  battle-field  of  Jena  like  chaff  before 
the  whirlwind.  This  change  we  do  not  bring  up 
as  a  reproach  to  Hegel ;  it  was  no  inconsistency 
but  the  natural  evolution  of  the  philosopher  of 
the  reality;  natural  indeed,  was  the  evolution, 
but  very  rapid,  for  the  times  were  rapid  with 
which  Hegel,  to  be  true  to  himself,  had  to  keep 
pace.  The  Absolute,  at  first,  was  incarnate  in 
Napoleon,  the  conqueror  of  Germany;  but  Ger- 
many has  wheeled  about  and,  putting  down  its 
conqueror  in  its  turn,  has  taken  up  that  Absolute 
into  itself,  making  the  same  now  internal.  Par- 
ticularly has  Prussia  done  this,  and  hence  calls 
Hegel,  the  philosopher  of  the  Absolute,  to  its 
central  seat  of  learning,  where  the  World-Spirit 
is  now  "  to  turn  inward  and  to  enjoy  itself  in  its 
own  peculiar  home."  Thus  the  Absolute  is 
made  real  in  the  State,  and  in  addition  is  made 
personal  in  the  philosopher  himself,  not  simply 
in  his  thought,  but  also  in  his  disposition,  in  his 
temper,  even  in  his  gesture,  if  report  be  true. 
No  blame  again ;  he  could  help  his  own  char- 
acter, he  could  not  stop  his  own  evolution ;  given 


HEGEL'S  LIFE.  637 

his  absolute  Philosophy,  he    had   to    absolutize 
himself,  when  he  had  fully  evolved. 

The  thirteen  active  years  of  the  Berlin  Period 
will  therefore  be  Hegel  realized.  His  specula- 
tive work  is  substantially  done ;  he  brings  with 
him  his  system  worked  out  in  thought  and 
theoretically  completed,  even  if  not  yet  fully 
finished  in  all  its  details.  A  great  advantage  is 
that  he  carries  to  his  new  home  his  Philosophy 
organically  set  forth  in  printed  books,  which  can 
be  put  into  the  hands  of  his  followers  and 
studied  at  leisure.  He  writes  no  books  at  Ber- 
lin with  the  exception  of  a  brief  manual  for  his 
students  on  the  Philosophy  of  Right,  composed 
during  his  first  two  years. 

The  activity  of  Hegel  at  Berlin  was  varied  and 
•  turned  in  many  directions.  The  pent-up  desire 
for  practical  life  after  so  long  a  period  of  mental 
incubation  went  forth  out  of  him  like  an  explo- 
sion. If  his  previous  years  had  been  chiefly  a 
time  of  intense  inner  concentration,  at  present 
there  is  the  opposite  tendency.  His  thought  has 
been  organized  through  and  through,  now  his 
function  is  to  apply  it,  to  make  it  real.  Or  we 
may  say  that  hitherto  Hegel  has  sought  after 
and  formulated  the  Universal,  which  he  is  now  to 
particularize  in  all  details.  The  leading  points 
of  this  multifarious  activity  we  may  set  aown 
as  follows :  — 

(1)  There  is  no  doubt  that  Hegel  took  great 


638         M  ODERN  E  UR  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

pleasure  in  being  an  official  of  the  State  at  Berlin. 
Of  course  his  chief  position  was  his  professor- 
ship in  the  University.  But  he  accepted  other 
offices,  especially  in  reference  to  education. 
These  culminated  in  the  rectorship  of  the  Uni- 
versity which  he  held  the  year  before  his  death. 
It  may  well  be  a  question,  however,  if  his  ad- 
ministrative life  improved  his  Philosophy  or  his 
temper  with  his  absolute  tendencies.  Neverthe- 
less both  Hegel  and  his  thought  became  a  reality, 
and  a  commanding  one,  through  his  officialdom. 
(2)  At  Berlin  Hegel  turned  out  supremely  the 
lecturer.  Very  wonderful  was  his  activity  in  this 
line  as  we  may  see  by  the  number  and  variety  as 
well  as  length  of  the  courses  which  he  gave.  It 
became  the  fashion  of  the  city  to  hear  Hegel  and 
to  Hegelize  everything  and  everybody.  For  once 
Philosophy  was  popular,  and  the  crop  of  imita- 
tors, apostles,  of  Hegelian  prophets  true  and 
false,  that  sprang  up  along  with  a  clamorous 
opposition  made  a  philosophic  tumult  the  like  of 
which  had  never  before  been  seen.  Moreover 
we  can  plainly  observe  that  Hegel  sought  to 
popularize  his  previous  concentrated  doctrine 
and  to  bring  it  within  the  range  of  the  average 
intellect.  His  books  of  the  Berlin  Period  edited 
by  his  special  apostolate  after  his  death  from  his 
lectures  (  Werke,  VIII-XV)  show  his  effort  to 
make  himself  understood  in  hundredfold  explana- 
tions, illustrations,  amplifications,  repetitions  to 


HE GEL1  S  LIFE.  689 

the  last  degree  of  pedogogical  endurance.  What 
a  mighty  hammering  took  place  in  that  smithy 
of  the  strong-boned  philosopher  upon  the  refrac- 
tory brains  there  before  him !  The  twelve  labors 
of  Hercules  seem  small  in  comparison.  We  can 
still  see  him  puffing  and  struggling  and  stammer- 
ing, as  if  he  could  hardly  get  the  right  word  out 
since  it  lies  so  deep ;  emphasizing  his  favorite 
category  when  it  does  emerge  from  the  philo- 
sophic abysses  with  a  peculiar  intonation  in  broad 
Suabian  dialect  which  had  a  dash  of  grotesquery 
on  the  Berlin  ear;  hemming,  hacking,  coughing 
between  his  periods  on  account  of  that  eternal 
catarrh  which  seldom  fails  to  plague  the  South- 
erner in  a  northern  atmosphere.  All  reporters 
agree  that  Hegel's  external  delivery  was  not 
good.  It  was  like  his  nomenclature,  it  had  to 
be  broken  into  and  be  seen  from  within  ere  it 
could  be  understood  and  finally  enjoyed.  To  be 
sure  the  philologists  could  not  make  much  out 
of  Hegel's  peculiar  language  and  cannot  to  this 
day.  W.  vonHumboldt  spoke  of  Hegel's  '*  help- 
lessness "  and  "  obscurity  of  manner."  He 
thought  in  Hegel's  case  that  "  speech  did  not 
break  through,"  but  remained  in  a  kind  of  im- 
plicit condition.  Prophetically  this  was  a  big 
miss,  since  Hegel's  utterance  has  proved  itself 
eternal,  peculiar  as  it  is.  Undoubtedly  it  has  to 
be  mastered,  for  it  is  a  kind  of  new  language 
which  Hegel  had  to  create  as  the  adequate  vehicle 


640        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  his  thought.  He  did  not  take  and  could  not 
take  merely  the  established  German  of  his  time; 
he  had  to  go  back  to  the  first  source  of  his 
mother-tongue  and  make  it  over  in  proportion  to 
his  needs .  Every  great  philosopher  and  every 
great  poet  does  the  same,  and  therein  manifests 
his  primal  creative  power,  his  born  command 
over  his  own  native  tongue  at  its  original  foun- 
tain-head. 

(3)  Thus  Hegel  sought  to  plant  the  seeds  of  his 
thought  in  the  mind  of  the  greater  public.  But 
he  had  also  his  inner  set  of  followers,  the  eso- 
teric circle  of  deeper  students  whom  he  looked 
upon  as  the  future  defenders  and  progagators  of 
his  doctrine.  There  is  no  doubt  that  Hegel  at 
Berlin  intended  to  found  a  School  of  Philosophy, 
as  did  his  Greek  predecessors  at  Athens,  Plato 
and  Aristotle.  He  deliberately  proposed  to  lay 
the  foundations  of  his  system  in  the  best  minds 
he  could  gather  about  him,  and  thus  to  make  his 
doctrine  eternal,  a  kind  of  inner  asketds  which 
was  to  be  handed  down  in  aline  of  initiates  from 
generation  to  generation.  But  there  was  no 
secret  rite,  no  mummery,  no  mystery  connected 
with  this  school,  which  was  based  upon  the  clear 
self-conscious  Intellect.  Thus  Hegel  becomes  a 
Scholarch  at  Berlin  in  addition  to  his  other 
activities. 

This  purpose  of  his  was  soon  observed  (he  ap- 
parently did  not  try  to  disguise  it)  and  brought 


HEGEL'S  LIFE.  641 

down  upon  him  a  good  deal  of  opposition  from 
various  quarters.  Other  philosophers  deemed 
such  action  very  improper.  Especially  Schleier- 
macher  was  outraged  by  the  awful  misbehavior 
of  Hegel  in  trying  to  establish  a  School  of  Phi- 
losophy at  Berlin,  and  endeavored  to  keep  him 
out  of  the  Academy,  it  is  said,  on  account  of  his 
persistent  School-making  ($chulmacherei).  Yet 
Plato  founded  a  School,  and  Schleiermacher  was 
the  translator  of  Plato  and  chief  modern  propa- 
gator of  the  Platonic  doctrine.  The  example  of 
the  old  philosopher  was  not  to  be  followed  in 
this  respect,  it  seems ;  still  Hegel  kept  up  his 
propagandism  and  met  with  great  success.  It 
must  be  taken  as  a  mark  of  transcendent  power 
that  he  was  able  to  bring  together  so  many  capa- 
ble men  into  a  School  and  inspire  them,  with 
his  own  thought  as  well  as  with  a  consecration 
of  their  lives  to  its  development  and  propagation. 
(4)  During  this  last  Period  Hegel  shows  the 
tendency  to  go  back  to  his  former  writings, 
revise  them  and  publish  them  afresh.  He  was 
working  at  a  new  edition  of  the  Logic  when  he 
was  overtaken  by  death ;  also  of  the  Phenome- 
nology he  had  planned  another  edition.  Of  the 
Encyclopedia  two  editions  were  issued  at  Berlin. 
Thus  at  the  end  he  returns  to  the  beginning, 
completing  in  his  own  life  that,  cycle  which  he 
has  traced  through  the  whole  universe.  In  fact 
his  lectures,  which  we  may  call  his  unwritten 

41 


642          MODERN  E  UEOPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

books  hereafter  to  be  written,  did  not  originate 
in  content  or  in  structure  at  Berlin;  they  were 
reproductions  of  parts  of  his  system  already 
thought  out  and  organized  in  his  previous 
Periods.  Theoretically  Hegel  at  Berlin  returns 
upon  himself  and  realizes  what  was  before  this  a 
conception,  an  idea,  a  scheme  more  or  less  naked, 
and  waiting  to  have  its  clothes  put  on  at  the  first 
good  opportunity,  which  has  now  arrived. 

Still  Hegel  felt  the  difference  between  his 
present  and  his  past.  He  was  not  the  same 
man  or  the  same  philosopher  altogether  at  Berlin 
that  he  was  at  Jena  twenty-five  years  before,  or 
at  Niirnberg.  In  the  prefaces  to  his  new  editions 
we  can  hear  the  changed  note,  sometimes 
amounting  to  an  undertone  of  dissonance  with  his 
former  self,  and  yet  this  is  on  the  whole  skill- 
fully concealed.  Of  course  in  the  deepest  sense 
it  was  the  same  absolute  Hegel  from  beginning 
to  end,  but  with  the  most  emphatic  evolution  out 
of  the  thoretical  to  the  practical  Absolute,  out 
of  the  introverted  to  the  extroverted,  out  of 
the  writing  to  the  acting  philosopher. 

(5)  We  must  not  neglect  to  mention  Hegel's 
journalistic  activity  at  Berlin.  Largely  through 
his  influence  in  1827  a  new  periodical,  the  Jahr- 
bucherfiir  Kritik  was  founded.  He  wrote  arti- 
cles for  it,  one  of  his  pupils  was  its  editor,  and 
it  was  recognized  as  mainly  devoted  to  the  prop- 
agation of  the  Hegelian  Philosophy,  which 


HEGEL'S  LIFE.  643 

through  it  was  sown  over  Europe.  Hegel  had 
always  manifested  journalistic  leanings.  He 
had  been  twice  editor,  at  Jena  and  at  Bamberg, 
and  had  schemed  various  journalistic  enterprises. 
Still  his  intellectual  life  had  been  a  concentrated 
one,  unified  and  organized  in  books,  and  not 
scattered  in  bits  through  periodical  literature. 
The  Berlin  Period,  however,  is  such  a  scattering 
of  his  productivity,  realizing  itself  in  manifold 
particular  forms,  even  in  magazine  articles,  re- 
views, criticisms,  the  ephemeral  record  of  the 
ephemeral.  Such  is  his  present  centrifugal 
tendency ;  his  flight  is  no  longer  toward  the 
central  sun  of  his  universe,  the  Absolute,  but  in 
the  opposite  direction  toward  its  separated  par- 
ticulars, toward  the  mutiplicity  of  the  real  world, 
toward  the  farthest  periphery  of  the  Hegelian 
solar  system. 

(6)  We  must  also  ask:  What  influence  had 
the  practical  Absolute  upon  the  man  in  his  out- 
ward dealings  with  his  fellow-man?  Biographer 
Rosenkranz,  friendly  buthonest,  feels  that  herein 
too  he  must,  though  regretful,  set  down  the  truth. 
4 'Even  with  his  friends  Hegel  often  fell  into  bit- 
ter conflict."  "  The  strong  unbending  charac- 
ter "  allowed  not  the  least  opposition  from  his 
associates ;  let  any  disciple  dare  have  an  opinion 
of  his  own  and  even  gently  assert  it,  the  storm 
would  gather  in  a  minute  and  lightning  would 
strike  the  audacious  rebel.  "  He  had  a  great 


644        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

power  of  wrath  and  scorn ;  "  he  was  a  bitter 
enemy,  and  "when  he  once  began  to  hate,  he 
did  it  from  the  bottom."  Any  difference  from 
the  Absolute  deserved  the  thunderbolt,  and  usu- 
ally got  it  on  the  spot.  "  In  a  fit  of  scolding  he 
wasfearful"  (Leben,  s.362).  "  He  whom  Hegel 
laid  hold  of  "  (  anfasste  —  we  suppose  this  means 
with  his  tongue  and  not  with  his  hands)  "  began 
to  have  a  knocking  of  the  knees,  like  a  school 
boy,"  and  while  the  tempest  raged,  *«  all  those 
present  crowded  down  together  in  terror."  Cer- 
tainly this  Absolute  is  realizing  itself  with  a  ven- 
geance. But  what  becomes  of  the  individual  in 
its  presence?  Scattered,  burnt  up,  annihilated 
as  if  before  the  pantheistic  God  Himself. 

It  is  satisfactory,  however,  to  note  that  there 
was  somebody  at  Berlin  who  dared  oppose  even 
the  Absolute,  and  to  remand  it  "  to  its  proper 
bounds"  —  to  limit  the  Unlimited.  Varnhagen 
von  Ense,  valiant  protagonist  against  the  actual 
Napoleon  in  bloody  war,  has  now  to  enact  a 
similar  part  against  this  new  philosophical  Na- 
poleon, who  has  again  captured  Berlin.  Varn- 
hagen has  left  us  a  notable  account  of  a  skirmish 
with  Hegel:  "At  the  founding  of  the  Berlin 
Jahrbucher  I  had  often  to  take  sides  against 
him,  and  this  the  more  decidedly  as  I  was  the 
only  one  who  had  no  personal  end  in  view  "  — 
really  the  old  soldier  was  the  only  one  pre- 
sent not  afraid  of  Hegel,  "  who  in  the  course 


HEGEL'S  LIFE.  645 

of  the  transaction  was  always  becoming  more 
obstinate  and  tyrannical.  At  last  he  began  to 
behave  himself  in  such  a  manner  at  the  meet- 
ings that  everybody  felt  that  the  enterprise 
could  proceed  no  further.  Then  it  fell  to  me  to 
take  him  in  hand  and  to  point  out  distinctly 
what  limits  he  had  to  observe."  So  Varnhagen 
actually  puts  limits  upon  the  Absolute  then  and 
there :  whereat  an  eruption  takes  place  as  if  the 
whole  inside  of  the  Universe  sought  at  once  to 
get  outside  and  vent  itself  "  in  a  bitter  conflict 
of  words  conducted  by  both  of  us  with  asper- 
ity.*' Who  cannot  imagine  the  old  war-horse 
rising  up  to  his  full  stature,  with  an  instinctive 
thrust  of  the  hand  to  his  side,  where  once  hung 
his  sword,  as  if  making  ready  for  a  charge? 
"But  no  dishonorable  word  was  spoken,"  cer- 
tainly not  by  the  courteous  Varnhagen,  for  he 
was  incapable  of  it,  nor  by  Hegel,  who  now  felt, 
seemingly  for  the  first  time,  that  the  Absolute 
also  had  to  "  observe  limits."  After  the  meeting 
the  company  sat  down  to  a  supper  overspread 
with  an  ominous  cloud;  but  let  the  outcome  be 
at  once  chronicled :  joyous  reconciliation  in  which 
the  combatants  "  embraced  each  other  while  tears 
stood  in  his  (Hegel's)  eyes.  After  that  we  had 
no  more  conflicts."  Thus  at  least  when  Varn- 
hagen was  around,  the  Absolute  "  observed  its 
limits"  (Rosenkranz,  Hegel's  Leben,  s.  392). 
In  these  records  of  the  closing  years  of  Hegel's 


646        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

life,  wnen  he  was  the  philosophical  autocrat  of 
Prussia,  we  are  often  reminded  of  the  picture  of 
the  aged  Lear,  in  whom  Shakespeare  has  por- 
trayed the  disease  of  unlimited  authority,  the 
grand  malady  of  the  Absolute  working  in  the 
finite  individual.  One  more  case,  for  the  in- 
structive point  must  be  enforced.  Leopold  Gans, 
professor  of  Jurisprudence  in  Berlin  University, 
was  a  devoted  follower  of  Hegel,  and  after  the 
latter 's  death  became  editor  of  two  of  his  most 
important  books.  Gans  recommended  to  his 
pupils  Hegel's  work  on  the  Philosophy  of  Right, 
his  motive  being  unquestionably  to  advance  the 
cause  of  his  master.  But  Hegel  took  the  act  as 
patronizing  effrontery  on  the  part  of  a  disciple, 
and  wrote  an  exceedingly  angry  letter, « « composed 
of  a  single  period  "  to  Gans,  demanding  retrac- 
tion. What  does  it  all  mean?  The  absolute 
temper  has  realized  itself.  Gans  intended  recog- 
nition, but  just  that  seemingly  was  the  insult. 
Hegel  has  become  like  Napoleon  who  said  at  the 
peace  of  Campo  Formio :  "  The  French  Eepublic 
(i.  e.,  Napoleon  himself)  needs  recognition  as 
little  as  does  the  Sun  in  Heaven  "  —  a  declaration 
cited  admiringly  by  Hegel  himself  (in  his  Recht 
if  we  remember  rightly).  But  this  "  single 
period"  contained  the  last  words  Hegel  ever 
wrote.  We  cannot  help  reflecting  that  the  Ab- 
solute is,  in  the  above  instance,  personally  con- 
summated. To  what  greater  height  can  it  ascend 


HE GEL1  S  LIFE  647 

when  it  no  longer  needs  human  recognition? 
Such  is  the  outcome  of  the  last  stage  of  Hegel's 
life.  It,  too,  was  an  evolution.  Says  Rosen- 
kranz  (s.  383)  :  "In  his  later  time  he  re-acted 
with  violence  (against  any  mention  of  his  mis- 
takes or  defects),  and  from  now  on  began  to  have 
a  real  lust  for  domination."  The  same  spirit  is 
seen  in  his  last  essay  of  importance,  that  pertain- 
ing to  the  English  Reform  Bill. 

o  o 

Hegel  died  of  cholera  at  Berlin,  November 
14th,  1831.  On  the  whole,  the  theoretical 
Hegel  is  a  much  nobler  subject  of  contem- 
plation than  the  practical  Hegel.  His  official 
life  was  not  the  best  for  him  as  philosopher. 
Administration  developed  the  unhappy  side  of 
his  nature,  or,  we  may  say,  of  the  Absolute  itself, 
which  became  more  and  more  regardless  of  the 
individual  till  it  approached  an  Oriental  despot- 
ism. His  Berlin  Period  was  reactionary  in  the 
deepest  sense,  not  only  against  the  French  Revo- 
lution, but  against  the  Spirit  of  the  Age,  indeed 
against  his  own  World-Spirit.  This  is  not  saying 
that  Hegel,  the  splendid  philosophic  genius,  in 
the  fullness  of  his  powers,  did  not  produce  much 
excellent  work  during  these  years.  But  his 
Prussian  life  of  officialdom  and  success  is  to  our 
eyes  on  a  descending  plane  to  the  end.  Let  us, 
however,  close  the  account  of  the  finite  mortal 
element  of  a  great  man  and  hasten  to  consider 
his  immortal  part. 


648          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

II.  HEGEL'S  WRITINGS. — The  life  of  Hegel, 
in  its  external  events,  would  already  have  passed 
out  of  memory  unless  he  had  written  books, 
which  show  what  the  man  was  at  his  highest. 
Through  these  he  now  lives  and  probably  will 
live  forever.  To  this  portion  of  his  activity  we 
shall,  accordingly,  devote  our  chief  effort.  What 
Hegel  wrote  is  for  us  properly  Hegel  himself, 
and  quite  all  of  him.  His  books  have  been  a 
prolific  source  of  other  books,  have  indeed  pro- 
duced a  Hegelian  Literature,  whose  stream  has 
by  no  means  yet  dried  up;  witness,  for  instance, 
the  present  attempt. 

The  Writings  of  Hegel  are  of  considerable 
bulk,  of  varied  contents,  and  are  scattered 
through  many  years.  But  their  depth  far  out- 
strips their  length  or  their  quantity ;  they  are 
peculiarly  difficult,  compared  even  with  other 
philosophic  books;  the  effort  required  to  read 
understandingly  a  product  of  Hegel  calls  forth 
the  mind's  strongest  tension,  and  it  must  often 
be  repeated. 

If,  therefore,  we  multiply  length  by  depth,  or 
the  number  of  Hegel's  books  by  the  labor  of 
reading  them,  we  have  here  a  greater  mass  of 
writing  than  any  other  man  of  the  past  has  pre- 
cipitated upon  posterity.  Lope  de  Vega,  Alex- 
ander Dumas,  Mrs.  South  worth  have  each 
written  several  times  more  pages,  but  these  are 
on  the  surface,  not  one  inch  thick,  usually;  but 


HEGEL'S  WHITINGS.  649 

Hegel's  superficies,  even  if  much  smaller,  reaches 
to  the  center  of  the  earth,  yes,  to  the  center  of 
the  universe.  Thus  the  inside  is  enormously 
greater  than  the  outside,  and  the  reader  must  be 
ever  alert  to  see  not  merely  this  little  fragment 
before  him,  but  in  it  to  behold  all,  in  the  part  to 
view  the  whole  of  which  it  is  a  part  and  which 
makes  it  a  part. 

Hence  looms  up  portentously  the  question: 
How  shall  we  organize  this  vast  work  of  the 
man,  vaster  than  the  pyramids,  and  infinitely 
more  complex  in  arrangement?  For  it  claims 
to  reflect  the  Universe  with  all  the  intricacy  re- 
vealed by  the  microscope  and  all  the  magnitude 
revealed  by  the  telescope.  Recollect  it  is  not 
now  the  purpose  simply  to  order  one  book  of 
Hegel;  that  he  has  always  done  himself;  nor 
is  it  to  put  his  books  in  a  consecutive  line  with 
an  account  of  the  contents  of  each  of  them, 
one  after  the  other.  The  far  greater  problem  at 
present  is  to  organize  Hegel  himself  as  a  colossal 
philosophic  totality ;  to  order  all  his  books  as  one 
great  book  which  he  did  not  and  could  not  order 
himself,  this  being  possible  only  to  some  o*ne 
coming  after  him  and  looking  back  at  the  en- 
tire sweep  of  his  career  when  it  is  closed  if  not 
completed. 

We,  therefore,  from  our  retrospective  view- 
point in  the  following  Century,  must  see  Hegel, 
great  as  he  is,  as  a  part  of  a  process  greater  than 


650         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

himself,  in  which  he  is  to  take  his  place  and  by 
which  he  is  ultimately  to  be  judged,  Still  we 
shall  find  in  him  unconsciously  that  greater  pro- 
cess of  which  he  is  but  a  part,  else  he  could  not 
be  a  part  of  it;  the  mighty  totality  of  the  en- 
tire Nineteenth  Century  is  lurking  in  him  every- 
where and  even  the  mightier  totality  of  the 
Twentieth  Century  can  often  be  felt  throbbing 
in  his  creative  soul  unborn  but  with  many  a  dis- 
tant premonition  of  its  approaching  birth. 

Hegel's  Writings,  therefore,  will  be  seen  to 
form  a  cycle  which  he  did  not  and  could  not 
make  of  them  as  a  Whole  but  which  he  did 
make  of  each  book  by  itself,  and  also  of  the 
sum  total  of  sciences  in  his  Encyclopedia. 
But  just  this  Encyclopedia,  the  cycle  of  the 
totality  of  science,  is  itself  only  a  part  or  stage 
of  even  Hegel's  entire  work,  and  a  still  lesser 
part  of  the  Century's  movement.  Hegel's  Writ- 
ings have  been  published  in  18  volumes,  which 
for  our  present  purpose  we  put  into  three 
classes.  (1)  Several  volumes  are  miscella- 
neous, containing  reviews,  articles,  essays,  etc., 
and  representing  the  journalistic  side  of  Hegel's 
activity.  (2)  The  complete  books  which  he 
wrote  himself  —  unquestionably  his  greatest 
works,  of  which  all  the  rest  are  applications  and 
amplifications  (  Werke  in  II-VII  chiefly).  (3) 
The  third  class  is  made  up  of  the  complete 
books  edited  by  his  pupils  (VII1-XV,  the  largest 


HEGEL'S  WRITINGS.  651 

part  in  bulk).  These  are  the  Writings  which 
extend  through  nearly  thirty  years  of  Hegel's 
life,  and  which  we  shall  seek  to  organize  and  un- 
fold in  their  inner  cyclical  process.  This  we 
shall  formulate  in  advance  as  follows :  — 

I.  The  Evolutionary  Hegel;  the  Evolution  of 
the  Absolute  as  the  outcome  and  end  of  Philos- 
ophy ;  the  philosopher  rises  to  the    First  Prin- 
ciple or  Essence  of    all  things  in  its  immediate 
form.     To  this  Absolute,  as  end   to  be  attained 
by  an  evolutionary  movement,  there  will  be  three 
roads  described  separately  in  three  of   Hegel's 
most  important  books. 

II.  The  Encyclopedic  Hegel;  the  Evolution  of 
the  Absolute  as  the  Norm  of  Philosophy,  which 
is  cyclical  in  itself  and  in  all  its  separate  stages. 
Thus  the  philosopher  throws  his  thought  into  a 
round  of  cycles  self-separating  and  self-return- 
ing in  each    and    in  the  whole.     This  we    may 
deem  the  second  stage    of  the  total    Hegel,   as 
his  Absolute  now  divides  within  itself  and  shows 
itself  as  process  which  is  his  total  Philosophy. 

III.  The  Philosopharch  Hegel;  the  Evolution 
of  the  Absolute  realized,    which    is   now  applied 
and  made  practical  in  the  world,  passing  out  of 
Intellect  into  Will.  Hegel,  intellecually  the  ruler 
of  the  Absolute,  now  becomes  the  absolute  ruler 
practically  in  his  sphere  (of  course  not  without 
opposition) ;  thus  the  philosopher  becomes  the 
Philosopharch   (an   unheard    of    thing    in    the 


652        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

World's  History,  and  hence  requiring  a  new 
name).  In  this  last  stage  we  may  see  a  return 
to  the  first  one,  to  the  absolute  Hegel,  who  there 
a  thought,  here  becomes  a  reality,  the  actual 
Absolute  incarnate  and  at  work  in  his  realm. 
Such  is  the  cycle  of  Hegel's  own  Evolution  as 
manifested  in  his  writings  and  here  given  by  way 
of  preparation  in  brief  shadowy  outline  which  is 
to  be  filled  in  with  the  details  of  the  later  exposi- 
tion. 

Thus  out  of  the  theoretical  Absolute  has 
evolved  the  practical  Absolute,  or  the  Ab- 
solute has  become  absolutistic.  The  Napoleon  of 
Philosophy  succeeds  the  Napoleon  of  the  State ; 
the  World-Spirit  seated  in  the  professorial  chair 
has  taken  the  place  of  *  *  the  World-Spirit  on 
horseback/'  The  whole  movement  is  evolu- 
tionary or  developmental,  though  it  has  within 
itself  also  the  cyclical  movement  as  an  element 
counteractive  yet  therein  propelling.  This  double 
process  united  in  a  third  we  shall  often  find 
formulated  by  Hegel ;  but  now  we  are  to  see  it  and 
formulate  it  as  the  process  underlying  his  whole 
career  to  the  end. 

We  should  note  again  that  before  the  evolu- 
tionary Period  Hegel  had  a  revolutionary  Period, 
that  part  of  his  life  and  thought  belonging  to  the 
Eighteenth  Century,  through  which  he  had  to  go 
in  its  last  and  most  complete  negative  act.  Such 
an  experience  lies  back  of  him  and  prepares  him 


HEGEUS  WHITINGS.  653 

for  his  great  work;  he  must  overcome  negation 
and  reduce  it  to  a  moment  or  an  element  of 
his  thought,  in  which  it  will  appear  as  the  Dia- 
lectic, that  subtle,  elusive  principle  which  gives 
his  readers  so  much  trouble  to  catch  and  hold. 

In  various  ways  we  may  imagine  this  colossal 
sweep  of  Hegel's  Spirit  in  his  Writings:  the 
ascent  in  thought  from  the  finite  world  to  the 
Absolute;  then  the  whirl  of  it  including  all  things, 
each  in  a  whirl  (or  process);  finally  the  descent 
or  the  going-back  to  the  finite  world  in  action 
with  the  authority  of  the  Absolute.  Or  we  can 
in  a  general  way  designate  the  entire  movement 
in  its  three  stages  as  the  centripetal,  the  circu- 
lar, and  the  centrifugal.  But  enough  of  these 
preliminary  metaphors ;  only  at  the  end  can  we 
look  back  to  this  beginning  and  observe  whether 
the  before-mentioned  cycle  of  Hegel's  work  is 
justified,  whether  we  can  see  three  Hegels,  yet 
one  and  a  process. 


654        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 


I.  THE  EVOLUTIONARY  HEGEL. 

This  is  Hegel  striking  the  key-note  of  his  Cen- 
tury, evolving  and  formulating  the  Absolute  as 
evolutionary .  Both  these  terms  apply  to  him  ; 
we  might  also  name  him  the  absolute  Hegel  dur- 
ing this  period. 

It  may  be  said  that  all  Philosophy  is  a  search 
for  the  Absolute,  the  First  Principle,  the  Es- 
sence of  things  (the  ousia  of  the  on  as  the  old 
Greek  put  it).  The  truly  philosophic  Ego  by  its 
own  inborn  nature  can  have  no  peace  till  it 
find  the  imperial  thought  of  the  universe  and 
formulate  it  in  a  category.  Hegel  may  well  be 
deemed  the  final  outcome  and  culmination  of 
this  tendency  from  the  beginning  of  Philosophy ; 
he  is  supremely  the  philosopher  of  the  Absolute 
explicity  unfolded  and  affirmed  in  its  most  com- 
manding phase. 

Herein  is  suggested  what  is  the  peculiar  ele- 
ment in  Hegel's  Absolute;  it  is  evolutionary. 
Evolving  and  itself  evolved  he  shows  it ;  thus  it 
is  the  fundamental  principle  of  his  Philosophy, 
and  becomes  the  first  great  stage  of  his  Century's 
thought.  Indeed  the  Evolution  of  the  Absolute 
is  Hegel's  own  Evolution.  What  else  could  he  be? 
Is  it  not  his  mind,  his  self  which  is  evolving  this 
whole  evolutionary  process?  Hence,  we  may 
also  consider  this  first  stage  of  Hegel's  original 


THE  EVOLU  TJONAE  Y  HE  GEL .  655 

thinking  as  the  absolute  Hegel,  or  the  philosopher 
evolving  the  Absolute  as  the  fundamental  princi- 
ple of  the  All. 

Now  Hegel  in  the  present  stage  (as  evolution- 
ary) moves  toward  his  goal  along  three  different 
lines ;  he  penetrates  to  the  center  of  the  Universe 
from  three  different  directions  upon  three  sepa- 
rate radii  as  it  were,  passing  from  three  distinct 
starting-points.  These  three  diversje  roads  to  the 
Absolute  are  represented  by  three  diverse  books 
describing  the  journey,  which  books  may  be 
rightly  considered  Hegel's  greatest,  most  origi- 
nal productions,  since  they  are  specifically  his 
creative  ones,  the  genetic  source  of  what  is  dis- 
tinctive in  his  Philosophy,  which  really  develops 
out  of  these  three  books.  They  are  the  following. 

A.  The  History  of  Philosophy  has  an  histo- 
rical setting,    and  shows  a   line  of  many  philo- 
sophic Egos,  each  with  his  principle  or  system, 
in  successive  Evolution  through  the  ages,  till  the 
Absolute  as  self -knowing  Self  is  reached.     The 
start  is  made  from  the  first  philosopher  with  his 
principle. 

B.  The  Phenomenology  of  Spirit  has  a  psy- 
chological setting,    and    shows    one    philosophic 
Ego  evolving  a  line  of  many  successive  forms  or 
stages  of  consciousness,  which  are  stimulated  by 
the  outside  world  till  the  Absolute  as  the  self- 
knowing  Self  is  reached.    The  start  is  made  from 
the  first  act  of  sense-perception  in  consciousness. 


656         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

C.  The  Logic  has  a  metaphysical  setting  and 
shows  a  line  of  pure  Thought-forms  or  Essences 
which  the  absolute  Ego  evolves  in  its  movement 
from  its  most  abstract  to  its  most  concrete  stage, 
which  latter  is  the  Absolute  as  self -knowing  Self 

O 

(Hegel's  absolute  Idea).  The  start  is  made  from 
the  most  abstract  thought  of  the  Absolute 
(which  with  Hegel  is  Pure  Being). 

We  have  ^aid  and  have  tried  to  indicate  in 
the  preceding  formulations  that  these  books  are 
three  roads  to  the  same  goal,  the  Absolute.  Yet 
they  are  internally  connected  together,  and  be- 
long to  one  man's  evolution  at  three  different 
stages,  and  thus  constitute  a  psychical  process  in 
themselves.  The  History  of  Philosophy  is  more 
immediate,  being  in  Space  and  Time,  with  a  row 
of  Spirits  declaring  their  doctrines.  But  the 
Phenomenology  has  a  row  of  phenomena  thrown 
out  of  himself  (separated)  by  an  individual 
Spirit,  while  the  Logic  has  a  row  of  the  Pure 
Thoughts  of  the  Absolute  Spirit  chiefly  as  they 
have  appeared  in  Time,  and  thus  is  a  return  to 
the  historical  element.  These  preliminary  state- 
ments will,  we  hope, be  explained  and  confirmed  by 
the  following  detailed  discussion  of  these  three 
books. 

A.    THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

This  is  the  work  which  we  place  at  the  begin- 
ning, since  it  may  well  be  deemed  the  foundation 


HEGEL'S  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY.        657 

of  all  Hegel's  philosophizing.  The  History  of 
Philosophy  was  his  chief  education  in  Phi- 
losophy, the  genetic  discipline  underlying  all 
his  works.  Out  of  it  he  unfolded  the  three  basic 
principles  which  he  worked  over  and  over  again 
through  his  whole  career:  the  Evolution  of 
Thought,  the  cyclical  movement  of  Philosophy, 
and  the  philosophic  Norm.  It  may  also  be  said 
that  the  History  of  Philosophy  overarches 
Hegel's  philosophic  life  from  beginning  to  end. 
We  can  find  traces  of  the  study  of  it  during  his 
student  years  at  Tubingen.  In  Switzerland  it 
was  not  neglected  in  his  historic  reading,  but 
particularly  at  Frankfort  the  History  of  Philoso- 
phy seems  to  have  been  his  favorite  and  most 
deeply  studied  and  appropriated  discipline.  It 
was  there  that  he  probed  the  depths  of  Greek 
Philosophy  and  assimilated  its  riches,  so  that 
when  he  passed  to  Jena  he  soon  felt  himself 
ready  to  give  a  course  in  the  History  of  Philoso- 
phy. This  took  place  in  1805-6,  and  opened 
his  academic  career  in  the  present  branch.  At 
Heidelberg  he  repeated  this  course  twice,  once 
during  each  of  the  two  years  of  his  stay.  At 
Berlin  the  record  runs  that  he  gave  six  full 
courses  on  the  History  of  Philosophy,  and  was 
engaged  upon  the  seventh,  in  the  fall  of  1831, 
when,  after  two  lectures  of  the  course,  delivered 
"  with  the  greatest  flow  of  discourse,  death  sud- 
denly called  him  away"  (Michelet). 
42 


658          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Hence,  we  repeat  that  the  History  of  Philoso- 
phy is  the  arch  spanning  Hegel's  philosophic 
activity  from  inception  to  conclusion.  From  his 
first  University  lecture  to  his  last  upon  this  sub- 
ject intervenes  a  period  of  more  than  twenty-five 
years,  a  period  embracing  all  of  his  great  books, 
which  we  may  imagine  dropping  down  out  of 
various  portions  of  this  celestial  bow.  The  His- 
tory of  Philosophy  was  what  chiefly  made  Hegel 
a  philosopher,  given  his  inborn  tendency  and  his 
time ;  hence  it  should  be  placed  first  in  a  genetic 
or  evolutionary  view  of  his  Works. 

But  while  the  book  has  this  general  relation  to 
all  the  books  that  follow  it  in  succession,  it 
has  also  a  special  relation  to  the  Phenomenology 
and  the  Logic  as  the  Evolution  of  the  Absolute 
in  Philosophy.  It  thus  directly  represents  a 
phase  of  the  evolutionary  Hegel,  as  we  call  him  in 
the  present  stage,  Hegel  evolving  the  Absolute 
(or  absolute  Knowing)  as  his  ultimate  principle 
of  Philosophy.  It  is  properly  the  first  one 
of  the  three  lines  on  which  he  moves  to  his 
supreme  thought.  The  History  of  Philosophy 
shows  this  movement  in  Time  which  brings 
forth  the  successive  systems  of  philosophers 
from  the  beginning  till  they  reach  the  self- 
conscious  All,  the  Absolute  of  Hegel.  It  is  a 
line  of  persons  with  their  doctrines,  usually  but 
by  no  means  always,  arranged  in  threes  —  the 
Triad  being  not  yet  so  fully  explicit  as  it  be- 


HEGEUS  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY.       659 

came  later.  Thus  we  may  consider  it  specially 
Hegel's  personal  Evolution,  in  which  he  turns 
back  to  the  first  appearance  of  philosophers 
(say  that  of  Milesian  Thales),  and  beholds  them 
personally  evolve  in  their  doctrines  till  himself 
who  is  the  absolute  philosopher  and  so  the  goal 
of  the  History  of  Philosophy,  the  end  of  the 
line,  which  in  its  whole  length  shows  how  he  got 
to  be  as  philosopher.  In  this  way  he  becomes 
aware  of  his  own  Evolution,  and  thereby  of  all 
Evolution,  Philosophy  being  the  absolute,  all- 
inclusive  science.  He  is  the  philosopher  who 
has  in  him  the  Evolution  of  all  the  other  philos- 
ophers as  his  principle,  which  is  the  Absolute 
turning  back  to  the  commencement  and  taking 
up  the  entire  line  and  thus  becoming  self- 
conscious,  that  is,  knowing  itself  as  evolutionary. 
So  Hegel,  truly  called  the  philosopher  of  reality, 
starts  with  Philosophy  as  a  reality  immediate, 
existent  as  a  fact  before  him,  and  unfolding  in 
Space  and  Time.  (There  are  three  volumes  of 
this  History  of  Philosophy  which  we  shall  cite 
in  order  as  I,  II,  III,  which  in  the  original 
Werke  are  XIII,  XIV,  XV.  A  translation  has 
been  mado  by  Haldane.) 

I.  We  should  note,  however,  that  Hegel's  History 
of  Philosophy  is  chiefly  the  History  of  Greek  Philoso- 
phy. He  has,  indeed,  something  to  say  upon  the 
medieval  and  modern  Periods,  but  it  is  less  hearty  on 
the  whole,  and  shows  itself  often  to  be  a  mere  com- 


660         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

pilation.  Of  the  three  volumes  the  first  and  second, 
and  a  small  part  of  third  are  devoted  to  Greek  Philos- 
ophy ;  that  is,  almost  two-thirds  of  the  entire  work. 
But  when  we  come  to  execution,  style  and  love  of  the 
theme,  the  difference  is  far  greater  than  that  indi- 
cated by  quantity.  It  is  evident  that  Hegel  dwelt 
upon  the  Hellenic  world  with  a  peculiar , inborn  de- 
light, as  if  he  might  be  an  old  Greek  re-incarnated. 
Utterly  mistaken  is  the  explanation  of  editor  Michelet 
that "  on  account  of  a  want  of  time  the  author  had  to 
be  briefer  toward  the  end  than  at  the  beginning," 
since  the  hours  allotted  to  the  course  were  exhausted. 
If  Hegel  had  loved  modern  Philosophy  as  he  did 
ancient,  the  preponderance  could  have  been  just  as 
well  the  other  way. 

It  was  the  History  of  Greek  Philosophy,  then,  from 
which  Hegel  received  his  primal  philosophic  training. 
Indeed  we  notice  a  marked  difference  in  his  unfolding 
of  the  different  periods  of  Greek  Philosophy.  It  is 
very  plain  that  the  second  or  Hellenistic,  and  the 
third  or  Alexandrian  periods  attracted  him  much  less 
than  the  first,  extending  from  Thales  to  the  death 
of  Aristotle.  This  first  period  takes  up  more  than 
twice  as  much  space  as  the  other  two  put  together 
and  here  again  we  may  note  a  corresponding  difference 
in  style,  in  interest,  and  it  must  be  added  in  knowl- 
edge of  the  subject.  Now  this  first  period  of  Greek 
Philosophy  (we  call  it  the  Hellenic —  see  our  Ancient 
European  Philosophy)  is  the  genetic  period  or  Evolu- 
tion of  Philosophy  itself  as  the  chief  European  Dis- 
cipline. Philosophy  not  only  begins  but  passes 
through  its  first  complete  cycle  (from  Thales  to  Aris- 
totle), which  primordial  cycle  may  be  justly  deemed 


HEGEL'S  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY.        661 

the  creative  source  of  all  other  philosophies  and  philo- 
sophic cycles  rising  afterwards.  At  this  first  gush  of 
the  philosophic  fountain  of  the  ages  Hegel  drank, 
drank  long  and  deeply  at  an  early  time  and  kept 
going  back  for  repeated  draughts  during  his  whole 
life :  he  was  standing  by  this  fountain  and  dipping 
from  it  for  his  pupils  "when  death  suddenly  called 
him  away.'* 

The  History  of  Greek  Philosophy  particularly  of 
the  First  Period  (the  Hellenic)  remains  a  permanent 
contribution  to  the  present  subject,  even  if  it  too  is  in 
the  grand  Evolution  and  has  to  be  re- written,,  There 
is  a  buoyancy  about  it  which  deeply  corresponds  to 
the  theme,  to  the  age,  to  the  people  —  to  that  youthful, 
joyous  Hellenic  soul  whose  fresh  breath  still  re-vivifies 
old  Europe,  which  has  to  go  back  thither  for  new  life 
or  Renascence.  Hegel  went  back  and  constructed 
one  of  the  best  roads  to  that  happy  land  of  the  past. 
Still  we  have  at  last  to  cry  out  to  him  and  to  Europe : 
You  must  go  forward  to  your  New  World,  not  back- 
ward ;  the  coming  renewed  youth  of  man  lies  ahead  of 
you  in  Space  and  Time,  not  to  the  rear. 

There  is,  however,  a  completeness  about  Greek 
Philosophy,  a  finished  character,  rounded  off  and 
artistic  in  its  form,  which  makes  it  a  lasting 
means  of  all  noble  education.  A  plastic  character 
it  has,  like  a  statue  of  Phidias.  Something  of 
the  instinctive  Greek  Spirit  Hegel  certainly  has, 
and  he  also  has  and  knows  its  inner  contradiction 
through  which  it  is  at  last  to  perish.  Hence 
comes  the  fact  that  the  tragedy  of  the  Hellenic  world 
Hegel  has  felt  an-d  portrayed  more  sympathetically 
and  more  profoundly  than  any  other  known  man  an- 


662         MODERN  EUROPEAN"  PHILOSOPHY. 

cieot  or  modern.  We  should  say  that  the  literary 
culmination  of  the  History  of  Philosophy,  if  not  all  of 
Hegel's  Writings  is  his  account  of  the  trial  and 
death  of  Socrates,  which  he  calls  the  tragedy  of 
Athens,  typical  and  prophetic  of  the  tragic  outcome  of 
the  entire  Greek  world.  Moreover  from  the  fate  of 
the  Athenian  philosopher  he  derives  the  very  nature 
of  all  Tragedy  in  its  aesthetic  character:  "two  ethical 
principles  fall  into  conflict,  each  goes  to  pieces  through 
the  other"  (II.  103).  The  conflict  of  Socrates  was 
essentially  that  of  conscience  against  law,  that  of  the 
inner  right  of  the  individual  against  the  outer  right  of 
the  State.  Both  sides  have  their  justification,  yet 
both  are  in  a  sense  wrong ;  the  two  grapple  and 
usually  perish  together.  Hegel  will  show  that  the 
great  Athenian  tragic  dramas,  particularly  the 
Antigone  of  Sophocles,  spring  from  such  a  collision. 
In  this  field  Hegel  has  done  an  eternal  work.  One 
thinks  that  he  must  have  written  out  this  conflict  of 
Socrates  when  he  was  himself  balancing  between  the 
two  sides,  when  he  might  have  been  tragic  himself 
either  way,  so  sympathetic  is  he  with  both.  Thus  the 
account  itself,  in  spite  of  its  philosophic  thought, 
becomes  highly  poetical  in  spirit  if  not  in  form  ;  it  is 
the  Socratic  tragedy,  not  only  in  its  immediate  poetic 
action,  but  at  the  same  time  knowing  itself  as  tragic 
and  telling  the  reason  why.  Hegel's  own  collision 
reflected  in  his  beloved  Hellas  we  may  here  in  a 
measure  see ;  but  later  he  will  be  more  decided,  he 
will  lean  to  the  Absolute  as  supremely  embodied  in 
the  State  and  vindicate  complete  submission  to  its 
authority  on  the  part  of  the  individual. 

II.  But  at  this   point  a  difficulty   presents  itself. 


HEGEL1  S  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY.       663 

An  impression  is  left  from  many  an  essay  and  treat- 
ise upon  Hegel  and  his  Writings  that  the  History  of 
Philosophy  is  his  latest  and  most  mature  production. 
This  impression  is  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  in  the  col- 
lected edition  of  his  Works  the  History  of  Philosophy 
is  put  the  last  in  the  order  of  his  great  books.  At  Ber- 
lin indeed  Hegel  was  zealous  in  lecturing  upon  this 
theme  as  already  stated.  But  the  work  was  sub- 
stantially written  at  Jena  when  he  gave  his  first  course 
there  in  1805-6.  The  following  is  the  statement  of 
his  editor  Michelet :  "The  Jena  manuscript  is  the 
only  one  we  possess,  executed  by  his  own  hand,  and 
set  forth  in  a  finished  style  almost  throughout."  Of 
this  he  wrote  a  brief  abstract  while  at  Heidelberg. 
"  All  the  additions  that  he  made  during  the  succeed- 
ing courses  (at  Berlin)  he  either  jotted  down  on  the 
margin  of  these  manuscripts  or  on  pieces  of  paper 
inserted  between  their  leaves,  and  containing  his  ran- 
dom thoughts  in  a  sketchy  manner."  The  introduc- 
tion, however,  was  re- written  at  Berlin  probably 
several  times  in  part.  So  we  have  in  the  book  two 
main  portions :  the  Jena  manuscript  which  "•  presents 
the  simple  abstract  conception  of  the  matter,"  and 
the  later  additions  which  "  contain  its  development." 
Thus  the  Jena  manuscript  **  furnishes  the  foundation, 
or,  so  to  speak,  the  skeleton  upon  which  the  more 
juicy  flesh  of  his  later  thought  had  to  fasten  itself." 
From  these  statements  it  is  evident  that  the  History 
of  Philosophy  was  in  substance  composed  at  Jena  and 
delivered  as  a  course  of  lectures,  though  there  are  in 
the  book  many  interpolations  of  his  later  thinking. 
Moreover  editor  Michelet  throws  out  the  observation 
by  the  way  that  Hegel  "  may  have  acquired  his  point 


664        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  view"  from  this  study  of  the  History  of  Philoso- 
phy, to  which  he  devoted  so  many  courses  of  lectures, 
and  that  "  it  may  furnish  the  best  key  for  the  under- 
standing of  his  whole  Philosophy."  (Geschichte  der 
Philosophic,  Vorrede,  for  all  the  cited  passages.) 

We  are,  therefore,  safe  in  considering  the  History 
of  Philosophy  as  Hegel's  earliest  written  book  from 
an  independent  standpoint.  To  be  sure  he  had  com- 
posed essays  and  studies  before  this,  considerable  in 
number  and  length ;  but  they  belong  to  the  period  of 
his  apprenticeship,  of  acquisition  and  preparation. 
Already  in  1803  he  had  shown  his  dissatisfaction 
with  the  Philosophy  of  Schelling  whose  disciple  he  was 
during  the  first  years  of  his  Jena  career.  But  what 
caused  him  to  transcend  Schelling?  No  doubt  his 
inner  genius  responding  to  the  spirit  of  the  age  ;  but 
this  genius  of  his  was  powerfully  nourished  and  cla- 
rified by  deep  meditation  upon  the  philosophical  de- 
velopment of  all  ages.  It  is  fair  to  conclude  that  by 
means  of  the  History  of  Philosophy  he  broke  through 
his  revolutionary  into  his  evolutionary  Period,  and  was 
thereby  born  again,  becoming  now  an  original  phi- 
losopher with  his  own  fundamental  principle. 

On  the  other  hand  we  are  not  to  forget  that  in  the 
present  book  are  expressions  taken  "  from  every  epoch 
of  Hegel's  philosophic  culture,"  as  the  editor  confesses, 
who  nevertheless  uses  the  Jena  manuscript  "  as  the 
foundation"  to  which  the  rest  is  added.  We  cannot 
always  tell  to  what  period  of  Hegel's  development  a 
given  citation  belongs,  though  we  may  be  sure  that  it  is 
Hegel's.  Ordinarily  this  is  enough  for  our  purpose. 

III.  Thus  somewhere  toward  the  beginning  of  the 
Jena  Period  we  place  Hegel's  History  of  Philosophy. 


HEGEUS  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY.       665 

This  is  acknowledged  to  be  one  of  his  greatest  works, 
and  has  retained  its  influence  down  to  the  present 
time.  It  was  not  printed  by  Hegel  during  his  life, 
though  he  must  have  intended  its  publication  by  the 
care  which  he  has  given  to  the  style  of  certain  por- 
tions, as  well  as  by  the  fullness  of  expression,  which 
at  times  becomes  quite  rhetorical. 

The  History  of  Philosophy  was  doubtless  the  chief 
source  whence  Hegel  derived  his  idea  of  spiritual  Evo- 
lution, which  became  a  dominating  principle  with  him 
during  his  stage  we  call  evolutionary.  Still  he  by  no 
means  neglected  the  other  grand  factor  of  his  system 
which  had  come  down  to  him  from  Greek  Thought  and 
of  which  he  seems  to  have  become  fully  conscious  at 
Frankfort.  This  is  the  threefold  philosophic  Norm, 
upon  which  we  have  already  dwelt.  Two  tendencies, 
then,  we  find  in  Hegel  during  the  present  time, 
which  we  may  name  the  evolutionary  and  the  cyclical. 
The  former  is  his  original  philosophic  act,  is  that  which 
gives  him  his  great  place  in  Philosophy.  The  latter,  the 
cyclical,  indicated  by  the  word  Encyclopedia,  is  his 
inheritance  from  Plato  and  Aristotle,  and  hints  the 
circular  movement  in  which  philosophic  thought 
has  always  expressed  itself  where  it  has  reached 
a  high  degree  of  completeness.  But  now  the 
addition  of  the  fundamental  idea  of  the  Nine- 
teenth Century,  that  of  Evolution,  is  to  take  place; 
this  idea  is  to  show  itself  in  its  first  germinal  form  as 
thought,  and  is  to  interweave  itself  into  the  philosophic 
Norm  of  the  past.  Such  is  the  process  which  begins 
to  ferment  in  Hegel  at  the  present  epoch  of  his  career ; 
the  Spirit's  infolding  for  2,500  years  in  a  line  of  philo- 
sophic systems  he  is  to  knit  into  the  inherent  cycle  of 


666        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

all  Thought.  These  two  tendencies,  we  say,  run 
through  this  entire  stage  in  repeated  struggles,  and 
in  repeated  reconciliations. 

We  hold,  then,  it  is  the  History  of  Philosophy  with  its 
succession  of  principles  and  systems  which  suggests 
most  emphatically  the  idea  of  Evolution  of  the  Spirit. 
The  outer  historic  sequence  of  these  Forms  of 
Thought  lures  the  inquiring  mind  to  look  within  them 
and  to  find  the  secret  source  of  their  connection  and 
order.  It  is  also  to  be  observed  that  such  a  History 
of  Philosophy  brings  to  light  not  merely  one  phase  of 
the  philosophic  Norm,  but  many  such  phases  in  a 
consecutive  line,  so  that  the  Evolution  of  Philosophy 
is  a  series  of  shapes  or  embodiments  of  this  philo- 
sophic Norm,  till  the  final,  all-inclusive  one  be 
reached.  The  Evolution,  therefore,  is  not  through  a 
row  of  fixed  forms,  but  of  processes,  each  of  which 
has  within  itself  the  cyclical  movement,  and  is  at  the 
same  time  a  part  or  a  stage  of  the  great  evolutionary 
movement  outside  of  itself.  So  Hegel  is  to  labor  at 
bringing  into  harmony  two  opposing  tendencies,  the 
new  and  the  old,  the  evolutionary  and  the  cyclical, 
the  developmental  and  the  encyclopedic ;  the  progress 
of  the  sciences  must  be  seen  to  be  cyclical,  and  the 
cyclus  of  sciences  (the  Encyclopedia)  must  be  seen  to 
be  progressive.  Accordingly  our  philosopher  as  the 
discipline  of  his  coming  career,  grapples  with  the 
History  of  Philosophy  which  shows  the  two  foregoing 
opposite  elements  in  their  primal  manifestation. 

IV.  At  this  point  a  question  rises:  Why  should  the 
thought  of  Evolution  so  emphatically  spring  out  of  the 
History  of  Philosophy  just  at  this  time?  For  Phi- 
losophy had  been  known  to  have  a  history  since  Aris  - 


HEGEL'S  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY.        667 

totle  at  least,  and  this  history  had  been  studied  and 
put  together,  as  we  see  in  Cicero  and  in  Diogenes 
Laertius,  for  instance.  And  why  is  just  this  Hegel 
the  chosen  man,  the  herald  of  the  new  idea?  The 
answer  to  the  first  question  lies  in  the  character  of  the 
age.  It  was  the  time  of  the  French  Revolution,  in 
which  Form  after  Form,  especially  of  Government, 
appeared  and  vanished  with  a  rapidity  which  made 
Evolution  the  most  impressive,  yea,  oppressive  fact 
of  the  period.  Concentrated  into  a  few  years  was 
the  development  of  many  ages  just  at  this  time,  and 
upon  every  receptive  mind  it  then  stamped  itself  with 
a  power  which  is  surely  not  to  be  effaced  from 
the  future  history  of  the  race.  In  the  philosophic 
mind,  like  that  of  Hegel,  it  led  to  philosophizing,  to 
working  out  and  formulating  the  inner  principle  of 
such  a  marvelous  development.  Co-incident  with  the 
movement  of  his  period,  Hegel  could  look  back  upon 
a  considerable  development  of  his  own  individual  life. 
These  are  the  prime  conditions,  historical  and  per- 
sonal, under  which  our  philosopher  studies  anew  the 
History  of  Philosophy,  in  whose  slow  succession  he 
cannot  help  seeing  a  long-extended  French  Revo- 
lution, Form  swallowing  Form  in  a  line,  system- suc- 
ceeding system,  drawn  out  through  the  ages,  till  the 
absolute  system  appears,  and  with  it  the  Napoleon  of 
Philosophy,  who,  of  course,  can  be  none  other  than 
Hegel  himself. 

V.  We  find  Hegel  grasping  the  conception  of 
Development  or  Evolution  (Entwickelung)  in  his  In- 
troduction. "When  this  becomes  clear,  everything 
else  follows  of  itself."  He  says  that  the  object  of 
Philosophy  is  to  deal  with  Truth,  and  that  "  Truth  is 


668         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

one,  the  one  source  from  which  all  is  derived  and  to 
which  all  is  to  be  brought  back."  But  what  is  this 
Truth  ?  Hegel's  answer  is  that  it  is  the  concrete  Concep- 
tion itself,  which  he  calls  the  Idea ;  "  and  it  is  the  nature 
of  the  Idea  to  evolve  itself,  and  to  grasp  itself  through 
Evolution."  It  must  turn  back  to  itself  and  seize  its 
own  process  in  order  to  be  truly  itself.  Hence  the 
expression  of  Hegel:  "  the  Idea  must  first  make  itself 
that  which  it  is,"  ere  it  can  truly  be  or  be  the  Truth. 
It  must  be  real,  not  simply  ideal  in  the  ordinary  sense  ; 
indeed  it  is  the  ultimate  Reality  with  the  process 
thereof. 

It  should  be  here  observed  that  Hegel's  Idea  is 
not  Plato's  Idea,  which  shuns  the  real  as  a  mere 
appearance  or  indeed  a  contamination ;  the  Platonic 
dualism  is  the  grand  chasm  between  the  Idea  and  the 
actual  world.  But  Hegel  makes  this  actual  world  a 
necessary  part  of  the  Idea,  its  realization.  Herein 
he  takes  up  the  view  of  Aristotle  and  explains  him- 
self by  means  of  it  (I.  38).  "In  order  to  under- 
stand what  Evolution  is,  two  stages  must  be  distin- 
guished. The  one  is  possibility  or  the  potential 
(Aristotle's  dunamis),  the  other  is  actuality  or  the 
real  (energeia).  The  difference  between  Asiatic  and 
European  peoples  is  that  the  former  are  free  but  do 
not  know  it  (hence  are  only  potentially  free),  while 
the  latter  know  that  they  are  free  (hence  are  actually 
free)."  Thus  for  Hegel  Europe  has  attained  the 
highest  degree  of  freedom.  Moreover,  in  this  doc- 
trine of  Evolution  is  contained  the  germ  of  all  Educa- 
tion. "  All  knowing  and  learning  to  know  as  well  as 
acting  have  no  other  aim  than  to  draw  out  what  lies 
within,  and  so  to  make  it  objective,"  or  to  make  the 


HEGEL'S  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY.        669 

potential  actual.  Yet  this  development  of  the  Spirit 
is  really  a  coming  to  itself:  "Spiritual  Evolution 
consists  in  this,  that  its  going  forth  out  of  itself  and 
its  self-unfolding  is  at  the  same  time  a  return  to  itself  " 
(I.  35).  Still  further  on  the  next  page  in  an  exalted 
vein:  "  Everything  in  Heaven  and  on  Earth,  God's 
existence  and  all  temporality  strive  toward  the  end 
that  Spirit  know  itself,  make  itself  objective  to  itself, 
find  itself,  interlink  itself  with  itself.  Spirit  is  sep- 
aration, alienation,  duplication  in  order  to  come 
back  to  itself  and  to  discover  itself.  Thus  it  is 
free,  when  it  relates  itself  to  another  which  is  itself  " 
(I.  36). 

The  student  of  the  History  of  Philosophy  will  find 
many  correspondences  in  these  thoughts  of  Hegel  to 
those  of  the  Greek  philosophers.  Especially  do  we 
think  of  Aristotle  whose  fundamental  principle  of  the 
Universe  is  Thought  thinking  Thought,  or  Spirit 
recognizing  itself  in  all  objectivity.  Then  the  Neo- 
Platonic  Triad,  particularly  as  it  presents  itself  in 
Proclus  seems  to  rise  up  again  for  a  fresh  utterance 
through  this  German  thinker.  It  is  Proclus  who  has 
the  threefold  movement  as  the  basis  of  all  things:  the 
Stay  (Jfone)  which  is  the  implicit  or  potential  stage; 
then  is  the  Going-forth  (  proodos)  which  is  the  Sepa- 
ration or  Alienation  ;  finally  is  the  Return  (epistrophe) . 
It  is  true  that  Proclus  does  not  distinctly  make  these 
the  three  stages  of  the  Spirit's  self-knowing  (sichselbst 
erkennen),  though  he  has  passages  which  may  be  thus 
interpreted.  Proclus  is,  on  the  whole,  abstract  and 
metaphysical ;  against  such  abstraction  Hegel  warmly 
protests,  and  insists  upon  the  Idea  as  that  which 
posits  its  own  division  and  distinction  out  of  itself 


670        MODERN  E  UROPEAN  PHIL O SOPHY. 

and  then  cancels  the  same,  whereby  it  becomes  con- 
crete as  the  absolute  process  of  itself. 

In  the  line  of  evolutionary  forms  of  thought 
Hegel  considers  the  result  of  one  stage  of  Develop- 
ment to  be  the  starting-point  of  the  next  stage ; 
the  last  of  the  preceding  phase  is  the  first  of  the 
following  phase.  Thus  arises  "  a  row  of  Evo- 
lutions, which  must  not  be  conceived  as  a  straight 
line  running  out  to  infinity,  but  as  a  circle  which  turns 
back  into  itself,  which  great  circle  has  as  its  periphery 
a  vast  multitude  of  lesser  circles  whose  entirety  is  a 
grand  succession  of  Evolutions  bending  around  into 
itself."  (I.  40.) 

This  thought  is  specially  a  Neo-Platonic  favorite, 
occurring  in  all  three  of  the  great  masters  of  the  Neo- 
Platonic  school  —  Plotinus,  Jamblichus,  and  Proclus. 

VI.  Thus  the  History  of  Philosophy  is  a  sequence 
of  systems  of  thought,  evolving  cyclically  in  each 
particular  case,  as  well  as  in  their  totality.  But  what 
governs  the  order  of  their  succession?  The  logical 
categories.  Hegel  holds  that  the  historic  succession 
of  Philosophies  corresponds  to  the  conceptions  of 
Logic,  that  is,  of  HegeFs  Logic.  This  statement  is  a 
famous  one,  having  provoked  contradiction  from  his 
opponents,  and  even  from  some  of  his  followers  (for 
instance  Zeller  and  Schwegler).  Conversely,  the 
logical  order  is  the  order  of  the  historic  appearance 
of  Philosophies  in  their  leading  principles  (I.  43). 
This  declaration  has  been  cited  to  prove  the  historic 
substrate  of  Hegel's  Logic.  Furthermore,  "the  study 
of  the  History  of  Philosophy  is  the  study  of  Philosophy 
itself. "  Such  a  declaration  seems  to  show  the  pri- 
macy of  the  History  of  Philosophy  in  the  Evolution 


HEGEL'S  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY.        671 

of  Hegel's  thinking.  Still  just  here  occurs  a  diffi- 
culty:  "  in  order  to  recognize  the  Idea  in  its  historic 
movement,  we  have  to  bring  with  us  the  knowledge  of 
the  Idea."  (1.44.)  It  is  indeed  a  strange  pursuit: 
we  can  get  Philosophy  only  by  having  it  beforehand ; 
we  can  understand  its  History  if  we  know  in  advance 
what  it  means.  After  all,  then,  we  must  learn  the 
significance  of  Philosophy,  if  we  would  grasp  its  true 
historic  Evolution.  At  least  we  must  have  "a  ra- 
tional faith  "  that  its  phenomena  are  not  merely  a 
matter  of  chance,  but  are  "determined  through  the 
Idea." 

The  preceding  Evolution  seems  to  show  a  succession 
of  systems,  in  which  each  vanishes  into  the  next  higher 
without  end.  "  But  the  idea  it  is  which  destroys  the 
finite  shapes  of  thought ;  a  Philosophy  which  has  not 
absolute  form  identical  with  its  content  must  pass 
away."  (1.50.)  What  Philosophy  has  this?  Seem- 
ingly Hegel's.  The  previous  Philosophies  have  dis- 
appeared as  independent  systems,  but  as  parts  or 
stages  in  the  process  of  the  Whole,  they  are  eternal 
and  necessary,  being  an  organic  link  in  the  total  Evo- 
lution, whose  final  act  is  to  return  upon  itself  and 
grasp  its  complete  movement  from  the  beginning. 
"The  result  of  the  History  of  Philosophy  is  the 
Thought  which,  while  remaining  with  itself,  embraces 
at  the  same  time  the  Universe,  transforming  the  latter 
into  a  world  of  Intelligence."  (III.  617.)  So  it 
comes  that  the  last  Philosophy  is  the  Form  including 
the  totality  of  all  Forms  as  its  content.  Here  we 
reach  the  Absolute  as  the  unity  of  subject  and  object ; 
this  unification  is  the  work  of  the  subject,  positing  and 
then  canceling  its  difference  from  the  object,  which 


672        MODERN  E UEOPEAN  PHIL OSOPET. 

process  is  absolute  Knowing.  "  Science  (absolute)  is 
this:  to  know  this  unity  in  its  entire  evolution 
through  itself."  (III.  622.) 

Hegel  concludes  his  History  of  Philosophy  with  a 
far-reaching  outlook  from  a  very  lofty  eminence :  **  A 
new  epoch  has  arisen  in  the  World.  It  seems  that 
the  World-Spirit  has  now  succeeded  in  shuffling  off 
everything  alien  to  it,  and  finally  in  grasping  itself  as 
Absolute  Spirit;  what  becomes  objective  to  it,  it 
succeeds  in  creating  out  of  itself  and  peacefully  pre- 
serving in  its  own  power.  The  struggle  of  the  finite 
Self-consciousness  with  the  absolute  Self-conscious- 
ness, which  once  seemed  outside  of  it,  is  ceasing. 
The  finite  Self-consciousness  (or  Ego)  is  no  longer 
finite;  and  on  the  other  hand  just  through  this  fact 
the  absolute  Self-consciousness  (or  Ego)  has  obtained 
a  reality  which  it  hitherto  lacked."  Here  we  cannot 
help  interrupting  the  quotation  and  saying  that  Hegel 
in  this  passage  begins  to  see  beyond  Hegel  and  all 
Philosophy.  When  he  declares  that  the  absolute  Self 
has  not  true  reality  till  the  finite  Self  thinks  it 
or  re-creates  it  (for  so  we  may  understand  him), 
he  is  passing  out  of  a  philosophical  into  a  psycholog- 
ical view  of  the  Universe.  But,  to  continue  the  pass- 
age: "The  whole  course  hitherto  of  the  History  of 
the  World  in  general,  and  of  the  History  of  Philosophy 
in  particular,  represents  just  this  struggle  (between  the 
two  preceding  forms  of  Self-consciousness),  and  seems 
to  have  reached  its  goal  at  that  point  where  the  abso- 
lute Self-consciousness,  whose  idea  (Vbrstellung)  it 
possesses,  has  ceased  to  be  an  alien  matter  (to  the 
finite  Self-consciousness),  hence  at  that  point  where 
Spirit  (or  Mind,  Geist)  is  actual  as  Spirit.  For  Spirit 


BEQEUS  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY.        673 

is  actual  only  as  it  knows  itself  as  absolute  Spirit,  and 
this  knowledge  it  obtains  in  Science  "  (  WissenscJiaft, 
here  Philosophy).  Such  is  the  standpoint  of  absolute 
knowledge:  "Only  in  Science  does  Spirit  know  of 
itself  as  absolute  Spirit,  and  this  knowing  is  alone  its 
true  existence.  This  is  the  point  of  view  of  the 
present  time,  and  here  the  line  of  the  Forms  of  the 
Spirit  is  for  the  present  closed  "  (III.  662-3). 

What  next?  Has  Philosophy  reached  its  final  desti- 
nation in  the  system  of  Hegel?  Repeated  expressions 
in  the  preceding  account  bear  out  such  an  inference. 
The  word  absolute  in  itself  as  well  as  in  its  various 
applications  certainly  implies  such  a  meaning.  Yet 
there  are  other  expressions  which  indicate  that  Hegel 
is  simply  the  last  of  a  series  which  though  "closed 
for  the  present,"  may  continue  its  development  in  the 
future.  Such  is  the  dualism  manifest  in  Hegel  just 
here,  and  it  is  found  in  many  other  places,  yes,  every- 
where in  his  writings  and  in  his  thought.  Nor  is  it 
confined  to  Hegel  by  any  means,  it  is  the  dualism 
inherent  in  all  Philosophy,  which,  now  driven  into 
opposition  with  itself  at  its  deepest  point,  be- 
gins to  look  beyond  itself  toward  a  new  dis- 
cipline. Such  an  outlook  we  may  repeatedly  note 
in  the  foregoing  citations.  But  again :  "  the  individual 
is  now  to  grasp  the  inner  substantial  Spirit  V  other- 
wise he  is  blindly  driven  forward  by  it.  "Accord- 
ingly our  (Hegel's)  standpoint  is  the  knowing  of  this 
Idea  as  absolute  Spirit,  which  posits  in  opposition  to 
itself  another  Spirit,  namely  the  finite  Spirit  whose 
principle  is  to  recognize  the  absolute  Spirit  in 
order  that  this  may  become  for  it"  or  one  with  it, 
the  Absolute.  Such  is  the  height  of  Hegelian  ideal- 

43 


674         MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ism:  the  absolute  Self  (Idea)  is  to  posit  the  indi- 
vidual Self  which  is  to  return  and  recognize  that  ab- 
solute Self  in  its  absoluteness  as  the  inner  process, 
the  universal  spirit  in  all  History.  Thus  the  historic 
line  of  Philosophies  is  *'  not  a  multiplicity,  not  a  suc- 
cession, but  through  self-recognition  becomes  one 
total  Spirit  ever-present,  of  which  each  single  Philos- 
ophy is  a  moment,"  or  an  element.  The  principle 
now  is  that  the  absolute  Self  posits  or  indeed  creates 
the  finite  Self  whose  function  is  to  recognize  this  ab- 
solute Self  as  its  own  essence  or  process.  With  such 
recognition,  coming  through  Science  or  Philosophy, 
the  old  conflict  between  the  two  sides  ceases.  For 
by  means  of  Philosophy  and  its  historic  evolution,  the 
finite  Spirit  appropriates  the  World-Spirit,  which 
thereby  becomes  an  actuality,  being  embodied,  so  to 
speak,  in  individuals.  Hegel* s  last  appeal  to  his 
hearer  (or  reader)  in  the  History  of  Philosophy  is 
"to  produce  actuality"  for  this  Spirit,  which  each  is 
to  accomplish  by  recognizing  it  and  making  it  his  own, 
and  then  being  determined  by  it  to  a  philosophic 
obedience.  So  "the  struggle  between  the  finite  and 
absolute  Self-consciousness "  ends  in  submission  to 
the  latter  through  the  absolute  Knowing  imparted  by 
Philosophy. 

VII.  Such  is,  ultimately,  the  Absolute  of  Hegel, 
truly  an  Absolutism  which  the  individual  is  to  recog- 
nize as  his  own  very  Self  universalized  ;  then  he  is  to 
be  one  with  its  movement.  It  is  the  absolute  author- 
ity above  him,  which,  indeed,  he  makes  real  by  his 
recognition  of  it  and  his  subjection  to  it,  but  which  is 
put  over  him  without  his  Will.  He  does  not  make 
this  supreme  law  or  law-giver,  even  if  he  makes  them 


HEGEL'S  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY.       675 

real  by  his  obedience.  But  the  fact  is  that  the 
individual,  in  the  shape  of  the  philosopher,  has  pro- 
jected this  supreme  principle,  this  absolute  Spirit, 
which  is  to  determine  the  individual.  The  latter  part 
of  the  process  is  what  receives  the  grand  stress  in 
Hegel  at  this  point;  the  former  part  of  the  process, 
the  determination  of  the  absolute  Spirit  by  the  indi- 
vidual, is  not  explicitly  set  forth,  even  if  at  times 
implied.  In  other  words,  Hegel  proclaims  the  law 
as  authoritative  over  the  individual  recognizing  it,  but 
the  philosopher  does  not  proclaim  the  individual 
as  the  maker  of  the  law  which  is  to  govern  him.  The 
latter  principle  is  not  philosophical  but  psychological, 
not  European  but  Occidental.  Hegel  has  repeatedly 
said  that  Philosophy  is  the  thought  of  the  age  and  its 
institutions.  The  principle  of  self-legislation  or  self- 
determination  was  not  in  his  time,  nor  is  it  yet 
completely  actualized  or  made  institutional  in  Europe. 
If  we  take  Hegel  at  his  word  in  the  present  case,  his 
Philosophy  cannot  be  the  thought  of  another  age  and 
of  another  institutional  world.  It  is  not  absolute 
in  spite  of  its  name  and  his  labor  to  make  it  such.  If 
it  creates  the  individual,  the  individual  must  recreate 
it  in  order  that  it  truly  exist,  yet  this  last  is  what 
Hegel  substantially  leaves  out  of  his  process  of  the 
Absolute,  even  if  we  catch,  in  certain  elevated  pas- 
sages, fleeting  glimpses  of  what  has  been  omitted. 

It  is  probable  that  the  latter  citations  above  given 
which  affirm  so  decidedly  the  absolutistic  Absolute 
belong  to  his  Berlin  period,  though  the  editor  has 
given  us  no  authority  for  our  conjecture.  They  show 
the  spirit  of  the  Philosopharch  preaching  the  duty 
of  the  individual  to  recognize  as  Absolute  and  final 


676         MODERN  EURO PEAN  PHIL 0 S OPHY. 


f; 


the  system  of  the  Master.  Still  the  individual  is  not 
simply  to  recognize  the  Absolute  and  to  obey  its  law  ; 
but  he  is  at  last  to  make  the  mandate  which  he 

; obeys,  and  to  recreate  the  Absolute  which  creates 
him ;  in  fine  Philosophy  is  to  bring  its  follower  to 
make  his  own  Philosophy  —  which  principle,  how- 
ever, is  no  longer  Philosophy  but  its  translation  into  a 
higher  discipline.  And  the  follower  of  the  master  is 
not  yet  complete  in  his  discipleship  till  he  reproduces 
that  master  completely,  following  him  not  so  much  in 
his  thought,  but  rather  in  his  creation  of  thought. 
Such  a  principle  however  is  not  strictly  that  of  Philos- 
ophy, but  of  what  underlies  Philosophy  and  makes  it 
an  element  or  stage  of  a  greater  process. 

It  is  true  that  the  learner  must  first  study  and 
understand  and  recognize  the  Absolute,  of  which  he 
is  intellectually  the  product,  —  such  is  the  training 
of  Philosophy,  perennial  and  indispensable.  But  he  is 
finally  to  reproduce  that  which  produces  hiui,  and  thus 
make  himself  a  part  of  the  process  determining  him, 
and  this  must  be  his  conscious  principle.  We  must 
see,  therefore,  and  not  only  see  but  practically  realize 
that  to  be  a  complete  follower  of  Hegel,  we  have  to 
transcend  Hegel.  If  we  adopt  simply  the  formulas 
and  doctrines  of  the  philosopher,  we  leave  out  that 
which  makes  him  a  philosopher,  namely  his  creativity. 
But  then  if  we  reach  philosophic  creation  and  make 
another  Philosophy,  it  will  ultimately  be  found  to  have 
the  same  dualism  as  the  Hegelian  and  all  Philosophy. 
The  creative  Ego  must  not  only  formulate  anew  the 
Absolute  but  formulate  itself  as  the  formulator  of  the 
Absolute. 

VIII.  Still  Hegel  has  drawn  an  everlasting  lesson 


HEGEVS  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY.       677 

from  the  History  of  Philosophy  which  is  certain  to 
bring  forth  fruit  in  many  directions.  His  great  state- 
ment is  Evolution  of  the  Spirit,  which  is  Philosophy 
itself.  Henceforth  Philosophy  having  evolved  itself 
historically,  is  to  show  the  Evolution  of  every  form  of 
science.  The  particular  Ego  or  the  finite  Self -con- 
sciousness, having  gotten  hold  of  and  appropriated  the 
universal  Ego  or  absolute  Self-consciousness  in  its 
inner  development  has  struck  the  key-note  of  the 
whole  Century. 

From  the  History  of  Philosophy,  accordingly,  Hegel 
gets  his  original  creative  conception  of  what  Philoso- 
phy is,  especially  in  its  coming  significance.  It  is, 
however,  not  simply  the  Spirit's  Evolution  but  the 
recognition  of  the  Spirit's  Evolution,  and  the  formula- 
tion thereof  by  thought.  The  Absolute,  having  been 
found  historically  to  be  self-knowing,  must  now  give 
a  full  account  of  its  evolutionary  Self  on  every  line. 

What  will  be  the  next  line  on  which  Hegel's  think- 
ing will  develop  itself?  Just  on  that  of  the  philoso- 
pher's own  Self,  of  the  individual  Ego.  We  may  hear 
him  talking  to  himself  at  Jena:  "  I  have  attained  the 
Absolute  externally,  through  History,  can  I  not  now 
attain  it  internally,  through  myself?  The  Absolute 
is  certainly  out  yonder  in  the  world  ;  is  it  not  in  me 
too  ?  And  if  I  have  evolved  it  out  of  the  row  of 
philosophers,  can  I  not  evolve  it  out  of  myself  who  as 
the  last  philosopher  of  the  row,  must  be  the  whole  of 
it  myself  ?  In  fact,  if  I  come  right  down  to  the  real 
point  in  the  case,  who  has  made  this  Evolution  of 
Philosophy  from  the  beginning  but  myself?  It  exists 
and  has  existed,  to  be  sure  ;  but  it  has  reached  a  new 
stage,  a  new  life,  the  self-conscious  one,  through  me. 


678         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

I  say  the  Absolute  has  become  truly  self-knowing  for 
the  first  time,  and  now  knows  itself  to  be  self-knowing 
through  this  Ego  of  mine,  which  I  must  at  once  pro- 
ceed to  separate  from  its  immediate  connection  with 
the  outer  Evolution  in  the  History  of  Philosophy,  and 
I  must  make  it  evolve  itself  within  through  its  own 
inner  events  or  stages." 

So  we  may  picture  a  bit  of  Hegel's  own  Evolution 
as  he  passes  to  writing  his  Phenomenology  of  Spirit, 
a  book  which  has  a  peculiar  personal  flavor,  being  the 
individual  development  of  the  Ego  into  the  Absolute 
or  Universal  which  is  also  Ego. 

B.  HEGEL'S  PHENOMENOLOGY. 

The  second  line  or  way  on  which  Hegel  moved 
toward  and  into  the  Absolute  goes  by  the  name 
of  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  «<  The  science  of 
this  way  is  the  science  of  experience,  which  the 
mind  or  consciousness  makes,"  and  which 
appears  as  forms  of  this  consciousness.  "  Such 
a  system  of  the  mind's  experience  embraces 
only  the  appearances  or  the  phenomena  of  the 
same,"  hence  the  above  title.  (Ph.  s.  27,  29.) 
"  What  appears  to  be  an  activity  against  the 
Ego  is  found  to  be  its  own  activity,"  which 
constitutes  the  Appearance  that  is  to  be  canceled. 
"  Thus  the  movement  seems  only  negative," 
but  this  is  again  the  seeming,  the  Appearance 
which  is  itself  to  be  negated.  For  it  is  the 
nature  of  Spirit  to  appear:  "  to  become  another 
to  itself,  that  is,  an  object  of  its  Self,  in  order 


HEQEUS  PHENOMENOLOGY.  679 

to  cancel  this  otherness  (dieses  Andersseyn 
aufzuheben) ."  Thus  we  lay  before  the  reader 
at  the  start  a  specimen  of  the  peculiar  subtle 
dialect  of  this  book  —  a  new  German  dialect 
which  has  to  be  learned  before  much  can  be 
done.  It  is  evident,  however,  that  the  Phe- 
nomenology is  at  bottom  the  separative  stage  of 
a  larger  process,  moving  as  it  does  in  a  long 
chasm  of  separations  between  Ego  and  Appear- 
ance, subject  and  object,  the  individual  and 
world,  which  separations  are  all  to  be  annulled, 
one  after  the  other,  up  to  the  Absolute  Ego  or 
Person,  the  self -knowing  One.  Hence  the 
double  demand :  Science  requires  of  the 
individual  that  "  he  elevate  himself  into  this 
ethereal  realm  of  the  Absolute  in  order 
to  live  with  it  and  in  it,"  to  identify 
himself  completely  with  its  process.  "On  the 
other  hand,  the  individual  has  the  right  to 
demand  of  Science  that  it  reach  to  him  the  lad- 
der for  climbing  up  to  this  viewpoint,  or  rather 
show  this  also  to  him  in  himself"  (Ph.  s.  20). 
Such  is  the  famous  phenomenological  ladder 
reaching  upward  into  the  pure  ether  of  the 
Absolute,  erected  by  Hegel  for  his  students, 
who  have  usually  found  it  exceedingly  difficult  to 
ascend.  One  more  sentence  giving  the  main 
purport  of  the  book :  "  The  plan  is  to  lead  the 
uncultured  individual  (or  Ego)  to  knowledge  "  of 
the  Truth,  which  is  to  bring  him  «*  to  contem- 


680          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

plate  the  universal  Individual  or  the  self-con- 
scious Spirit  in  its  formation,"  that  is,  to  behold 
the  Absolute  as  self -knowing  in  its  Evolution 

(8.   21). 

Thus  the  Ego  as  self-observing  observes  its 
own  Evolution  as  manifested  or  phenomenal  till 
it  reaches  just  this  self-observation  as  the  princi- 
ple of  the  Universe,  or  the  Absolute  as  self- 
knowing,  self -observing,  self-conscious.  In  this 
way  the  individual  Ego,  through  its  self-con- 
scious activity,  rises  to  the  knowledge  of  the  All 
as  self-conscious  Ego,  which  posits  in  its  own 
Evolution  the  stages  of  the  Phenomenology. 

If  we  take  this  book  literally,  it  is  the  science 
(logos,  rational  principle)  in  all  Phenomena,  or 
Appearances  of  the  world,  as  they  conie  before 
and  pass  through  the  individual  human  Ego.  It 
is  manifest  from  this  title  that  Hegel  is  here  grap- 
pling with  Kant's  dualism,  the  Thing-it-itself  and 
its  Phenomena,  which  divided  the  Universe  into 
two  moieties,  the  unknowable  and  the  knowable. 
From  this  point  of  view  we  might  call  Hegel's 
Phenomenology  the  unfolding  into  unity  of  the 
Kantian  dualistic  science  of  knowledge. 

But  there  are  other  points  of  view  from  which 
we  have  to  look  at  the  present  work.  We  have 
already  seen  how  intimately  Hegel  was  bound  up 
in  the  French  Revolution,  which  had  become  the 
central  movement  of  all  Europe.  One  kind  of 
government  in  France  had  succeeded  another, 


HEGEVS  PHENOMENOLOGY.  681 

one  form  of  Spirit  (Hegel's  Geist)  had  evolved 
out  of  another,  with  amazing  rapidity;  Hegel 
himself  had  been  whirled  along  through  the 
maelstrom  of  this  universal  European  process. 
The  death  of  the  king,  the  Reign  of  Terror, 
the  Directory,  the  Consulate,  the  Empire  — 
what  a  bewildering  line  of  mighty  events, 
bringing  forth  at  last  the  Absolute  in  person, 
NAPOLEON  !  Now  the  Phenomenology  is  in  its 
way  the  child  of  this  epoch,  and  reflects  the 
feature  and  the  soul  of  its  parentage,  being  truly 
a  universal  book  and  the  product  of  the  Spirit  of 
the  Age.  The  total  movement  of  Europe  has 
generated  its  Absolute  as  ruler,  who  is  no  longer 
received  from  the  past  and  transmitted  through 
inheritance.  By  the  furious  Dialectic  of  Revolu- 
tion he  has  been  begotten  and  now  governs  in 
his  own  individual  right,  and  not  through  the 
precedents  of  law.  He  has  transformed  Revolu- 
tion into  Evolution,  or  rather  through  him  Revolu- 
tion is  seen  to  have  been  Evolution  all  along,  in 
its  most  violent,  destructive  manifestations,  since 
just  he  is  what  has  been  in  the  process  of  evolv- 
ing from  the  beginning.  Hegel's  Phenomenology 
is  likewise  the  Evolution  of  the  Absolute  as  the 
all-daminating  Spirit,  and  thus  gives  in  its  most 
internal  form,  the  movement  of  the  Age. 

That  this  written  theoretical  Evolution  should 
be  the  work  of  a  German  was  in  the  order  of 
things.  France  practically  shows  the  Dialectic 


682         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  Forms  of  Government,  through  whose 
whole  gamut  she  runs  in  the  course  of  about 
a  dozen  years.  But  Philosophy,  as  the  Teutonic 
discipline  of  modern  Europe,  has  to  show  the 
Dialectic  of  the  Forms  of  Mind,  which  she 
separates  from  their  concrete  embodiment  in 
the  occurrences  of  Time  and  formulates  as 
they  are  in  themselves.  The  voice  of  Teu- 
tonic Philosophy  is  now  Hegel.  To  be  sure  he 
had  examples  long  before  him,  specially  Plato 
who  also  lived  in  a  great  period  of  political  dissolu- 
tion, when  the  Greek  City-State  was  likewise 
going  to  pieces  by  its  own  inner  Dialectic  which 
the  Greek  philosopher  extracted  from  his  own 
age,  and  fixed  in  the  categories  of  his  philos- 
ophy. Nor  must  we  forget  to  mention  that 
Plato  also  evolved  something  akin  to  the  Abso- 
lute as  the  ruling  power  of  his  Republic. 

We  are  to  see,  therefore,  that  Hegel  pri- 
marily heard  the  call  of  his  time ;  or,  as  he 
would  say,  he  followed  the  dictation  of  the 
World-Spirit  in  writing  his  Phenomenology.  He 
had  to  show  the  untruth  in  all  the  Appearances 
of  the  period,  but  also  the  underlying  ultimate 
truth.  The  French  Revolution  was  to  be  seen  as 
phenomenal,  as  a  grand  phantasmagoria  of  unre- 
alities which  Europe  danced  through  toward  the 
Absolute  Reality.  Its  winning  but  deceptive 
Appearances  which  at  the  start  enticed  all  the 
aspiring  souls  of  Europe,  turned  out  to  be  de- 


BEGEUS  PHENOMENOLOGY.  683 

monic  powers  which  always  scourged  and  often 
destroyed  their  own  followers,  till  at  last  this  neg- 
ative energy,  after  having  first  charmed  and  then 
disillusioned  the  world,  commits  suicide,  that  is, 
turns  its  own  negation  against  itself.  Such  is  the 
final  manifestation  of  that  which  is  here  called 
Dialectic. 

Now  Hegel  in  his  book  gives  this  process  of 
his  own  age  specially,  though  he  will  not  fail 
to  wheel  into  line  other  corresponding  ages. 
All  the  delusive  shapes  of  the  human  mind  are 
thrown  out  upon  his  canvas,  and  are  shown 
devouring  one  another  in  succession,  till  that 
shape  comes  forth  which  not  only  swallows  all, 
but  re-establi.-shes  all  —  the  Absolute.  Hegel 
himself  in  his  revolutionary  Period  passed 
through  these  experiences,  and  felt  himself  cut 
to  pieces  inwardly  by  their  rapid  self-destruction. 
In  his  own  heart  he  felt  the  remorseless  knife  of 
the  Dialectic  slaughtering  the  shapes  which  he 
had  taken  to  his  bosom.  But  this  knife  he  will 
afterwards  get  hold  of  by  its  handle  and  use 
in  his  Phenomenology,  no  longer  its  victim  but 
its  master.  For  Hegel  particularly  at  Tubingen 
may  be  said  to  have  been  the  victim  of  Ap 
pearances,  as  was  all  Europe.  And  the  delusion 
continued,  though  at  Frankfort  he  began  to  see 
into  the  phenomenal  side  of  the  Universe,  chiefly 
through  the  study  of  Plato  whose  eternal  Idea  is 
still  the  medicine  against  the  fleeting  Appear- 


684        MODERN"  EUROPEAN'  PHILOSOPHY. 

ances  of  the  world.  Very  real  Plato  became  to 
him  as  we  see  by  his  History  of  Philosophy  and 
by  many  allusions  scattered  through  his  works. 
So  Hegel  begins  to  clutch  Appearance,  and 
finally  he  seizes  the  Appearance  of  Appear- 
ances and  makes  it  tell  its  secret,  its  truth  (in  the 
Phenomenology),  as  Ulysses  clutches  thousand- 
shaped  Proteus  (in  the  Odyssey)  and  compels 
him  to  appear  as  he  is  in  reality  and  to  "  speak 
what  is  true." 

I.  The  real  fruitage  of  the  French  Revolution  is 
Evolution,  which  Hegel  grasps  and  applies  through 
his  method  in  the  Phenomenology.  Consciously 
France  seeks  to  reconstruct  herself  and  all  the  world 
a-priori,  according  to  so-called  rational  principles. 
Reason  was  to  prescribe  the  Form  of  Government  and 
to  make  its  Constitution  ;  no  growth,  no  Evolution  was 
acknowledged;  the  past  had  been  all  wrong,  and 
society  must  begin  over  again  from  its  first  founda- 
tions dictated  by  Philosophy,  that  is  by  the  Illumina- 
tion (Aufklarung)  of  the  Eighteenth  Century.  Still 
Evolution  was  doing  its  work  in  all  the  swift  changes 
of  the  Revolution,  till  finally  it  becomes  conscious, 
explicit,  uttered  in  Hegel  who  theoretically  evolved 
the  Absolute  which  was  practically  incarnate  in  the 
French  Emperor. 

But  what  becomes  of  the  individual  in  the  presence 
of  this  Absolute?  Herein  Hegel's  own  experience 
will  furnish  a  symbolic  fact  illustrating  the  World's 
History.  This  Phenomenology  is  said  by  Gans  (in 
his  funeral  notice  of  Hegel)  to  have  been  "  completed 
amid  the  thunder  of  the  cannon  at  the  battle  of  Jena," 


HEGEL'S  PHENOMENOLOGY.  685 

in  which  Napoleon  commanded  the  French.  Thus  the 
incarnate  Absolute  has  penetrated  to  the  quiet  nook 
of  the  philosopher  evolving  it  from  within.  The  latter 
sets  down  in  a  letter:  "  Monday,  October  13th,  1806, 
the  Emperor  Napoleon  has  entered  the  walls  of  Jena." 
Hegel  witnessed  the  battle.  The  troops  stormed  in, 
the  town  was  on  fire,  the  soldiers  entered  his  quar- 
ters. Hegel  thrust  into  his  pocket  the  last  portion  of 
the  manuscript  of  his  Phenomenology,  which  was  now 
being  printed,  and  fled  to  a  place  of  safety,  leaving 
his  other  papers  and  his  books  to  their  fate.  That 
last  portion,  what  does  it  contain?  Just  the  Absolute 
evolved,  existent  and  at  work  in  the  world.  And  be- 
hold, here  comes  that  Absolute  in  person;  the  indi- 
vidual Hegel  loses  "  paper,  pen  and  penknife,"  and 
has  to  beg  for  materials  in  order  to  write  a  letter  even  ; 
he  takes  refuge  in  a  deserted  student's  room,  passes 
a  time  of  anxiety  for  his  personal  safety,  but  his 
chief  care  pertains  to  his  manuscript  which  may 
be  consumed  through  the  very  presence  of  that  Abso- 
lute which  it  has  deduced,  or  apparently  educed, 
as  Faust's  invocation  calls  forth  the  Earth-Spirit.  At 
last  "he  knew  not  whither  to  turn,"  a  wall  of 
fiery  fate  surrounded  him  on  every  side.  He  had 
''literally  not  a  penny,"  and  sought  relief  through 
the  charity  of  friends,  among  whom  the  ever-thought- 
ful Goethe  sent  a  contribution.  So  near  did  the 
philosopher  come  to  being  burnt  up  by  his  own 
all-consuming  Absolute. 

And  yet  he  escapes.  And  not  only  does  he  escape 
but  he  persists  in  his  principle,  though  nearly  scorched 
to  death  by  its  flames.  Also  his  book  escapes  ;  even 
that  precious  last  portion  gets  through  the  wall  of  fire, 


686         MODERN  E  UR  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

reaches  the  publisher,  and  is  printed  so  that  it  lies  here 
before  our  eyes  to-day  far  off  in  the  Mississippi  Val- 
ley, very  placid  and  imperturbable,  showing  no  trace 
of  its  baptism  in  blood  and  conflagration.  But  the 
shrinking,  scorched  individual  Hegel,  peeping  out 
from  some  coign  of  vantage,  beholds  with  sensuous 
vision  the  grand  Appearance,  something  like  a 
Theophany :  * '  I  saw  the  emperor  —  this  World- Spirit 
(  Welt-seele)  —  riding  out  through  the  city  to  recon- 
noitre." A  most  marvelous  phenomenon,  the  view 
of  which  is  quite  enough  to  repay  us  for  what  we  have 
suffered.  "  It  is  truly  a  wonderful  experience  to  see 
such  an  Individual,  who,  concentrated  here  to  a  point 
and  sitting  on  a  horse,  reaches  out  over  the  world  and 
controls  it "  (Rosenkranz,  Leben,  s.  229).  Then 
comes  a  sharp  dig  at  Prussia  (note  this  for 
future  reference)  followed  by  fresh  admiration 
for  "the  extraordinary  man."  And  yet  along  with 
this  exaltation  runs  a  note  of  deep  anxiety  lest 
"  my  manuscript  may  not  have  reached  the  pub- 
lisher." Ach  Himmel!  What  then?  "  My  loss 
would  be  altogether  too  great  "  for  human  endurance. 
Then  there  would  be  no  philosophy  of  this  terrible, 
yet  most  wonderful  Absolute,  the  grand  Reality  be- 
fore us.  The  philosophic  Napoleon  would  be  de- 
stroyed by  the  actual  Napoleon.  **  The  Lord  knows 
with  what  a  heavy  heart  I  send  off  this  package  by 
mail,"  lest  it  perish  from  the  earth.  And  still  he  can 
say  in  spite  of  his  heavy  heart:  "Everybody  now 
(after  the  battle  of  Jena)  wishes  success  to  the  French 
army,  as  I  did  before  it."  Then  another  dig  at  the 
whipped  Prussians  on  account  of  "  the  enormous  dif- 
ference between  the  leaders  and  even  the  common 


HEGEL'S  PHENOMENOLOGY.  687 

soldiers  of  the  two  armies."  All  of  which  will  rise 
up  against  Hegel  a  dozen  years  later  when  he  goes  to 
the  Prussian  capital  as  prof essor  of  Philosophy.  And 
not  only  then:  to  this  day  in  his  own  country  the 
above  words  rise  up  against  him  and  cause  him  to  be 
branded,  along  with  Goethe,  as  unpatriotic,  as  false 
to  his  country  in  the  hour  of  her  sorest  trial.  Excuse 
we  may,  but  impossible  it  is  to  justify  such  an  attitude 
at  such  a  time. 

We  have  spoken  of  Goethe  and  we  may  here  note 
that  there  is  an  inner  relation  between  the  Faust  and 
the  Phenomenology.  Both  spring  out  of  the  negative 
Eighteenth  Century  with  its  denial ;  both  are  evolu- 
tionary —  the  Evolution  of  Mephistopheles  in  the  First 
Part  of  Faust  is  the  foundation  of  the  whole  poem 
Each  is  the  development  of  the  individual  Self,  which, 
however,  is  representative  of  all,  and  so  universal. 
The  authors  were  cotemporaries  arid  indeed  friends ; 
undoubtedly  both  drank  deeply  from  the  common 
fountain  of  the  spirit  of  the  Age,  so  that  Hegel's  follow- 
ers often  deemed  that  they  could  translate  Goethe's 
poetic  forms  into  the  philosopher's  categories. 

Such,  however,  was  the  remarkable  coincidence  (so 
let  it  be  called)  occurring  at  Jena  with  a  kind  of  clash 
between  the  two  Absolutes,  the  theoretical  and  the 
practical,  the  philosophic  and  the  actual.  "  The 
World-Spirit  on  horseback,  concentrated  to  a  point," 
but  all  ablaze  with  destructive  energy,  sweeps  over 
and  envelops  in  flames  its  own  spiritual  Evolution,  but 
does  not  and  seemingly  cannot  destroy  it  —  a  mirac- 
ulous preservation  which  certainly  ought  to  sharpen 
our  interest  in  the  bonk —  which  by  the  way  will  call 
into  exercise  all  our  sharpness. 


688         MODE  EN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

II.  How  shall  we  grasp  this  Phenomenology  f  The 
mind  as  individual  Ego  looks  at  all  its  experiences 
which  are  stimulated  by  the  world  of  objects  as  imme- 
diate or  existent,  and  orders  them  in  an  ascent  or 
gradation  from  the  lowest  (as  mere  sense  perception) 
to  the  highest,  which  is  itself  Mind  as  ordering  prin- 
ciple and  which  knows  itself  as  Absolute.  Thus  it  is  a 
hierarchy  of  all  the  experiences  which  the  Ego  has  from 
its  first  knowing  of  the  sensuous  thing  up  to  absolute 
knowing  fct  as  the  self  consciousness  of  absolute 
Spirit."  These  experiences  of  the  Ego  are  also 
called  its  phenomena,  its  manifestations  to  itself  as 
conscious,  of  which  the  present  is  the  science,  Phe- 
nomenology. 

We  may  look  at  the  movement  in  this  way  also : 
the  outer  world  coming  upon  Mind  and  being  taken 
up  by  it,  determines  it  to  an  activity  which  is  special 
in  many  ways.  For  this  outer  world  is  that  of  divi- 
sion, of  multiplicity,  of  particular  things,  and  it 
separates  or  particularizes  the  Mind  as  total,  as  the 
one  process  of  the  All.  Now  this  total  Mind  as  self- 
conscious  is  to  look  at  itself  thus  divided  into  many 
activities  by  the  manifold  world,  which  thereby  be- 
come forms  of  its  experience,  and  which  have 
received  certain  names  or  categories  expressing  just 
this  special  determination  of  the  Mind  (as  Perception, 
Understanding,  Reason,  etc.).  These  are  the  phe- 
nomena or  manifestations  of  Mind  in  its  attempt  to 
make  the  objective  world  in  all  its  manifoldness 
subject  or  known. 

We  have  already  had  to  speak  of  the  Absolute,  or 
absolute  Knowing  which  is  the  end  of  the  Phenom- 
enology, and  yet  determines  the  cognition  of  the 


HEGEL'S  PHENOMENOLOGY.  689 

object  from  the  start.  The  Ego  takes  each  ob- 
ject as  independent  or  self-subsistent  at  first,  but 
each  then  is  made  to  show  its  dependence  and 
imperfection  till  absolute  Knowing  is  reached,  which 
alone  has  truth  and  self-subsistence.  For  instance, 
the  sensuous  percept  is  taken  as  independent,  ex- 
istent by  itself,  but  it  at  once  shows  itself  to  be 
dependent,  to  exist  through  something  else.  My  Ego 
at  first  asserts  every  particular  object,  even  that  of 
sensation,  to  be  self-contained,  to  be  its  own  master, 
in  other  words  to  be  a  kind  of  Absolute,  all  to 
itself,  and  hence  to  be  the  Truth.  Then  comes  its 
change,  its  evanishment,  its  negation,  showing  it 
to  be  untrue  or  imperfect,  at  most  a  part,  a  phase, 
or  phenomenon,  which  is  not  the  Absolute,  but 
which  just  the  Absolute  in  its  negative  might  (as 
the  Dialectic)  reduces  to  an  Appearance,  properly 
an  Appearance  of  itself,  but  not  the  Reality  of  itself. 
Manifold  are  these  Appearances,  graded  on  a  line  up 
to  this  ultimate  Reality  which  is  the  Absolute. 

Thus  the  total  Mind  (or  Ego)  looks  at  itself  de- 
termined and  divided  up  by  the  world  of  objects, 
which  it  is  to  know  separately,  yet  as  its  own,  as  its 
distinct  activities  in  knowing,  which  activities  are 
are  to  be  grasped,  categorized  and  ordered  in 
this  Phenomenology.  Finally  the  total  Mind  grasps 
itself,  grasps  Mind  as  totality  making  all  these 
divisions  of  objects,  and  then  making  them  vanish 
as  self-subsistent,  into  phases  of  its  own  total  pro- 
cess, which  is  the  Last  Reality,  or  the  Absolute  as 
self  knowing,  or  self-conscious  Person. 

Such  is,  then,  the  movement:  man,  the  reader,  this 
Ego  reaches  by  the  foregoing  process  absolute  Being, 
44 


690          MODERN  E  UROPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

thinks  it,  creates  or  recreates  it  out  of  his  own 
thought.  Here  the  question  comes  up :  Does  he,  this 
individual  Self  thinking  the  absolute  Self,  belong  to 
the  process  in  his  own  right?  Is  he  made  by  Hegel 
an  integral  part  of  it,  distinctively  formulated  ?  He 
is  certainly  present  all  along,  but  his  presence  is  more 
or  less  an  implicit  part  of  the  absolute  Totality.  He 
is  himself  a  phenomenon  of  consciousness  reflecting 
the  phenomena  of  consciousness  till  he  attains  the 
supreme  self-knowing  Absolute  which  posits  him  as 
one  of  its  phases  or  appearances.  What  now  is  the 
function  of  the  individual?  He  is  to  recognize  the 
Absolute  (er&erwen),  and  thus  become  the  philoso- 
pher, whose  recognition  is  followed  by  an  absolute 
submission  to  the  Absolute.  It  would  seem  that  the 
creative  activity  of  the  Ego  winning  its  supreme 
Reality  now  droops,  and  lets  itself  be  determined 
wholly  by  its  own  Absolute. 

Here,  then,  we  would  add  to  Hegel,  making  explicit 
that  which  is  implicit  in  the  phenomenological  process : 
the  individual  is  not  simply  to  recognize  the  Absolute 
and  to  obey  its  law,  but  he  is  at  last  to  make  the  law 
which  he  obeys,  is  to  recreate  the  Absolute  which 
creates  him,  is,  in  fine,  to  determine  that  which  de- 
termines him.  Thus  he  reaches  his  true  freedom  in 
and  through  the  Absolute. 

To  be  sure,  he  must  first  study  and  understand  and 
recognize  the  Absolute  of  which  he  with  all  his  knowl- 
edge is  the  product  —  such  is  the  work  of  Philoso- 
phy. But  then  he  must  also  perpetually  reproduce  that 
Absolute,  and  not  simply  recognize  and  obey  it ;  nay, 
he  must  not  only  reproduce  it,  but  formulate  such 
reproduction  through  himself  as  an  integral  part  of 


HEGEL'S  PHENOMENOLOGY.  691 

the  process  of  the  Absolute  itself  —  that  will  give  the 
new  discipline,  Psychology. 

III.  There  is  another  element  in  the  Phenomenology 
which  adds  to  its  difficulty.  This  is  the  peculiar  liter- 
ary form  in  which  the  author  has  clothed  his  work. 
Is  he  really  in  earnest  or  is  he  cajoling  us  with  his 
sly  Rabelaisian  humor?  Is  it  philosophy  with  a  sys- 
tem or  a  philosophical  romance?  Often  the  reader  is 
puzzled  in  what  way  to  take  the  book.  A  serio-comic 
vein  runs  through  these  forms  arising  and  vanishing 
in  so  many  unexpected  turns,  that  one  cannot  exactly 
tell  whether  the  thing  is  a  comedy  or  tragedy.  Its 
literary  form  is  certainly  confounding  to  the  unini- 
tiated reader,  indeed  highly  provoking,  whereat  the 
general  critic  starts  to  cursing  it  with  the  hottest  ex- 
pletives in  his  vocabulary. 

But  just  this  literary  method  is,  we  hold,  one  of 
the  chief  merits  of  the  book,  and  assuredly  one  of  its 
most  original  qualities,  though  the  reader  has  to 
familiarize  himself  with  it,  and  see  into  the  reason  of 
it.  Undoubtedly  its  form  is  as  a  whole  highly  Ro- 
mantic, though  its  different  portions  vary  a  good 
deal  in  this  regard.  At  the  same  time  it  satirizes, 
negates,  cuts  to  pieces  Romanticism  in  its  pitiless 
Dialectic.  In  the  Introduction  Hegel  breaks  loose 
from  Schelling,  the  philosopher  of  Romanticism,  as  is 
well  known.  But  in  his  whole  work  he  makes  the 
Romantic  movement  undo  itself  through  its  own  inner 
self-negation ;  its  very  form  is  shown  to  be  self- 
undoing,  that  is,  dialect'cal.  Now  it  is  just  this 
doubleness  of  procedure  which  constitutes  a  leading 
difficulty  of  the  Phenomenology:  it  is  a  book  written 
in  a  Romantic  style,  which  destroys  Romanticism. 


G92          MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY, 

Herein  lies  the  concealed  satire  which  we  feel  in  the 
literary  manner  of  the  author,  a  certain  duplicity 
whose  object,  however,  is  to  serve  up  duplicity  to 
itself.  The  Romanticists  made  a  great  deal  out  of 
irony ;  here  we  have  it,  but  pushed  to  its  own  self- 
dissolution.  The  reader,  therefore,  must  train  him- 
self to  a  kind  of  second  sight  or  double  vision  which 
looks  in  two  opposite  directions,  the  Romantic  and 
the  anti-Romantic.  For  this  reason  the  Phenomenol- 
ogy is  not  likely  to  have  more  than  a  dozen  sympathetic 
readers  in  a  century,  but  these  dozen  will  keep  it 
alive  and  even  make  it  germinate  in  new  books. 

It  has  been  compared  to  the  Divine  Comedy  of 
Dante,  the  great  poem  of  medieval  Romanticism. 
Both  indeed  have  a  long  line  of  disembodied  spirits, 
extending  up  from  the  lowest  pit  to  the  highest  heaven. 
But  Hegel's  Inferno  begins  here  and  now  with  sen- 
suous consciousness,  and  his  Paradiso  is  the  Absolute. 
Both  may  be  said  to  show  stages  of  the  Ego  in  passing 
through  a  world  of  shades  (Hegel  calls  it  a  Schatlen- 
reich).  Still  there  are  many  differences  between  the 
two ;  one  of  which  is  that  Dante  personalizes  and 
names  his  forms,  while  Hegel  is  careful  to  keep  them 
impersonal.  Gladly  would  we  know  at  times  their 
names  as  well'  as  their  period  and  locality  in  history, 
but  usually  all  these  matters  have  to  be  guessed  at  in 
the  Phenomenology.  Occasionally  it  is  plain  whom 
and  whose  doctrine  the  author  means,  but  he  seldom 
designates  the  individual  philosopher  whose  principle 
he  may  be  assigning  to  its  position  in  his  "  realm  of 
shades."  One  reason  may  be  that  he  is  not  now 
writing  a  History  of  Philosophy,  in  which  the  philoso- 
pher is  personally  named  along  with  his  doctrine  in 


HEGEL'S  PHENOMENOLOGY.  693 

its  historic  setting  of  time  and  place.  Such  a  work 
has  been  already  done ;  so  at  present  Hegel  is  to  set 
forth  the  pure  movement  of  human  consciousness, 
abstracted  from  all  its  finite  incumbrances  ;  the  mind 
unbodied  is  to  be  seen  in  its  impersonal  movement 
evolving  its  transparent  shapes  from  the  lowest  to  the 
highest.  It  is  not  the  first  German  Philosophy  to 
produce  the  impression  of  a  fantastic  philosophical 
romance ;  witness  Leibniz'  Monadology,  'which  is 
also  a  gallery  of  ethereal  forms  rising  in  a  line 
from  the  lowest  Monad  to  the  supreme  One,  also  a 
Monad. 

IV.  There  is  another  relation  of  the  Phenomenology 
which  must  not  be  omitted:  It  is  a  working  out  of 
the  philosophical  problem  of  the  time  which  specially 
begins  with  Kant,  who  inherited  it  from  Locke  and 
Hume,  and  which  is  deeply  connected  with  the  funda- 
mental aim  of  all  Modern  Philosophy.  This  hovers 
about  the  cognition  of  the  object.  Can  I  here  know 
the  thing  out  yonder  in  the  world?  The  answer  of 
the  Eighteenth  Century  is,  in  general,  that  you  cannot 
know  it,  not  as  it  is  in  itself,  but  only  its  appearance. 
The  answer  of  Kant  specially  is  that  Ego  can  only 
know  what  it  has  put  upon  the  object  (or  thing)  by 
the  Forms  of  Sense-perception  or  by  the  Categories  of 
the  Understanding,  while  the  true  object  remains  out- 
side and  unknown.  Now  just  this  Kantian  dualism, 
which  separates  the  object  into  Phenomenon  on  one 
side  and  Thing-in-itself  on  the  other  is  what  Hegel 
tackles  and  seeks  to  overcome  in  all  its  shapes  by  the 
phenomenological  process.  His  purpose  is  to  get 
back  to  the  genetic  source  of  this  separation,  and  to 
grasp  the  unity  which  primordially  divides  into  Appear- 


694          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ance  and  Truth,  and  which  he  will  ultimately  find  to 
be  his  Absolute,  the  self-knowing  universal  Ego. 

Hegel  affirms  that  Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Reason 
is  essentially  a  Phenomenology,  or  a  science  of  Phe- 
nomena showing  what  appears  to  the  Ego  in  its 
attempts  to  know  the  object.  This  fact  gives  to  Hegel 
his  starting-point  and  problem.  But  his  movement 
is  to  transcend  Kant  and  to  find  the  true  Thing-in- 
itself ,  the  Absolute.  This  he  evolves  stage  by  stage 
out  of  the  world  of  Phenomena  which,  however,  con- 
tain it  in  a  series  of  imperfect  manifestations.  For 
each  stage  or  form  is  an  appearance  by  virtue  of  its 
incomplete  expression  of  the  ultimate  Reality  or  of 
the  Absolute,  in  which  it  disappears  as  phenomenon. 

For  this  reason,  Phenomenology  is  a  vanishing 
science.  It  is  a  ladder,  but  when  the  ladder  is  drawn 
up  into  "  the  ether  of  pure  Spirit,"  there  is  no  longer 
an  ascent.  As  soon  as  science  has  found  the  truth  of 
Appearance,  there  is  no  Appearance  and  hence  no 
science  of  it.  Or  when  Kant  has  vanished  into  Hegel, 
Phenomenology  as  such  goes  along.  Hegel's  main 
argument  is  to  show  the  invalidity  of  the  unknown 
Thing-in-itself,  in  which  the  mind  denies  its  own 
determination  as  valid,  determining  what  it  declares 
at  the  same  time  it  cannot  determine.  This  contra- 
diction Hegel  exploits  through  the  whole  world  of 
consciousness  from  its  lowest  stage  to  its  highest. 
Every  object  is  a  Thing-in-itself  which  when  known  to 
be  such  cannot  be  known,  except  as  it  appears  to  the 
Ego.  Reality  cognized  by  mind  is  really  incogniza- 
ble, and  hence  is  but  phenomenality,  a  delusion. 
Such  is  Kant's  negation,  or  rather  implicit  self-nega- 
tion, which  Hegel  makes  explicit  in  the  Phenomenology 


HEGEL'S  PHENOMENOLOGY.  695 

by  means  of  his  so-called  Dialectic.  The  book  is, 
therefore,  one  continued  negation  of  negation,  the 
denial  of  denial,  the  destroyer  of  destruction.  But 
when  the  process  is  completed,  the  whole  science 
vanishes  into  its  underlying  positive  principle,  which 
is  Psychology.  Hegel  himself  knew  this.  In  his 
later  work,  the  Encyclopedia,  he  literally  tore  to  pieces 
his  Phenomenology,  and  assigned  its  parts  to  other 
sciences,  keeping  but  a  small  fragment  under  its 
own  name.  And  this  name  has  quite  disappeared 
from  later  mental  science. 

Thus  Hegel  connects  in  his  Phenomenology  with  the 
Philosophy  of  his  own  time,  the  modern  German 
movement  starting  with  Kant,  and  running  through 
various  stages  in  Jacobi,  Fichte  and  Schelling.  Hegel 
has  relations  to  all  these  philosophers.  But  his  great 
object«is  to  overcome  the  dualism  of  the  Eighteenth 
Century,  which  culminates  in  Kant.  We  have  seen, 
however,  that  the  phenomenological  sweep  is  far 
wider  than  the  modern  German  movement,  since  it 
likewise  embraces  the  ancient  Greek  world.  Indeed 
it  runs  parallel  with  the  whole  History  of  Philosophy, 
as  already  stated,  which  is  here  shorn  of  its  temporal 
wrappage  and  set  forth  in  the  pure  movement  of  its 
concepts,  without  any  label  of  person,  time  or  place. 
The  distinctively  historic  side  of  the  evolution  of 
thought  is  carefully  removed,  that  the  mind  may  be- 
hold its  own  naked  Self  rising  through  all  its  ancestral 
shapes,  till  it  sees  the  very  Absolute  as  the  self- 
knowing  All.  It  is  true  that  the  Absolute  has  been 
secretly  present  in  these  antecedent  forms  of  con- 
sciousness and  seeking  to  express  itself  in  them,  but 
they  show  themselves  inadequate  and  hence  r.re  van- 


696          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ishing ;  they  are  broken  to  pieces  by  their  too  great 
content,  and  thus  manifest  what  we  have  repeatedly 
called  the  Dialectic. 

V.  Already  we  have  used  the  term  Dialectic  several 
times  in  different  connections.  It  is  the  most  subtle, 
elusive  thing  in  Hegel,  more  so  in  the  Phenomenology 
than  in  his  other  books,  being  not  separately  set  forth 
and  held  up  by  itself,  but  immanent  in  the  procedure 
from  beginning  to  end.  Hegel  had  studied  the  Dia- 
lectic in  Plato,  particularly  in  the  Parmenides;  he 
had  also  gone  back  and  carefully  traced  it  (as  we  see 
in  his  History  of  Philosophy)  in  the  first  philosopher 
who  had  employed  it,  Eleatic  Zeno.  Thus  we  must 
suppose  that  Hegel  already  had  theoretically  grasped 
the  Dialectic  through  his  profound  studies  in  Greek 
thought.  But  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  had  as  yet 
practically  realized  it  in  writing  till  we  find  it  weaving 
through  all  the  intricacies  of  the  Phenomenology,  the 
most  intricate  and  impalpable  element  in  the  work. 
It  is  really  that  dynamite  which  enters  into  every 
phenomenal  form  and  explodes  it  as  finite,  as  inade- 
quate to  express  the  content  of  the  Absolute.  So  we 
have  a  line  of  mental  explosions  produced  by  this 
form-bursting  Dialectic  all  along  the  line  of  ascent,  till 
at  last  the  Absolute  gets  its  own  form  adequate  to  it- 
self, which  the  Dialectic  cannot  blow  up  except  by  the 
carelessness  of  the  philosopher. 

From  this  source,  too,  comes  the  atmosphere  of 
Humor,  unpurposed  indeed,  but  all  the  more  effective 
because  it  flows  of  itself,  in  which  the  Phenomenology 
floats  on  its  way  toward  the  Absolute.  These  forms 
show  themselves,  one  after  another,  as  self-annulling, 
as  comic  to  a  degree,  through  their  own  inner  process, 


HEGEUS  PHENOMENOLOGY.  697 

which  is  the  Dialectic.  This  element  enters  into  the 
literary  quality  of  the  book  and  makes  us  read  it  with 
a  smile  when  we  get  into  its  subtle  movement.  We 
have  already  spoken  of  its  Romantic  irony  which  is 
indeed  closely  related  to  the  above-mentioned  Humor. 

Great  misunderstanding  exists  concerning  the  na- 
ture of  the  Dialectic.*  It  is  often  considered  as  a 
mere  word-play  to  produce  mental  confusion  ;  or  "  to 
make  the  worse  appear  the  better  reason."  Sophistry 
is  held  to  be  its  synonym,  and  the  honest  seeker  of 
truth  is  told  to  shun  its  use.  Such  views  show  a  com- 
plete misconception  of  the  Dialectic,  or  at  most  take 
into  account  only  its  perversion.  Doubtless  it  has  its 
bad  side,  so  have  most  doctrines,  and  men'too.  Even 
Religion  has  its  Devil.  Moreover  it  is  a  very  rare 
power,  even  more  rare  than  the  poetic  gift.  Really 
it  cannot  be  learned,  even  if  many  externals  about  it 
can  be  acquired.  It  is  a  born  product  of  the  spirit 
spontaneously  welling  up  into  speech  and  also  into 
action.  A  speaker  or  writer,  with  a  native  dialectical 
power,  is  very  different  from  a  person  with  a  merely 
rhetorical  gift.  The  mind  endowed  by  nature  with 
the  Dialectic  has  an  insight  into  the  inner  movement 
of  all  finite  things,  it  sees  the  self-negating  energy  in 
the  world  of  limitation,  and  puts  into  its  utterance 
this  inner  energy.  The  dialectical  soul  has  the  uni- 
versal born  in  it,  yet  chafing  against  this  confine  of 
birth,  and  perpetually  breaking  over  it  into  what  is 
beyond.  The  greatest  dialectician  in  History  is  Soc- 
rates, who  through  his  dialogue  made  his  people  and 
then  the  world  conscious  of  the  Universal. 

VI.  The  Scheme  or  Order  is  usually  an  important 
and  strongly  emphasized  portion  of  Hegel's  proced- 


693         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ure,  being  set  down  in  advance  as  a  guide  for  the 
following  exposition.  But  in  his  Introduction  to  this 
book,  no  Scheme  is  given.  He  speaks  of  the  System 
which  embraces  "  the  whole  realm  of  the  truth  of 
mind,"  whose  successive  stages  or  moments  are  the 
Forms  of  Consciousness.  Eight  of  those  Forms  the 
author  places  one  after  the  other  designated  by  Roman 
numerals.  Such  seems  to  be  his  fundamental  division. 

Now  upon  this  primal  division  is  clapped  a  new 
order,  a  Triad  which  embraces  the  entire  work —  Con- 
sciousness, Self-consciousness,  and  Reason.  Hegel 
affirms  the  triplicity  of  Mind  strongly  in  his  Prelimin- 
ary Discourse  ( Vorrede).  But  when  we  look  into 
the  third  stage  (Reason),  of  this  Triad,  we  find  that 
it  contains  considerably  more  than  twice  as  much  as 
both  the  other  stages  put  together.  Thus  it  seems 
decidedly  top-heavy,  and  Hegel  changed  it  just  at  this 
point  in  his  later  Encyclopedia.  Still  more  strangely, 
the  divisions  of  Reason  are  not  threefold,  but  four- 
fold, and  those  of  Self-consciousness  are  twofold. 
But  when  we  come  down  to  the  subordinate  details, 
the  Triad  holds  largely  though  not  always  in  the 
minute  subdivisions. 

Thus  the  Scheme  must  be  pronounced  to  be  confused, 
particularly  in  its  leading  outlines  ;  which  fact  stands 
in  decided  contrast  to  the  schematic  transparency  of 
Hegel's  later  books.  We  have  to  conclude  that  the 
author  had  not  come  to  complete  clearness  in  regard 
to  the  larger  sweeps  of  his  work.  The  details  he  has 
wrought  out,  but  the  organization  of  the  whole  is 
manifestly  defective.  Here  lies  the  ground  why  some 
contemporary  matters  are  elaborated  with  a  fullness 
which  is  out  of  all  proportion  to  their  importance,  for 


HEGEUS  PHENOMENOLOGY.  699 

instance  Physiognomy  and  Phrenology.  The  result 
is  the  Gre<k  symmetry  so  manifest  in  Hegel's  other 
great  books,  is  violated,  and  we  have  often  a  capricious 
subjective  treatment.  In  other  words  the  Phenomen- 
ology shows  its  Romantic  character  in  the  vagaries  of 
its  Scheme  as  well  as  in  its  literary  manner. 

We  have  noted  that  the  basic  division  designated 
eight  leading  Forms  of  Consciousness  in  an  ascending 
line  up  to  the  Absolute.  But  these  are  very  different 
in  importance  and  so  disproportionate  in  treat- 
ment that  the  best  way  is  to  make  a  division 
distinct  from  any  of  Hegel's,  namely  to  regard 
these  leading  Forms  of  Consciousness  as  six.  They, 
will  be  as  follows:  (I)  Consciousness  proper  —  the 
Ego  knows  the  object  immediately  as  determining 
it.  Three  stages.  (II)  Self-consciousness  —  the 
Ego  knows  itself  as  determining  the  object  — 
mainly  Will.  Three  stages.  (Ill)  Reason  —  the  Ego 
knows  the  object  as  its  own  process.  It  is  evident  that 
this  stage  returns  to  the  first  and  forms  a  true  psychical 
process  (Psychosis).  At  this  point  the  Phenomenol- 
ogy, as  it  is  reformed  and  restated  in  the  Encyclo- 
pedia, is  made  to  end.  The  following  three  stages  are 
there  assigned  to  wholly  different  spheres  from  those 
given  here  whJch  we  proceed  to  state.  (IV)  Spirit 
(Geist)  —  the  Ego  now  knows  the  institutional  world 
as  its  object,  in  regard  to  which  knowing  it  passes 
through  three  main  stages  or  attitudes,  each  of  which 
in  turn  shows  the  triple  division.  To  our  mind  this  is 
the  best  part  of  the  book.  (V)  Religion  —  the  Ego 
knows  the  object  as  absolute  Ego  under  the  form  of 
image  or  symbol.  Three  stages.  (VI)  Absolute 
Knowing  —  the  Ego  knows  the  object  as  Absolute  Ego 


700         MODEtttf  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

under  the  form  of  the  self-knowing  Self,  that  is,  under 
its  own  form  of  self-conscious  Ego  (not  under  that  of 
an  image  or  symbol  as  in  Religion).  Thus  the  Form 
becomes  adequate  to  its  content,  both  being  absolute. 
Absolute  Knowing  is  "  Spirit  (or  Mind)  knowing  it- 
self in  the  Form  of  Spirit."  Moreover  this  Form  is 
4 'that  of  the  Self  or  P^go  "  which  is  thus  Self-con- 
sciousness as  absolute  or  the  absolute  Person,  whose 
movement  is  to  divide  within  into  itself  and  its  oppo- 
site (as  Appearance)  and  then  to  return  to  itself  by 
annulling  this  division  (P/i.  s.  582-3.) 

Science  ( Wissenschaft,  Philosophy  according  to 
Hegel)  does  not  arise  till  the  individual  Ego  reaches 
absolute  Knowing,  and  beholds  its  process  as  one  with 
itself.  Accordingly  we  have  now  properly  attained 
Philosophy  at  the  end  of  the  Phenomenology.  Now 
we  can  see  the  absolute  Ego,  in  its  own  self-evolution 
positing  those  Forms  of  Consciousness  which  the  in- 
dividual Ego  has  made  to  vanish  as  Appearances  iu 
Succession  or  in  Time.  But  the  absolute  Ego  turns 
back,  and  takes  up  into  itself  this  Succession  or  Time, 
"  which  is  Fate  and  Necessity  only  to  the  incomplete 
Ego,"  before  the  latter  has  attained  the  Absolute. 
Time  is  the  empty  outer  Form  of  the  self-evolution  of 
the  Absolute  without  its  content  of  selfhood.  "  This 
Form  of  Time  is  not  extinguished  till  the  Ego  grasps 
itself  as  absolute  "  (P/i.  s.  584).  Thus  it  has  over- 
come the  difference  or  separation  which  underlies  all 
Appearance,  and  hence  underlies  this  Phenomenology. 

On  this  path  we  have  reached  essentially  tue  same 
result  that  we  attained  at  the  end  of  the  History  of 
Philosophy.  The  absolute  self-knowing  Self  has  gen- 
erated the  individual  who  through  Science  is  to  recog- 


HEGEL'S  PHENOMENOLOGY.  701 

nize  it  and  obey  it  as  absolute.  And  yet  the  individ- 
ual as  philosopher  has  generated  and  formulated  it, 
otherwise  it  would  not  be  as  Science.  But  the  philos- 
opher Hegel  after  having  done  the  whole  work  leaves 
himself  and  his  own  activity  out  of  the  process.  Very 
manifestly  his  Absolute  is  not  the  whole  of  itself,  of 
its  own  movement,  and  hence  is  not  the  Absolute. 
It  becomes  finite  and  falls  into  the  jaws  of  its  own 
Dialectic. 

And  yet  the  autocracy  of  the  Absolute  is  by  no 
means  so  explicitly  affirmed  as  in  some  of  Hegel's 
later  writings.  In  this  early  book  the  absolutistic 
character  of  his  First  Principle  does  not  come  out  so 
fully,  still  it  is  there  and  is  fermenting.  We  have 
here,  however,  distinctly  the  individual  evolving  the 
Absolute  till  the  latter  is  recognized  as  containing  all 
Evolution  within  itself,  and  thus  knows  itself  as 
evolutionary.  In  fact,  the  Absolute  cannot  be  self- 
knowing  for  man  till  it  has  created  him  what  it  is, 
namely  a  self-knowing  Ego,  which  has  the  power  of 
producing  or  evolving  the  Absolute  as  self-knowing. 
The  very  movement  of  this  Phenomenology  is  the 
calling-forth  of  the  Absolute  through  the  individual, 
but  this  part  of  the  process  is  dropped  when  the  grand 
result  is  attained. 

VII.  In  the  evolution  of  the  phenomenological 
forms  of  experience  or  of  consciousness  we  note  the 
following:  (1)  Each  form  is  an  identity  of  subject 
and  object,  so  that  this  fact  runs  through  the  whole 
science.  (2)  Subject  is  the  higher,  and  is  what  de- 
termines the  form  of  experience  as  such,  though  the 
object  is  present  and  stimulates  the  subject  to  take  it 
up,  and  to  throw  this  act  into  a  category  of  mind 


702          MODERN  E UEOPEAN  PHIL OSOPH Y. 

which  is  psychological.  (3)  The  degree  of  the 
ascent  toward  the  Absolute  depends  upon  the  degree 
of  completeness  with  which  the  total  Mind  is  present 
in  the  form  of  Experience.  How  near  is  it  to  the 
Absolute?  Or  how  adequate  is  the  object  to  the  sub- 
ject? or  the  Content  to  the  Form?  (4)  The  individ- 
ual mind  is  evolving  itself  through  all  these  forms 
of  experience,  till  it  reaches  Absolute  Mind  or 
the  Supreme  Reality,  which  has  within  its  own 
self-knowing  Ego  the  entire  evolution  of  the  forms 
of  experience  as  well  as  its  own  self-conscious  act- 
ivity. 

But  now  enters  a  new  fact,  verily  a  discovery.  We 
begin  to  find  underlying  all  these  categories  of  the 
Phenomenology  another  wholly  different  set  of  cate- 
gories which  have  been  lurking  in  its  movement  from 
the  beginning.  When  I  say  simply,  Consciousness  is 
or  becomes  something,  I  have  applied  to  it  at  first  quite 
unconsciously  two  (if  not  three)  new  categories, 
Being  and  Becoming.  Are  these  also  to  be  dragged 
out  from  their  hiding-place,  separately  held  up  and 
looked  at  by  themselves,  and  then  also  ordered  in 
a  new  work?  Consciousness,  Perception,  Self-con- 
sciousness, Reason,  pertain  properly  to  the  Ego,  are 
psychological  categories;  but  Being,  Essence,  Qual- 
ity and  Quantity  pertain  properly  to  all  existence,  are 
logical  categories,  expressions  of  the  Logos  itself. 
Undoubtedly  this  speech  of  the  Absolute  itself,  the 
substrate  of  all  human  speech,  must  be  freed  of  its 
external  appearance,  seized  as  it  is  in  itself,  and 
organized  into  a  science  self-unfolding,  which  will  be 
called  Logic  (we  might  almost  dare  name  it  Logology, 
parallel  to  yet  in  contrast  with  Phenomenology,  or  the 


HEQEUS  PHENOMENOLOGY.  703 

science  of  the  Logos,  as  distinct  from  the  science  of 
the  Phenomenon). 

When  this  new  task  with  all  its  magnitude  dawned 
upon  Hegel,  we  can  imagine  him  crying  out  (say 
atNurnberg):  Dear  me!  Will  this  phantasmagoria 
(Schattenreich)  never  come  to  an  end?  Have  I  to  go 
through  another  dance  of  the  Ghosts  (Geister),  far 
longer,  more  desperate,  more  elusive  and  impalpable 
than  that  last  one?  I  might  as  well  pass  to  Hades 
(Hell)  at  Once,  the  home  of  all  the  shades,  and  be- 
come there  a  shade  myself.  When  I  had  dug  out 
at  Frankfort  that  line  of  past  Philosophers  I  thought 
I  had  done  a  nice  little  piece  of  work,  enough  for  a 
life-time.  But  when  I  went  to  Jena  and  associated 
with  those  Romanticists,  the  spooks  of  my  own  Ego 
began  teasing  me,  teasing  me  incessantly,  so  that  I 
could  find  no  peace  till  I  had  separated  them  all  from 
myself  and  had  banned  them  into  one  long  line  of  that 
printed  book,  the  Phenomenology.  But  now  from  its 
depths  I  see  rising  here  before  me  a  new  •  order  of 
Spirits,  denizens  of  a  still  deeper  realm  to  which  I 
must  descend,  and  of  which  I  must  tell  to  the  people 
of  the  Upper  World." 

So  our  philosophical  Dante  sets  out  on  a  new  jour- 
ney to  explore  a  still  profounder  Inferno  than  the 
preceding  one,  also  more  devious  and  lengthy.  For 
bis  soul's  salvation  it  was  done,  let  us  think  in  his 
case  too,  since  "  there  was  no  other  way  "  to  Para- 
("'iso  and  to  Beatrice,  whose  terrestrial  counterpart 
(let  us  never  forget)  he  found  and  made  his  own  dur- 
ing the  writing  of  this  book. 


704          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 


C.  HEGEL'S  LOGIC. 

How  can  the  scope  of  the  Logic  be  grasped 
for  making  a  start?  Conceive  the  Universe  first ; 
then  conceive  it  to  be  self -knowing,  self-con- 
scious, properly  an  Ego  or  Intelligence  as  abso- 
lute ;  thirdly  conceive  this  absolute  Intelligence 
or  Ego  as  going  through  its  process  of  knowing 
itself,  and  precipitating  all  the  stages  of  such 
process  into  categories  so  that  the  whole  of  them 
form  a  kind  of  language  of  the  Absolute. 
Hegel's  Logic  is  the  Universe  as  Ego  thinking 
and  uttering  its  thoughts  as  absolute  in  an  abso- 
lute tongue  which  the  student  now  is  to  learn. 

This  Absolute  is  Mind,  Ego,  and  has  the 
movement  of  self-consciousness,  separating 
within  itself  and  returning  to  itself  in  order 
to  know  itself,  and  at  the  same  time  talk- 
ing to  itself  in  its  own  peculiar  speech  that 
it  may  fully  understand  itself.  Thus  it  can 
also  be  conceived  as  the  one  Absolute  Person 
seeking  to  know  himself  adequately,  as  univer- 
sal; for  the  Universe  can  have  but  one  supreme 
end:  to  become  self-conscious.  Yet  this  becom- 
ing is  a  process,  each  step  of  which  has  its  desig- 
nating word,  its  formula  or  category.  Thus  it  is 
evolutionary,  the  Evolution  of  the  Absolute,  or 
we  may  say  the  Absolute  evolving  itself,  its  Self- 
evolution.  Hence  it  is  also  perpetually  self- 
returning,  going  back  upon  itself  in  the  act  of 


HEGEL'S  LOGIC.  705 

self-consciousness.  So  it  comes  that  the  Evolu- 
tion of  the  Logic  has  likewise  within  it  a  cyclical 
principle,  of  which  many  examples  will  be  given 
later. 

Moreover  we  can  now  see  that  the  Logic  is  the 
third  stage  of  the  evolutionary  Hegel,  that  is, 
of  Hegel  evolving  the  Absolute.  In  the  Phe- 
nomenology he  reached  the  Absolute  by  means  of 
the  individual  Ego  passing  the  world  through  its 
alembic  and  positing  the  appearances  thereof  in 
a  line  of  ascending  categories,  the  last  of  which 
was  just  this  Absolute.  But  in  the  Logic  this 
Absolute  having  been  attained,  is  next  to  give  an 
account  of  itself  to  itself,  to  show  itself  forth  unto 
itself  through  its  own  inner  history,  that  it  may 
know  itself  as  the  self-knowing  Absolute  through 
all  its  gradations.  Such  is  its  logical  function 
as  distinct  from  its  phenomenological :  in  the 
former  the  Universe  as  self-determined  absolute 
Ego  is  categorized ;  in  the  latter,  the  Universe  as 
determining  the  individual  Ego  is  categorized. 
Thus  our  absolute  Hegel  has  reached  the  third 
or  self -returning  stage  in  his  Evolution  of  the 
Absolute,  which  is  finally  to  be  seen  as  a  stage 
of  the  philosopher's  own  Evolution. 

But  what  has  become  of  the  individual  in  this 
logical  process  of  the  Absolute?  He  is  "  to  look 
on  "  (zuzusehen)  and  see  the  thing  run  of  itself. 
He  is  no  longer  an  element  of  the  movement. 
To  be  sure  the  individual  in  the  Phenomenology 

45 


706         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

attained  or  in  a  sense  produced  the  Absolute ;  but 
now  he  is  dismissed  without  ceremony  from  any 
further  participation,  or  is  allowed  perchance 
"  to  look  on."  Wait;  he  being  thus  left  out,  is 
sure  to  make  trouble  with  the  Absolute. 

Still  we  are  to  keep  in  mind  the  mighty  sweep 
of  this  Logic:  the  Intelligence  of  the  Universe 
is  speaking  and  is. at  the  same  time  making 
speech,  as  it  speaks  of  itself  and  tells  what  it 
is,  namely  what  is  universal  Intelligence  in  which 
all  men  must  participate  if  they  are  to  under- 
stand one  another.  This  language  of  the  Logos 
as  unfolded  in  the  Logic,  the  individual  must 
appropriate  if  he  would  know  truly  what  he  is 
talking  about,  and  reach  down  to  the  basic  cate- 
gories of  human  speech,  which  otherwise  he 
uses  unconsciously,  just  as  they  lie  imbedded  in 
his  ordinary  sentences.  These  must  now  be 
stripped  of  their  phenomenal  finite  appurte- 
nances and  shown  in  their  underlying  essential 
forms,  which  constitute  the  language  of  Intel- 
ligence as  universal,  and  which  are  set  down 
and  ordered  in  this  Logic.  Two  Dictionaries 
henceforth  the  thinking  man  is  to  possess :  first 
is  the  ordinary  one  of  separate  vocables;  but 
the  second  is  the  Dictionary  of  the  language 
of  the  Absolute  Self,  which  language  originates 
in  the  process  of  the  latter  knowing  itself  and 
talking  to  itself.  This  speech  of  the  Absolute 
Self  or  of  Universal  Intelligence  is,  according 


HEGEVS  LOGIC.  707 

to  Hegel,  the  logical  one,  which  must  now  be 
evolved  and  made  scientific  by  the  philosopher. 
And  the  individual  (let  us  repeat)  is  simply  "  to 
look  on,"  and,  if  he  can,  behold  "  the  march 
of  the  Object  itself"  (der  Gang  der  8ache 
selbst),  for  this  is  "  the  representation  of  God 
Himself  as  He  is  in  His  eternal  Essence  before 
the  creation  of  Nature  and  of  Finite  Mind  "  (III. 
s.  39,  33.  Our  reference  here  and  elsewhere, 
when  we  cite  the  logical  treatises,  is  to  Hegel's 
Werke  III— VI,  which  four  volumes  include  the 
three  volumes  of  his  larger  Logic  and  the  one 
volume  of  his  smaller  Logic  of  the  Encyclo- 
pedia ) . 

I.  There  is  a  fair  degree  of  unanimity  among  the 
most  competent  judges  that  Hegel's  Greater  Logic 
(there  is  also  a  Lesser  Logic  of  his  in  the  Ency- 
clopedia) is  his  most  important  work.  It  was  written 
in  the  height  of  his  power,  being  published  in  1812-16, 
when  the  author  was  42-46  years  old.  Of  course  he 
was  unfolding  into  it  a  long  while  before,  all  his 
mature  life  in  fact.  In  the  Frankfort  outline  of  his 
system  it  is  present,  though  as  yet  immature;  he  lec- 
tures upon  it  repeatedly  at  Jena ;  it  has  its  place  in 
the  Propaedeutic.  In  Hegel  himself,  therefore,  the 
Logic  is  a  long,  persistent  Evolution,  and  the  work  it- 
self, in  its  deepest  character,  is  also  evolutionary, 
nothing  less  than  the  unfolding  of  the  Pure  Forms  of 
Thought  through  all  their  previous  stages  till  their 
culmination  is  reached  in  Hegel's  Absolute.  Also  the 
age  was  evolutionary,  transforming,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  Revolution  into  Evolution,  which  is  now  to 


708        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

become  conscious  in  the  thought  of  the  time.  That  is, 
the  epoch  has  arrived  in  which  Evolution  is  to  be  made 
aware  of  itself,  and  to  this  process  a  whole  Century 
(the  Nineteenth)  is  to  be  chiefly  devoted.  Its  deepest 
note  is  still  this  Logic  of  Hegel,  which,  as  a  phi- 
.losophic  utterance,  has  taken  its  place  alongside  of 
the  world's  greatest  books  in  the  present  field,  such 
as  Aristotle's  Metaphysics,  Spinoza's  Ethics,  Kant's 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason. 

Hegel  had  been  quietly  turning  over  his  funda- 
mental principle  since  1808  when  he  became  rector 
of  the  Gymnasium  at  Niirnberg.  The  situation  was 
favorable  to  making  mind  turn  back  upon  itself  and 
explore  its  most  subtle  and  abstruse  processes.  South 
Germany  accepted  Napoleon  the  Absolute,  being 
essentially  imperialistic  both  in  politics  and  religion. 
Its  ties  to  the  Empire  and  to  the  Papacy  had  always 
been  closer  than  those  of  North  Germany  which  was 
by  nature  protesting  (Protestant),  and  dissatisfied. 
After  the  catastrophe  of  Jena  Hegel  had  enough  of 
the  North-German  tumult,  and  turned  southwards  to 
the  land  of  peace  and  submission.  We  have  seen  how 
he  barely  saved  himself  and  his  Phenomenology  from 
being  swallowed  up  by  that  Absolute  "  on  horseback" 
whom  he  had  theoretically  evolved.  Hegel  (with 
Goethe)  has  been  much  blamed  for  the  lack  of  patri- 
otism, because  he  did  not  stir  up  the  German  people 
(as  Fichte  did)  to  resist  the  foreign  despot.  But  that 
was  not  his  call  in  life,  was  not  his  conviction.  He 
could  never  have  dwelt  with  the  "  Pure  Essences," 
and  have  unfolded  them  in  writing,  if  he  had  allowed 
himself  to  be  swept  along  in  the  time's  hurly-burly. 
His  true  vocation  he  rightly  grasped  ;  accordingly 


HEGEL'S  LOGIC.  709 

under  the  aegis  of  the  living  Absolute  he  gives  him- 
self up  to  the  contemplation  and  development  of  all 
its  antecedent  shapes  whose  inner  movement  is  to 
bring  forth  its  present  final  shape.  Undoubtedly  most 
men  will  continue  to  admire  the  patriotic  Fichte  as  a 
character  more  than  Hegel.  We  can  see,  however, 
that  each  filled  his  place  and  worked  out  his  destiny 
in  his  own  way. 

II.  The  entire  sweep  of  the  Logic  is  the  Evolution 
of  the  Absolute ;  it  has,  therefore,  the  same  general  end 
that  we  find  in  the  History  of  Philosophy  and  in  the 
Phenomenology,  and  its  period  is  that  of  the  evolution- 
ary Hegel.  Yet  we  observe  in  it  the  self-returning 
principle  more  marked  than  ever  before.  The  circu- 
lar movement  is  everywhere  applied.  Philosophy 
evolves  itself  not  in  a  straight  line,  but  in  the  form  of 
a  vast  cycle  "  whose  periphery  is  composed  of  a  great 
number  of  lesser  cycles."  The  structure  of  the  Logic 
will  carry  out  this  principle  at  every  point ;  as  a  whole 
it  is  one  vast  cycle  self-returning,  which,  however,  is 
made  up  of  an  infinite  number  of  small  and  smaller 
cycles,  each  of  which  is  also  self-returning  or  the  total 
process. 

Moreover  the  Logic  is  not  merely  a  self-returning 
totality  within  itself,  or  the  whole  logical  cycle,  but  this 
logical  cycle  is  a  part  or  stage  of  a  still  greater  cycle 
which  is  in  general  what  we  have  called  the  evolution- 
ary, properly  a  stage  of  Hegel  himself.  Very  dis- 
tinctly does  the  Logic  go  back  to  the  History  of 
Philosophy,  quite  to  the  beginning,  and  thence  take  the 
category  of  Being,  which  was  the  Eleatic  principle  of 
Philosophy.  Then  the  doctrine  of  Becoming  (Wer- 
den)  was  that  of  Heraclitus.  These  facts  are  noted  by 


710         MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Hegel  himself,  who  also  declares  that  each  category  of 
the  Logic  was  once  the  basic  formula  of  a  system  of 
Philosophy  that  rose,  flourished,  and  declined  with  its 
time.  Thus  the  historic  Evolution  furnishes  the 
content  of  the  Logic  and  up  to  a  certain  point  its 
movement  also.  Each  of  the  logical  categories  may 
be  regarded,  says  Hegel,  as  a  statement  or  definition 
of  the  Absolute,  specially  belonging  to  the  age  in 
which  it  appeared.  So  we  have  to  consider  the 
Logic  as  a  return  to  Hegel's  first  great  evolutionary 
insight,  that  of  the  History  of  Philosophy,  and  a  new 
elaboration  of  its  content  and  its  process.  Thus  we 
see  that  the  Logic  through  its  very  position  as  the 
third  si  age  of  the  evolutionary  Hegel  is  self-returning 
by  its  innermost  nature;  in  it  the  philosopher  returns 
upon  himself,  and  recognizes  just  that  act  (the  self- 
returning)  as  an  inherent  element  of  the  total  logical 
movement.  Well  may  he  say  that  Philosophy  is  not 
merely  a  progress  to  infinity  in  a  straight  line  as  given 
by  Time  but  is  also  cyclical  as  given  by  the  Ego,  by 
Spirit. 

It  is  true  that  Hegel's  Logic  does  not  rigidly  follow 
the  History  of  Philospohy.  Some  historical  categories 
are  omitted,  some  are  translocated.  Still  further,  some 
are  introduced  from  Natural  Science,  as  Chemism  and 
Mechanism ;  others  betray  their  mathematical 
origin,  as  Measure  and  Proportion.  Still  these  have 
their  justification.  There  are  times  when  a  mechanical 
view  of  the  Universe  prevails,  as  in  the  Seventeenth 
Century,  while  the  Eighteenth  may  be  called  the 
chemical  Century.  In  the  main,  however,  flegel  de- 
rives his  logical  categories  from  the  History  of  Philos- 
ophy, freeing  them  indeed  from  their  temporal  wrap- 


HEGEL  S  LOGIC.  711 

page  and  making  them  over  into  the  pure  evolu- 
tionary forms  of  the  Absolute,  which  thereby  knows 
itself  as  the  underlying  principle  from  the  beginning, 
as  Spirit  or  Ego. 

III.  This  movement  of  "the  pure  Essences"  of 
the  Universe  is  seized  as  objective,  necessary,  abso- 
lute. The  result  is  there  will  be  small  room  for  the 
play  of  fancy  and  subjective  caprice ;  the  individual 
is  to  make  himself  one  with  this  movement  of  the 
All,  recognizing  it  and  yielding  himself  to  its  process. 
Hence  Romanticism  which  was  such  a  dominant  note 
in  the  Phenomenology,  qnite  drops  away  in  the  Logic, 
with  its  impassive  objectivity,  flowing  along  in  its 
course  with  a  classic  Olympian  serenity.  The  Ab- 
solute is  indeed  subject,  Ego,  but  also  object,  the 
All ;  this  Ego,  however,  cannot  become  Romantic 
and  break  over  bounds,  being  itself  just  the  bound- 
less. 

Such  an  infinite  movement  of  infinite  Spirit  would 
seem  to  be  beyond  man's  reach  in  its  abstraction  from 
everything  tangible  and  finite.  Hegel  appears  to 
have  felt  this,  and  consequently  he  runs  a  second 
terrestrial  thread  through  his  Logic  underneath  his 
upper  ethereal  world.  This  second  thread  appears 
in  the  shape  of  observations  (Anmerkungen),  which 
are  sometimes  carried  out  to  a  considerable  length. 
Besides  these  we  find  remarks  by  the  way,  brief  intro- 
ductions, tabular  statements,  which,  Hegel  is  careful 
to  say,  do  not  belong  to  the  proper  evolution  of  the 
work.  These  outside  remarks  are  chiefly  historical 
and  phenomenological,  and  thus  externally  connect 
the  Logic  with  the  two  antecedent  stages  of  the 
evolutionary  Hegel. 


712         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

But  the  Dialectic  remains  in  its  full  force,  yet 
shows  itself  under  a  somewhat  different  aspect  from 
that  already  noted  in  the  Phenomenology,  in  which  it 
was  more  secret  and  implicit.  In  the  Logic,  however, 
it  has  become  the  conscious,  governing  method  of  the 
whole  exposition.  It  may  be  called  the  soul  of  the 
categories  impelling  them  to  an  inner  movement, 
which  is  "  unceasing,  unalloyed,  undetermined  by 
anything  from  without."  Hegel's  logical  categories 
are  endowed  with  a  kind  of  self-propulsion,  they  go 
of  themselves  according  to  "their  own  immanent 
rhythm,"  while  the  individual  (if  he  can  get  admitted 
to  their  ghostly  presence)  is  simply  "to  look  on  " 
their  dance.  He  can  witness  it,  recognize  it  in  its 
transcendental  purity  and  absoluteness ;  hardly  can 
he  share  in  it,  certainly  he  cannot  make  himself  an 
integral  part  of  its  process  by  recreating  that  which  he 
recognizes  to  be  the  universally  creative  principle. 
"The  system  of  Pure  Thoughts  (represented  by  the 
categories)  completes  itself  through  itself"  undis- 
turbed by  any  external  influence. 

Each  logical  category  through  its  own  inner  Dialectic 
moves  out  of  its  limits  and  passes  over  into  the  next 
higher  category  which  preserves  it,  but  preserves  it 
as  canceled  or  sublated  (aufgehoben).  This  is  one 
of  Hegel's  most  famous  and  fruitful  thoughts.  The 
higher  principle  does  not  destroy  the  lower,  but  takes 
it  up  and  integrates  it  in  a  new  synthesis.  There  is  a 
progressive  movement  of  the  categories,  but  in  order 
to  progress  it  must  go  back  and  include  its  earlier 
stage.  Thus  the  Logic  is  a  grand  metamorphosis  of 
categories ;  these  are  no  longer  fixed,  separate,  mo- 
nadal  as  in  previous  systems,  but  fluid,  bound-burst- 


HEGEL'S  LOGIC.  713 

ing,  aspiring  (one  may  say)  for  what  is  highest,  the 
Absolute,  which  is  the  complete  self-knowing,  self- 
returning  All. 

In  Hegel's  Logic  the  old  separation  between  Logic 
and  Metaphysics  is  overcome.  It  took  Hegel  many 
years  and  much  study  to  bring  about  this  unity 
to  his  own  satisfaction.  In  his  Frankfort  out- 
line, the  first  stage  of  the  Norm  is  Logic  and 
Metaphysics ;  at  Jena  he  puts  both  under  one 
heading  in  his  lectures.  Not  till  he  wrought  over  the 
subject  in  the  quiet  of  Niirnberg,  did  he  seize  the  cre- 
ative Conception  (Begriff)  as  the  genetic  center  of 
both  Logic  (Form  of  Thought)  and  Metaphysics 
(Content  of  Thought).  Being  and  Essence,  the  first 
two  stages  of  the  Logic,  lead  up  to  the  Conception 
which  is  the  third  stage,  which  returns  to  and  repro- 
duces the  two  previous  stages  as  necessary  parts  of 
its  own  complete  process. 

IV.  Hegel's  Logic  has  even  a  deeper  relation  to 
Kuut  than  has  the  Phenomenology.  The  latter  dealt 
with  the  Kantian  problem  of  the  Thing-in-itself  and 
the  Phenomenon,  and  pertained  to  the  cognition  of  the 
object.  But  the  former  grapples  with  the  logical 
scheme  of  categories  which  Kant  simply  takes  for 
granted,  adopting  them  from  Formal  Logic.  Hegel, 
however,  gets  back  of  this  assumption  of  Kant,  un- 
dermining it  and  then  reconstructing  from  the  founda- 
tion the  whole  logical  movement.  The  dozen  cate- 
gories which  Kant  picks  up  externally  and  disconnec- 
tedly, are  increased  enormously  in  number  and  in- 
ternally connected  through  their  own  self-evolution 
from  beginning  to  end.  The  result  is  a  vast  super- 
structure is  raised  by  Hegel  who  in  the  line  of  thought 


714        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

shows  himself  the  greatest  constructive  genius  that 
ever  lived.  For  Aristotle's  Metaphysics,  with  which 
alene  Hegel's  Logic  can  be  compared  in  this  regard, 
is  a  disconnected  discussion  of  the  separate  categories, 
not  an  organic,  internally  jointed  treatise  upon 
them.  At  least  such  is  Aristotle's  book  as  time  has 
transmitted  it  to  us,  and  we  suspect  that  it  was 
always  of  this  character,  though  some  critics  are  of 
a  different  opinion.  Hegel  is  supremely  the  archi- 
tect of  thought,  and  his  Logic  is  his  masterpiece  in 
construction. 

In  another  way  Hegel  reaches  underneath  Kant,  in 
part  broadening  the  old  foundation  and  in  part 
building  a  new  structure.  Kant  had  seen  and  un- 
folded the  Dialectic  of  the  Ideas  of  Pure  Reason  as 
expressed  in  finite  categories,  and  had  drawn  thence 
a  negative  conclusion.  Hegel,  however,  uncovers  the 
Dialectic  in  all  finite  categories,  but  makes  them  over- 
come their  fiuitude  in  the  Absolute,  and  so  reaches 
a  positive  conclusion.  Thus  the  Categories  and  their 
dialectical  movement  are  evolved  by  Hegel  out  of 
Kant,  who  is  therein  transcended  yet  preserved.  This 
is  an  instance  of  Hegel's  manner  of  refuting  pre- 
vious philosophers:  he  evolves  them  into  the  higher 
stage  which  is  his  own.  Hence  arises  the  question : 
Is  Hegel's  own  Philosophy  also  to  be  evolved  into 
the  next  higher  st-ige?  Is  his  own  principle  to  be 
applied  to  himself?  Elsewhere  this  question  will 
ceme  up  and  will  be  discussed. 

V.  In  his  Introduction  to  Being  (III.  s.  55-69) 
Hegel  grapples  with  the  difficult  problem  about  the 
starting-point  of  absolute  Science.  How  can  the 
Absolute  begin  without  becoming  finite?  Hegel 


HEGEL'S  LOGIC.  715 

speaks  of  two  beginnings  —  the  most  abstract  cate- 
gory (Being)  and  the  most  concrete  (Conception). 
He  puts  the  former  first,  though  in  the  end  it  is  found 
to  be  the  product  of  the  latter.  The  Beginning  as 
such  "  both  is  and  is  not;  "  it  is  the  "  unity  of  both 
Being  and  Nothing  "  in  one  process.  Logic  starting 
with  this  process,  has  to  begin  with  its  first  member, 
Being. 

Thus  Being  is  "  the  utterly  vacant,"  that  which  is 
emptied  of  all  difference,  even  of  Nothing.  It  is  the 
Ego  as  All  negating  its  own  self -distinction  or  inner  dif- 
ference, and  seizing  itself  without  difference.  Or  the 
self-consciousness  as  Absolute  takes  away  its  division 
jis  self  conscious,  and  is  its  own  opposite.  This  is 
Pure  Being,  the  Absolute  purely  without  that  self- 
division  which  is  its  own  nature.  This  is,  then,  the 
beginning,  since  the  All  is  to  develop  into  the  self- 
consciousness  which  is  itself.  But  why  must  it  begin? 
Because  it  must  show  its  own  process  as  self-con- 
scious, starting  from  its  own  other.  The  All  as 
self-conscious,  in  being  self-conscious,  must  first  be, 
and  then  move  to  difference  or  division  ;  this  imme- 
diate First  of  the  absolute  self -consciousness  is 
Being.  So  it  is  Being  with  its  own  self-division 
canceled  for  the  beginning.  "  The  Absolute  Spirit 
at  the  conclusion  of  the  Logic  unfolds  a  world  of 
Evolution  from  Being1  to  itself."  Thus  the  beginning 
is  "no  longer  immediate  but  mediated  and  the  move- 
ment is  a  circle." 

Hegel  calls  Logic  "  pure  science,  that  is,  pure  know- 
ing in  the  total  circuit  of  its  evolution."  This  pure 
knowing  is  self-knowing,  which  is  a  process.  On  the 
one  hand  the  Ego  "  is  no  longer  opposite  to  the  object, 


716          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

but  has  made  it  internal,  and  knows  it  as  itself."  But 
on  the  other  hand  the  Ego  as  knowing  itself,  or  as 
self-conscious,  "has  given  up"  its  separation  or  op- 
position to  the  object  and  "  is  one  with  the  same." 
Mind  takes  the  object  into  itself,  and  the  object  takes 
mind  into  itself.  Pure  knowing,  or  Logic,  or  Science, 
is  the  All  knowing  itself  as  process,  and  putting  the 
steps  of  this  process  into  its  own  categories.  The 
total  intelligence,  grasping  its  steps  and  forming  them 
into  categories,  must  be  reknown  by  the  individual 
intelligence  and  ordered  into  a  science.  Logical 
categories  exist  long  before  logical  science,  which  is 
consciously  expressed  evolution.  "From  this  ex- 
plication of  pure  knowing,  we  see  that  nothing 
is  to  be  done  except  to  consider  its  movement, 
leaving  out  all  reflections  and  opinions,  and  taking  up 
only  what  is  at  hand  (vorhanden)."  Here  again  is  the 
statement  of  Hegel  which  affirms  the  philosophical 
Absolute  without  its  recreation  through  the  Self. 

Hegel  further  says :  "To  determine  pure  knowing 
as  Ego  leads  to  the  continuous  suggestion  of  the  sub- 
jective Ego,  whose  limits  ought  to  be  forgotten,"  and  so 
results  confusion.  But  here  comes  the  grand  difficulty : 
there  is  no  going  over  from  the  Phenomenology  to  the 
Logic  without  the  Ego  or  Psychology.  What  is  to 
forget  its  limits  ?  Just  the  Ego  which  is  recreating 
this  absolute  knowing  or  process.  Hence  the  Ego 
must  be  present  and  active  in  order  "  to  forget  its 
limits,"  that  is,  in  order  to  reproduce  itself  as  abso- 
lute. But  with  such  a  thought  the  underlying  element 
which  makes  both  the  Phenomenology  and  the  Logic 
comes  to  the  surface :  the  Ego  as  determining  the  Ab- 
solute which  determines  it  —  which  Ego,  Hegel  thinks, 


HEGEL'S  LOGIC.  717 

"  ought  to  ba  forgotten"  by  itself  in  its  supreme 
process. 

VI.  We  see  from  the  introductory  notices  to  the 
several  parts  of  his  Logic  that  its  organization  caused 
Hegel  a  good  deal  of  doubt,  which  has  left  its  marks 
upon  this  work  in  various  ways  (for  instance  in  the 
twofold  division  into  subjective  and  objective.) 
But  at  last  he  settled  upon  the  threefold  division 
into  Being,  Essence  and  Conception.  All  three  might 
be  put  into  a  sentence  which  expresses  the  Logic; 
Being's  Essence  is  Conception.  Logical  science, 
however,  must  go  into  detail  and  answer  the  three 
questions:  first,  What  is  Being?  second,  What  is 
Essence?  third,  What  is  Conception?  It  may  here 
be  noted  that  the  great  Athenian  thinkers  of  an- 
tiquity had  also  elaborated  substantially  the  same 
thought:  Being's  Essence  is  Conception,  or  the  Uni- 
versal (see  our  Ancient  European  Philosophy,  third 
stage  of  the  Hellenic  Period).  Hegel's  Logic  un- 
folds each  of  these  categories  with  its  process  into  a 
vast  number  of  subordinate  categories  with  their  pro- 
cesses. The  mentioned  sentence  may  be  regarded 
as  the  fundamental  saying  of  the  Logos,  generative 
of  all  its  other  sayings. 

In  the  treatment  of  Logic  we  must  consider  three 
things  which  every  stage  has  to  pass  through.  These 
are:  (1)  Procedure;  the  threefold  movement,  which 
as  being  the  outer  numerical  form  (quantitative)  is 
always  present.  Or  the  Mind  has  its  own  quantitative 
form  in  which  it  moves,  and  which  it  necessarily  pro- 
duces. (2)  Dialectic;  the  inner  movement  of  the 
object  (and  also  of  the  Ego)  from  one  stage  to 
another,  each  stage  showing  its  finitude  and  the  annul- 


7 1 8         MODERN  E  UEOPEAN  PHIL O SOPHY. 

ment  thereof.  Here  the  Thought  or  Ego  breaks  out  and 
shows  itself  one  with  the  object  in  the  flash  of  the 
Dialectic,  like  the  electric  spark.  (3)  Process;  not 
the  Dialectic  proper,  but  its  completion  in  a  positive 
result,  called  often  by  Hegel  the  Speculative.  Thus 
the  Dialectic  is  itself  dialectical,  or  the  negative  act  is 
negated,  and  the  outcome  is  the  positive  totality,  a 
cycle  of  three  stages.  This  is  the  process  which  is 
fundamental  with  Hegel,  really  the  Conception,  or  the 
before-mentioned  Speculative  (VI.  151),  which  to 
our  mind  is  not  a  good  term,  since  it  does  not  sug- 
gest or  necessarily  contain  the  all-important  thing, 
namely  the  Process,  but  rather  implies  its  absence. 
Undoubtedly,  Hegel  has  the  Process,  not  however  as 
psychical  (which  is  its  concrete  form),  but  as  meta- 
physical (which  makes  it  an  abstraction).  This  point 
will  be  more  fully  unfolded  later. 

The  Procedure  of  the  Logic  we  shall  try  to  bring  to 
the  mind,  and,  as  far  as  possible,  to  the  eye  of  the 
student,  by  corresponding  quantitative  signs  —  by 
numerals,  Roman,  Arabic,  and  also  by  letters  large 
and  small  —  the  whole  in  triple  order  and  subordina- 
tion. Thus  we  hope  to  keep  the  outer  form  of  the 
Process  ever  present  to  him,  which  will  also  suggest 
the  inner  movement,  or  at  least  that  there  is  an  inner 
movement,  Hegel  has  not  failed  to  give  these  hints 
of  arrangement  throughout  his  Logic,  whose  organiz- 
ation at  once  falls  into  vision.  For  Hegel  is  supremely 
schematic;  philosophically  this  must  be  considered 
one  of  his  chief  merits.  He  hated  a  chaos  of  thoughts 
tumbling  over  and  through  one  another  without  order 
and  due  subordination,  as  is  the  present  way  of  writ- 


HEGEVS  LOGIC.  719 

ing  even  Philosophy.     We  can  forgive  him  even  if  at 
times  he  was  over-schematic. 

The  threefold  content  of  Logic,  Being,  Essence,  and 
Conception,  with  its  organization  we  shall  try  to  present 
in  a  brief  way. 

(1)  BEING.  This  is  the  Conception  as  immediate, 
and  hence  outside  of  itself,  for  Conception  properly 
is  not  only  mediated  but  the  self-mediated.  Each 
determination  of  Being  is  other  or  external,  hence  the 
universe  is  made  up  of  things  all  separate  ;  this  is,  hence, 
the  realm  of  finitude  with  its  Dialectic  which  is  the 
inner  lurking  Conception  breaking  down  the  limit  of 
the  Finite.  Three  fundamental  stages,  Quality,  Quan- 
tity and  Measure. 

(A)  Qualitative  Being  —  in  which  "the  Being  is 
one  with  its  determinations."  Here  again  we  have 
three  stages,  and  each  of  these  is  still  further  subdi- 
vided into  three  stages  as  follows:  — 

(1)  First  Process  of  Qualitative  Being:  (a)  Pure 
Being,  (b)  Nothing,  (c)  Becoming.  Here  occurs  the 
famous  expression  that  Being  is  Nothing,  about 
which  there  has  been  much  criticism,  mainly 
through  a  misconception  of  the  meaning.  Hegel  also 
states  that  Nothing  returns  to  Being  and  thus  we 
reach  the  Becoming,  which  is  the  total  Process 
of  this  primal  or  Pure  Being.  When  we  reflect 
that  Being  and  Nothing  (Positive  and  Negative)  are 
categories  of  human  thinking  and  are  also  in  essence 
inter-related,  we  begin  to  catch  a  glimpse  of  what  the 
philosopher  has  in  mind  by  dragging  these  terms  and 
their  Process  to  the  light.  He  deems  them  the  first 
words  in  the  language  of  the  Logos  or  of  the  Absolute 
Intelligence  which  man's  Intelligence  has  learned  im- 


720         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

plicitly,  but  which  is  now  to  become  explicit  and  ordered 
in  this  Logic.  Also  these  categories  (according  to 
Hegel)  are  the  starting-point  of  the  History  of  Philo- 
sophy, the  earliest  ones  separated  from  their  phenom- 
enal wrappage  and  formulated  by  human  thinking  in 
ancient  Hellas.  The  Eleatics,  for  instance,  had  Pure 
Being  as  their  principle,  and  Heraclitus  seized  the 
Becoming.  Note  also  this  primordial  connection  or 
rather  return  of  the  Logic  to  the  History  of  Philoso- 
phy, indicating  the  place  of  these  two  works  in  the 
Process  of  Hegel's  own  Evolution. 

Hegel  uses  the  term  Being  in  three  (if  not  four) 
different  senses  in  his  exposition.  The  first  stage  of 
the  Logic  is  called  Being,  then  the  first  stage  of  Qual- 
ity, then  the  first  stage  of  tnat  stage,  which  last  we 
have  just  named  Pure  Being.  These  different  uses  of 
the  one  word  in  the  same  general  connection  some- 
times produces  confusion  and  must  be  pronounced  not 
good  exposition.  We  shall  help  ourselves  out  by 
using  specifying  adjectives,  which  Hegel  does  now 
and  then,  but  not  regularly. 

(2)  Second  Process  of  Qualitative  Being  (Extant 
Being,  Daseyn):  (a)  Extant  Being  in  itself,  Some- 
what ;  (6)  Extant  Being  as  explicit,  Somewhat  and 
Other,  the  realm  of  the  Finite;  (c)  The  Infinite  as 
qualitative  and  as  a  Process  with  the  Finite.  This 
last  division  is  specially  important  in  a  philosophical 
sense.  Hegel  distinguishes  between  the  infinite  Prog- 
ress (the  sic  ad  infinitum,  called  by  him  the  bad,  the 
finite,  and  the  negative  Infinite)  and  the  infinite  Pro- 
cess, which  is  affirmative,  cyclical.  This  is  really  the 
Conception  (Begriff)  breaking  up  into  the  realm  of 
Being. 


HEGEUS  LOGIC.  721 

(3)  Third  Process  of  Qualitative  Being  (  Being- for- 
itself,  Fiirsichseyn) :  (a)  Independent  Being,  the 
One  ;  (6)  One  and  Many  ;  (c).Attraction  and  Repul- 
sion as  a  process  together.  Individual  Being  we 
might  call  this  sphere  and  thus  it  has  a  fresh  sugges- 
tion of  Conception.  In  the  History  of  Philosophy 
Hegel  identifies  it  largely  with  the  atomic  movement 
in  ancient  Greece,  which  in  its  complete  sweep  in- 
cluded the  individual  Ego.  In  fact  Atomism  may  be 
defined  as  the  Process  of  Being  as  individual  (see  our 
Ancient  European  Philosophy,  p.  151)  or  the  first 
getting  of  the  individual  through  thought.  Here 
again  we  .should  note  that  Hegel  connects  his  Logic 
with  the  History  of  Philosophy  in  Greece. 

(B)  Quantitative  Being — in  which  the  determi- 
nateness  is  external  to  Being  yet  is  (has  Being).  Or 
Quantity  is  the  Pure  Being  which  is  indifferent  to  its 
own  Quality.  Or  Being  separates  into  itself  and  its 
own  other  or  opposite  which  nevertheless  is  —  Quan- 
tity. Also  three  subdivisions. 

(1)  First  Process  of  Quantitative  Being  —  undeter- 
mined Quantity  :  (a)  Pure  Quantity,  which  "  has  no 
limit;"    (6)  Continuous   and   Discrete    Magnitude; 
(c)  The  limiting  of  Quantity. 

(2)  Second  Process  of  Quantitative -Being  —  deter- 
mined Quantity  {Quantum),    (a)  Number;  (6)  Ex- 
tensive (multiplicity)  aad  Intensive  (degree)  Quan- 
tity;  (c)  Quantitative  Infinity.     Here   again,  as    in 
Quality,  the   Infinite  becomes  explicit  and  plays   an 
important  part.     The  infinitely  small  and  the  infinitely 
large   indicate  the   infinite  progress   as   quantitative, 
which,  however,  is  really  the  process  of  the  Quantum, 

46 


722          MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

according  to  Hegel,  the  annulling  and  the  positing  of 
the  quantitative  limit. 

(3)  Third  Process  of  Quantitative  Being  —  Ratio 
or  inter-related  Quantity,  wherein  the  Quantitative 
Process  becomes  explicit ;  (a)  the  direct  Ratio;  (&) 
the  indirect  or  converse  Ratio;  (c)  the  Ratio  of 
Powers  —  unit,  square,  cube. 

The  preceding  Quantitative  Being  is  the  realm  of 
Mathematics  in  its  triple  Process  of  undetermined, 
determined,  and  interdetermined  Quantities.  These 
are  separated  from  Being  as  Quality  and  are  made  to 
proceed  within  themselves  in  their  purity.  Thus, 
however,  they -have  the  Quality  of  having  no  Quality, 
and  thereby  show  their  twofold  or  separative  charac- 
ter, which  must  come  back  and  unite  with  Quality  as 
such.  This  takes  place  in  the  next. 

(C)  Measured  Being  (Maass) — in  which  Quantity 
determines  Quality  ;  we  may  call  this  sphere  quantita- 
tive Quality.  Measure  (or  proportion)  has  its  moral 
and  aesthetic,  as  well  as  physical  and  mathematical 
applications.  The  expression  "too  much  of  a  good 
thing"  suggests  Quality  determined  by  Quantity. 

( 1 )  First  Process  of  Measured  Being  (specific  Quan- 
tity in  its  three  main  forms)  :  (a)  the  specific  Quantum, 
as  one  inch,  which,  being  once  measured  itself,  meas- 
ures the  whole  material  world  ;  (6)  specifying  Measure, 
as  ten  inches  long  ;    (c)   Being-f or  itself  in  Measure, 
or  permanent  Measure   (as    in   the  law   of    falling 
Bodies). 

(2)  Second  Process  of  Measured  Being;  Measure 
becomes  manifold   or   many  Measures  in  ratio:   (a) 
The  ratio  of  independent  Measures  (as  in  chemical 
affinities) ;  (6)  The  knotted  line  of  measured  Ratios 


BE  GEL'S  LOGIC.  723 

(as  the  decimal  system,  and  the  scale  in  music)  ;  (c) 
The  Measureless,  which  is  the  infinite  of  Measure,  as 
there  was  a  corresponding  Infinite  in  Quality  and 
Quantity. 

(3)  Third  Process  of  Measured  Being,  called  by 
Hegel  "  the  Becoming  of  Essence."  (a)  Absolute 
Indifference  (between  Quantity  and  Quality) ;  (6) 
Indifference  as  inverse  ratio  of  its  factors  (centripetal 
and  centrifugal  forces) ;  (c)  Transition  to  Essence,  in 
which  the  two  factors  of  Being,  Quality  and  Quantity, 
are  seen  to  be  inter-related,  each  posits  the  other. 
Thus  the  going-over  of  one  to  the  other  and  of  the 
other  to  the  one  (which  is  the  Process  of  Being)  is 
seized  in  itself  as  the  Essence  of  Being,  and  both  sides 
are  grasped  in  relation. 

(II)  ESSENCE.  —  This  is  Conception  as  the  Imme- 
diate mediated,  both  elements  of  which  statement 
must  be  present  and  related.  "In  Essence  there  is 
no  longer  transition  but  relation"  (VI.,  s.  221).  For 
instance,  Being  and  Nothing  are  independent  cate- 
gories (immediate) ;  but  Positive  and  Negative  are 
relative  categories,  each  is  mediated  through  the 
other.  Thus  Essence  is  inherently  twofold,  two- 
sided,  which  sides  are  always  in  separation,  yet 
always  in  relation  —  two  suns  revolving  around  each 
other  yet  never  flying  together. 

Now  the  Absolute  (Logos)  unfolds  in  speech  its 
world  of  relativity,  which  is  its  separative  stage,  its 
division  within  itself,  of  which  each  half  reflects  the 
other  half  as  its  own  complement.  Hence  Hegel  calls 
this  also  the  reflective  stage  of  the  total  logical  move- 
ment. He  is  careful  to  say  that  Essence  is  not 
complete  reflection  into  itself  (VI.  s.  223)  as  that 


724  MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

would  be  Conception ;  it  is  the  mutual  reflection 
of  two  complementary  categories  (like  Positive  and 
Negative).  It  is  evident  that  Hegel  fluctuated  a  good 
deal  about  the  ordering  of  his  Essence.  Between  his 
two  Logics,  apparently  not  written  more  than  six  or 
seven  years  apart,  there  are  considerable  differences 
of  arrangement  and  exposition.  We  shall  make  a  brief 
outline  of  the  treatment  found  in  the  larger  Logic, 
with  its  three  main  divisions  which  are  still  further 
divided  and  subdivided  in  triadal  succession. 

(A)  Essence  as  reflective  within  itself  (or  inter- 
reflective),  which  is  its  first  or  immediate  form.  (1) 
First  Process  of  Reflective  Essence  (Schein,  appear- 
ance as  immediate):  (a)  the  Essential  and  the  Unes- 
sential; (6)  the  Appearance  (Schein)  of  Being;  the 
latter,  when  annulled  as  immediate,  appears  to  be ; 
(c)  Reflection  in  which  each  side  is  mediated  through 
the  other  and  thus  we  have  the  process  of  this  stage. 
(2)  Second  Process  of  Reflective  Essence  (or  the 
Essences  proper,  Wesenheiten,  also  called  the  determi- 
nations of  Reflection):  (a)  Identity,  (6)  Difference  ; 
(c)  Contradiction.  These  are  the  basic  categories  of 
the  reflective  stage,  which  holds  them  asunder, 
though  in  relation.  If,  however,  the  mind  puts  them 
into  a  process  together,  there  is  at  once  the  rise  to 
Conception,  which  is  indeed  hard  to  avoid  at 
this  point.  But  Hegel  passes  to  (3)  The  Third 
Process  of  Reflective  Essence  (Ground):  (a)  the 
absolute  Ground;  (6)  the  determined  Ground;  (c) 
the  Condition  (as  Ground).  When  the  Conditions 
are  all  present  the  Appearance  follows,  being  medi- 
ated by  the  Conditions  or  in  general  the  Ground. 
Hence,  we  come  to  the  following. 


I1EGEUS  LOGIC.  725 

(B)  Essence  as  mediated  Appearance  (Erscheinung , 
not  Schein  which  is  immediate).     This  stage  we  may 
call  the  phenomenal.  ( 1 )  First  Process  of  Phenomenal 
Essence  (Existence)  :    (a)  The  Thing  and  its  Proper- 
ties ;  (&)  The  Thing  as  composed  of  material  elements 
(stuffs);   (c)   The   Dissolution  of   the   Thing.     (2) 
Second   Stage  of  Phenomenal    Essence    (Phenome- 
nality):  (a)  The  Law  of  the  Phenomenon  ;    (6)   The 
World  as  phenomenal  and  as  in  itself  (essential)  ;  (c) 
Dissolution  of  the   Phenomenon.     It  is  evident   that 
this  stage  of  Phenomenality  is  Hegel's  elaboration  and 
rise  out  of  the  well-known  Kantian   dualism  between 
the  Phenomenon   and  the  Thing-in  itself.     (3)  Third 
Process  of   Phenomenal   Essence  (the  esential   Rela- 
tion):   (a)   The    Relation   between    the   Whole   and 
the  Parts  ;  (b)  The   Relation    between   Force  and  its 
Expansion  (latent  and    actual) ;     (c)    The    Relation 
between  the  Internal  and  the  External.     With  this  we 
have   reached   Actuality,    the   third    and  last  general 
division  of  Essence. 

(C)  Essence  as   Actuality,  which   Hegel  calls  the 
unity  of  Essence  and  Appearance;  the  Actual  is  the 
inter-relation  of  the  two  sides  in  one  Process,  which, 
however,  has  three  main  stages,  each  of  which  is  like- 
wise a  Process.     (1)  First  Process  of  actual  Essence, 
or  the  Absolute,  into  which  all  difference  between  Form 
and  Matter,  Essence  and  Appearance,  vanishes  as  into 
the  supreme  One:    (a)  The  Exposition  of  the  Abso- 
lute (as  the  disappearance  of  determination)  ;  (6)  The 
absolute  Attribute  (the  relative  Absolute,  or  the  Ab- 
solute taking  Form)  ;  (c)  The  Modus  of  the  Absolute, 
its  externality  as  a  mere  manner  or  mode  of  appearing. 
These  categories   are  the    leading   ones  of   Spinoza. 


726         MODERN  EUROPEAN' PHILOSOPHY. 

Hegel's  interpretation  of  them,  as  here  given  is  ques- 
tionable on  a  number  of  points.  At  the  best  he  shows 
only  the  metaphysical  pantheistic  side  of  Spinoza, 
who  has  also  decidedly  an  ethical,  individual  side. 
(See  in  the  present  work  the  account  of  Spinoza,  pp'. 
177,  179,  231,  etc.)  (2)  Second  Process  of  actual 
Essence,  or  Actuality  as  such,  which  is  the  manifesta- 
tion of  the  Absolute,  the  moving  out  of  it,  not  into  it 
(as  in  the  preceding  stage):  (a)  Accident —  or  formal 
Actuality,  Possibility  and  Necessity;  (6)  relative 
Necessity  —  or  real  Actuality.  Possibility,  and  Neces- 
sity; (c)  Absolute  Necessity.  (3)  Third  Process  of 
actual  Essence  —  the  absolute  Relation  which  is  here 
discussed  under  three  forms :  (a)  Substantiality;  (6) 
Causality  ;  (c)  Reciprocity.  Or  the  Relation  of  Sub- 
stance and  Accident  (annihilates),  of  Cause  and 
Effect  (equalizes),  of  mutual  determination  of  the  two 
sides  which  become  one  Process.  When  this  posits 
the  twofoldness  or  the  relation  and  then  returns  out 
of  it  to  the  completed  Process,  we  have  transcended 
the  doubleness  inherent  in  Essence,  and  have  reached 
Conception,  the  third  stage  of  the  total  Logic,  which 
(Conception)  has  been  underlying  all  the  preced- 
ing forms  and  their  Processes. 

What  is  the  object  of  presenting  to  the  reader  the 
foregoing  dry  abstract  outline?  It  is  to  impress  upon 
his  mind  Hegel's  organization  of  thought.  Thus  can 
be  seen  at  a  glance  the  external  Procedure  of  the  work, 
its  thorough-going  triadal  movement  from  beginning 
to  end  and  down  to  the  smallest  details  of  the  mighty 
structure.  Here  a  glimpse  may  be  caught  of  Hegel's 
supreme  gift:  his  architectonic  power  in  constructing 
the  vast  temple  of  the  World's  spiritual  acquisitions, 


HEGEL'S  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  727 

and  making  each  of  them  as  it  were  march  to  its  place 
in  the  colossal  edifice.  And  this  edifice  becomes 
transparent  to  thought  in  its  totality  and  in  its  minut- 
est parts ;  at  least  this  in  the  main  can  be  said.  Herein 
the  work  is  unique  in  Philosophy.  The  other  greatest 
thought-builders  of  the  ages  can  show  no  such  perfect 
organization  of  the  world  of  Ideas  —  not  Aristotle, 
not  Spinoza,  not  Kant.  And  this  power  of  organiz- 
ing thought  is  what  must  henceforth  rule  our  earth 
more  and  more. 

To  be  sure,  the  inner  movement  of  the  work, 
the  subtle  mental  dynamite  called  the  Dialectic  with 
its  bound-bursting  explosion  of  all  these  finite  forms 
or  categories,  could  not  be  given  in  the  foregoing 
sketch  without  undue  expansion.  Still  the  Process, 
the  One  and  All,  is,  we  hope,  suggested  —  that  cycli- 
cal movement  in  the  Evolution  of  the  Logos,  which  is 
yet  to  become  a  part  of  man's  education,  when  this 
gets  to  be  completer  than  it  is  now.  Thus  we  havo 
come  to  the  fundamental  Process,  the  Process  of  all 
these  Processes  of  Being  and  Essence,  which  is  next 
to  be  considered. 

(Ill ) .  CONCEPTION  (  BEGRIFF  ) .  —  In  this  term 
with  its  corresponding  thought  we  have  reached 
the  center  of  Hegel's  Logic  and  also  of  his 
whole  philosophical  system.  In  his  own  per- 
sonal evolution  he  unfolds  into  Conception  as 
the  unitary  principle  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics, 
and  thence  unfolds  out  of  it  into  all  the  applica- 
tions of  it  to  the  special  sciences.  This  pene- 
tration to  the  logical  center  of  his  system  was 
doubtless  completed  at  Niirnberg,  though  begun 


728         MODERN-  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

before.  There  he  had  to  teach  Logic  and  also 
Metaphysics  to  immature  pupils,  and  so  was 
compelled  to  unify  his  thought  and  bring  it  to 
the  greatest  possible  clearness.  At  any  rate  the 
process  of  Conception  is  the  first  and  last  of  his 
Logic,  veritably  the  Alpha  and  Omega  of  its 
inner  constructive  movement.  And  afterwards 
we  find  it  generally  applied  to  his  special 
elaborations. 

It  is  true  that  Hegel  in  his  Logic  develops 
Conception  proper  into  a  higher  and  final  sphere 
which  he  calls  Idea.  This  is  the  reality  of  the 
Conception.  Still  the  Idea  has  in  itself  the  pro- 
cess of  Conception  as  its  essential  nature,  and 
so  is  properly  Conception  also,  being  the  third 
stage  thereof  in  the  systematic  order.  So  it 
comes  that  Hegel  when  he  gives  the  fundamental 
logical  germ  of  his  theme,  cites  the  threefold 
process  of  Conception  —  the  Universal,  the  Par- 
ticular, and  the  Individual  —  as  the  ultimate 
source  beyond  which  the  mind  does  not  reach. 
This,  therefore,  we  may  deem  the  germinal 
Conception,  out  of  which  is  born  Hegel's  Logic, 
and  out  of  this  in  turn  springs  Hegel's  total 
scheme  of  Philosophy.  Thus  we  reach  down  to 
the  original  Hegelian  embryo,  the  examination 
of  which  will  have  to  be  somewhat  more  micro- 
scopic than  heretofore. 

At  the  start  is  the  difficulty  of  getting  a  good 
term  to  represent  this  sphere.  The  best  English 


HEGEUS  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  729 

translation  for  the  German  word  employed  by 
Hegel,  is,  to  our  mind,  the  word  Conception. 
There  are  objections  to  this  term,  but  on  the 
whole  it  best  corresponds  to  Hegel's  Begriff. 
Particularly  is  the  translation  of  it  into  Notion 
to  be  rejected,  though  sanctioned  by  many 
authorities.  Notion  is  just  about  the  most 
shallow  and  uncertain  word  for  Begriff  to  be 
found  in  the  English  dictionary.  "  I  have  a 
notion  of  a  thing  "  quite  perverts  the  meaning 
and  linguistic  character  of  Begriff  as  used  by 
Hegel.  Moreover  the  word  Conception  is 
found  in  the  older  English  writers  with  the  sense 
of  creativity.  This  sense  has  not  wholly  lapsed, 
or  may  be  revived,  since  the  Bible  employs  it 
and  also  Shakespeare. 

Conception,  then,  is  the  third  stage  or  division 
in  the  total  sweep  of  the  Logic,  whose  two  pre- 
ceding stages  are  Being  and  Essence.  These  are 
the  "  moments  "  of  its  process  or  its  "  Becom- 
ing; "  the  three,  accordingly,  constitute  the 
threefold  movement  of  the  total  Logic,  and  thus 
belong  together  in  one  round  or  cycle.  More- 
over Conception  is  not  only  "  the  result  "  but 
also  "  the  foundation  "  of  Being  and  Essence;  it 
is  in  truth  the  First  in  the  logical  process,  since 
it  mediates  Being,  which  we  started  with  as  the 
Immediate.  Thus  it  is  a  return  to  the  beginning 
which  it  posits,  making  the  same  no  longer  the 
beginning.  The  movement  of  Logic  through 


730        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Being  and  Essence  is  hence  the  genesis  of  the 
Conception,  which  is  just  this  genesis  of  itself 
made  explicit  and  formulated.  The  process 
underlying  Being  as  Immediate  is  the  implicit 
Conception,  which  is  to  unfold  fully  into  itself, 
thus  showing  what  mediates  Being  as  the  Immedi- 
ate. Herein  Hegel  shows  his  basic  procedure  as 
cyclical,  the  last  of  the  process  turning  back  and 
determining  or  creating  the  first. 

But  we  must  not  omit  to  notice  that  each  of 
these  stages,  though  a  part  or  phase  of  the 
total  logical  movement,  has  also  the  whole 
of  that  movement  within  itself,  and  so  is 
organized  by  the  Conception,  which  at  first 
orders  Being,  then  Essence,  then  itself.  In  the 
last  case  the  Conception  is  seen  to  be  self- 
organizing,  the  Conception  of  the  Conception. 
Thus  it  organizes  itself  and  everthing  else.  One 
statement  of  this  point,  among  many  scattered 
through  his  Works,  runs  as  follows:  Concep- 
tion is  "  the  Totality  in  which  each  of  its  mo- 
ments is  the  Whole  that  Conception  itself  is" 
(VI.  315).  And  we  are  also  to  note  that 
"  the  procedure  of  the  Conception  is  no  longer 
a  going-over  from  one  thing  into  another  (as 
in  Being),  but  is  Evolution  (Entwickelung, 
Development)  since  the  different  is  at  the  same 
time  identical  with  the  other  and  with  the 
Whole."  Each  separate  stage  has  fundament- 
ally the  same  process  as  the  other  stages  and 


HEGEL'S  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  731 

as  all  of  them  together.  Such  is  Hegel's  con- 
trast between  Being  and  Conception:  the  one 
has  Transition,  the  other  has  Evolution  (or  De- 
velopment) by  means  of  which  ««  that  is  pos- 
ited which  is  potentially  or  ideally  existen  ," 
not  yet  real.  For  instance,  the  plant  is  ideally 
present  in  the  seed,  and  it  is  the  process  of 
Conception  (this  is  in  all  organic  life)  which 
is  its  development  from  one  stage  to  the  other 
(VI.  316-7). 

Here  another  question  rises :  What  existent 
thing  in  the  entire  universe  most  adequately  rep- 
resents this  Conception?  What  object  can  you 
point  out  which  is  Conception?  Otherwise  the 
treatment  remains  hazy.  Listen  to  Hegel  in  a 
very  important  passage  which  sounds  almost 
like  a  confession:  "  I  shall  here  confine  myself 
to  one  observation  which  may  serve  for  help- 
ing us  grasp  the  present  subject  and  lighten 
its  difficulty.  The  Conception  (Begriff)  in  so 
far  as  it  has  arrived  at  an  existence  which  is 
free  (complete),  is  nothing  else  than  Ego>  or 
pure  Self-consciousness.  I  have  indeed  con- 
cepts, or  specific  conceptions,  but  Ego  is  the 
pure  Conception,  which  as  Conception  has  come 
to  existence."  (V.  13).  This  is  in  a  number 
of  ways  a  very  significant  statement.  It  may  be 
considered  Hegel's  explanation  of  Hegel,  the 
metaphysical  or  philosophical  Hegel  for  the 
nonce  turning  psychological.  He  declares 


732          M  ODE  EN  E  UR  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  tiOPH  Y. 

openly  that  the"  Ego  with  its  process  as  self- 
consciousness  is  just  his  Conception  as  existent, 
as  a  reality  in  the  world.  Yet  his  Conception 
is  the  principle  which  underlies  and  propels  his 
Logic  and  consequently  his  whole  philosophy 
from  beginning  to  end.  Hence  one  asks  at 
this  point,  why  he  did  not-  install  the  Ego 
directly  and  by  name  as  the  ultimate  process 
of  his  system,  the  process  of  his  own  Self 
always  on  hand  and  at  work?  Or  has  he  done 
so?  In  a  manner  he  has,  but  in  a  more  de- 
cided manner  he  has  not.  Just  here  indeed 
lies  Hegel's  grand  uncertainty,  his  dualism,  his 
fluctuation  between  the  purely  philosophical 
and  the  psychological  points  of  view.  For 
though  he  acknowledges  again  and  again  that 
his  Conception  is  Ego,  he  will  abstract  it 
from  the  Ego  and  keep  it  abstracted  as  a 
metaphysical  category,  till  its  connection  with 
its  fountain  head  seems  obscured  if  not 
lost.  Still,  having  once  heard  this  key-note 
of  his  entire  system,  we  shall  not  forget  it, 
through  all  the  vast  and  intricate  mazes  of  our 
philosopher.  Nor  can  we  help  noticing  in  the 
preceding  passage  a  sort  of  hesitation,  as  if  he 
were  unwilling  to  speak  the  matter  out.  Why 
such  an  undertone  in  his  words?  Each  reader 
will  naturally  make  his  own  interpretation  in  such 
an  uncertain  matter;  but  our  opinion  is  that 
Hegel  caught  a  glimpse  of  the  fact  that  such  a 


HEGEUS  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  733 

declaration  ultimately  involves  a  complete  recon- 
struction of  his  system.  He  would  have  to  carry 
all  his  categories  back  to  the  process  of  the  Ego 
and  explain  their  origin  and  movement  by  that 
process  directly.  But  thus  Hegel's  Philosophy 
would  push  beyond  itself,  indeed  beyond  Philos- 
ophy itself,  and  entes  a  new  world-discipline, 
namely,  Psychology.  Such  a  step  he  did  not 
and  could  not  make  in  his  epoch  nor  in  Europe, 
since  he  had  no  actual  institutional  realm  for  the 
ground- work  and  the  illustration  of  his  thought. 
Hegel  himself  has  often  said  that  Philosophy  can 
only  utter  the  thought  underlying  the  institutions 
and  civilization  of  the  country  and  age  in  which 
it  appears.  Philosophy  cannot,  any  more  than 
can  man,  leap  out  of  its  skin. 

In  the  same  passage  Hegel  describes  or  per- 
chance defines  the  Ego  as  "  the  pure  unity  which 
relates  itself  to  itself,"  which  is  "  the  abstraction 
from  all  content  and  determinateness,"  and  in 
such  act  "  returns  into  the  freedom  of  unlimited 
equality  with  itself."  This  is  the  absolute  free- 
dom of  the  Ego,  and  is  "  Universality  which  is 
the  result  of  the  previous  negative  procedure," 
the  abstracting  from  all  determinate  content. 
Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Ego  is  Individuality 
just  by  this  procedure,  "  since  it  places  itself  in 
opposition  to  everything  else  and  excludes  the 
same;"  thus  it  is  "individual  personality." 
Note  now  the  change:  the  abstract  terms  with 


734        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

which  Hegel  here  characterizes  the  Ego  are  Uni- 
versality and  Individuality,  which  we  shall  later 
find  in  the  treatment  of  Conception,  though 
Particularity,  or  inner  separation  will  have  to  be 
introduced  in  order  to  make  the  process  complete. 
Still  further:  "  each  of  these  is  the  totality, 
each  contains  the  determination  of  the  other  in 
itself,  and  they  are  One,  which  One,  however,  is 
the  disruption  of  itself  into  Two,"  namely,  the 
Universal  and  the  Individual  (V.  12).  Such  is 
not  only  Conception,  but  "  the  Conception  of  the 
Conception,"  or  the  Ego  grasping  and  formu- 
lating its  own  process.  It  is  plain  that  Hegel 
has  here  before  his  mind  the  Psychosis,  but  is 
expressing  it  metaphysically  and  not  psycholo- 
gically. What  necessity,  inner  and  outer,  lay 
upon  him  to  do  just  thus,  has  been  already 
touched  upon. 

In  the  same  connection  Hegel  sets  forth  an- 
other important  point :  his  relation  to  antecedent 
philosophies.  Specially  does  he  trace  the  devel- 
opment of  his  Conception  out  of  the  Substance 
of  Spinoza.  He  emphasizes  the  fact  that  he 
will  not  and  cannot  refute  the  system  of  Spinoza, 
as  if  his  own  were  the  truth  and  the  latter  false. 
Refutation  is  not  the  right  word  or  thought  to 
express  the  evolution  of  one  System  out  of  the 
other.  '«  The  doctrine -of  Spinoza  is  a  neces- 
sary standpoint,  upon  which  the  Absolute  places 
itself  "  in  its  movement.  "  But  it  is  not  the 


HEGEL'S  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  735 

highest  standpoint,"  though  it  is  to  unfold  into 
the  latter,  which  is  to  contain  it  as  a  subordinate 
element.  "  This  implies  a  deficiency,  a  lack  of 
completeness;  it  is  imperfect  truth,  but  not  un- 
truth. The  only  refutation  of  Spinozism,  is 
first,  to  recognize  its  principle  as  essential  and 
necessary,  and  then  to  elevate  this  principle  out 
of  itself  into  the  higher.  Substance  (Spinoza's 
doctrine)  is  to  be  seen  as  a  stage  in  the  genesis 
of  the  Conception,"  into  which  it  unfolds  and 
becomes  a  moment  (V.  9-11). 

In  like  manner  Hegel  goes  back  (in  his  Intro- 
duction to  Conception)  to  Kant,  and  shows  us 
on  what  lines  his  Logic  is  an  evolution  from 
Kantian  thoughts.  Even  to  ancient  Aristotle 
he  returns  (V.  30)  and,  while  giving  great  ap- 
preciation, indicates  wherein  the  supreme  Greek 
philosopher  has  to  be  transcended.  For  Logic 
must  now-  concern  itself  not  simply  with  the 
Forms  of  Thought,  but  "  must  investigate  in 
how  far  these  forms  correspond  to  Truth."  It 
is  plain  that  Hegel  seeks  to  connect  himself  with 
antecedent  philosophies,  as  they  come  down  the 
stream  of  time,  regarding  his  own  philosophy  as 
the  last  point  of  view  into  which  the  rest  have 
developed,  and  from  which  they  are  to  be 
judged.  Very  closely  he  joins  his  Logic  to  the 
History  of  Philosophy,  which  is  evidently  pres- 
ent to  him  all  the  while,  and  from  which  he 
draws  as  from  his  primal  sources. 


736         MODERN  E UROPEA N  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

Another  reflection  the  alert  reader  will  not  fail 
to  make  at  this  point.  The  whole  line  of  the 
philosophies  of  the  past  has  unfolded  into  the 
Hegelian,  which  thus  becomes  their  test  and 
final  arbiter.  But  is  Hegel's  own  doctrine  to  be 
subjected  to  the  same  law?  Is  he  in  the  process  of 
Evolution  or  is  this  to  stop  with  him?  If  his  is 
truly  the  absolute  philosophy,  it  would  seem  to 
be  the  end  of  the  philosophic  world-movement, 
and  the  beginning  of  something  else.  There  is 
no  doubt  that  Hegel  at  times  speaks  as  if  his 
system  were  the  philosophic  finality.  Particu- 
larly during  his  last  period  at  Berlin,  his  auto- 
cratic spirit  in  philosophy  increased,  and  practi- 
cally at  times  he  tried  to  play  the  part  of 
dictator.  Equally  certain  is  it  that  the  opposite 
trend  can  be  shown  in  Hegel;  he  regards  his 
own  work  as  being  no  exception  to  the  evolu- 
tionary principle  in  philosophy,  of  which  he  has 
been  the  stoutest  champion.  The  present  is, 
then,  another  case  of  what  we  have  already  noted 
as  the  Hegelian  dualism,  and  the  same  dualism  lies 
deep  in  all  philosophy.  In  the  foregoing  state- 
ments Hegel  decidedly  stands  for  evolution  of 
thought,  find  he  explains  his  Conception  as  devel- 
opment, till  at  last  the  Absolute  Idea  is  reached. 
Just  here  can  be  seen  the  germinal  point  of  the  new 
thought,  which  is  to  reconcile  the  Hegelian  dual- 
ism and  that  of  all  philosophy.  Yet  this  must 
be  done  in  accord  with  Hegel's  own  principle  a$ 


HEGEL' 8  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  737 

heretofore  set  forth.  His  philosophy  is  «not  to 
be  refuted  by  argumentation,  nor  is  it  to  be  set 
down  as  false.  On  the  contrary  it  is  to  develop 
its  own  inadequacy  from  within,  and  so  bring 
forth  the  higher  point  of  view.  What  he  says 
he  has  done  to  Spinoza  and  to  Kant,  must  be 
done  to  him,  if  his  doctrine  be  universal,  and  not 
a  caprice  of  his  own.  It  is  a  necessary  stage  in 
the  movement  of  philosophy,  but  shows  itself 
inadequate  and  contradictory,  wherein  its  own 
Dialectic  must  apply  to  itself.  To  be  true  to 
Hegel  in  the  deepest  sense,  we  are  to  unfold 
Hegel  out  of  Hegel.  He  cannot  be  battered 
down  from  without,  but  he  can  and  must  be 
evolved  *'  into  the  higher  standpoint."  Thus  he 
is  eternally  preserved  in  his  own  History  of 
Philosophy,  and  is  the  whole  by  being  truly  the 
part. 

And  we  may  state  here  that  not  only  Hegel's 
philosophy,  but  Philosophy  itself  as  a  world- 
discipline  is  also  to  be  put  into  this  development. 
The  time  has  come  when  not  only  separate  phi- 
losophies are  to  unfold,  one  out  of  the  other,  in 
an  endless  chain,  of  succession,  but  Philosophy 
itself,  the  whole  of  it,  as  a  world-discipline  is  to 
be  thrown  into  the  cauldron  of  Evolution,  in 
order  that  out  of  it  may  come  forth  not  merely 
another  new  Philosophy,  but  another  world- 
discipline,  which  is  «'  the  higher  standpoint  "  not 

47 


738         MODERN  EUROPEAN-  PHILOSOPHY. 

merely  in  relation  to  some  special   philosophy, 
but  in  relation  to  the  totality  of  Philosophy. 

Hegel,  however,  cannot  entirely  avoid  discuss- 
ing the  psychological  side  of  his  logical  process. 
This  comes  up  prominently  with  the  question, 
What  is  it  to  conceive?  (V.  15.)  The  answer 
runs:  "To  conceive  an  object  consists  really 
in  nothing  more  than  that  the  Ego  makes  the 
same  its  own,  penetrating  the  same  and  bringing 
it  into  its  form,  which  is  the  Universal  made 
individual,  or  the  Individual  made  universal" 
(as  set  forth  in  the  preceding  process  of  Con- 
ception). Emphatic  is  here  the  statement  that 
the  Ego  must  perform  the  process  of  Concep- 
tion, is  indeed  just  that  process.  But  what  is 
this  Ego?  It  has  several  stages  very  different, 
which  are  in  general  sense-perception  (or  sensu- 
ous intuition),  representation,  and  this  Concep- 
tion (or  Thought).  But  how  are  these  stages 
graded  in  importance?  "The  object  in  sense- 
perception  or  in  representation  is  still  external, 
still  something  foreign.  But  in  Conception  (the 
third  stage),  the  independence  or  the  immediacy 
of  the  object,  which  it  has  in  sense-perception 
and  representation,  is  transformed  into  some- 
thing posited  or  mediated ;  the  Ego  in  thinking 
penetrates  the  same,"  assimilating  it,  in  fact 
re-creating  it  and  making  it  truly  object.  Thus 
Conception  (or  Thought)  is  seen  to  return  to  the 
first  immediate  Being  given  by  the  senses,  and  to 


EEQEU S  L OGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  739 

mediate  it,  completing  the  process.  Such  is  tte 
difference  in  the  same  object  sense-perceived 
and  conceived  (or  thought) .  The  house  in  sense- 
perception  is  something  given  immediately  to  the 
senses ;  but  the  house  in  Conception  is  no  longer 
merely  this  given  something,  but  we  get  behind 
it  (so  to  speak),  and  behold  its  creative  principle 
in  Thought.  Now  it  is  truly  objective,  when  con- 
ceived or  thought.  Previously  it  was  «'  an  ap- 
pearance; "  not  till  we  think  it,  do  we  reach  the 
truth  of  the  object.  "  This  objectivity  or  the 
Conception  is  nothing  other  than  the  nature  of 
self-consciousness,  and  has  no  other  moments  or 
determinations  than  the  Ego  itself"  (V.  16). 
Objective  truth  is,  therefore,  the  very  process  of 
Ego,  or  the  Conception.  This  is  the  process 
which  we  are  to  find  in  all  things,  if  we  would 
know  them  in  their  truth.  But  this  is  properly 
the  psychological  process,  and  really  underlies 
the  logical,  or  is  one  with  it. 

Here,  then,  one  is  compelled  to  inquire 
into  the  relation  between  Psychology  and 
Logic.  Hegel  says:  "Concerning  this  matter, 
the  observation  is  to  be  made,  at  the  very  start, 
that  those  forms,  sense-perception,  representa- 
tion, and  the  like,  belong  to  self-conscious  mind 
which  as  such  is  not  considered  in  logical 

o 

science  "  (V.  17).  Here  he  omits  the  mention 
of  Conception  or  Thought,  which  is  considered 
in  Psychology  as  well  as  in  Logic,  being  really 


740        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  third  stage  of  both.  "  The  pure  (logical) 
determinations  of  Being,  Essence  and  Concep- 
tion, constitute,  it  is  true,  the  foundation  and 
inner  fabric  of  the  Mind  (or  Ego);  but  this 
Mind,  when  sense-perceiving,  is  in  the  determi- 
nateness  of  Being,  and,  when  representing  (or 
imaging),  has  risen  out  of  Being  to  Essence." 
Thus  he  parallels  the  first  two  stages  of  Logic 
(Being  and  Essence)  with  the  first  two  stages  of 
Mind  (or Intellect  in  Psychology).  He  declares 
that  these  concrete  forms  of  Mind  (sense-per- 
ception and  representation)  have  as  little  to  do 
with  the  science  of  Logic  as  the  forms  of  Nature 
have  (for  instance  Space  and  Time).  Ac- 
cording to  him  Logic  determines  both  Nature 
and  Mind.  But  what  about  the  third  form,  Con- 
ception? "  As  the  act  of  the  self-conscious 
Understanding  (or  Ego)  Conception  too  is  not 
to  be  considered  a  part  of  logical  science,  which 
treats  Conception  as  it  is  in  and  for  itself  (or 
objective)."  This  is  peculiarly  Hegelian;  the 
Conception  in  Logic  must  be  divorced  from 
the  Conception  in  the  Mind  (or  Ego),  which  is 
somehow  to  be  put  out  of  sight.  Though  the 
Ego  as  subjective  Conception  has  had  to  recreate 
objective  Conception,  and  put  it  into  its  catego- 
ries, whereby  logical  science  arises,  still  that  first 
(or  psychological)  Conception  must  be  in  a 
manner  suppressed  as  something  too  individual 
for  the  universality  of  Logic.  Thus  the  latter 


HEGEL '  8  L  OGIC  —  C  ON  CEP  TION.  74 1 

becomes  the  determinant  of  the  Ego,  though 
this  Ego  has  really  determined  it,  and  our  phi- 
losopher establishes  a  new  logical  autocracy  of 
the  universe.  Now  such  autocracy  has  its  valid- 
ity, yet  not  complete  validity;  it  is,  yet  Is  not 
the  whole  which  Hegel  claims  for  it;  Logic  as 
science  is  not  to  cast  out  of  its  process  the  Ego 
which  made  it,  aud  which  must  be  perpetually 
re-making  it  in  order  that  it  be  at  all.  Logic 
after  obtaining  absolute  authority  in  the  City  of 
the  Spirit,  being  called  by  Hegel  just  the  Ab- 
solute in  its  highest  potence,  cannot  be  allowed 
to  turn  around  and  thrust  down  the  individual 
Ego  through  which  it  rose  to  power,  and  which 
is  an  essential  part  of  its  process.  That  is  absolu- 
tism with  a  vengeance.  It  is  true  that  the  in- 
dividual Ego  must  be  subordinate  to  the  Law  as 
absolute  and  must  obey  the  same.  But  the 
other  side  is  not  to  be  left  out ;  that  same  in- 
dividual is  ultimately  to  make  the  Law  which  he 
obeys,  and  he  is  properly  to  obey  none  other  in 
any  complete  institutional  condition.  We  can- 
not help  thinking  that  the  logical  autocracy  of 
Hegel  has  its  counterpart  in  the  social  and 
political  autocracy  we  still  find  in  Europe,  which, 
however,  is  gradually  throwing  off  this  form 
of  absolutism. 

We  have  given  with  greater  detail  the  preced- 
ing analysis  of  Hegel's  introduction  to  the  Third 
l*art  of  his  Larger  Logic  (  Werke  V. )  because  it 


742         MODERN  EURO PEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

shows  the  philosopher  at  the  Parting  of  the 
Ways  in  the  deepest  depth  of  his  thought. 
Which  road  will  he  turn  down  and  proceed  upon 
for  the  future,  the  philosophical  or  the  psycho- 
logical? Just  these  two  elements  he  has  found 
in  his  Conception  which  as  creative  Ego  has 
solved  his  primal  problem  of  uniting  Metaphy- 
sics and  Logic  in  a  common  process  with  itself. 
And  he  declares  that  the  truth  of  the  object  is 
just  this  process  of  Ego  and  contains  no  other 
moments  than  those  of  self -consciousness.  The 
reader  may  well  ask,  why  not  then  show  this 
Logic  and  with  it  show  the  whole  objective 
world  as  containing  the  process  of  the  Ego 
directly,  that  is  psychologically?  But  Hegel  at 
once  throws  away  the  psychological  element  of 
the  Conception,  though  he  knows  that  just  that 
has  created  his  whole  science.  He  seems  afraid 
of  the  Fichtean  or  Kantian  solipsism  (or  subjec- 
tive idealism),  and  hence  places  all  his  emphasis 
upon  the  metaphysical  reality  of  Conception, 
giving  to  its  process,  which  is  properly  psycho- 
logical, three  metaphysical  categories  (Universal, 
Particular,  Individual)  which  quite  ignore  and 
even  conceal  its  psychical  origin.  Thus  his 
Absolute  Science  as  creative  leaves  out  the  very 
principle  that  created  it  and  keeps  it  going. 
And  then  how  can  it  be  absolute  if  it  leaves  out 
that  or  anything? 

Here  we    see  the    deepest  breach  in  Hegel's 


HEGEVS  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  743 

thought,  really  the  dualism  between  Philosophy 
and  Psychology,  between  the  outgoing  and  in- 
coming world-disciplines.  In  Hegel  Philosophy 
here  openly  rejects  Psychology  even  while 
acknowledging  that  the  latter  has  created  it. 
Now  we  must  be  careful  to  consider  that  this 
proceeds  from  no  insincerity  on  the  part  of 
Hegel,  yea  from  nothing  which  can  rightly  be 
called  weakness  in  the  man.  He  represents  his 
deepest  self,  as  well  as  his  age  and  Europe;  he 
represents  Philosophy  which  has  now  evolved 
itself  to  the  point  of  the  most  piercing  dualism, 
which  dualism,  however,  has  been  in  it  more  or 
less  implicitly  from  the  beginning.  The  great- 
ness of  Hegel  is  that  Philosophy  herself  takes 
him  as  her  final  representative  and  expositor. 
His  voice  is  her  voice,  his  character  is  her  char- 
acter, at  least  as  far  as  the  Nineteenth  Century 
is  concerned.  And  through  him  and  also 
through  her  the  man  of  thought  has  to  pass  in 
order  to  reach  the  Twentieth  Century.  There  is 
no  road  around  them  or  over  them.  This  move- 
ment of  the  Ages  runs  through  them,  and,  we 
think,  out  of  them  into  the  next  stage,  for  which 
they  are  the  necessary  preparation. 

Thus  Hegel,  having  penetrated  to  the  last 
Parting  of  the  Ways  before  the  Future,  turns 
down,  or  rather  turns  back,  upon  the  Way  of 
Philosophy  which  he  will  reconstruct  from  the 
beginning,  showing  its  evolution  in  the  Nine- 


74: 4         M  ODE  UN  E  UE  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

teenth  Century  and  within  himself  through  the 
Principle  of  Evolution. 

In  the  same  Introduction  (V.  25),  Hegel  comes  to 
speak  of  the  relation  of  Logic  to  Nature  and  Mind. 
Thus  he  has  before  him  the  philosophic  Norm  with  its 
threefold  division — Logic,  Nature  and  Mind.  This 
is  fundamentally  tbeoldGreekNorm  of  all  Philosophy, 
though  in  place  of  Metaphysics  Hegel  substitutes 
Logic,  which  he  expressly  declares  to  be  the  customary 
Metaphysics,  as  far  as  its  general  character  is  con- 
cerned. The  sciences  of  Nature  and  Mind  he  calls 
the  concrete  sciences,  though  they  are  created  by 
Logic,  the  abstract  science,  which  is  "  the  inner  con- 
structive artist  of  the  concrete  sciences/'  is  what  un- 
folds them  into  reality.  Yet  ' '  Logic  is  also  the  arche- 
typal producer  "  of  the  forms  after  which  Nature  and 
Spirit  are  patterned,  and  is  conceived  as  creative,  or 
the  true  genetic  conception  of  the  physical  and  spir- 
itual worlds.  Thus  Mind  as  Ego  is  created  by  it,  yet 
this  same  Ego  has  to  recreate  it  by  thinking  in  order 
to  attain  to  science  or  knowledge. 

We  here  come  to  the  division  of  the  Conception, 
which  has  been  the  secret  power  dividing  and  organ- 
iz'ng  both  Being  and  Essence.  But  now  it  must  be 
grasped  as  that  which  divides  and  organizes  itself.  It 
has  been  hitherto  the  determinant  of  the  Other,  but 
now  this  determinant  must  determine  itself.  Hence 
Conception  is  the  self-determined,  the  free,  or  is  that 
which,  in  going  forth  from  itself,  is  always  with  itself. 
It  is  the  totality  seized  as  process,  which  must  sepa- 
rate within  itself  (otherwise  it  could  not  proceed), 
yet  be  one  with  itself  in  all  its  separation.  Its  sepa- 
rated parts  must  be,  accordingly,  what  the  Whole  is,  or 


EEOEUS  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  745 

must  have  its  process,  in  order  to  be  identical  with 
it.  Such  is,  in  general,  Hegel's  Conception  conceived, 
or  the  Conception  of  the  Conception  (Begrift  des  Be- 
griffs).  Now  this  we  are  to  seize  in  its  division, 
or  rather  in  its  self-division,  for  its  division  does  not 
come  from  the  outside,  butis  its  own, is  through  itself. 
Really  it  is  Conception  dividing  and  ordering  Con- 
ception itself  and  so  seeing  what  it  itself  is. 

The  division  of  Conception  through  itself  is  triple  — 
into  subject,  object,  and  the  unity  of  the  two,  or 
the  return  of  object  to  subject.  Hence  Hegel's  divi- 
sions of  the  Conception  are  Subjectivity,  Objectivity, 
and  the  Idea  in  the  Hegelian  sense.  These  divisions 
we  are  to  see  unfolding  out  of  the  Conception  as  a 
Whole,  which  divides  within  itself  into  its  parts  —  Sub- 
jectivity, Objectivity  and  Idea ;  yet  each  of  these 
parts  is  the  Whole  and  a  Conception,  and  so  has  the 
total  process  as  its  own.  We  shall,  therefore,  behold 
each  of  these  parts  dividing  within  itself  and  unfold- 
ing in  the  threefold  process  which  is  Conception.  Or 
Conception  is  conceiving  Conception  and  developing 
it,  which  is  thus  its  own  genetic  process. 

Here  occurs  a  difficulty  in  nomenclature.  Hegel 
uses  this  term  Conception  for  no  less  than  three  differ- 
ent phases  of  his  scheme.  It  is  applied  to  this  whole 
sphere,  then  to  the  first  stage  of  this  sphere,  then  again 
to  the  first  form  of  this  first  stage.  The  inherent 
difficulty  of  the  work  is  thus  heightened  by  a  confu- 
si®n  which  comes  from  using  the  same  word  for  differ- 
ent grades  of  the  same  thought.  This  ambiguity  we 
found  also  in  Being,  and  is  not  infrequent  in  Hegel. 
It  is  true  that  he  sometimes  helps  himself  out  by  using 
adjectives  and  other  special  designations  in  order  to 


746         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

keep  his  distinctions  clear.  Herein  we  shall  follow 
him  and  employ  adjectives  or  brief  descriptions  to 
mark  these  subtle  divisions  which  so  easily  slide  into 
one  another. 

A.  Subjectivity.  It  can  be  called  also  subjective 
Conception,  or  Conception  as  subject.  Hegel  calls  it 
formal  Conception,  which  develops  the  forms  of  itself, 
or  of  thinking.  Hence  it  includes  formal  logic  with 
its  three  spheres  usually  stated  as  Conception,  Judg- 
ment and  Reasoning.  It  is  properly  the  ratiocinative 
process  put  into  its  place  in  the  Hegelian  Logic.  It  is 
called  Subjectivity  since  the  subject  or  Ego  is  dealing 
with  its  own  shapes;  Conception,  unfolding  in  itself 
is  determining  the  forms  of  Conception,  the  categories 
into  which  it  precipitates  the  stages  of  its  own  process. 
Yet  each  of  these  stages  is  again  the  total  process. 
This  fact  may  be  indicated  by  putting  stress  upon  the 
subjective  Processes  in  the  following  outline,  which 
are  three  —  the  first  or  germinal  one  (Conception 
proper),  the  second  or  separative  one  (Judgment), 
and  the  third  or  returning  one  (Syllogism). 

(1)  The  first  subjective  Process  of  Conception  as  a 
Whole  is  still  called  Conception  by  Hegel  though  with 
a  special  emphasis  (Conception  as  such  in  his  smaller 
Logic).  Conception  now  seizes  its  own  inner  process 
as  self-conscious  and  puts  its  three  stages  into  meta- 
physical categories — Universality,  Particularity  and 
Individuality.  That  is,  Conception,  though  it  is  the 
Ego  just  here,  throws  its  own  process  out  of  itself  and 
makes  the  same  the  process  of  all  existence,  including 
itself.  So  it  is  universal  and  indeed  creates  the  Uni- 
versal. But  this  Universal  as  Conception  divides 
within  itself  and  becomes  particular,  being  separated 


HEGEL'S  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  747 

from  itself  and  put  in  opposition  to  itself.  Thus  the 
division  of  the  Conception  at  this  stage  produces  the 
Particular.  But  this  Particular  is  a  moment  or  part 
of  the  Whole  and  so  has  the  process  of  the  Whole  in 
itself,  whereby  it  becomes  individual.  But  the  Indi- 
vidual must  have  within  it  the  total  process  of  Con- 
ception and  so  is  universal,  which  is  a  return  to  the 
first  stage.  Thus  Hegel  evolves  his  three  fundamental 
categories  (a)  Universality  (6)  Particularity  and  (c) 
Individuality  as  the  three  stages  of  Conception  in  its 
first  subjective  Process. 

This,  as  already  stated,  is  the  germinal  Pro- 
cess of  Hegel's  Logic,  and  indeed  of  Hegel's 
whole  Philosophy.  Here  is  the  embryonic  cell  out 
of  which  his  entire  system  unfolds.  Really  it  is  the 
Conception,  the  one  basic  Conception  at  which  we  have 
now  arrived  —  the  Conception  of  all  Conception, — 
and  all  the  rest  is  Conception  in  some  form.  That  is, 
the  Universe  and  all  its  parts,  even  the  smallest,  is  a 
Conception  and  has  to  be  grasped  ultimately  as  a 
Conception  by  the  Conception.  It  is  the  original 
genetic  act  of  the  All- Mother  when  "  she  conceives 
and  bears  a  son."  The  Universal,  the  Particular  and 
the  Individual  form  the  primal  creative  process,  with 
which  Thought  truly  begins,  for  Being  and  Essence 
were  but  abstract,  preliminary  stages  of  the  Mind 
penetrating  to  its  inner  generative  principle,  to  its  own 
Self. 

Does  this  Conception  exist  as  an  actual  object 
which  can  be  pointed  out?  Already  we  have  found 
Hegel  intimating  more  than  once  that  it  is  the  Ego. 
Every  individual  as  person  is  a  manifestation  of  it, 
every  act  of  self-consciousness  is  a  recreation  of  the 


748        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Universe  in  little,  an  embryonic  reproduction  of  the 
All.  The  Ego,  in  order  to  be,  must  be  the  universal 
Process,  or  the  Process  as  universal.  This  is  the 
first  fact  of  it,  the  fact  of  universality,  which  ulti- 
mately can  only  mean  the  creative  Process  of  the 
Universal.  But  creation  means  separation,  division, 
particularity,  which  has  been  noted  as  the  second 
stage.  Yet  such  a  state  of  division  cannot  remain,  it 
separates  from  itself  or  negates  itself  and  so  returns 
to  the  Universal  whereby  it  becomes  Individuality. 
Here  lies  (specially  in  connection  with  the  second 
stage)  what  Hegel  calls  the  Dialectic,  the  movement 
of  Conception  into  an^l  out  of  the  Finite,  the  Par- 
ticular, the  Negative,  ending  in  the  completion  of  the 
Process. 

It  is  to  be  again  observed  that  Hegel  was  not  the 
first  to  reach  the  Universal.  It  belongs  to  Greek 
Philosophy  and  was  the  grand  attainment  of  the 
supreme  philosophical  Period  (the  Athenian)  of 
antiquity.  Socrates,  Plato  and  Aristotle  elaborated 
and  unfolded  the  Universal.  The  fundamental  for- 
mula of  them  all  may  be  given  in  the  statement 
that  the  Essence  of  Being  is  the  Universal  (or  the 
Conception).  Yet  each  of  these  philosophers  shows  a 
different  stage  in  its  development  (see  our  Ancient 
European  Philosophy,  pp.  204,  211;  also  the  whole 
account  of  the  mentioned  philosophers).  The  old 
Greek  thinkers,  however,  regarded  this  process  of 
Conception  (or  Thought)  as  One  with  Being  immedi- 
ately; not  even  Aristotle  seems  to  be  conscious  that 
his  principle  of  Thought-thinking-Thought  (noesis 
noeseos)  has  any  reference  to  the  subjective  Ego. 
But  Hegel  is  aware  of  this ;  he  makes  his  Universal 


HEGEL'S  LOGIC  -  CONCEPTION.  749 

an  abstraction  from  the  self-knowing  Ego,  which  he 
thus  metaphysicizes  consciously.  With  him  the  pro- 
cess of  Conception  as  universal,  particular  and  indi- 
vidual, is  thrown  out  from  the  Self  and  formulated  in 
its  metaphysical  abstractness.  But  after  doing  this 
and  knowing  that  he  has  done  it  and  saying  that  he 
has  done  it,  he  drops  the  part  of  the  Ego  ;  he  will  not 
take  it  as  an  element  of  the  process  which  it  has  created 
and  must  always  recreate  in  order  to  know.  In  other 
words,  Hegel  is  not  psychological,  but  philosophical 
(or  metaphysical). 

Now  it  is  emphatically  our  thought  that  this  Process 
of  Conception  is  to  be  brought  back  to  the  Ego,  to 
the  primal  source  whence  it  originally  sprang,  in 
order  to  drink  perpetually  of  its  own  creative  foun- 
tain-head. The  abstraction  thus  is  eternally  revivified 
out  of  the  source  of  life  itself,  of  all  creation.  We  can- 
not do  without  the  precious  heritage  of  Universality, 
Particularity  and  Individuality,  derived  from  the  old 
Greeks,  transmitted  through  the  medieval  thinkers, 
and  wrought  over  by  the  moderns  till  these  terms  have 
become  an  ingrown  element  of  thought  and  language. 
But  they  need  to  be  psychologized.  They  must  be 
seen  as  the  inner  process  of  the  Ego  creating  its  own 
purest  forms  of  self- activity.  They  are  indeed  the 
necessary  shapes  which  the  Ego  takes  in  all  thinking ; 
they  show  the  way  it  works  and  must  work.  So  w£ 
can  in  a  sense  say  that  this  process  (Universal,  Par- 
ticular, and  Individual),  dominates  the  Ego,  giving 
to  it  its  law,  and  prescribing  the  way  it  must  go.  Such 
is  the  side  of  necessity,  of  the  Absolute,  of  autocracy, 
the  side  of  Hegel.  But  on  the  other  hand  it  is  the 
Ego  which  makes  this  process,  which  dominates  it,  and 


750         M ODEEN  E  UK 0 PEAN  PHIL  OSOPB  Y . 

establishes  the  law  which  it  obeys,  creating  the  very 
Constitution  by  which  it  is  controled.  Now  this 
self-legislative  power  of  the  Ego  must  be  acknowl- 
edged in  our  Psychology  as  fully  as  it  has  been  ac- 
knowledged in  our  government.  Such  is  the  side  of 
self-determination,  of  institutional  freedom,  of  democ- 
racy, which  also  must  have  its  science  of  thought, 
which  is  Psychology.  This  is  not,  however,  the  old 
Psychology,  rational  or  experimental,  but  is  the 
science  of  the  Psychosis,  the  threefold  Process  of  the 
Ego  which  explicitly  determines  the  above  Process  of 
Conception  and  is  not  simply  determined  by  it. 
(Those  who  may  wish  to  see  these  three  stages  of 
Conception — Universal,  Particular,  and  Individual  — 
psychologized  and  thus  brought  back  to  the  psychical 
Process  of  the  Ego  from  which  Hegel  separated  them 
and  metaphysicised  them,  can  see  the  exposition  in 
our  Psychology  and  Psychosis,  pp.  478-495.) 

(2)  The  second  subjective  Process  of  Conception 
is  called  Judgment  by  Hegel,  using  a  traditional 
term  of  Formal  Logic.  The  German  word  is  Urtheil, 
whose  etymology  suggests  the  meaning  of  primordial 
division,  or  the  original  part.  It  is  thus  the  second 
or  separative  stage  of  Conception  as  Subjectivity. 
''Judgment  can,  therefore,  be  called  the  realization 
of  Conception,  in  so  far  as  reality  designates  the  pass- 
ing into  a  determinate  existence.'*  The  previous 
process  of  Conception  was  simply  that  of  the  subjec- 
tive Ego  within  itself;  but  in  Judgment  the  stages  of 
this  process  step  forth  as  separate  products  and  are 
uttered  in  distinct  categories,  which,  however,  are 
still  united  in  thought  and  in  expression.  * '  The  nature 
of  this  realization  of  Conception  is,  first,  that  the 


HEGEUS  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  751 

moments  (or  stages)  of  Conception  (in  its  first  forru) 
are  independent  totalities  through  individuality.  But 
in  the  second  place  these  totalities  are  joined  together 
in  Conception  which  is  their  relation,  and  which  is  now 
Judgment."  But  these  independent  totalities  which 
are  still  a  unity,  must  be  named  or  categorized  ;  they 
are  called  in  the  present  connection  Subject  and  Pred- 
icate, each  of  which  is  separate  and  a  Whole  taken 
by  itself,  yet  both  form  a  new  Whole  which  is  a 
proposition  or  Judgment  (V.  64). 

This  is  manifestly  a  new  stage  of  separation,  differ- 
ent from  yet  closely  related  to  the  previous  stage. 
In  the  latter  we  had  conception,  separating  itself 
into  the  Universal  and  the  Individual  primarily 
(V.  12)  as  implicitly  subjective.  But  now  Conception 
has  become  explicit,  though  still  subjective,  a  Judg- 
ment. That  is,  Judgment  realizes  or  utters  the  as 
yet  immediate  Conception  which  is,  of  course,  the 
germ  of  such  utterance.  Hence,  as  the  process  of 
Conception  separates  itself  into  the  Universal  and  the 
Individual,  so  the  process  of  Judgment  separates 
itself  into  Subject  and  Predicate.  "  Judgment  is  the 
division  of  Conception  through  itself ;  this  unity  (of 
Conception)  is,  therefore,  the  ground  from  which  it 
(Judgment)  is  regarded  according  to  its  true  objec- 
tivity. Judgment  (  Urtheil)  is  accordingly  the  origi- 
ginal  dividing  into  parts  (Theilung)  of  the  original 
One."  (V.  66.)  But  after  such  division  comes  uni- 
fication, or  the  return  to  the  primal  One  of  Conception  ; 
this  unifying  of  the  separated  Subject  and  Predicate  is 
expressed  by  the  Copula,  with  which  the  process  of 
Judgment  is  completed. 

Thus  the   second  Process   of   Conception  has  un- 


752        MODERN'  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

folded  out  of  the  first,  which  showed  the  Universal 
(or  Generic)  developing  into  the  Individual.  But 
now  the  Individual  goes  back  to  its  origin,  and  asserts 
itself  as  universal.  That  is,  Judgment  explicitly  de- 
clares that  the  Individual  is  universal  (or  generic), 
or  that  the  process  of  the  Individual  is  to  return 
and  to  re-create  the  Universal  from  which  it  originally 
sprang.  Such  is  the  essence  of  every  Judgment,  of 
every  proposition  uttered  by  the  human  mind.  The 
act  of  EJTO  in  expressing  itself  has  just  this  funda- 
mental form:  the  Conception  as  the  Universal  (gen- 
eric or  genetic)  unfolds  the  Individual,  which  as 
Conception  also  (or  Ego)  goes  back  to  and  recreates 
its  origin,  the  Universal.  -To  be  sure,  Hegel  does 
not  give  this  exact  statement  to  his  formulation  of 
Judgment.  But  it  underlies  what  he  says  and  it  may 
be  developed  out  of  his  basic  Judgment:  the  Indi- 
vidual is  the  Universal.  This  is,  however,  a  philo- 
sophical formula  which  needs  to  be  distinctly  psychol- 
ogized by  throwing  it  back  into  the  process  of  the 
Ego  whence  it  came.  Every  Conception  must  become 
a  Judgment,  and  the  Universe  is  a  vast  concourse  of 
Judgments,  being  judged  by  the  Ego  after  the  inner- 
most norm  of  itself,  which  is  the  Psychosis. 

Hegel  gives  four  classes  of  Judgments :  (a)  that 
of  Existence ;  (6)  of  Reflection ;  (c)  of  Necessity ; 
(d)  of  Conception.  Each  of  these  has  its  own  three 
stages. 

(3)  The  third  subjective  Process  of  Conception  is 
called  bv  Hegel  Syllogism  or  Conclusion,  for  the  term 
(Schluss)  means  both.  Etymologically  in  German  it 
has  an  opposite  meaning  to  Judgment,  since  it  signi- 
fies a  bringing  together  while  Judgment  means  sepa- 


HEGEUS  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION  753 

ration.     It   suggests  the  restoration  of  the  unity  of 
Conception  after  its  division  in  Judgment. 

How  is  this  brought  about?  The  subsumption  of 
the  Individual  under  the  Universal  in  Judgment  is 
direct,  their  unity  is  hence  an  immediate  one.  But 
in  the  Syllogism  this  subsumption  is  mediated,  is 
through  a  reason  or  ground  which  is  formally  the 
middle  term.  Judgment  as  yet  gives  no  reason,  it  is 
the  autocratic  judge  who  puts  down  the  Individual 
under  the  Universal.  But  in  the  Syllogism  (or  Con- 
clusion) is  contained  the  mediating  word  which  con- 
nects the  two  extremes  by  a  common  link. 

But  when  we  come  to  look  into  this  mediating  word 
or  link,  we  find  that  it  too  is  a  Judgment,  or  an  im- 
mediate subsumption  of  the  Individual  under  the 
Universal.  Thus  between  the  extremes  (the  major 
and  minor  terms)  a  mean  or  middle  term  is  interjected, 
making  a  series  or  hierarchy  of  subsumptions.  In 
each  case,  however,  the  Individual  is  subsumed  under 
the  Universal,  and  the  mediation  between  two  imme- 
diate Judgments  is  but  another  immediate  Judgment. 
Thus  the  mediation  in  the  Syllogism  is  still  external, 
in  fact  contradictory.  To  mediate  the  Individual 
with  the  Universal,  the  Individual  must  be  subsumed 
under  the  Universal  in  the  act  of  mediation.  If  the 
original  problem  underlying  the  Syllogism  is  to  remove 
the  harshness  of  immediately  subsuming  the  Individ- 
ual under  the  Universal,  then  the  Syllogism  has  only 
repeated  in  its  mediation  the  original  problem.  The 
mediator  (if  we  may  personify  this  process)  commits 
the  same  acts  in  essence  against  the  Individual,  which 
he  is  called  upon  to  mediate.  Still  this  process  has  in 
it  the  formal  side  of  mediation. 
48 


754          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY 

Hegel  is  an  exceedingly  warm  friend  of  the  Syllogism. 
4i  It  is  the  Rational,  since  it  is  Conception  completely 
posited  (or  realized).  But  not  only  is  the  Syllogism 
rational,  but  everything  rational  is  a  Syllogism." 
(V.  115.)  The  universe  as  rational  must  be  a  Syllo- 
gism, so  is  all  philosophy  of  it,  specially  Hegel's 
philosophy,  whose  supreme  work  from  this  point  of 
view  is  to  subsume  the  Individual  under  the  Universal 
through  a  middle  term  which  is  itself  an  immediate 
subsumption.  Europe  is  syllogistic  in  the  same  gen- 
eral sense ;  it  will  not  crush  the  Individual  under  the 
Universal  immediately,  as  does  the  Orient  (in  the 
form  of  State,  Religion,  Law,  and  Institutions  gener- 
ally) ;  it  will  have  some  form  of  harmonizing  and 
mediating  the  Individual  with  the  Universal.  Still 
this  mediatorial  act  is  the  subsumption  of  the  Indi- 
vidual, not  through  himself,  but  externally,  more  or 
less.  We  may  say  that  the  Oriental  Consciousness 
takes  the  form  of  an  immediate  Judgment,  while  the 
European  consciousness  is  a  Syllogism. 

In  his  lesser  Logic  Hegel  says:  *'  The  Syllogism  is 
the  essential  ground  of  all  truth,  and  the  definition  of 
the  Absolute  now  is  that  it  is  a  Syllogism.  All  is 
a  Syllogism"  (VI.  345).  That  is,  the  syllogistic 
process  is  the  absolute  or  divine  one,  God  is  a  Syl- 
logism. Every  single  thing  is  a  Syllogism  in  itself, 
is  to  be  mediated  with  other  things  by  the  Syllogism 
and  with  the  All  which  is  itself  a  Syllogism.  Thus  we 
behold  a  syllogistic  Universe,  which  is  fundamentally 
hierarchical,  as  we  see  in  the  example  of  the  medieval 
mind  and  its  devotion  to  formal  Logic,  whose  acme  is 
the  Syllogism. 

It  is  manifest,  nowever,  that  the  Syllogism  does  not 


HEGEVS  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  755 

completely  mediate  the  Individual  with  the  Universal, 
the  Self  with  Law,  or  Man  with  God.  The  missing 
point  is  that  the  Individual  in  the  Syllogism  does  not 
posit  its  own  mediatorial  principle,  does  not  create  or 
re-create  the  power  which  subsumes  it.  Here,  then,  is 
at  bottom  the  same  difficulty  which  we  found  in  Judg- 
ment as  the  ultimate  principle:  the  Individual  (or  the 
Ego)  does  not  determine  the  Universal,  even  as 
mediator,  which  determines  it.  That  is,  the  Uni- 
versal as  middle  term,  is  still  subsumptive  directly  of 
the  Individual,  though  it  has  been  itself  subsumed 
under  the  summum  genus.  But  the  mediatorial  prin- 
ciple must  be  finally  determined  not  by  what  is  above 
it  but  by  what  is  below  it,  by  the  Individual  which  it 
determines.  Thus  dawns  a  real  world  of  freedom, 
which  cannot  be  given  by  the  Syllogism  or  its  con- 
sciousness, since  it  but  half-way  furnishes  the  mediat- 
ing link  between  what  subsumes  and  is  subsumed. 

What  now  is  the  situation  in  regard  to  the  Syllogism? 
Evidently  it  has  failed  to  mediate  the  Individual  with 
the  Universal  in  an  adequate  manner,  which  problem 
really  underlies  the  whole  sphere  of  Subjectivity, 
whose  inherent  contradiction  has  thus  become  ex- 
plicit. The  statement  is  that  the  Universal  is  to 
subsume  the  Individual;  but  who  is  it  that  makes 
the  statement,  thinks  this  thought?  Just  the  Indi- 
vidual as  Ego,  Subject.  So  the  Individual  has  been 
secretly  unfolding  and  expressing  this  Universal 
which  openly  is  affirmed  to  control  and  subsume  it 
(the  Individual).  Thus  the  Individual  all  the  while 
has  been  implicitly  making  the  power  which  subordi- 
nates it.  Or  the  subject,  subjecting  itself  to  the 
Universal,  subjects  that  which  subjects  it,  and  brings 


756          MODERN  E UBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

to  a  conclusion  this  whole  process  of  Subjectivity  in 
its  three  stages:"  Conception,  Judgment,  Syllogism. 
For  the  subjective  is  no  longer  that  which  is  sub- 
jected merely,  but  has  become  also  that  which 
subjects. 

What  is  the  next  stage  ?  Evidently  the  implicit  sub- 
ject which  has  become  explicit;  the  Individual  which 
has  hitherto  been  subsumed  by  the  Universal,  must 
now  subsume  its  subsumer,  determine  its  determinant. 
The  Syllogism  must  take  up  into  its  process  the  syllo- 
gizer  making  it.  The  Ego  having  recognized  itself  as 
the  maker  of  the  Syllogism  which  subsumes  the  Ego, 
must  now  consciously  assert  its  place  in  a  new  order, 
which  is  to  our  mind,  Reason.  (See  this  entire  sphere 
of  Subjectivity  —  Conception,  Judgment,  Reasoning 
or  Syllogism  —  unfolded  psychologically  under  the 
name  of  Ratiocination  as  properly  the  second  stage  of 
the  Process  of  Thought,  whose  third  stage  is  the 
before  mentioned  Reason,  in  Psychology  and  Psy- 
chosis. ) 

Hegel  gives  three  kinds  of  Syllogisms :  (a)  that  of 
Existence;  (6)  that  of  Reflection;  (c)  that  of  Neces- 
sity. There  is  no  Syllogism  corresponding  to  the 
fourth  kind  of  Judgment. 

To  these  we  may  well  add  the  philosophical  Norm 
as  the  absolute  Syllogism,  which  is  the  conclusion  that 
man  (or  Mind)  must  return  to  God  (or  the  Infinite). 
Thus  God,  Nature,  and  Man  are  the  three  terms, 
really  the  Syllogism  of  Syllogisms,  Summum  Genus 
or  the  Universal  as  such  being  the  first  Term.  The 
Universe  is  truly  the  primordial  Syllogism,  or  (as 
before  said)  the  Syllogism  of  all  Syllogisms.  But 
when  formalized,  it  is  cut  off  from  its  source  and  thus 


HEGEUS  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  757 

made  abstract;  the  creative  element  is  left  out  of  the 
Syllogism  and  there  is  the  mere  subsumption  of  the 
lesser  under  the  greater. 

Of  course  Hegel  has  no  such  Syllogism;  in  fact 
there  can  be  (properly  speaking)  no  such  Syllogism, 
since  it  has  no  subsumption  of  the  Individual  by  the 
Universal,  except  with  the  counterpart  of  this  move- 
ment. Nor  does  Hegel  rise  out  of  his  subjective  Pro- 
cess to  Reason — that  would  be  psychological.  So 
he  makes  a  skip  at  this  point  from  Subject  to  Object 
and  gives  us  a  surprise  by  introducing  a  Philosophy  of 
Nature  into  his  purely  logical  Process.  This  skip  has 
always  caused  doubt  and  trouble  to  his  followers. 
For  the  Philosophy  of  Nature  properly  springs  from 
and  hence  comes  after  the  total  Logic  according  to 
Hegel  himself,  who  has,  therefore,  two  Philosophies 
of  Nature  at  different  points  in  his  system,  to  be  sure 
somewhat  differently  ordered.  But  let  us  make  the 
skip  with  Hegel  into  his  new  domain  and  see  what  we 
can  find  there. 

B.  Objectivity.  This  is  the  second  phase  or  part  of 
the  movement  of  Conception  as  a  whole,  the  objective 
process  thereof.  We  may  deem  it  real  Conception,  or 
Conception  as  a  reality,  in  contrast  to  formal  Concep- 
tion which  is  the  preceding  (subjective)  phase,  in  which 
Conception  develops  its  own  inner  Forms,  often  called 
Forms  of  Thought.  But  now  these  inner  Forms  are 
thrown  out  into  the  world  and  become  Objects,  sepa- 
rate from  the  Subject  and  from  one  another.  Thus 
they  have  independence  on  the  one  hand,  and  are  im- 
mediately existent ;  yet  on  the  other  they  are  posited 
by  the  Subject  or  Conception  and  still  show  its  process. 

Here,  then,  we  may  deduce  the  characteristic  of  the 


758         MODERN  E  UEOPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

Object;  it  is  an  immediate  entity  in  form,  yet  it  is 
mediated  —  mediated  still  by  Conception.  In  Sub- 
jectivity Conception  (as  Ego)  divided  within  itself  and 
unfolded  its  own  shapes,  which  in  all  their  separation 
were  still  connected  together  directly  by  the  Subject. 
But  now  this  subjective  thread  of  connection  is  cut  by 
the  Subject  itself  and  each  shape  is  posited,  or  medi- 
ated as  immediate  by  the  same. 

Thus  Objectivity  is  twofold  and  self-opposed,  has  a 
positive  contradiction  in  the  statement  of  it  as  an  im- 
mediate (object)  which  is  mediated,  as  an  independ- 
ent something  which  is  none  the  less  dependent.  Or 
it  is  Subjectivity  turned  inside  out,  yet  through  itself, 
and  still  remaining  Conception  with  its  process. 

Such  is  the  general  relation,  according  to  Hegel, 
between  the  subjective  and  objective  Process  of  Con- 
ception. ' '  The  Object  is  the  one  undetermined  Whole 
(the  side  of  the  Universal)  ;  but  it  is  also  the  separa- 
ted, the  differenced  (the  side  of  the  Particular),  and 
so  falls  asunder  into  the  indefinite  multiplicity  of  the 
world,  in  which  each  object  is  an  individual  (the  side 
(  f  individuality),  a  concrete,  independent,  complete 
entity."  (VI.  361.)  Herein  we  see  the  process  of  Con- 
ception as  objective,  grasped  indeed  as  the  external 
Universe,  which  still  has  its  internal  process  of  Con- 
ception. So  Hegel  says  that  the  Object  is  God,  is  the 
Absolute. 

The  movement  of  Subjectivity  has  been  all  along 
toward  Objectivity,  toward  getting  out  of  itself  into 
reality.  Such  a  movement  is  implied  in  the  first  pro- 
cess of  Conception,  when  it  particularizes  itself  of  its 
own  inner  necessity.  Then  Judgment  is  a  more 
advanced  stage  in  which  the  Individual  is  expressly 


HEGEL'S  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  759 

present,  yet  subsumed  under  the  Universal  immedi- 
ately. Finally  the  Syllogism  seeks  to  mediate  this 
immediacy  through  the  middle  term,  which,  however, 
is  itse  an  immediate  subsumption  of  the  Individua 
under  the  Universal  by  the  Subject  (or  Ego).  Thus 
the  Syllogism  mediates  the  Individual  as  immediate ; 
such  an  Individual  is  Object,  according  to  Hegel. 

But  now  the  movement  of  Objectivity  is  toward 
Subjectivity,  which  it  seeks  to  recover  and  put  inside 
of  itself.  Still  it  will  not  be  the  first  Subjectivity  bat 
a  new  one,  which  Hegel  names  the  Idea.  This  is  the 
Conception  adequately  realized ;  in  the  forms  of  Ob- 
jectivity it  is  inadequately  realized,  these  forms  do  not 
fully  represent  Conception,  though  advancing  always 
in  that  direction. 

But  the  Idea  lies  ahead  of  us ;  we  must  set  forth 
the  stages  of  Objectivity,  which  are  primarily  three. 
We  start  with  the  object  as  immediate  and  separated 
while  the  mediation  is  external  (mechanical);  but  it 
slowly  moves  toward  internal  mediation  in  this  sphere, 
becoming  more  and  more  a  manifestation  of  the  Pro- 
cess of  the  subject. 

( 1 )  The  first  objective  Process  of  Conception.    This 
is  Mechanism  in  which  the  objects  are  independent 
and   outside  of   one   another.     Still   the  Conception 
controls  them,  though  externa/ly.     (a)  The  mechani- 
cal  object,    individual   and  impenetrable;    (6)    The 
finite  mechanical  Process  (between  bodies)  ;  (c)  The 
absolute  mechanical  Process   (the   individual  center 
has  a  universal  center  controlling  it  within  the  totality 
of  bodies,  as  in  the  solar  system). 

(2)  The  second  objective  Process  of  Conception,  or 
Chemism.     This  stage  is  separative,  since  the   Object 


760         MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

now  divides  within  itself,  separates  into  its  constitu- 
ents. The  outside  division  of  Mechanism  between 
Objects,  has  turned  inside  the  Object  —  a  kind  of 
Judgment  or  Subject  and  Predicate  of  Nature,  one 
side  subordinating  the  other  as  in  acid  and  alkali. 
The  object  is  mediated  from  within:  (a)  The  chemi- 
cal Object;  (&)  The  chemical  Process;  (c)  Transi- 
tion: when  the  object  mediated  within  (chemically) 
is  determined  from  without  (mechanically)  ;  thus  are 
suggested  the  doctrines  of  immanence  and  transcend- 
ence. 

(3  )  The  third  objective  Process  of  Conception 
Hegel  designates  as  Teleology.  The  Object  is  still  im- 
mediate, though  it  has  a  process  in  itself  which,  how- 
ever, has  a  design  determined  from  without.  Thus 
it  is  a  unity  of  Mechanism  and  Chemism ;  according 
to  Hegel:  "  The  End  or  Design  is  the  Conception 
which  has  become  free  from  the  immediacy  in  which 
it  was  sunk  in  Chemism  and  exists  in  and  for  itself 
over  against  the  immediate  Object"  (VI.  374).  It 
is  therefore  posited  or  mediated  through  Chemism 
whose  process  externalized  is  the  teleologic.  (a) 
The  subjective  End;  (6)  The  Means;  (c)  The  real- 
ized End.  This,  when  it  becomes  Objective  with 
the  Conception  inside  of  it  and  creating  it,  is  Idea, 
or  the  Conception  realized. 

C.  Idea.  The  Conception  having  attained  reality 
is  Idea  (this  is  Hegel's  use  of  the  word  which  is  un- 
usual). Conception  as  subject  has  m®ved  through 
the  object,  and  has  become  one  with  it  (subject- 
object).  Or  the  transcendent  Conception  in  Tele- 
ology enters  the  object  as  the  All  and  becomes  its 
immanent  process.  Or  the  Idea  is  the  immediate  as 


HEGEUS  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  761 

such  (real)  mediating  itself.  Thus  "  Being  (the  Im- 
mediate) has  reached  the  significance  of  Truth," 
for  "anything  has  Truth  in  so  far  as  it  is  Idea" 
(V.  229),  otherwise  it  is  not  true  (in  Hegel's  sense). 
Idea  is  the  Conception  not  simply  objectified  (made 
into  different  objects),  but  realized  (making  itself 
object  and  forming  the  latter's  process). 

Conception  as  Idea  will  show  three  stages  —  vital, 
recognitive  and  absolute. 

(1)  First  Process  of  Conception   as  Idea  is  Life 
(the  vital,  organic  Process)  which  is  the  Conception 
immediately  realized  in  the  object,  not  yet  grasping 
itself  as  Process  (as  it  does  in  the  Ego).     The  divi- 
sion of  the  Conception  is  not  from  the  inside,  but  is  ex- 
ternal in  the  members  of    the  living  body,    each  of 
which  is  alive  through  the  Whole,  of  which  it   is   a 
member,  but  not  in  itself.     Life  shows  the  threefold 
Process:  (a)   The  living  Individual ;  The  Process  of 
Life   in  separation   and  return  through  organs  ;  (3) 
The  Genus  or  Genetic  Process  —  the  reproduction  of 
the  Individual  externally  —  which  Process,   when  it 
becomes  internal,  is  the  next  stage. 

(2)  Second  Process  of  Conception  as  Idea  is  here 
called  Recognition  (Erkennen).    We  have  now  reached 
that  which  can  recognize  itself:   divide  itself  within 
itself,  and  take  this  division  of  itself  back  into  itself 
and  thus  know  itself.     This  is  the  primal    separation 
(Hegel's   Urtheil)  of   the  second   stage   of   the  Idea 
which  still  makes  itself  one  by  returning  into  itself. 
"Thought,  Spirit,  Self-consciousness  are  designations 
of  the  Idea"  as  Recognition  (V.  s.  255).     In  other 
words  Hegel  here  evolves  the  Ego  out  of  the  preceding 


762         MODERN  EUEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Process  of  Life,  in  which  this  separation  between  sub- 
ject and  subject-object  is  as  yet  but  implicit. 

And  still  the  recognitive  Process  of  Conception,  or 
the  self-conscious  Ego,  is  one-sided  as  different  from 
the  outside  world.  Its  inner  movement  is  to  overcome 
this  difference,  which  movement  Hegel  makes  of  two 
kinds. 

(a)  Recognition   a  second  time,  which  is  now  the 
Ego  taking  up  and  assimilating  the  external  world  of 
objects   "into  its  Representation  and  Thought"  — 
the  theoretic  activity  of  the  Idea  (VI.  s.  399).     Here 
Hegel  again  commits  his  too  frequent  sin  against  expo- 
sition by  giving  the  same  name  to  different  stages. 
Moreover,  there  is  a  good  word  for  this  second  or  special 
form  of  Recognition  :  it  is  the  Intellect  proper.     Later 
in  his  Psychology  Hegel  will  call  it  Intelligence.     The 
reader  may  well  note  at  this  point  that  Hegel's  Logic  is 
becoming  psychological.     The  Ego  has  been  deduced, 
and  its  first  great  activity,  that  of  Intellect,  has  been 
designated.     We  even  catch  stray  hints  of  the  leading 
subdivisions   of    Intellect  —  sense   perception     (An- 
schauen),    representation   (Vorstellen)   and    thought 
(Denken).     Still   these  are  not   Hegel's  explicit  divi- 
sions of  this  sphere,  which  are  analytic  and  synthetic. 

(b)  The  Will  or  the  act  of  Willing  (Wollen)  —  the 
practical   activity  of   the   Idea.     Now  the  Ego,   in- 
stead of  taking  up  the  outer  world  into  itself,  moves 
outward  and  transforms  that  world,  putting  into  the 
same  its  own  purpose  and  end.     Thus  the  Will  seeks 
to   make   the   world   good,  or  to  realize  the  Idea  of 
the  Good,  the  Good  being  the  Process  of  Spirit  or 
Ego  objectively  realized.     On  the  other  hand  Intellect 
seeks  to  find  the  Truth  of  the  object,  to  realize  within 


HEGEL1  S  LOGIC—  CONCEPTION.  763 

itself  the  Idea  of  the  True,  which  is  also  the  Process 
of  the  Spirit  or  Ego  beheld  in  the  object. 

Such  are  the  two  formulations  found  in  this  sphere, 
the  one  being  psychological  (Intellect,  Will),  the 
other  being  philosophical  (the  Idea  of  the  True  and  of 
the  Good).  Hegel  uses  the  latter  in  the  nomencla- 
ture of  his  laiger  Logic,  but  he  employs  the  former 
in  that  of  his  smaller  (and  later)  Logic.  The  change 
is  significant,  showing  that  Hegel  during  his  theoreti- 
cal Period  (before  he  went  to  Berlin)  was  becoming 
more  and  more  psychological  —  a  fact  of  which  we 
shall  find  numerous  other  indications,  specially  in  the 
Encyclopedia. 

Such  is  the  dualism  here  getting  manifest,  that  be- 
tween Philosophy  and  Psychology,  as  the  Evolution 
of  the  Logic  draws  toward  its  close.  Moreover  the 
division  now  is  dual  instead  of  triadal  —  the  only 
important  stage  of  the  Logic  in  which  this  takes 
place.  And  one  of  the  leading  subdivisions  here  is 
also  dual  (analytic  and  synthetic).  Hegel  seems  to 
be  getting  badly  shaken  up  toward  the  conclusion  of 
his  work.  What  is  the  cause  of  it?  Does  he  glimpse 
the  other  principle  (the  psychological)  breaking  up 
through  his  metaphysical  scheme  and  demanding  its 
total  »re-construction  ?  At  least  the  Logic  seems  to 
be  undergoing  a  gradual  metamorphosis  into  Psy- 
chology. Intellect  and  Will  are  here  in  their  own 
name,  and  we  may  obtain  the  realm  of  Feeling  partially 
from  the  preceding  stage  (Life).  Nor  should  we 
fail  to  add  that  in.  this  whole  sphere  of  Conception 
there  is  an  underlying  movement  of  the  philosophic 
Norm :  the  purely  logical  and  metaphysical  element 
in  subjective  Conception;  the  physical  element  or 


764          MODERN  E  UEOPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

Philosophy  of  Nature  in  the  objective  Conception ; 
and  now  comes  Man  as  individual  Ego  in  the  Idea, 
which  Ego  is  next  to  grasp  the  absolute,  self-con- 
scious Idea  which  is  also  Ego. 

(3)  Third  Process  of  Conception  as  Idea  is  called 
by  Hegel  the  absolute  Idea.  It  is  Conception  which 
knows  itself  as  the  self-knowing  Absolute,  dividing 
within  itself  and  still  remaining  itself  in  such  division. 
"  The  absolute  Idea  is  alone  Being,  imperishable  Life, 
self-conscious  Truth  and  all  Truth."  It  contains 
within  itself  all  Finitude,  Determinateness,  Negation 
as  canceled,  and  "  is  the  single  theme  and  content  of 
Philosophy"  (V.  318).  With  such  intensity  does 
Hegel  assert  the  absoluteness  of  the  Idea  that. some- 
times he  borders  on  making  it  the  all-devouring  pan- 
theistic One:  4t  Everything  else  is  delusion,  darkness, 
caprice,  transitoriness  ' '  — namely  the  finite  world. 

Thus  the  absolute  Idea  is  the  self-separating  and 
self-returning  Process  of  Conception  or  Ego  in  all 
and  in  the  All.  It  is  the  Universe  grasped  as  self- 
conscious,  or  as  self-mediating  absolutely.  Self- 
mediation  is  not  now  outside  of  the  object  as  in 
Recognition,  but  is  inside ;  it  is  the  Whole  as  absolute 
self-mediation  which  has  no  objective  world  beyond 
itself  to  recognize  through  Intellect,  and  no  subject- 
ive world  within  itself  to  realize  through  Will.  For 
both  are  one  and  one  Process  of  the  Absolute,  which 
is  Intellect  whose  thought  is  Will,  and  Will  whose  act 
is  Intellect.  It  is  not  only  the  cycle  of  the  Universe, 
but  cycle-producing,  with  "periphery  composed  of 
a  vast  multitude  of  lesser  cycles  whose  entirety  is  a 
grand  succession  of  Evolutions  bending  around  into 
itself." 


HEGEVS  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  765 

It  is  manifest  that  Hegel  has  here  reached  the  same 
goal  —  the  Absolute  —  which  he  attained  through  his 
History  of  Philosophy  and  his  Logic.  Such  are  the 
three  roads  along  which  the  evolutionary  Hegel  has 
traveled  to  the  same  destination.  But  as  the  roads 
are  different,  the  books  are  different.  Along  the 
first  route  we  beheld  all  the  philosophers  with  their 
doctrines  personally  pass  before  us ;  the  second  route 
unrolled  before  us  an  inner  scenery  of  the  Forms  of 
Consciousness  or  Appearances  of  the  Ego  to  itself ; 
but  the  third  journey  has  led  us  through  the  bodi- 
less Shapes  of  the  Absolute  itself  which  underlie  all 
existence. 

Such  is  the  Logic  of  Hegel,  which  attempts  to  teach 
us  the  language  of  the  self-conscious  All  in  its  Evo- 
lution unto  itself  as  it  thinks  and  even  talks  to  itself, 
thus  projecting  into  speech  the  logical  categories.  It 
is  the  absolute  Idea  which  makes  its  own  language  in 
order  to  know  itself  adequately  ;  in  this  language  man 
participates,  having  to  remake  it  for  himself  whereby 
he  can  communicate  with  man,  which  renders  human 
association  possible.  No  individual  man  ever  made  a 
language  at  first  hand,  though  he  must  re-make  it. 
What  then  produces  it  primarily?  Spirit  (Geist)  utters 
speech  for  all  in  common  which  each  has  to  learn. 
Ordinary  speech  is  to  express  the  objects  of  sense 
and  the  relations  of  life.  But  logical  speech  is  dif- 
ferent :  it  utters  the  Pure  Thought  of  the  absolute 
Idea  in  its  unfolding  into  self-consciousness,  and 
furnishes  its  categories  to  man  who  is  moving  in  the 
same  direction.  Hegel  would  have  to  say  that  God's 
speech  to  man  now  is  the  Logic,  though  He  may  have 
talked  differently  to  Adam  in  the  Garden  a  long  time 


766         MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ago.  Hegel  says  that  each  category  may  be  taken  as 
one  definition  of  the  Absolute  in  the  process  of 
defining  itself;  this  goes  on  till  at  last  it  reaches 
Hegel's  definition,  when  it  turns  back  and  includes 
all  its  definitions  within  itself  as  its  own  Evolution 
into  self-consciousness.  Properly  through  Hegel  the 
Absolute  has  for  the  first  time  adequately  defined 
itself,  having  become  now  the  self-conscious  Self 
which  knows  all  its  evolutionary  stages  up  to  the 
absolute  Idea  which  is  just  this  self-knowing  Self. 

The  evolutionary  Hegel  has  now  reached  his  cul- 
mination and  finality,  having  evolved  the  absolute 
Idea  upon  three  different  lines,  and  therein  expressed 
the  fundamental  thought  of  the  Century.  The  Abso- 
lute is  Evolution,  is  the  outcome,  and  this  Evolution 
moves  forward  till  it  attains  the  absolute  Idea  as 
self-conscious,  that  is,  conscious  of  its  evolutionary 
Self,  and  categorized  and  ordered  in  all  of  its  stages. 
(Unfortunately  the  reader  of  English  possesses  no 
printed  complete  translations  of  Hegel's  two  chief 
evolutionary  works,  the  Phenomenology  and  the  Logic, 
though  translated  portions  of  both  can  be  found  scat- 
tered through  American  and  British  Hegelian  Litera- 
ture. There  are,  however,  unprinted  translations  of 
these  two  most  original  books  of  Hegel,  complete, 
we  are  informed,  made  by  Gov.  Brockmeyer,  of  St. 
Louis.) 

Having  thus  evolved  the  Absolute  on  all  the  im- 
portant, if  not  possible,  lines,  the  author  must  ask : 
What  next?  What  are  we  going  to  do  with  it?  This 
question  arose  in  Hegel's  mind  with  tremendous 
pressure,  and  brought  him  face  to  face  with  the 
grand  difficulty  of  his  system.  For  now  he  has  to 


HEGEUS  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION,  767 

meet  the  problem  of  creation  itself,  the  transcend- 
ence and  immanence  of  the  creative  principle,  the 
theistic  and  the  pantheistic  solutions  of  the  problem 
of  the  Universe.  The  difficulty  centers  itself  in  the 
movement  from  the  absolute  Idea  to  Nature,  from  the 
Infinite  to  the  Finite,  from  the  Perfect  to  the  Imper- 
fect. Already  in  Frankfort  we  can  see  that  he  was 
worrying  over  the  matter,  while  he  was  engaged  in 
putting  together  the  philosophical  Norm.  But  at  the 
end  of  the  Phenomenology  as  well  as  of  the  larger  Logic 
he  grapples  with  the  question  in  a  manner  which  must 
be  here  briefly  noted. 

Hegel  says  in  the  closing  pages  of  his  Phenome- 
nology that  the  self-knowing  Spirit  in  the  phenomeno- 
logical  process  4t  has  not  won  its  complete  freedom, 
since  it  still  stands  in  relation  to  the  object,"  which 
makes  it  limited.  "  This  it  knows,  knows  its  own  lim- 
itation, which  means  that  it  knows  how  to  sacrifice 
itself,"  to  give  up  its  own  absoluteness.  ' '  Such  a  sacri- 
fice is  alienation  "  of  itself  from  itself,  whereby  it  drops 
down  "  to  a  free  accidental  happening  "  or  to  Chance, 
in  which  it  "  beholds  its  pure  Self  as  Time  and  its 
Being  as  Space."  Thus  "  the  alienated  (or  outered) 
Spirit"  as  logical  or  absolute,  is  Nature,  and  has 
won  its  freedom  by  becoming  "  a  free  accidental  hap- 
pening." But  here  one  may  well  ask,  What  has 
become  of  the  Absolute,  thus  <k  let  loose  "  into  free- 
dom which  is  Chance  and  Caprice? 

At  the  end  of  the  larger  Logic  (V.  341-3)  Hegel 
has  to  grapple  with  the  same  problem.  After  giving 
a  brief  hint  that  the  last  stage,  the  absolute  Idea, 
must  go  back  to  the  first,  which  is  Pure  Being,  and 
thus  complete  the  logical  cycle,  he  passes  to  the  far 


768          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

deeper  difficulty,  the  transition  to  Nature.  But  now 
at  the  start  he  rejects  the  very  notion  of  transition  in 
the  present  case,  for  he  sees  that  his  Absolute  is  not 
absolute  if  it  can  go  over  to  something  else.  What  will 
he  do?  '*  The  pure  Idea  (absolute)  is  rather  absolute 
Liberation,  for  which  there  is  no  longer  any  immediate 
determination  which  is  not  also  Conception  (medi- 
ated) ;  in  this  freedom  (now  won)  there  is  no  transi- 
tion.'* But  the  difficulty  will  come  up:  the  absolute 
Idea  as  logical  was  not  free  before  this  Liberation  ; 
it  must  have  been  limited,  finite,  unfree  till  it  broke 
over  the  bounds  of  the  Logic  and  liberated  itself  in 
Nature.  Thus  Hegel's  Absolute,  after  its  long  evolu- 
tion through  the  Dialectic,  becomes  itself  dialectical 
at  the  close  of  the  Logic,  and  after  having  swallowed 
everything  else,  gets  swallowed  in  turn  by  some 
bigger  monster  which  now  suddenly  appears  under- 
neath it,  rising  into  activity.  What  is  this  new 
colossal  apparition? 

Perhaps  we  shall  see  when  we  have  finished  the 
preceding  citation.  "The  transition  is  rather  to  be 
grasped  thus:  the  Idea  freely  lets  itself  loose,  abso- 
lutely certain  of  itself  and  reposing  in  itself,"  and 
so  is  "the  externality  of  Space  and  Time,"  or  the 
beginning  of  Nature,  which  is  the  second  stage  of  the 
new  and  larger  Process  of  which  the  logical  Idea  is 
the  first.  But  there  is  still  a  third  stage  in  which  the 
"  absolute  Idea  completes  its  Liberation  through 
itself  in  the  science  of  Spirit  (Ego)  and  finds  the 
highest  Conception  of  itself  in  logical  Science,"  to 
which  the  Spirit  (or  Ego)  returns  in  order  to  "  com- 
plete its  Liberation."  Thus  we  have  the  cycle  — 
Logic,  Nature,  Spirit — and  the  evolutionary  Hegel  has 


HEGEL'S  LOGIC  —  CONCEPTION.  769 

become  the  encyclopedic,  having  evolved  into  the  philo- 
sophic Norm  which  he  is  now  to  fill  and  to  re-create 
with  his  evolutionary  Idea.  The  Absolute  has  shown 
itself  finite,  enslaved,  and  needing  Liberation  from 
its  unfree  condition,  which  enfranchisement  and  com- 
pletion it  evidently  obtains  by  becoming  a  stage  of 
the  larger  Process,  the  total  Norm.  But  is  it,  then, 
absolute  ? 

Plainly  we  see  that  Hegel  tries  to  save  its  absolute- 
ness by  calling  its  Transition  to  Nature  and  to  Spirit 
a  Liberation  ;  but  does  this  really  help  him  out?  His 
cliffi  -ulty  is  like  that  of  Plotinus,  who  also  makes  his 
absolute  One  liberate  itself  or  overflow  into  Man  and 
Nature.  The  words  used  by  Hegel  remind  us  of  the 
Neo-Platonic  nomenclature  (sich  entlassen,  the  Abso- 
lute lets  itself  loose ;  also  sich  entscliessen,  it  re- 
solves itself  or  unlocks  itself).  Undoubtedly  the 
problem  before  Hegel's  mind  is  the  theological  con- 
tradiction between  God's  Transcendence  and  Imma- 
nence, which  the  philosopher  tries  to  solve  by 
Philosophy.  But  Philosophy  here  reveals  the  same 
dualism  which  Theology  has  labored  under  from  the 
beginning.  Neither  of  these  two  world-disciplines 
solves  the  problem  ;  can  the  third  ? 

But    in    the  evolution  of   Hegel   himself  we  have 
reached  a  new  stage   in  which  Evolution  is  no  longer 
his  fundamental  principle,  but  subordinate. 
49 


770          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 


II.  THE  ENCYCLOPEDIC  HEGEL. 

Our  philosopher,  evolving  the  Absolute  along 
three  different  roads,  finds,  when  he  has  reached 
it,  a  conflict  each  time,  adualistic  struggle.  For 
this  Absolute,  the  grand  end  of  Evolution,  he 
discovers  to  be  itself  evolutionary,  showing  itself 
to  be  a  part  or  stage  of  still  another  and  higher 
Process,  which  will  have  to  be  unfolded  in  still 
another  book.  In  Hegel's  own  soul  we  can  see 
this  struggle  between  the  evolutionary  and  the 
normative,  or  encyclopedic;  we  may  call  it  meta-  f 
phorically  the  struggle  between  the  rectilineal 
and  the  circular.  The  latter  is  embodied  in  the 
philosophical  Norm  transmitted  from  the  ages ; 
the  former  is  the  new  Idea  of  the  Century  now 
to  be  ingrafted  upon  this  Norm,  which,  appar- 
ently a  closed  circle,  must  be  made  to  expand 
itself  and  to  take  up  new  processes. 

In  the  fall  of  1816  Hegel  left  his  position  at 
Niirnberg  and  went  to  Heidelberg,  where  he  had 
been  appointed  professor.  The  last  volume  of 
his  Logic  had  been  published  just  before  his  de- 
parture. The  following  year  he  issued  a  com- 
pendium of  his  whole  Philosophy  which  he  called 
Encyclopedia  of  the  Philosophic  Sciences,  which 
still  remains  the  most  complete  statement  of  the 
total  system  of  the  author.  Moreover  it  shows  a 


THE  ENCYCLOPEDIC  HEGEL.  771 

new  stage  in  the  development  of  the  philosopher 
which  had  indeed  been  long  preparing,  and 
had  already  given  numerous  written  signs  of 
itself,  but  which  now  definitely  rises  to 
supremacy.  Hegel  has  worked  out  of  the 
stage  of  pure  logical  Evolution,  which  he 
sees  to  be  dialectical  if  taken  by  itself.  Hence 
it  must  be  supplemented,  and  made  a  stage 
of  the  complete  cycle  of  the  sciences.  Thus  the 
evolutionary  Hegel  moves  forth  into  the  encyclo- 
pedic Hegel,  and  reveals  anew  stage  of  himself, 
and  produces  a  new  kind  or  book.  (  Werke  VI.- 
VII. ,  the  latter  in  two  volumes.  The  Logic 
(lesser)  and  the  Mind  (Geist)  have  been  trans- 
lated by  Wallace ;  the  Philosophy  of  Nature  is 
untranslated.) 

I.  We  must  understand,  however,  that  this  change 
is  not  sudden,  but  has  been  growing  a  long  time. 
Hegel  is  indeed  a  slow  grower,  and  shows  all  his  lead- 
ing stages  in  succession  ;  he  is  philosophical  Evolution 
incorporate.  The  germ  of  the  encyclopedic  Hegel 
may  be  traced  far  back  into  his  revolutionary  Period. 
For  the  basic  movement  of  the  Encyclopedia  is  the 
philosophic  Norm,  which  Hegel  had  already  grasped 
at  Frankfort,  and  which  he  must  have  been  working 
at  a  good  while  before.  But  such  is  the  pres- 
ent fact:  Hegel  now  seizes  the  transmitted  three- 
fold Norm  which  Philosophy  has  employed  since  the 
time  of  the  old  Greeks,  and  pours  into  it  his  own 
original  thought  as  content.  His  evolutionary  works 
are  to  become  encyclopedic,  forming  no  longer  a 


772         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

progressive  line,  or  three  such  lines,  toward  and  to 
the  Absolute,  but  a  rounded,  self-returning  totality. 

We  can  trace  the  development  of  the  Hegelian 
Norm  in  three  considerable  publications,  each  of 
which  has  the  triple  division:  Logic  (and  Metaphys- 
ics), Nature,  Mind  or  Spirit. 

(1)  The  System  (1798-1800)  as  it  is  called  by  Bo- 
senkranz  (Hegel's  Leben,  s.  99.     See  also  in  the  pres- 
ent book,  p.  620).     This   shows  Hegel  more  as  the 
student,  appropriating  the   past,  though  he   already 
gives  numerous  indications  of  his  own  system.      Still 
he  has  gotten  the  Norm  and  will  never  let  go  of  it, 
since  it  helps  him  out  of  the  negative  Eighteenth  Cen- 
tury and  reconnects  him  with  Philosophy  and  with  the 
past  of  the  science,  with  the  History  of  Philosophy. 

(2)  The  Propcedeutic,  written  at  Niirnberg  (1808) 
for  the  use  of  the  advanced  class  at  the  Gymnasium. 
Hegel  has  settled  the  main  divisions  of  his  Norm,  but 
he  is  still  struggling  over  the   union  of   Metaphysics 
and  Logic. 

(3)  The  Encyclopedia,  which  is  Hegel's  word  for  the 
new  form  of  his  work.     It  is  a  Greek  compound  which 
we  may  translate  circular  Education,  though  in  mod- 
ern usage  it  has  quite  lost  any  such  meaning.     Hegel, 
however,  restores   the   old   Hellenic  suggestion   that 
science  completed  forms  a  cycle.     Moreover,  it  must 
be  internally  connected  and  thus  show  itself  organic. 
An  Encyclopedia  has  indeed  become  the  most  external 
of  all  means  of  knowledge,  being  put  together  simply 
according  to  the  letters  of  the  alphabet.     But  Hegel's 
Encyclopedia  is  very  different :  it  is  the  conception  of 
the  Universe  dividing  within  itself  and  returning  to 
itself,  thus  forming  the  cycle  of  Thought  as  absolute. 


THE  ENCYCLOPEDIC  HEGEL.  773 

The  various  parts  of  this  great  cycle  are  the  special 
sciences,  each  of  which  must  also  be  conceived  as 
cyclical.  In  this  respect,  as  in  many  others,  Hegel's 
work  furnishes  the  strongest  contrast  to  the  French 
Encylopedia  of  the  Eighteenth  Century,  whose  writers 
were  the  chief  apostles  and  propagators  of  the  En- 
lightenment (Aufklarung),  and  spread  the  negative 
spirit  of  the  age  throughout  Europe.  That  Hegel 
should  have  called  his  book  by  this  name  shows  his 
ambition  and  probably  his  intention  of  devoting  the 
rest  of  his  life  to  producing  a  vast  German  work  which 
would  supplant  the  French  one.  The  further  thought 
of  making  Education  cyclical  has  not  been  realized  to 
this  day,  though  it  certainly  is  a  very  suggestive 
pedagogical  principle. 

II.  In  the  Introduction  to  his  Encyclopedia,  Hegel 
has  given  some  suggestive  hints  for  the  student. 
Says  he:  -"  Each  of  the  parts  of  Philosophy  is  a  phi- 
losophic Whole,"  even  if  it  be  a  part ;  "  it  is  a  circle 
which  encloses  itself  within  itself,"  self-returning  and 
thus  self-completing;  "but  the  philosophic  Idea 
therein  is  in  a  particular  determination  or  element." 
Each  special  form  of  the  Idea  must  show  the  whole 
Idea  of  which  it  is  a  form  or  part.  "The  single 
circle  breaks  through  for  the  reason  that  it  is  in  itself 
the  totality,"  and  cannot  remain  in  its  limited,  finite 
sphere.  *'  The  Whole,  therefore,  manifests  itself  as 
a  circle  of  circles  of  which  each  (circle)  is  a  necessary 
stage."  Thus  "the  total  Idea  is  the  system  of  its 
own  peculiar  elements  or  stages  and  appears  in  each 
of  them"  (s.  23).  Great  stress  Hegel  places  upon 
system;  "a  philosophizing  without  system  has  no 
scientific  value,"  being  merely  some  "  subjective  way 


774        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  thinking,"  with  an  accidental  content.  "  A  con- 
tent or  subject-matter  has  justification  only  as  an 
element  or  stage  of  the  Whole/'  and  this  is  what  sys- 
tematizes it,  making  it  an  organic  member  of  the 
totality.  Nothing  is  so  needful  to  our  time  as  a  little 
study  of  Hegel's  views  on  system,  for  the  power  of 
organizing  thought  seems  quite  unknown  to  or  disbe- 
lieved by  even  the  philosophers  of  to-day. 

In  these  utterances  we  see  the  struggle  of  Hegel  to 
pass  out  of  the  evolutionary  into  the  cyclical  element. 
He  has  broken  through  (to  use  an  expression  of  his) 
the  principle  of  Evolution  as  such ;  that  is,  he  has 
found  it  limited,  a  part  or  stage  which  will  not  stand 
alone  but  must  be  supplemented.  Having  seen  many 
forms  of  thought,  stages,  categories  rising  in  a  succes- 
sive Evolution  and  passing  away  through  their  own 
inner  Dialectic,  he  has  now  come  to  see  that  Evolu- 
tion itself  is  dialectical.  What  is  to  be  done?  The 
evolutionary  Hegel  must  himself  make  a  transition  or 
be  swallowed  up  in  the  process  of  his  own  Dialectic. 
It  has  become  plain  that  Evolution  to  be  true  to  itself, 
must  evolve  out  of  itself,  and  somehow  get  back  to  its 
starting-point ;  it  begins,  but  what  makes  it  begin  ?  It 
must  be  the  Whole  which  returns  upon  itself  and  starts 
through  itself,  evolving  itself  forever  without  begin- 
ning or  end.  But  this  is  no  longer  strict  Evolution, 
the  external  unfolding  of  one  form  out  of  another. 
Thus  the  evolutionary  Hegel  evolves  into  the  encyclo- 
pedic Hegel,  and  makes  his  science,  Philosophy,  abso- 
lutely cyclical,  self-returning,  the  totality  which  has 
within  itself  the  process  from  the  start. 

It  is  true  that  Hegel  has  long  been  aware  of  the 
inner  necessity  of  the  encyclopedic  procedure.  But 


THE  ENCYCLOPEDIC  HE  GEL.  775 

he  had  to  work  out  the  Evolution  of  his  age  in  the 
Phenomenology  and  the  Logic,  though  at  end  of  each, 
he  declares  that  there  must  be  a  return  to  the  begin- 
ning. But  that  is  not  all.  Even  the  grand  outcome, 
the  Absolute,  self -knowing  and  creative,  is  finite,  is 
not  absolute  till  it  has  separated  within  itself  and 
become  its  own  other  in  Nature,  and  then  has  returned 
into  itself  through  Spirit.  Thus  it  takes  up  and 
appropriates  the  philosophic  Norm,  becoming  encyclo- 
pedic, and  truly  universal.  Otherwise  the  Absolute 
itself  is  dialectical  and  goes  to  pieces  through  its  own 
inner  negation  and  finitude.  In  the  Encyclopedia, 
therefore,  Hegel  reaches  Philosophy,  not  simply  the 
Absolute,  and  thereby  escapes,  for  a  while  at  least, 
from  the  maw  of  his  own  Dialectic,  that  awful  monster 
into  whose  jaws  he  has  flung  all  former  Philosophers, 
all  the  shapes  of  the  past,  in  fact  the  whole  finite 
world.  But  the  question  will  arise  again:  Has  Hegel 
himself  escaped  this  second  time  forever?  We  shall 
have  to  wait  and  see. 

III.  What  will  be  the  special  relation  of  this  ency- 
clopedic elaboration  with  its  overarching  Norm  to  the 
three  evolutionary  works  already  set  forth?  The 
Phenomenology  which  first  came  forth  a  unity  from  the 
mind  of  the  author  and  was  regarded  as  a  kind  of  in- 
troduction to  his  Philosophy,  "  a  voyage  of  discov- 
ery," will  be  taken  to  pieces  in  the  Encyclopedia, 
and  its  parts  will  be  given  a  new  arrangement.  We 
have  already  mentioned  some  of  the  more  important 
changes  and  re- adjustments  of  the  Phenomenology 
when  the  latter  is  fitted  into  the  work  before  us. 

When  we  come  to  the  Logic  (lesser)  we  find  that 
internally  it  is  nearly  the  same  as  before,  but  that  it 


776          MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

has  been  given  a  different  position.  In  the  evolu- 
tionary Hegel  its  place  is  last,  being  the  last  develop- 
ment; but  in  the  encyclopedic  Hegel  its  place  is  first, 
being  the  genetic  souree  of  the  other  sciences.  In  the 
one  case  it  is  the  end  of  an  ascending  movement,  in 
the  other  it  is  the  beginning  of  a  cyclical  movement ; 
or  to  change  the  metaphor  a  little,  the  right  line  is 
made  to  curve  back  into  the  round,  and  to  return  into 
itself  through  the  Logic  as  starting-point  and  gener- 
ative principle  of  the  Whole.  This  makes  it  the*first 
stage  of  the  Norm,  whose  outline  and  materials  it 
receives  from  the  past,  but  it  puts  into  them  a  new 
genesis,  the  old  body  it  endows  with  a  new  life.  It  is 
chiefly  this  present  position  and  conception  of  the 
Logic,  which  makes  the  encyclopedic  movement  par- 
amount henceforth  in  Hegel's  Philosophy,  which 
movement  had  been  hitherto  subordinate  to  the  evo- 
lutionary principle,  though  alive  and  at  work  in  the 
soul  of  the  philosopher  underneath  all  his  Evolution. 
This  brings  us  to  the  remaining  book  of  Hegel's 
evolutionary  period,  the  History  of  Philosophy.  In 
the  before-mentioned  introduction  to  the  Encyclopedia 
Hegel  dwells  a  good  deal  upon  this  subject.  He 
traces  the  origin  of  philosophizing,  of  man's  need  of 
Philosophy,  the  need  of  thought  to  think  itself  which 
drives  it  "to  an  Evolution  out  of  itself."  And  this 
Will  show  itself  primarily  in  the  History  of  Philosophy 
which  "  gives  to  the  evolutionary  stages  of  the  Idea 
the  form  of  external  succession  in  time  and  of  an  acci- 
dental difference  of  principles."  But  underlying  and 
unfolding  through  these  different  Philosophies  is 
"one  Philosophy  of  which  the  others  are  only 
branches."  The  last  Philosophy  in  the  evolutionary 


THE  ENCYCLOPEDIC  HEGEL.  Ill 

series  "  is  the  result  of  all  preceding  ones  and  con- 
tains them  all,  hence  is  the  most  explicit,  richest,  most 
concrete."  Of  course  this  last  one  is  Hegel's,  at 
least  for  Hegel  himself. 

But  what  is  the  relation  of  this  History  of  Philos- 
ophy with  its  Evolution  in  time  to  the  Encyclopedia 
or  to  Philosophy  as  a  Whole?  The  latter  has  "the 
same  Evolution  of  Thought,"  but  it  is  "  freed  of  the 
historic  externality,"  and  is  held  "  purely  in  the  ele- 
ment of  Thought  "  which,  grasping  itself  and  return- 
ing into  itself,  is  concrete,  is  "the  Absolute  as 
evolving  itself  within  itself;"  thus  it  is  the  true 
Totality  which  is  self-separative  and  self-returning, 
all  inside  itself.  Such  is  the  process  of  the  Absolute 
which  Hegel  still  keeps  metaphysical,  and  does  not 
identify  with  the  Ego,  with  the  process  of  his  own 
very  Self  which  is  now  creating  and  projecting  this 
process  of  the  Absolute,  whereof  he  is  indeed  an 
essential  part,  reproducing  and  making  it  live  just 
here  and  no\v.  That  is,  the  mentioned  process  is  not 
conceived  by  the  philosopher  as  psychological, 
though  it  is  his  own  Ego's  as  well  as  that  of  the 
Absolute. 

It  is  manifest  that  the  encyclopedic  Hegel  absorbs 
the  Phenomenology  and  the  Logic  into  his  new  Norm, 
transforming  their  evolutionary  principle  to  the  degree 
of  subordinating  it  to  the  cyclical.  But  the  History 
of  Philosophy  remains  evolutionary  and  in  time, 
according  to  Hegel  outside  of  yet  preparatory  to 
the  absolute  process  of  the  Idea,  of  the  grand  Total- 
ity. But  if  anything  be  left  outside,  have  we  the 
Totality,  the  All?  More  particularly  if  the  Evolu- 
tion of  Philosophy  lies  before  and  outside  of  Philoso- 


778         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

phy  itself  as  absolute,  is  the  latter  absolute?  Has 
our  philosopher  after  his  tremendous  labor  really 
gotten  his  Dialectic  inside  his  Absolute!  Somehow 
we  fancy  we  see  the  jaws  of  the  monster,  lying  behind 
there  in  the  dark,  make  a  portentous  opening  of  them- 
selves as  if  getting  ready  to  swallow  Hegel  and  his 
whole  Universe.  For  the  Universe  itself  became  dia- 
lectical if  it  be  limited  ;  or  (to  resume  the  metaphor) 
unless  it  swallows  all,  it  is  bound  to  be  swallowed 
itself  by  that  insatiable  argos-eyed  Dialectic  spying 
out  every  little  corner  of  finitude  in  the  Universe  — 
of  which  Dialectic  Hegel  himself,  if  not  the  father 
exactly,  is  at  least  the  great  modern  reviver  and  ex- 
positor. 

IV.  The  movement  from  the  evolutionary  to  the 
encyclopedic  principle  lay  in  the  time,  and  herein 
again  Hegel  reflects  the  innermost  process  of  his  age. 
The  intimate  relation  between  the  career  of  Napoleon 
and  the  Philosophy  of  Hegel  has  already  been  con- 
sidered. In  1817  when  the  Encyclopedia  appeared, 
Napoleon  the  Absolute  was  no  longer  absolute,  but 
was  limited  to  a  little  solitary  island  in  a  far-off  sea. 
Europe  had  rallied  and  had  dethroned  the  new  emperor. 
This  is  what  Hegel  had  most  recently  experienced. 
He  had  seen  the  real  Absolute,  "  the  World-Spirit 
on  horseback  "  made  very  finite,  reduced  at  most  to  a 
mere  stage  of  the  new  process  which  had  in  it  the 
Return  and  Restoration  as  a  leading  constituent.  For 
Europe  had  restored  the  old  order,  had  returned  upon 
itself  and  thus  had  introduced  a  new  stage,  which 
goes  back  and  completes  the  cycle  of  the  period. 

Now  Hegel,  the  philosopher  of  the  Reality,  responds 
in  his  deepest  Spirit  to  this  significant  turn  of  events. 


THE  ENCYCLOPEDIC  HEGEL.  779 

One  of  his  chief  sayings  is,  the  Real  is  the  Rational. 
It  is  the  function  of  the  philosopher  simply  to  cate- 
gorize the  Reality,  to  precipitate  it  into  the  transpar- 
ent forms  of  thought.  He  is  to  mirror  its  pivotal 
transitions  in  the  terms  of  universal  Reason.  It  is 
hardly  too  much  to  say  that  with  the  overthrow  of 
Napoleon,  Hegel's  philosophical  Absolute  was  over- 
thrown in  his  own  conviction.  The  historic  reality, 
which  never  tells  a  lie,  had  declared  that  the  evolved 
Absolute  was  finite  and  hence  dialectical.  Hegel  heard 
the  voice  and  understood  its  message  ;  probably  of  all 
men  of  that  time,  he  understood  it  best.  At  once  he 
gave  his  response,  and  reconstructed  his  evolutionary 
Absolute,  making  it  cyclical  or  encyclopedic,  and  call- 
ing the  whole  now  Philosophy. 

Europe  itself,  therefore,  enters  upon  a  kina  of  en- 
cyclopedic movement  which  thrills  the  philosophic 
mind  of  Hegel  to  its  new  utterance.  But  another 
change  is  brewing.  Berlin  was  the  center  of  the 
resurrected  Teutonic  folk-soul  which  mainly  put 
down  Napoleon  and  subordinated  the  Absolute.  Hegel 
again  heard  the  voice  of  the  time,  felt  the  impulse  to 
respond  and  soon  did  respond.  At  Berlin  a  great 
fresh  concentration  of  the  German  spirit  was  taking 
place  in  Art,  Science,  Literature  and  Philosophy.  We 
recollect  how  in  the  beginning  of  the  Century  there 
was  a  similar  concentration  at  Jena,  which,  however, 
lasted  but  a  short  time,  the  geniuses  scattering  thence 
to  all  parts  of  Germany.  Hegel  also  had  followed  the 
call  of  the  time  and  had  gone  to  Jena,  but  had  been 
swept  out  of  it  bodily  by  the  personal  appearance 
of  "the  World-Spirit  on  horseback."  We  have  al- 
ready followed  his  course  southward  till  he  landed  at 


780         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Niirnberg  where  he  stayed  some  eight  years  under  the 
domination  of  the  Absolute  both  externally  and  in- 
ternally, and  there  wrote  Ms  larger  Logic.  But 
the  great  change  has  come  at  last,  the  new  concentra- 
tion is  taking  place,  and  the  encyclopedic  Hegel,  no 
longer  revolutionary  or  dominantly  evolutionary,  is 
drawn  to  the  Prussian  capital  where  he  remains  till 
the  end. 

V.  The  same  architectonic  power  which  we  saw  in 
the  construction  of  the  Logic,  we  witness  again  in  the 
Encyclopedia,  which  shows  even  vaster  outlines.  For 
here  the  total  edifice  of  science  is  built  according  to 
one  plan  which  penetrates  to  the  smallest  nook,  co- 
ordinating and  subordinating  every  division,  large  and 
little.  Even  the  prospect  of  such  a  structure  is  soul- 
stretching,  but  to  enter  into  and  to  master  its  details  is 
the  greatest  possible  discipline  in  organizing  thought, 
and  to  organize  thought  from  a  central  principle  may 
be  well  deemed  the  highest  bloom  of  human  intellect. 
Here  then  we  have  the  largest  subject  which  the  mind 
of  man  can  compass,  nothing  less  than  the  Universe 
itself,  completely  ordered  and  made  transparent 
through  the  philosopher's  thinking.  No  other  philos- 
opher, not  even  Aristotle,  the  greatest  constructive 
thinker  of  antiquity,  has  left  any  such  Temple  of 
Thought. 

Its  procedure  is  again  triadal  through  and  through. 
That  God  and  all  that  God  has  created  must  be 
triune,  is  not  only  believed  but  realized  by  Hegel. 
Still  just  this  triadal  procedure  is  for  the  Anglo-Saxou 
mind  the  greatest  stumbling  block  placed  at  the  very 
entrance  of  the  Temple.  To  be  sure  we  believe  in  a 
triune  God,  creator  of  Heaven  and  Earth,  and  of  Man 


THE  ENCYCLOPEDIC  HEGEL.  781 

in  His  image,  but  that  all  creation  must  in  conse- 
quence be  triune  and  thus  reflect  and  reveal  its 
Maker,  is  simply  revolting.  The  Trinity  we  are  sup- 
posed to  worship  as  the  creative  source  and  principle 
of  all  things ;  but  we  put  it  off  into  a  corner  all  by 
itself,  somewhere  in  a  church,  and  take  it  down  for 
an  hour  or  so  once  a  week  on  Sunday,  looking  at  it 
with  pious  wonderment  and  then  putting  it  back  into 
its  retired  nook  again  for  another  week,  far  from  the 
noise  and  soilure  of  the  wicked  world.  But  for  Hegel 
the  Trinity  with  its  process  is  an  eternal,  ever-present 
process,  at  work  in  everything,  particularly  in  Mind, 
Spirit,  the  Absolute.  Hence  it  comes  that  in  the 
widest  sweeps  as  well  as  in  the  minutest  turns  of  his 
exposition  we  find  the  triadal  form,  as  if  he  would 
compel  us  to  see  the  creative  triune  All  in  the  Small 
and  Smallest.  We  hold  it,  therefore,  to  be  one  of  the 
great  merits  of  Hegel  that  he  has  broken  through  the 
sacerdotal  Trinity  and  made  it  universal,  secular  as 
well  as  religious,  an  ever-present  reality. 

If  the  triadal  procedure  is  just  as  emphatic  as  ever, 
there  is,  on  the  other  hand,  it  seems  to  us,  a  consider- 
able diminution  of  dialectical  energy  in  the  Encyclo- 
pedia as  compared  with  either  the  Phenomenology  or 
the  Logic.  This  may  be  in  consequence  of  the  nec- 
essary condensation  of  the  book  and  of  its  pedagogi- 
cal purpose,  since  it  was  written  as  a  manual  for 
students  who  attended  his  lectures.  The  lecturer 
could  expand  and  prove  what  is  here  only  stated  in  the 
form  of  naked  propositions.  Such  a  plan  we  may  still 
trace  in  the  added  observations,  which  are  reflections 
upon  the  main  text.  Still  the  book  on  this  side  shows 
Hegel  becoming  more  dogmatic  and  assertory ;  he  is 


782         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

approaching  his  absolute  period,  when  he  dictates  from 
above  instead  of  unfolding  from  below. 

In  fact  the  Dialectic  is  in  a  manner  relegated  to  a 
back  seat  in  the  Encyclopedia,  being  the  second  or 
negative  stage,  so  that  the  third,  or  speculative,  is  dis- 
tinctly placed  above  it,  being  the  positively  rational, 
while  the  Dialectic  is  the  negatively  rational  (see 
VI.  157).  Hegel  seems  to  regard  his  Encyclopedia  as 
speculative  or  speculative  Philosophy,  which  though 
properly  a  result  of  the  Dialectic,  no  longer  needs  it, 
having  become  independent  as  it  were,  by  kicking 
down  the  ladder  of  its  ascent.  This  partial  absence, 
or  weakness  of  the  Dialectic,  however,  is  a  weakness 
in  the  book  itself  as  a  product  of  Hegel,  whose  main 
philosophic  function  is  to  show  every  part  of  the 
Universe  to  be  dialectical  when  taken  as  a  part,  and 
thus  to  make  every  fragment  of  the  Whole  declare 
itself  a  fragment.  Change,  transition  may  be  called 
the  primal  manifestation  of  the  Dialectic  in  the  world  ; 
beginning  and  ceasing,  birth  and  decay,  generation 
and  corruption,  are  all  categories  of  this  visible  Dia- 
lectic seen  everywhere  in  finite  existence.  Hegel  was 
not  the  first  to  observe  it  or  to  name  it,  but  was  the 
first  to  realize  its  full  meaning  and  to  order  it  in  a 
system  of  thought. 

And  yet  even  Hegel  seems  to  turn  his  back  upon  the 
Dialectic,  partially  at  least,  in  a  pivotal  moment.  We 
have  to  query  in  ourselves,  What  is  the  reason? 
After  all,  he  does  not  see  it  as  psychological,  as  the 
very  life  and  essence  of  the  Ego  with  which  he  is 
working,  but  as  metaphysical,  as  something  abstract 
which  is  turning  around  out  yonder  in  the  world  with 
a  curious  sort  of  movement  quite  separated  from  its 


THE  ENCYCLOPEDIC  HEGEL.  783 

source  in  the  Ego.  So  he  appears  to  get  tired  of  his 
plaything  and  drops  it,  picking  it  up  again  occasionally. 
For  the  same  reason  Hegel  has  never  given  a  sufficient 
ground  for  his  triadal  procedure,  for  the  final  triplicity 
of  the  All.  To  be  sure  he  sees  it,  assumes  it,  and 
never  abandons  it,  when  he  once  gets  it,  not  even  in 
the  Encyclopedia.  Again  we  must  go  back  to  the  Ego 
for  the  real  genesis  of  the  triadal  movement,  whose 
source  lies  far  deeper  and  truer  in  Psychology  than  in 
Philosophy.  In  the  former  we  reach  down  to  the  psy- 
chical Process  of  the  Universe  (the  Pampsychosis)  as 
all-creative,  wherein  lies  not  only  explanation,  but 
final  verification. 

To  our  mind,  therefore,  the  Encyclopedia  in  spite  of 
its  vast  sweep  and  its  marvelous  constructive  power, 
shows  a  falling  off  in  the  pure  innermost  energy  of  the 
Hegelian  spirit.  We  shall,  accordingly,  give  no  such 
full  account  of  Hegel's  Encyclopedia  as  we  have  given 
in  three  preceding  works,  which  are  by  all  means  his 
supremely  original  productions.  The  divisions  of  the 
Encyclopedia  are  briefly  as  follows:  — 

(I.)  Logic  or  Pure  Philosophy  —  the  science  of  the 
Idea  in  and  for  itself. 

(II.)  The  Philosophy  of  Nature — the  science  of 
the  Idea  in  its  other-being  ( Andersseyn). 

(III.)  The  Philosophy  of  Spirit  —  the  science  of 
the  Idea  in  its  return  from  other-being  into  itself. 

The  divisions  of  Philosophy  as  Hegel  has  often  told 
us,  can  only  be  understood  at  the  conclusion,  for  it  is 
the  Idea  of  the  Whole  which  must  be  seen  dividing 
itself  within.  Any  other  method  of  division  is  exter- 
nal. Accordingly  the  Idea  shows  the  following  pro- 
cess;  it  is  first  "self-identical  thinking,  which  then 


784         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

separates  itself  and  places  itself  over  against  itself," 
in  order  to  be  4t  in  this  other  of  self  one  with  itself," 
that  is,  in  order  to  return  out  of  separation  into  unity. 
Hence  there  are  three  divisions  of  the  Encyclopedia, 
which  (as  before  said)  now  embraces  all  Philosophy. 

VI.  Of  the  three  foregoing  divisions,  the  Logic  and 
the  Philosophy  of  Nature  we  shall  here  pass  over  ;  the 
former  has  already  been  considered  and  the  latter  will 
be  noticed  later.  The  third  stage,  usually  called 
Spirit  or  Mind  (Geist)  may  be  briefly  looked  at.  It 
also  has  its  three  stages  divided  according  to  the  Con- 
ception into  subject;ve,  objective,  and  absolute  Spirit, 
all  of  which  are  forms  of  the  self- returning  movement 
which  is  its  essential  character,  be  it  finite  or  infinite. 
Properly  this  third  stage  is  the  return  of  the  finite  Mind 
(Man)  to  its  creative  source  in  the  infinite  (God). 
According  to  Hegel,  Mind  as  finite  returns  out  of 
opposition  in  Nature  to  itself  as  absolute.  Finite 
Mind  is  really  the  contradiction  of  finitude,  which  has 
to  get  out  of  itself  (through  its  own  inner  Dialectic)  and 
be  infinite.  "  The  highest  definition  of  the  Absolute 
is  that  it  is  the  revealed,  self  conscious,  infinitely 
creative  Mind  "  (VII.  2.  s.  32).  This  is  the  foregoing 
Absolute  Spirit  (or  Mind),  the  end  and  fulfillment  of 
the  other  two  stages,  which  are  finite. 

These  three  stages  Hegel  puts  together  in  thought 
as  follows:  (I.)  Subjective  Mind:  the  self-return  of 
Mind  is  immediate,  within  itself,  "  in  the  form  of  self- 
relation."  Or,  the  total  process  of  the  Idea  is  here 
ideal  and  implicit,  not  yet  real.  Three  subdivisions: 
Anthropology,  Phenomenology,  and  Psychology.  The 
latter  has  now  crept  into  the  Hegelian  system  and 
evidently  threatens  to  take  possession  ;  Hegel  here  calls 


THE  ENCYCLOPEDIC  HEGEL.  785 

it  ominously  the  Science  of  the  Spirit  (6reis£),  the 
same  term  which  he  has  hitherto  applied  to  this  entire 
sphere.  In  Psychology  we  now  observe  Intellect 
and  Will  specially,  also  the  subordinate  divisions 
of  Intellect  —  Sense-perception,  Representation  and 
Thought —  all  of  which  we  shall  find  to  be  the  secret 
forces  hereafter  organizing  his  work.  (II.)  Objective 
Mind:  the  self-return  of  Mind  is  now  through  a 
mediated,  Mind-produced  world — the  world  of 
Right,  Law,  and  Institutions  —  which  determine  the 
Ego  to  determine  it.  Three  subdivisions:  Formal 
Right  or  Legality,  Morality,  and  Institutionality 
(Sittlichkeil).  It  is  to  be  noticed  that  Hegel 
derives  this  sphere  of  objective  spirit  directly 
from  the  Will:  "It  is  the  existence  (Daseyn)  of  the 
Will."  Thus  he  drops  the  logical  and  adopts  the 
psychological  deduction,  just  after  the  preceding 
Psychology,  which,  however,  is  here  not  even  a  co- 
ordinate stage.  All  this  is  unconsciously  done,  but  is 
very  significant,  indicating  that  Hegel  is  giving  up 
secretly  his  metaphysical  standpoint.  When  we  come 
to  treat  of  the  Philosophy  of  Right,  something  more 
will  be  said  upon  this  theme.  (III.)  Absolute  Mind: 
the  self-return  of  Mind  is  the  objective  world  which 
is  at  the  same  time  subject;  is  the  unity  of  the  two, 
both  as  self-returned  and  as  self-returning;  is  the 
Absolute  as  self-knowing  Self,  to  which  the  finite  Ego 
is  to  return  and  with  which  it  is  to  unify  itself  in 
thought.  This  is  the  same  conclusion  to  which  Hegel 
comes  at  the  end  of  his  three  evolutionary  books.  As 
he  has  organized  this  sphere  somewhat  more  fully  than 
before,  we  may  follow  out  his  main  lines. 

The  point  to  be  emphasized  is  the  return  of  the  finite 
50 


786         MODERN  E  UE  OPE  AN  PHIL  OSOPHY. 

Mind  (Man)  to  the  Absolute  Mind  (God),  which  re- 
turn takes  three  forms  or  stages:  that  of  Sense-per- 
ception which  gives  Art,  that  of  Representation  which 
gives  Religion,  that  of  Thought  which  gives  Philos- 
ophy. That  is:  the  Absolute  as  Object  perceived 
through  the  senses,  is  artistic ;  the  Absolute  as  Object 
internally  seen  through  image  and  symbol,  is  religious  ; 
the  Absolute  as  Object  penetrated  by  self-conscious 
thought  is  philosophical.  Such  are  Hegel's  three 
famous  divisions  of  absolute  Spirit  —  Art,  Religion, 
and  Philosophy  —  putting  an  order  into  this  lofty 
theme,  which  not  only  captivates  the  Reason,  but  also 
dazzles  or  even  dizzies  the  Imagination. 

Now  the  most  striking  fact  in  this  division  is  that  its 
principle  is  not  logical  but  psychological,  being  taken 
from  the  three  well-known  stages  of  the  Intellect  — 
Sense-perception,  Representation,  and  Thought  —  and 
not  from  the  stages  of  the  Conception — Univer- 
sality, Particularity  and  Individuality.  Thus  Hegel 
in  the  organization  of  the  supreme  movement  of  his 
whole  Philosophy  — just  this  Absolute  Spirit  —  throws 
overboard  his  logical  division,  which  he  has  so  often 
declared  to  be  fundamental,  and,  without  any  notice 
or  any  justification  of  his  procedure,  seizes  upon  the 
psychological  division  of  the  Intellect  for  the  principle 
of  order.  Now  we  are  far  from  saying  that  this  classi- 
fication of  Absolute  Spirit  is  wrong;  on  the  contrary 
we  believe  it  to  be  in  the  main  correct.  The  point, 
however,  is  that  Hegel  here  abandons  his  Logic  as 
fundamental  and  goes  over  to  Psychology,  and  that 
too  in  the  very  highest  and  last  cycle  of  Sciences  in 
his  entire  Encyclopedia. 

Again  the  question  comes  up:    What  does  it  mean? 


THE  'ENCYCLOPEDIC  HEGEL.  787 

Recollect  this  is  the  unconscious  Hegel ;  certainly  he 
is  not  fully  aware  of  what  he  is  doing.  But  just  this 
unconscious  element  is,  to  our  mind,  the  deeper  com- 
ing principle  rising  underneath  and  breaking  through 
his  conscious  logical  or  metaphysical  scheme.  This 
psychological  division  (that  of  the  Ego)  determines 
his  Absolute  Spirit,  is  really  its  own  self-division,  and 
hence  should  determine  every  other  division,  logical 
included.  But  such  a  thought  did  not  rise  into  the 
consciousness  of  Hegel ;  if  it  had  so  risen  and  borne 
fruit,  he  would  have  been  compelled  to  reconstruct  his 
Logic  by  putting  under  it  its  psychologic  foundation 
as  he  has  done  here  in  Absolute  Spirit,  partially  at 
least. 

Moreover  we  may  consider  this  the  last  philosophic 
product  of  the  theoretic  Hegel,  written  at  Heidelberg 
not  long  before  his  departure.  His  first  and  second 
Periods,  devoted  to  the  inner  evolution  of  his  Philoso- 
phy, close  with  the  view  of  Absolute  Spirit  at  the  end 
of  the  Encyclopedia.  But  just  at  this  point  the  theo- 
retic Hegel  is  suddenly  whisked  out  of  his  inner  world 
and  becomes  the  practical  Hegel,  who  will  unfold  and 
apply  to  reality  chiefly  these  three  divisions  of  abso- 
lute Spirit,  namely  Art,  Religion  and  Philosophy. 

We  saw  the  evolutionary  Hegel  evolve  the  Absolute 
as  the  great  finality,  which,  however,  showed  itself  at 
the  very  last  to  be  not  absolute,  but  finite  and  dialec- 
tical. To  escape  from  such  a  dualism,  the  encyclo- 
pedic Hegel  arose,  seizing  the  philosophic  Norm  and 
its  supreme  self- returning  cycle  of  the  All  whose  funda- 
mental genetic  principle  was  the  Logic.  But  in  the 
last  stage  of  the  total  movement  of  this  Norm,  that  of 
the  Absolute  Spirit,  the  Logic  shows  itself  to  be  not 


788          MODERN  E  UR  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

fundamental,  and  is  supplanted  by  a  psychologic 
principle.  Thus  the  encyclopedic  Hegel  has  evolved 
a  new  dualism,  deeper  than  even  the  former  one,  in- 
deed the  deepest  of  all,  that  between  Philosophy  itself 
and  Psychology,  the  conscious  and  the  unconscious, 
the  outgoing  and  the  incoming  world-disciplines. 
To  such  a  point  of  inner  separation  and  transition 
the  last  European  philosopher  has  brought  his  Sci- 
ence, having  evolved  it  though  its  own  principle  of 
Evolution  to  its  conclusion. 

This  we  may  call  a  new  Parting  of  the  Ways,  and 
again  we  may  ask,  Which  road  will  our  philosopher 
now  take?  Will  he  follow  the  psychologic  beckoning 
toward  the  future?  Impossible;  he  is  largely  uncon- 
scious of  its  significance,  even  if  he  sees  it ;  he  cannot 
make  the  skip  out  of  the  first  of  the  Nineteenth  to  the 
first  of  the  Twentieth  Century.  Moreover  he  cannot 
reconstruct  his  entire  colossal  edifice  on  which  he  has 
wrought  all  his  life,  till  nearly  his  fiftieth  year,  putting 
underneath  him  a  new  substructure,  and  transform- 
ing the  whole  superstructure.  Just  in  this  Absolute 
Spirit  he  has  driven  Philosophy  to  its  stepping-off 
place,  when  he  turns  back,  dropping  all  further  theo- 
retic development  of  his  principle,  and  applies  what  he 
has  won  to  special  sciences  and  to  practical  life  at 
Berlin.  Thither  we  shall  follow  him  and  scan  what  we 
may  call  his  Prussian  productions. 


TBE  PHTLOSOPHARCH  HEGEL.  789 


III.  THE  PHILOSOPHARCH  HEGEL. 

As  Hegel  regarded  each  stage  of  his  Logic  to 
be  a  definition  of  the  Absolute,  so  we  may  re- 
gard each  stage  of  Hegel's  own  development  as 
a  definition  of  Hegel's  Absolute.  Thus  we  have 
already  passed  through  two  stages,  or  two  Hegels, 
the  evolutionary  and  the  encyclopedic.  Now  we 
have  reached  the  third,  the  realized  Hegel,  in  his 
sphere  an  actual  ruler  of  the  real  world,  whom 
we  shall  designate  the  Philosopharch,  who  is  not 
simply  a  new  Hegel,  but  a  new  character  in  the 
World's  History. 

For  now  a  philosopher  becomes  in  and  through 
his  science  an  official  of  the  State,  a  chief  official; 
he  is  not  indeed  the  practical  Prime  Minister,  yet 
a  kind  of  theoretical  one,  a  veritable  part  of  the 
governmental  process,  the  thought  of  which  he 
is  to  declare  and  formulate,  as  it  manifests  itself 
in  action.  The  State  must  now  think,  be  con- 
scious of  its  own  purpose  and  end  ;  the  man  .who 
is  to  make  it  think,  furnishing  his  Thought  to  its 
Will,  is  the  new  official,  not  indeed  a  member  of 
the  cabinet,  but  the  thinker  of  the  Institution, 
who  in  the  progress  of  the  ages  has  appeared,  no 
longer  outside  but  inside,  or  at  least  behind  the 
practical  administration  of  affairs.  Listen  to  his 
view:  "The  State  is  the  Spirit  which  stands 


790          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

forth  in  the  world  and  realizes  itself  in  the  same 
consciously ,! "  of  course  through  the  man  who  is 
conscious  of  what  it  is  and  who  is  an  official 
attending  to  such  duty,  chiefly  on  account  of  his 
native  ability  in  that  direction.  Yet  he  is  cer- 
tainly regarded  with  approval  by  the  government. 
Such  a  peculiar  position  Hegel  s®on  obtained 
after  his  removal  from  Heidelberg  to  Berlin  in 
1818.  He  succeeded  substantially  in  enthroning 
Philosophy  as  the  ruler  of  the  State ;  he  be- 
came the  Philosopharch,a  being  unknown  before 
or  since ;  and  Prussia  for  a  time  became  a  Phi- 
losopharchy,  a  style  of  government  previously 
unheard  of,  and  probably  never  to  be  seen  again. 

I.  It  is  true  that  philosophers  had  long  dreamed  of 
some   such  position  as  due  to  themselves   and  their 
thought.     Plato  in  antiquity  had  constructed  his  ideal 
Republic  with  a  philosopher  at  the  head  ;  but  no  such 
principle  has  ever  been  realized.    Aristotle  also  would 
have  the  ruler  a  philosopher.     Plotinus  was  encour- 
aged by   a  Roman   emperor   for  a  while  to  found   a 
Platonopolis,  a  city  of  philosophers,  but  the  scheme 
came  to   naught.     Sir   Thomas  More   was  a   practi- 
cal statesman,  but  he  probably  never  thought  of  realiz- 
ing his  Utopia.     Hegel  indeed  is  not  the  Monarch,  not 
the  Executive,  but  we  may  call  him  the  Philosopharch 
of  Prussia  at  this  time. 

II.  Why  this  unique  coming-together,  this  mutual 
attraction  of  what  had  before  been  opposites?    The 
answer  must  be:  both  sides  were  ready,  each  indeed 
was   seeking  the  other;  Prussia  was  calling  for  the 


THE  PHILOSOPHAECH  HEGEL.  791 

absolute  philosopher,  and  the  philosopher  was  calling 
for  the  absolute  State. 

Hitherto  Hegel  had  been  theoretical;  at  most  his 
practical  life  was  that  of  an  instructor  who  taught  his 
own  theory.  He  had  written  the  most  abstruse,  the 
most  difficult,  the  most  theoretical  books  in  all  Chris- 
tendom ;  yet  he  had  a  practical  side,  and  he  longed 
to  apply  his  Philosophy  to  real  life.  If  he  had  remained 
at  Heidelberg,  he  would  probably  have  continued  to 
write  out  his  Encyclopedia,  and  have  made  it  the  cycle 
of  all  the  sciences,  in  accordance  with  the  original 
plan,  which  was  to  rival  the  great  French  work  of  the 
same  name. 

But  he  receives  the  invitation  to  Berlin  University, 
and  at  once  a  vast  new  prospect  opens.  He  had 
evolved  out  of  his  first  Absolute  into  his  cj'clical  stage, 
which  was  still  theoretical,  at  Heidelberg.  But  can 
it  now  be  made  real,  applied  not  only  to  the  special 
sciences  but  to  practical  life?  We  see  from  Hegel's 
letters  that  he  had  a  longing  to  be  a  man  of  affairs; 
in  fact,  he  deemed  Philosophy  to  be  the  true  solvent 
of  all  reality. 

Prussia  had  shown  herself  to  be  the  intellectual 
leader  of  Germany  in  the  War  of  Liberation.  She  had 
been  the  chief  power  in  putting  down  Napoleon,  the 
foreign  French  Absolute,  and  she  was  on  the  way  to 
take  his  place  as  the  native  German  Absolute.  At 
the  battle  of  Jena  Hegel  had  seen  Prussia  utterly  de- 
feated and  humiliated,  and,  as  he  then  thought,  deserv- 
edly. But  she  had  risen  from  the  dust,  had  trans- 
formed herself  through  efforts  of  her  statesmen,  Stein 
and  Scharnhorst,  and  had  driven  out  her  oppressor. 
At  such  a  view  Hegel  changed  his  former  opinion,  had 


792         MODE  UN  E  UE  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

to  change  it,  and  could  not  help  wishing  himself  at 
the  center  of  such  a  remarkable  transformation,  which 
had  now  its  inner  response  in  his  own  soul.  He 
would  no  longer  stay  in  South  Germany ;  he  must  put 
himself  at  the  heart  of  the  great  movement  in  his 
own  native  land.  As  he  went  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Century  to  the  University  of  Jena,  then  the  center  of 
an  epoch,  so  now  he  goes  to  Berlin  answering  the  call 
of  the  time. 

Thus  Hegel  the  philosopher  of  the  Absolute  hitherto 
is  next  to  become  the  absolute  philosopher  -—  a  very 
different  thing.  In  his  evolutionary  period  we  saw 
him  evolving  the  Absolute,  which  stood  outside  of 
his  nation  and  himself,  yet  dominated  both.  But  the 
time  has  come  when  the  Absolute  has  gone  inside  his 
nation  and  himself.  Prussia  will  incorporate  it  in 
the  State.  But  Hegel  personally  will  manifest  the 
Absolute  incarnate,  and  will  become  the  Napoleon  of 
Philosophy,  dominating  and  tyrannical. 

III.  Another  pivotal  fact  in  the  life  of  Hegel  at 
Berlin  is  that  he  becomes  the  founder  of  a  school  of 
Philosophy,  which  he  makes  the  center  of  the  Univer- 
sity, and  of  the  culture  of  Berlin,  where  it  was  for  a 
time  the  fashion  to  hear  Hegel.  He  gathered  about 
himself  a  band  of  zealous  disciples,  some  of  whom 
were  men  of  great  ability,  and  carried  his  doctrines 
into  the  special  departments  of  science.  Others  were 
shallow  repeaters  of  his  categories,  and  some  were 
downright  charlatans.  Thus  Hegel  becomes  the  abso- 
lute ruler  of  a  School,  the  Scholarch  asserting  his  au- 
thority over  his  followers,  and  requiring  their  obedience 
to  his  doctrine  as  if  he  were  the  philosophic  pope. 

Before  he  went  to  Berlin  Hegel  had  laid  the  solid 


THE  PHILOSOPHAECH  HEGEL.  793 

foundations  for  a  School.  Particularly  the  Encyclope- 
dia gave  an  outline  which  was  to  be  fi  led  up  by  many 
special  workers.  Three  different  editions  (two  at  Ber- 
lin) appeared  showing  how  much  it  was  used  as  a  text- 
book. Then  the  Logic  would  furnish  a  rich  mine  for 
the  deeper  delvers,  who  through  it  would  become  truly 
initiates  into  the  most  esoteric  Hegelian  thought.  Nor 
must  we  leave  out  the  Phenomenology,  the  original 
4 'voyage  of  discovery,"  for  the  philosopher  himself 
and  for  many  of  his  pupils.  These  three  books  which 
are  still  the  basic  studies  for  Hegel's  Philosophy,  he 
carried  with  him  already  printed  to  Berlin.  He  was 
48  years  old,  the  theoretical  part  of  his  work  was 
done,  now  he  must  plant  and  propagate,  in  fine  must 
realize  his  ideas.  Such  was  the  substructure  which 
he  had  laid  chiefly  in  the  quiet  years  at  Niirnberg,  and 
without  which  he  could  never  have  reared  the  colossal 
superstructure  at  Berlin. 

He  devotes  himself  specially  to  lecturing  and  really 
writes  but  one  book  during  the  Berlin  period  and  that 
not  a  very  large  one  (Philosophic  des  Rechts).  But 
he  gives  courses  on  a  number  of  branches,  which  his 
pupils  will  after  his  death  edit  and  publish  as  Philos- 
ophy of  History,  and  History  of  Philosophy,  the 
Aesthetics  and  Religion.  All  these  books  are  differ- 
ent in  style  and  in  manner  of  exposition  from  his 
earlier  ones.  On  the  whole  they  are  much  easier 
for  the  average  reader,  less  rigid  in  development, 
less  technical,  though  his  peculiar  philosophical 
nomenclature  is  not  wanting  in  them.  It  is  clear  that 
Hegel  is  seeking  to  popularize  his  thought,  to 
bring  it  home  to  a  general  audience,  to  realize  it  in 
many  cultured  human  souls  who  have  little  or  no  spe- 


794        MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

cial  philosophic  training.  Very  different  arc  his  first 
three  written  books  already  mentioned.  In  these  his 
mind  is  upon  the  thing,  not  upon  his  hearer  or  reader  ; 
but  in  the  later  books,  made  up  from  his  lectures,  bis 
standpoint  is  in  his  audience  largely,  and  his  exposi- 
tion has  a  more  popular  tinge.  From  the  central 
Encyclopedia,  or  the  circular  Totality  moving  on  its 
own  axis,  special  lines  are  turned  off  and  wrought  out 
into  detail.  If  Hegel's  first  or  evolutionary  move- 
ment was  centripetal,  and  his  second  or  encyclopedic 
was  cyclical,  his  third  or  philosopharchic  is  centrifu- 
gal, sending  off  particular  threads  which  are  then 
elaborated  in  themselves. 

IV.  As  Scholarch,  or  ruler  of  the  school,  he  began 
to  assign  departments  to  pupils,  who  were  to  carry 
them  out  to  completeness.  Here  an  inner  conflict 
begins,  for  some  of  these  pupils  did  not  follow  him 
closely  enough,  but  insisted  upon  a  certain  individ- 
uality and  independence.  This  H(  gel  on  the  whole 
could  not  tolerate;  he  asserted  himself  as  the  incar- 
nate Absolute  of  his  School.  Moreover  the  present 
was  the  period  of  the  Absolute  realized,  both  in  the 
State  and  in  the  philosopher  personally.  We  have  to 
confess  that  Hegel  was  inclined  during  this  time 
more  and  more  to  relegate  the  individual  to  a  back 
seat  if  not  to  nullify  him. 

But  when  it  came  to  philosophers  of  a  different 
School,  he  played  the  part  of  Philosopharch  with  a 
vengeance.  Dr.  Beneke,  who  had  his  own  system  of 
thought,  Hegel  tried  officially  to  bar  out  of  the  Uni- 
versity completely,  as  being  heterodox.  In  this  and 
in  similar  cases  Hegel  really  was  devoured  by  his  own 
Dialectic,  for  a  University  should  certainly  be  uni- 


THE  PHILOSOPHAECH  HEGEL.  795 

versal,  at  least  in  the  universal  science  Philosophy. 
Thus  there  was  getting  to  be  the  one  true  Philosophy  at 
Berlin,  determined  by  authority,  as  in  former  ages  the 
one  true  Religion  was  determined  by  authority.  Such 
a  claim  to  infallibility  on  the  part  of  our  philosophic 
pope  could  only  beget  violent  opposition  whose  hate 
continued  long  after  Hegel's  death.  The  result  was 
that  he  was  often  blamed  for  matters  in  which  he  had 
no  hand.  Krause  and  Krause's  friends  blamed  him 
for  lack  of  promotion,  Herbart  blamed  him,  and 
Schopenhauer  cursed  him  and  his  doctrine  in  language 
which  still  smells  sulphurous.  In  fact  it  has  to  be 
acknowledged  that  there  is  a  transmitted  dislike  of 
Hegel  personally  in  Germany  to-day.  Educated 
Germans  we  find  often  who  do  not  know  or  care 
about  his  Philosophy  or  any  Philosophy,  but  who  make 
wry  faces  at  the  mention  of  his  name.  They  show  a 
feeling  against  him  which  they  do  not  show  against 
Fichte  or  Schel'ing  or  Schleiermacher  or  against  any 
other  philosopher.  A  similar  animosity  often  is  man- 
ifested in  otherwise  calm  philosophic  books,  as  we 
may  see  in  Haym's  work  on  Hegel.  We  have  often 
asked  ourselves,  why  so  bitterly  personal  in  matters 
of  impersonal,  dispassionate  Philosophy?  Why  these 
charges  of  fraud  (Betrug),  of  charlatanry,  of  double- 
dealing  in  the  ethereal  realm  of  Pure  Thought? 
They  seem  to  go  back  to  this  period  of  the  absolute 
Philosopharch  when  he  is  declared  to  have  betrayed, 
liberty  and  the  individual,  to  have  subjected  Philoso- 
phy to  a  reactionary  government,  and  to  have  played 
the  tyrant  himself  in  the  very  citadel  of  Free 
Thought.  The  result  is  the  study  of  Hegel  has  been 
almost  driven  out  of  German  Universities  and  has 


796         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

fled  to  Anglo-Saxon  countries  for  appreciation  and 
new  life.  And  here  it  may  be  noted  that  the  institu- 
tional idea  of  Hegel  (barring  his  practice)  is  more 
congenial  to  the  Anglo-Saxon  than  to  the  German 
conception  of  institutions.  But  the  name  of  Hegel 
is  not  honored  in  Germany  like  that  of  Kant  and 
Fichte ;  the  autocratic  Philosopharch  is  remembered 
more  than  the  truth-seeking  philosopher. 

V.  On  the  other  hand  Hegel  knew  how  to  inspire 
his  pupils  with  a  deep  enthusiasm,  often  with  a  kind  of 
adoration.  Few  philosophers  before  him  have  been 
the  recipient  of  so  much  flattery.  Poetry  sang  his 
praises  and  put  his  thoughts  into  rhyme.  The  culmi- 
nation was  reached  in  this  line  when  Werder  cele- 
brated the  philosopher's  birthday  in  words  which  de- 
clared the  categories  of  Hegel's  Logic  to  be  *'  the 
new  Gods."  Olympus  was  restored,  the  Hegelian 
Pan-categoreon  was  really  the  modern  Pantheon  out 
of  which  the  coming  epic  poet  might  construct  the 
new  Iliad.  Thus  Homer  was  now  to  appear  after  the 
philosopher,  not  before  him,  as  was  the  case  in  old 
Greek  times  when  Aristotle  philosophized  Homeric 
poetry.  Of  course  such  extravagances  could  not  fail 
of  calling  up  the  counterblast.  A  comedy  circulated 
through  Berlin  bearing  the  title:  The  Winds,  or  the 
wholly  absolute  construction  of  the  newer  World's 
History  blown  through  O heron's  horn  by  Absolutus 
von  Hegelingen.  So  the  town  divided  into  the  Hegel- 
ians and  Anti-Hegelians,  which  division  had  to  be- 
come political,  as  the  philosopher  was  in  high  favor 
with  the  government,  and  those  who  opposed  it  would 
not  see  much  good  in  the  Hegelian  Philosophy. 

Hegel,  however,  succeeded  in  building  up  a  school 


THE  PHILOSOPHAECH  HEGEL.  797 

of  able  and  powerful  defenders.  His  apostles  were  not 
poor  fishermen  like  those  of  the  Nazarene,  nor  were 
they  poor  women  like  those  of  Froebel.  Many  of  them 
were  men  in  power,  officials  of  the  State.  Hegel's 
gospel  was  not  persecuted,  but  was  the  very  road  to 
favor  and  political  preferment.  Hence  there  was  in 
his  following  a  noisy  set  of  self-seekers  and  hypocrites, 
who  were  ready  to  fall  away  at  the  least  frown  from 
above.  Never  purified  in  the  fire  of  persecution,  the 
School  had  no  holding  power  and  went  to  pieces  soon 
after  the  master's  departure.  This  does  not  mean 
that  Hegel's  thought  was  lost  even  if  it  passed  into  an 
eclipse  in  its  native  land. 

VI.  It  was  this  School  of  Hegel  at  Berlin,  which 
earned  the  gratitude  of  all  thinkers  by  publishing  a 
complete  edition  of  Hegel's  Works,  to  which  we  have 
often  made  reference  in  the  preceding  account.  Special 
credit  is  due  to  those  who  burdened  themselves  with 
the  task  of  putting  together  his  later  books  from  a 
great  variety  of  scattered  notes.  Of  this  final  part  of 
Hegel's  writings  it  remains  to  give  some  account. 

A  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RIGHT. —  Hegel's  work  whose 
title  (Philosophie  des  Rechts)  we  thus  translate,  was 
the  only  book  which  he  wrote  out  and  printed  after  he 
came  to  Berlin.  He  was  overwhelmed  with  practical 
affairs ;  the  time  of  quiet  self-communing  which  is 
necessary  to  elaborate  thoroughly  organized  books 
(and  such  were  hitherto  Hegel's)  was  past  forever. 
Undoubtedly  he  still  continued  to  write,  but  it  was  in 
the  form  of  lectures,  articles,  and  additions  to  what 
he  had  already  conceived  and  in  part  wrought  out. 
Then  he  was  largely  employed  with  administration, 
and,  as  we  see  by  this  book,  with  politics.  We  might 


798         MODE  EN  E  UR  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

almost  call  in  bis  own  nomenclature  his  previous 
philosophic  life  Conception  (Begriff),  but  now  this  is 
to  be  endowed  with  reality  and  so  become  Idea 
(Hegel's  Idee). 

The  present  book,  as  we  have  it,  is  not  as  Hegel 
published  it  in  the  first  edition.  It  is  in  the  transi- 
tional state  from  his  own  writings  to  those  which  the 
society  of  his  followers  published  after  his  death. 
This  fact  we  have  from  the  editor,  Gans,  who  states 
in  his  preface  that  he  added  to  Hegel's  text  many 
notes  taken  from  the  latter's  lectures  on  the  present 
subject.  Thus  we  have  in  the  book  two  strands  both 
coming  from  Hegel,  one  original  and  the  other  edi- 
torial. Hence  it  may  be  deemed  a  kind  of  transition 
and  introduction  to  the  Berlin  series  of  Hegel's  works 
(represented  mainly  by  vols.  VIII- XV  of  the  col- 
lected edition). 

In  1818  when  Hegel  arrived  at  Berlin,  a  time  of  re- 
action against  all  popular  measures  had  set  in.  When 
the  Prussian  people  arose  in  1814-5,  responding  to 
the  summons  of  their  king,  and  drove  out  Napoleon, 
they  had  been  led  to  believe  that  they  would  have  a 
Constitution  which  granted  them  representation  in  the 
government.  This  expectation  the  Prussian  authori- 
ties, from  one .  cause  and  another,  refused  to  fulfill, 
and  started  a  systematic  persecution  of  those  who  agi- 
tated for  such  a  reform.  The  Prussian  people  also 
began  to  have  an  aspiration  to  be  sharers  in  the  gov- 
ernment of  their  country  ;  they  began  to  feel  that  they 
should  have  a  hand  in  making  the  laws  which  they  had 
to  obey  and  to  defend  with  their  lives.  The  new  im- 
pulse of  the  age  was  fermenting  in  Prussia. 

Into  this  political  discussion  Hegel  is  plunged  on  his 


THE  PHILOSOPHARCH  HEGEL.  799 

arrival  at  Berlin  and  he  has  to  take  sides.  In  the  book 
now  under  consideration  he  must  treat  of  the  State, 
its  powers  and  limitations ;  here  too  he  has  to  take 
sides.  Which  side  will  he  take?  Will  he  support  the 
people  in  their  aspiration  for  a  small  part  in  govern- 
ing themselves,  or  will  he  make  government  absolute? 
In  order  to  answer  these  questions,  or  rather  this  one 
fundamental  question  properly,  we  must  look  into 
the  treatise  before  us. 

As  a  preparation  he  gives  some  warm  prefatory  re- 
marks "on  the  position  of  Philosophy  toward  the 
Reality."  He  will  have  nothing  to  do  with  anything 
like  a  construction  of  an  ideal  State;  for  "  it  is  the 
function  of  Philosophy  to  comprehend  what  is  "  or  the 
Reality,  "inasmuch  as  this  is  Reason."  Hereupon 
he  lays  down  his  famous  double  maxim :  — 

(t  Whatever  is  rational,  is  real " 
"  Whatever  is  real,  is  rational." 

The  inference  must  be  that  the  chief  object  of  the 
present  treatise  is  to  comprehend  the  rationality  of  the 
existent  State,  that  is,  of  Prussia.  The  fact  that  it 
exists  makes  it  rational,  and  the  Philosophy  of  the 
State  can  have  no  other  task  than  to  set  forth  the  in- 
dwelling Reason  now  manifested  in  the  Prussian  Gov- 
ernment. There  is  to  be  apparently  no  criticism,  no 
suggestion  of  improvement,  and  political  evolution 
seems  to  have  quite  reached  its  limit.  The  foregoing 
principle  in  its  extreme  form  has  been  rarely  defended 
even  by  the  Hegelians ;  for  instance,  Rosenkranz,  the 
most  devoted  among  the  abler  followers  of  Hegel,  crit- 
icises it  sharply.  Hegel  himself  does  not  comply  with 


800         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

it  always ;  still  it  shows  his  present  trend  even  if  this 
be  one-sided.  At  Berlin  he  has  at  last  the  opportu- 
nity to  make  his  Philosophy  a  Reality,  indeed  to  make 
himself  also  real  as  absolute,  as  Philosopharch,  pass- 
ing actually  and  literally  from  an  abstract  subjective 
Conception  hitherto  into  the  real  objective  stage  of  the 
Idea  (which  Idea,  we  must  never  forget,  is  with  Hegel 
the  Conception  clothed  in  Reality). 

Our  philosopher  goes  on  to  declare  that  "every 
individual  is  the  Son  of  his  time,"  and  in  like  man- 
ner every  Philosophy  can  only  put  in  thought  its  own 
period.  It  is  not  to  build  the  State  over  as  this  ought 
to  be,  no  ideal  construction  of  a  commonwealth  is  to 
be  tolerated;  you  must  take  what  is  and  understand 
that.  Very  plainly  do  these  declarations  show  that 
Hegel  has  now  found  his  Absolute  as  a  real  existent 
object  before  him,  no  longer  spun  out  of  his  brain,  as 
it  is  at  the  end  of  the  Logic  or  the  Encyclopedia. 
Here  it  is,  the  divine  epiphany  at  least,  the  State,  and 
specially  this  Prussian  State,  autocratic,  absolute,  in 
fact  just  the  Absolute  embodied  (see  this  whole  pre- 
face, Philosophe  des  Rechts,  Vorrede). 

These  expressions  are  formulated  and  made  still 
more  precise  when  the  philosopher  comes  to  that  of 
the  State  in  particular.  Says  he:  the  State  is  "the 
substantial  Will  which  thinks  and  knows  itself,  and 
executes  what  it  knows,'*  namely  itself,  this  Will. 
We  recall  that  in  the  Phenomenology  and  Logic  the 
Absolute  was  the  self-knowing  Spirit;  this  is  now 
quite  identified  by  Hegel  with  his  State  which  has 
Will  (VIII.  s.  305-6),  and  also  "Self-consciousness 
elevated  to  univerality."  In  fact,  Philosophy  "  has 
the  same  element  of  form  as  the  State,"  the  latter 


THE  PHILOSOFHARCn  HEGEL.  801 

being  "  absolute,  immovable  self -end."  Hegel, 
therefore,  has  two  Absolutes,  or  rather  he  has  evolved 
out  of  one  (the  ideal)  into  the  other  (the  real)  —  or 
out  of  the  Niirnberg  and  Heidelberg  Absolute  into 
this  new  Berlin  one,  or  out  of  the  Absolute  of  the 
Intellect  into  that  of  the  Will. 

Unquestionably  this,  last  Evolution  was  not  a  sud- 
den jump  but  stood  long  before  the  door  knocking 
lightly  or  at  times  loudly  for  entrance  into  the  Real 
World.  We  may  find  hints  of  its  presence  through 
his  entire  philosophic  career.  It  lay  in  the  man,  in 
the  time,  yea  in  the  Absolute  itself,  that  it  be  truly 
absolute,  a  fact  and  not  merely  a  thought  of  the  Will 
as  well  as  of  the  Intellect.  Then  Prussia  furnished  the 
golden  opportunity  into  which  Hegel,  long  waiting, 
sprang  at  a  bound.  The  apparent  suddenness  is  but 
superficial ;  internally  Hegel  had  been  traveling  the 
road  to  Berlin  all  his  life,  even  if  he  did  not  know  it, 
and  often  supposed  just  the  opposite. 

Still  further  we  may  carry  forward  this  thought  of 
the  State.  Hegel  of  course  knew  that  there  were 
many  States  besides  Prussia,  that  Europe  was  a 
society  of  individual  States  with  boundaries  limiting 
each  other  and  interests  perpetually  clashing.  Hence 
he  comes  to  the  thought  of  the  Spirit  presiding  over 
all  these  manifold  political  units  and  determining  their 
destiny  in  the  destiny  of  the  Whole.  Such  a  Spirit 
he  calls  the  World-Spirit.  "  In  the  Idea  of  the  State 
we  are  not  to  consider  merely  particular  States,  but 
the  Idea  as  such,  this  actual  God,  is  to  be  regarded  " 
(VIII.  s.  313).  So  the  State  in  its  Idea  is  God  made 
real  on  this  earth,  the  true  Theophany.  In  such  a 
view  the  Church  must  be  a  very  subordinate  institution. 

51 


802         MODERN  E UROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Such  is  Hegel's  complete  spiritual  absorption  into  and 
coalescense  with  the  Prussian  State,  which  in  its  turn 
was  equally  ready  to  be  transformed  into  Hegel.  Will 
the  crab  assimilate  the  oyster  or  the  oyster  the  crab? 
If  Hegel  was  Prussianized,  Prussia  was  Hegelized.  Of 
this  fact  we  may  find  testimony  in  a  letter  to  Hegel 
from  the  Prussian  Minister,  V.on  Altenstein,  in  refer- 
ence to  this  Philosophy  of  Right.  "  In  the  present 
work  as  well  as  in  your  lectures  you  lay  stress  upon 
grasping  the  present  Reality,  and  upon  comprehend- 
ing the  rational  principle  in  History.  This  is  the 
only  correct  attitude  of  Philosophy  toward  Reality. 
Xhus  you  best  succeed  in  preserving  your  hearers 
from  the  destructive  conceit  which  rejects  the  existent 
order  without  recognizing  its  meaning,  and  whicli 
takes  pleasure  in  empty  ideals  as  regards  the  State." 
(Cited  in  Rosenkranz,  Leben,  s.  337.)  Such  was  the 
ministerial  seal  of  approval  upon  this  book  with  its 
view  of  the  State. 

Prussia,  then,  has  become  for  Hegel  "  the  self- 
knowing  Absolute  "  realized,  actually  present  and  at 
work  in  the  world.  There  is  little  or  no  organic 
movement  from  below  upward,  but  from  above  down- 
ward, from  "  the  actual  God"  above  downward  to 
the  people.  It  is  true  that  just  now  the  Prussian 
people  are  showing  a  strong  aspiration  in  their  hearts 
to  say  a  word  in  making  the  law  which  they  have  to 
obey.  But  against  any  such  notion  "of  the  popu- 
lace "  Prussia  is  at  "present  in  strong  reaction  and 
is  sending  to  jail  any  "demagogue"  who  dares 
speak  of  such  a  thing.  The  State  is  the  Absolute 
"  which  knows  itself  and  wills  what  it  knows  ;  "  it  is 
the  grand  Totality  within  itself,  which  sends  forth  its 


THE  PHILOSOPIIABCH  HEGEL.  803 

decree,  and  the  people  have  nothing  to  do  but  to 
follow. 

And  here  by  way  of  counterpart  we  may  introduce 
the  Hegelian  definition  of  the  People,  as  "that  por- 
tion of  the  State  which  does  not  know  what  it  wills." 
(The  emphasis  is  Hegel's.  See  VIII.  s.  386.)  Such 
is  the  assumption:  only  the  State,  or  rather  the 
bureaucracy  governing  it,  can  u  know  what  it  wills  ;  " 
the  people  have  "  no  insight  or  recognition  "  of  what 
most  deeply  concerns  them.  They  must  accept  the 
Absolute  without  any  creative  participation  of  their 
own  ;  they  are  not  to  ask  how  did  it  get  there  or  who 
put  it  there ;  least  of  all  they  must  not  think  of  taking 
a  hand  in  establishing  this  supremacy  over  themselves. 

Such  is  "  the  actualization  of  Freedom,"  with  which 
word  trouble  again  enters.  "  In  the  case  of  Freedom 
we  are  not  to  start  from  the  individual,"  but  from  the 
self-conscious  Absolute  already  mentioned,  "  in  which 
the  individuals  are  only  moments"  (VIII.  s.  313). 
Hegel  often  speaks  of  Freedom,  believes  in  Freedom, 
but  it  is  the  Hegelian  Freedom,  which  we  have  already 
characterized.  The  free  individual  recognizes  by  his 
intelligence  the  absolute  State  and  aquiescesin  it  as  the 
realized  Reason  of  the  world.  Any  resistance  to  it  or 
separation  from  it  is  the  destruction  of  Freedom,  whose 
supreme  act  is  to  appreciate  and  to  obey  the  behests 
of  "  the  present  deity,"  the  State,  graciously  coming 
down  from  above. 

And  now  for  the  other  side.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  just  the  opposite  line  of  thought  can  be  found  in 
this  book  of  Hegel.  ' '  The  essence  of  the  modern 
State  is  that  its  universal  principle  be  united  with  the 
full  freedom  of  the  partic  ilar  person,"  and  its  proper 


804         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

administration  "  cannot  progress  without  taking  into 
account  the  right  of  the  individual  both  knowing  and 
willing"  (VIII.  s.  315).  Many  other  similar  pas- 
sages might  be  cited.  In  fact  Hegel  becomes  elo- 
quent, when  he  starts  to  dilating  upon  the  "  modern 
principle  of  subjectivity  "  which  enters  into  the  State 
of  to  day  as  distfnct  from  that  of  antiquity.  Emo- 
tional, almost  sentimental  extracts  we  might  cull  per- 
taining to  this  theme.  Unquestionably  he  regarded 
himself  as  a  defender  of  true  liberty,  and  as  an  vindi- 
cator of  the  individual.  And  he  was  of  course  from 
point  of  his  view. 

In  the  detailed  organization  of  his  State  Hegel  pre- 
sents the  outlines  of  a  constitutional  Monarchy,  simi- 
lar to  England  which  the  Prussia  of  his  time  was  not. 
All  this  we  must  consider  a  step  and  a  courageous 
step,  in  advance.  When  it  comes  to  the  representa- 
tion of  the  people,  he  shows  some  hesitation.  Still  he 
adopts  it,  even  if  in  a  subordinate  way.  That  the 
people  should  make  the  law  which  governed  them  was 
on  the  whole  antagonistic  not  only  to  Hegel's  view  of 
the  State  but  to  his  view  of  the  Universe.  The  Abso- 
lute independent  of  the  individual,  the  supreme 
Reason  in  and  for  itself,  the  divine  Substance  from 
which  all  particularity  came  forth,  was  fundamental 
with  him.  Yet  as  already  stated  he  had  at  times  the 
other  side,  that  of  the  individual  as  source  of  right 
and  freedom. 

It  is  a  fair  inference,  therefore,  that  this  work  on 
the  Philosophy  of  Right  is  at  bottom  dualistic.  When 
Hegel  made  his  Absolute  real  in  the  Prussian  State 
he  dualized  himself  and  his  Philosophy.  At  Berlin 
there  are  two  strands,  quite  opposite  running  through 


THE  PHILOSOPHARCH  HEGEL.  805 

him  and  his  work.  Indeed  he  could  not  help  it,  such 
is  the  true  outcome  and  culmination  of  his  thought. 
When  editor  Gans,  the  warm  defender,  declares  the 
work  to  be  forged  "  out  of  the  single  metal  of  Free- 
dom," and  points  to  many  confirmatory  passages,  he 
is  right  in  his  way.  When  biographer  Haym,  the 
bitter  antagonist,  declares  the  work  to  be  steeped  in 
hostility  to  the  right  of  the  individual  and  hence  to 
Freedom,  he  certainly  finds  many  quotations  support- 
ing his  view.  Now  both  these  men  are  right  in  assert- 
ing their  side ;  but  each  is  wrong  in  maintaining  that 
his  half  is  the  whole  Hegel.  The  time  has  come  when 
both  halves  must  be  recognized,  each  in  its  complete- 
ness yet  also  in  its  separation.  For  this  inner  dualism 
to  which  the  Philosophy  of  Hegel  has  pushed  forward 
must  be  seen  as  the  stage  antecedent  to  its  dissolution 
first  and  then  to  its  higher  evolution.  Just  this  in- 
herent scission  and  separation  of  the  colossal  philo- 
sophic organism  is  the  premonition  of  and  the  call  for 
the  coming  new  synthesis. 

In  fact  we  can  see  that  neither  of  the  foregoing 
representative  men  (Gans  and  Haym)  can  solve  the 
other's  problem.  The  one  puts  supreme  stress  upon 
the  objective,  the  law  and  institution  ;  the  other  upon 
the  subjective,  the  moral  consciousness,  the  individ- 
ual self-determination.  Such  is  the  European  dualism 
in  this  sphere;  the  State  with  its  officials,  its  police, 
its  law,  is  to  secure  the  freedom  of  the  people,  who, 
however,  are  not  allowed  to  have  any  hand  in  secur- 
ing their  own  freedom  through  their  freedom.  They 
are  to  obey  the  authority  placed  over  them  not  through 
their  own  act,  and  thus  safeguard  their  Will.  On  the 
whole  this  is  Hegel's  conception  of  liberty,  and  is  de- 


806         MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

rived  from  the  reality  before  him,  namely  from  Europe, 
and  specially  from  Prussia.  In  a  manner  the  people 
must  be  subservient  in  order  to  be  free,  must  renounce 
self-determination  in  order  to  get  something  of  it  at 
last.  The  State  shall  not  disturb  my  conscience,  my 
way  of  thinking,  my  subjective  world,  but  I  must  keep 
out  of  politics,  and  turn  government  over  to  the 
divinely  established  authorities.  The  outcome  is  that 
I  must  leave  the  State  alone  and  the  State  must  leave 
ire  alone.  Thus  it  would  seem  that  there  is  no  State 
for  the  moral  man  ;  the  moral  and  the  institutional  are 
absolutely  divorced  and  irreconcilable,  and  must  re- 
main asunder  as  the  ideal  and  the  real. 

It  is  a  merit  of  Hegel  that  he  seizes  the  worth  of  the 
Institution,  particularly  of  the  State.  But  the  moral 
element  is  a  vanishing  one  in  his  thought.  The  right 
of  the  subject,  of  the  individual,  seems  to  grow  less 
and  less  during  his  Prussian  career.  It  is  on  this 
point  that  the  European  Liberal  attacks  him  ;  but  the 
tame  European  Liberal  is  in  general  equally  one- 
sided, as  he  has  no  adequate  ground  for  institutions. 

B.  LECTURES  AT  BERLIN.  —  That  Hegel  was  very 
active  as  a  lecturer  during  his  Berlin  Period  has 
already  been  noted.  His  themes  were  various,  some 
of  them  we  have  sufficiently  considered.  There 
remain,  however,  three  important  books  of  his  belong- 
ing to  the  present  sphere',  products  of  his  lectures, 
which  must  be  briefly  glanced  at. 

A  favorite  conception  of  Hegel's  was  that  of  the 
World-Spirit,  and  it  was  certainly  one  of  his  most 
grandiose  and  fruitful  thoughts.  It  is  the  moving 
principle  in  his  Philosophy  of  History,  which  he 
brought  to  its  full  realization  after  the  preceding  work 


THE  PIIILOSOPIIAnCII  HEGEL.  807 

(the  Philosophy  of  Right).  This  is  his  third  if  not 
fourth  Absolute,  if  we  count  those  of  the  previous 
books.  Already  the  State  has  been  one  of  these 
Absolutes,  "  the  actual  God.*'  But  the  World-Spirit 
employs  the  individual  State  for  its  end,  which  must, 
therefore,  be  absolute,  and  above  the  State.  Such  is 
now  "the  absolute  Idea,"  which  unfolds  itself  histo- 
rically and  thus  is  precipitated  into  time. 

Here  Hegel  becomes  again  evolutionary  but  in  a 
new  way.  Not  a  line  of  Categories,  but  a  line  of 
States  is  the  present  evolution  of  the  Absolute.  The 
absoluteness  of  the  State  is  secretly  dropped,  other- 
wise there  would  be  a  row  of  Absolutes,  each  devour- 
ing the  other.  For  the  World's  History  reveals  the 
inner  Dialectic  of  the  historic  State  in  its  rise  and  fall. 
Each  nation  or  folk  is  a  stage  in  "  the  development  of 
the  consciousness  of  freedom."  Hegel  also  hints  that 
these  stages  correspond  to  the  Categories  of  the  Logic, 
which  thus  receive  a  fresh  confirmation.  His  new 
interest  is  shown  in  a  new  statement  about  Philosophy 
which  now  "  has  to  do  with  the  manifestation  of  the 
Idea  as  it  has  appeared  in  the  World's  History."  Art, 
Religion,  Philosophy  are  simply  to  portray  this  pro- 
cess ;  "all  spiritual  activity  has  as  its  end  to  make  man 
conscious  of  his  unity  "  with  the  State  and  the  World- 
Spirit  (Phil.  Gesch.  s.  61).  This  is  a  great  and  true 
thought,  but  it  makes  a  new  demand  upon  the  Hegelian 
system  which  it  does  not  fulfill,  namely  for  an  Educa- 
tive Institution.  Art,  Religion,  and  Philosophy  are 
not,  then,  self-end  as  formerly  declared,  but  are  an 
end  for  man's  instruction,  and  for  his  elevation  to  an 
institutional  life. 

In  a  number  of  ways  Hegel's  Philosophy  of  History 


808         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

demands  a  total  remodeling  of  his  system.  It  often 
reaches  underneath  the  whole  superstructure  and  calls 
for  a  new  order.  If  we  seek  for  the  Absolute  Reality 
in  the  historic  succession  of  Time,  the  encyclopedic 
ring  is  broken  and  another  stage  is  heralded.  Haym 
declares  that  Hegel's  Philosophy  of  History  "  has  no 
future."  This  is  again  a  one-sided  statement,  for  the 
opposite  can  also  be  shown.  In  other  words  this  book 
likewise  runs  into  that  inherent  dualism  which  we 
have  so  often  noted  before  in  Hegel  and  in  all  Philos- 
ophy. The  self-returning  principle  in  its  supreme 
form  gets  successive  again  and  evolves  not  into  but 
out  of  the  Absolute,  or  perchance  out  of  one  Abso- 
lute into  another.  The  encyclopedic  Hegel  bursts 
over  his  cycle  and  leaps  into  the  stream  of  Time  whose 
events  the  Absolute  as  World-Spirit  now  posits.  Thus 
the  cycle  as  metaphysical  is  broken  to  pieces  and  quite 
abandoned  by  Hegel  himself  in  this  book,  and  its 
fragments  may  be  seen  here  and  there  floating  at  the 
mercy  of  the  aforesaid  stream  of  Time.  Surely  the 
cycle  must  be  transformed  if  ever  again  it  shall  come 
to  validity. 

Another  point  may  be  mentioned  in  this  connection. 
As  the  World-Spirit  has  shown  such  a  terribly  nega- 
tive character  in  its  career  hitherto,  destroying  one 
State  in  order  to  produce  a  new  one,  can  it  not  be  made 
positive,  and  become  endowed  with  the  universal  prin- 
ciple of  saving  the  State?  It  oan  be  and  has  been  — 
but  this  lies  outside  of  Europe  and  hence  outside  of 
Hegel's  horizon.  The  State-producing  State,  the 
Federal  Union  as  realized  in  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  is  the  World-Spirit,  not  as  capricious 
and  negative,  but  as  calling  forth  and  preserving  the 


THE  PHILOSOPHAECH  HEGEL.  809 

individual  State  which  calls  forth  and  preserves  it. 
Thus  Time,  which  is  the  monstrous  devourerof  States 
in  Hegel  (and  also  in  reality),  is  met  and  turned  back  ; 
the  individual  State  is  first  produced  by  the  supreme 
State  or  the  World-Spirit  embodied  and  realized,  then 
it  turns  back  and  eventually  reproduces  that  which 
produced  it.  This  is  the  Occidental  State  which  is 
wholly  left  out  by  Hegel,  though  it  was  in  existence 
when  he  composed  his  book.  And  here  we  may  add 
that  there  are  properly  three  Periods  of  the  World's 
History  (Oriental,  European,  and  Occidental),  not 
four,  as  Hegel  says,  making  a  division  which  is  at 
present  decidedly  superannuated. 

It  may  be  said  that  Hegel's  World- Spirit  is  arbi- 
trary, destructive,  tyrannical,  in  other  words,  anti- 
institutional,  using  the  State  as  its  means  or  its 
plaything.  And  this  view  was  not  untrue  to  the  fact. 
But  the  Federal  Constitution  has  institutionalized  the 
World-Spirit,  making  it  an  inner  principle  of  the  pro- 
cess of  the  State,  and  not  leaving  it  outside  of  the 
same  with  its  destroying  might  (see  our  work  on  The 
State,  p.  493,  et  passim).  Evidently  this  last  histori- 
cal stage,  the  Occidental,  demands  a  complete  recon- 
struction of  the  Philosophy  of  History  which  by  its 
very  conception  requires  a  new  elaboration  at  every 
pivotal  epoch. 

We  pass  to  another  book  which  springs  from  Hegel's 
lectures  during  the  present  period,  namely  his  Philos- 
phy  of  Religion.  This  has  also  been  a  very  fruitful 
work.  It  is  the  main  source  of  the  modern  higher 
criticism  of  the  Scriptures.  It  may  likewise  be  con- 
sidered as  the  chief  fountain  of  recent  investigation 
into  the  history  of  Religion.  Hegel,  however,  has  no 


8 1 0    MODEEN  E  UE  OPE  A  N  PHIL  OSOPH  r. 

religious  Institution,  except  in  a  very  subordinate 
sense.  Nor  does  he  always  distinguish  between 
Religion  and  Poetry,  each  of  which  employs  the  image 
in  Representation.  He  does  <not  seize  the  secular 
and  the  religious  institutions  as  two  co-ordinate 
stages  of  the  ene  complete  institutional  process  — 
which  is  the  deepest  fact  of  them  both.  The  Church 
is  for  him  a  kind  of  appendage  to  the  State  —  wherein 
again  he  was  largely  true  to  the  Prussian  reality. 

Another  epoch-making  work  of  this  period  was 
Hegel's  Aesthetic.  It  still  remains  the  most  original 
and  most  complete  book  on  the  Philosophy  of  Art. 
Moreover,  it  is  the  best  edited  book  of  the  series ; 
Hotho,  the  editor,  shows  a  peculiar  delight  in  his 
business  and  a  special  talent  for  his  task.  As  it 
stands,  it  is  the  largest,  the  most  intelligible,  and  the 
most  elaborately  finished  work  of  Hegel.  Indeed  its 
size  and  its  treatment  make  it  disproportionate  in  the 
total  philosophic  edifice.  One  asks,  why  this  exces- 
sive self-indulgence  in  the  contemplation  of  Art?  Is 
the  Aesthetic  a  kind  of  anaesthetic  for  political  ills? 
Is  it  a  substitute  given  to  a  people  who  laek  partici- 
pation in  public  life?  Whatever  be  the  answer,  the 
book  is  a  great  and  noble  production,  placing  upon 
deep  foundations  the  beautiful  World  of  Art,  and 
also  forming  the  most  attractive  entrance  to  Hegel's 
own  Temple  of  Philosophy. 

The  afore-mentioned  three  works,  the  Philosophies 
of  History,  of  Religion,  and  of  Art  are  applications  of 
Hegel's  central  Idea  to  the  highest  themes.  The 
philosopher  is  popularizing  his  thought,  is  going  from 
within  outwards  to  the  world  of  immediate  reality.  In 
his  first  two  Periods  his  tendency  was  the  other  way 


THE  PHILOSOPHAECH  HEGEL.  811 

from  without  inwards  to  the  center,  to  the  Absolute. 
On  a  number  of  points  these  three  works  have  been 
his  most  influential  ones,  being  let  down,  as  it  were, 
from  his  ideal  empyrean  to  his  terrestrial  reader.  For 
the  same  reason  some  of  the  "  pure  Hegelians  "  have 
been  known  to  disparage  them,  in  comparison  with  the 
Logic,  and  even  with  the  Phenomenology. 

C.  MISCELLANEOUS  —  THE  ENGLISH  REFORM  BILL.  — 
The  first  word  of  this  title  indicates  the  extreme  of 
Hegel's  centrifugal  tendency  at  Berlin.  He  writes 
reviews,  articles,  criticisms;  he  enters  periodical  Lit- 
erature as  a  means  for  propagating  his  ideas,  he  scat- 
ters himself  broadcast  through  the  realm  of  particu- 
larity. Herein  we  cannot  follow  him. 

Toward  the  close  of  Hegel's  life  Revolution  again 
broke  loose  in  France  (1830)  and  startled  all  Europe. 
Especially  the  old  fellows  who  had  lived  through  the 
Reign  of  Terror,  the  Regicide,  and  Napoleon,  were 
shaken  as  by  an  earthquake.  Hegel  was  now  of  the 
old  ones,  and  he  became  not  only  anti-revolutionary 
but  anti  progressive,  even  anti-constitutional,  and 
turned  against  his  previous  views  as  expressed  in  his 
Recht  ten  years  before. 

The  people  and  their  rights  became  his  horror  — 
no  ballot,  no  free  speech,  no  individual  liberty  in 
political  matters.  Thus  he  reacts  from  his  former 
Prussian  attitude  toward  a  more  absolute  absolutism 
in  the  State. 

In  this  mood  he  writes  an  article  on  the  English 
Reform  Bill,  then  pending.  He  takes  sides  against 
Reform,  predicts  revolution  in  England,  laments  the 
decay  of  kingly  authority,  censures  "  the  weakness 
of  the  monarchical  principle  against  Parliament," 


812         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

instead  of  which  he  would  have  u  the  great  and  wise 
sense  of  Princes."  He  expresses  disgust  at  the  free 
speech,  the  declamation  and  discussion  rampant  in 
England,  for  which  he  would  substitute  the  "  still 
thoughtf  ulness "  of  the  Prussian  bureaucracy. 
Enough;  Hegel  has  completely  lost  touch  with  his 
own  World-Spirit  which  will  soon  begin  to  introduce 
this  very  parliamentary  government  into  Prussia. 

Very  deep  is  this  reaction  against  himself.  In  his 
Philosophy  of  Right  England  was  the  European  na- 
tion which  on  the  whole  best  represented  the  World- 
Spirit.  But  at  present  she  is  dethroned,  and  absolute 
Prussia  is  emphatically  put  in  her  place.  Yet  deeper 
is  the  scission  in  the  soul  of  Hegel:  he  now  (quite 
unconsciously,  it  is  true)  renounces  his  former  lead- 
ing maxim  that  the  Real  is  rational,  for  the  English 
Constitution  which  he  assails,  has  certainly  shown 
itself  to  be  a  reality  in  the  world.  But  instead  of  ap- 
preciation he  now  criticises  the  Real  and  breaks  with 
it.  In  the  meantime  we  have  to  ask:  What  has 
become  of  Hegel  himself?  Is  he  not  rent  in  twain  by 
his  own  blow  when  he  makes  the  Real  so  very 
irrational  ? 

This  article  on  the  English  Reform  Bill  was  Heg- 
el's last  important  piece  of  writing  for  the  public 
(printed  in  the  Prussian  Staatszeitung,  1831).  That 
private  letter  to  Grans  (see  prece  ling  p.  646)  was 
somewhat  later,  yet  in  a  similar  mood.  Hegel's 
final  act  would,  therefore,  seem  to  be  the  destruction 
of  Hegel  as  the  philosopher  of  Reality.  He  appears 
before  us  dividing  himself  in  twain,  assailing  and 
demolishing  himself.  Thus  the  lurking  dualism 
which  we  have  noticed  in  him  from  the  beginning  has 


EEGEUS  PHILOSOPHY.  813 

become  actual.  His  followers  on  the  whole  regret 
this  article.  Rosenkranz  speaks  of.  tt  with  disappro- 
val, and  seems  to  regard  it  as  written  in  a  diseased 
frame  of  mind,  since  he  plainly  sees  that  his  master 
has  here  committed  philosophic  suicide. 

Thus  Hegel  the  Philosopharch  is  also  dialectical, 
shows  himself  finite  and  undoes  himself  at  the  end. 
In  his  first  stage  we  saw  the  evolutionary  Hegel 
evolving  the  Absolute  along  three  lines  and  then 
through  his  own  Dialectic  passing  over  into  the  ency- 
clopedic Hegel.  But  the  latter  also  breaks  out  of 
the  cycle  and  again  finds  his  first  principle  to  be 
evolutionary  in  Time,  unfolding  the  same  in  the 
World's  History.  It  would  seem  that  Hegel  himself 
in  his  Evolution  quite  unconsciously  makes  all  three 
Hegels  dialectical,  makes  them  stages  of  a  greater 
process  underlying  them  all.  What  is  this  greater 
process,  or  higher  principle,  as  he  would  call  it? 
Repeatedly  we  have  sought  to  point  it  out,  as  we  have 
caught  a  glimpse  of  it  at  the  pivotal  turns  in  the 
preceding  movement. 

III.  HEGEL'S  PHILOSOPHY  —  OUTCOME. — In 
general  Hegel's  struggle  lies  between  the  philo- 
sophical (or  metaphysical)  and  psychological 
views  of  the  Universe,  that  is,  of  God, 
Nature  and  Man.  This  struggle  has  been  in 
Philosophy  from  its  beginning  far  back  in  old 
Greece ;  but  it  was  Hegel  who  brought  the 
two  sides  to  the  point  of  open  battle,  inas- 
much as  his  is  the  last  and  most  complete  state- 
ment of  Philosophy  in  its  entire  circuit.  We 
have  noticed  a  secret  power  breaking  up  from 


814          MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  depths  of  his  colossal  structure  and  compel- 
ling him  to  move  to  a  new  standpoint,  which, 
however,  as  philosophical,  will  bring  to  light  the 
same  old  difficulty.  His  Absolute,  after  being 
evolved  again  and  again,  will  show  limitation,  or, 
in.  Hegelian  nomenclature,  will  be  dialectical. 
His  own  weapon  (the  Dialectic),  wielded  by  him 
with  so  much  skill  upon  other  Philosophies, 
turns  back  at  last  upon  his  own. 

Evidently  Hegel  is  inclined  to  except  his  own 
system  from  the  principle  of  development  exist- 
ent in  all  previous  Philosophies.  These  have 
reached  in  him  the  ultimate  principle  underlying 
and  determining  them  in  the  past  and  seemingly 
controlling  them  in  their  future  unfolding.  Thus 
the  doctrine  of  refutation  which  he  applies  to 
others  is  not  to  be  applied  to  his  system.  His  is 
the  autocratic  imperial  Philosophy  ruling  all 
Philosophies.  Such  is  the  dualism  of  Hegel:  he 
sets  up  an  universal  principle,  which  holds  good 
for  all  except  himself.  Hence  his  Universal  is 
not  universal ;  this  law  is  not  for  all,  but  for  all 
others ;  his  Absolute  develops  a  limit  which  con- 
tradicts its  very  nature,  and  subjects  it  to  the 
Dialectic. 

Now  we  hold  that  this  dualism  is  not  peculiar 
to  Hegel;  it  is  the  dualism  of  all  Philosophy,  of 
the  philosophic  Norm  itself,  indeed  of  the  Euro- 
pean mind.  Hegel  as  Europe's  last  great  philoso- 
pher has  simply  pushed  it  to  its  ultimate  spiritual 


HEGEL'S  PHILOSOPHY.  815 

scission,  and  made  this  more  decidedly  explicit. 
In  a  very  different  sense  from  what  he  intended 
he  has  given  us  the  final  system  of  Philosophy, 
its  last  stage  of  development  before  it  passes  over 
into  another  Norm  of  Thought,  and  not  into  an- 
other system  of  Philosophy,  which  could  have 
nothing  new  to  tell,  being  already  determined  in 
its  process  and  order  by  Hegel's  Logic. 

Another  fact  may  be  noted  at  this  point. 
After  Hegel  Philosophy  scattered  in  all  direc- 
tions and  never  since  his  time  has  it  been  able  to 
gather  itself  together  and  make  a  great  original 
concentrated  effort.  Undoubtedly  many  talented 
men  have  appeared  and  have  written  philosophic 
books  not  lacking  in  bulk  or  quantity.  But  they 
are  relatively  small,  they  are  asteroids  which 
seems  to  be  the  fragments  of  some  huge  philo- 
sophical planet  which  has  exploded  and  strown 
its  particles  through  the  Heavens.  The  age  of 
the  Philosopharch  has  been  followed  by  the  age 
of  the  philosophules — the  little  philosophers 
who  write  big  books.  And  it  cannot  be  helped; 
the  trend  of  the  time  is  decidedly  out  of  Philoso- 
phy and  into  something  else  — what?  Or  to  use  an 
Hegelian  phrase,  the  World  Spirit  has  distinctly 
refused  to  incarnate  himself  in  any  philosopher 
since  Hegel.  Again  one  asks.,  What  is  the  rea- 
son? We  recollect  that  proud  declaration  of 
Hegel  in  his  opening  address  at  Berlin,  proclaim- 
ing himself  in  substance  to  be  the  World  Spirit 


816        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

incorporate,  no  longer  as  conquering  Napoleon 
but  as  triumphant  philosopher.  And  for  a  time 
he  made  good  the  claim,  though  his  Philosophy 
also  had  to  go  the  way  of  Napoleon's  conquests. 

Thus  in  Hegel  European  Philosophy  can  read 
two  leading  facts:  first,  the  very  bloom  of  the 
philosophic  thought  of  the  ages  and  also  its  doom. 
Its  terror  at  its  future  fate  can  be  discerned  in 
the  whole  body  of  philosophers  since  Hegel,  for 
they  with  great  unanimity  preach  some  kind  of  a 
reversion  to  -former  philosophers  —  to  Plato,  to 
Leibniz,  to  Spinoza,  and  specially  to  Kant. 
"  Back,  back  from  the  dangerous  precipice,  from 
the  final  jumping-off  place  of  all  Philosophy  un- 
covered to  our  vision  by  that  Hegel,"  and  they 
often  cast  bitter  reproaches  upon  our  philosopher 
who  has  only  unfolded  into  full  daylight  what 
lay  in  Philosophy  from  the  beginning. 

Perhaps  we  ought  not  to  speak  of  daylight  in 
connection  with  Hegel,  the  most  recondite  and 
hence  the  most  difficult  of  philosophers.  Though 
he  often  objects  to  abstraction,  he  of  all  men  who 
have  employed  human  speech,  is  the  most  ab- 
stract, more  so  than  Aristotle  who  is  no  weakling 
in  this  respect.  Hegel  has  not  merely  single 
abstractions,  but  builds  vast  temples  out  of  them, 
like  his  Logic.  It.  may  be  said  that  Hegel  pushes 
Philosophy  as  the  abstract  science  to  the  very 
limit  of  intelligibility.  The  Hegelians  them- 
selves very  often  berate  not  only  others  but  one 


BE  GEL'S  PHILOSOPHY.  817 

another  with  the  reproach:  You  do  not  under- 
stand Hegel.  The  significance  of  this  fact  should 
be  noted.  The  separation  of  Philosophy  from 
concrete  human  consciousness  has  reached  its  last 
stage,  it  has  become  in  Hegel  so  far  removed 
from  the  Ego,  that  the  latter  can  find  it  only 
with  the  greatest  toil  and  outlay  of  patience. 
Philosophy  has  indeed  been  the  grand  educator 
of  man  to  thought,  which  always  requires  this 
act  of  abstraction  or  self -alienation.  But  the 
self-alienation  required  to  grasp  Hegel  is  so  great 
that  the  Self  seems  in  danger  of  never  getting 
back  home  from  its  alienation.  Hence  the  cry 
of  the  Ego  in  the  reader  runs  through  all  Hegel 
in  an  undertone  which  is  often  tinged  with 
despair :  Bring  me  back  to  myself  out  of  these 
ghostly  regions,  point  out  in  me  the  living  coun- 
terpart of  these  pale  abstractions  of  the  philoso- 
pher, restore  me  from  this  desert  to  drink  again 
of  the  Artesian  well  of  rny  own  Ego. 

Such  is  the  cry  of  Psychology  to  Philosophy, 
which  has  been  heard  all  down  the  ages,  some- 
times low  and  sometimes  loud,  till  in  Hegel's 
Logic  it  becomes  a  piercing  scream  for  help.  It 
is  no  wonder  that  Philosophy  herself  took  a 
deadly  fright  on  beholding  these  abysses  of  her 
own  soul,  and  began  a  rapid  retreat  back  to  for- 
mer ages,  as  already  observed.  But  the  World- 
Spirit  does  not  march  that  way,  and  moreover  is 
not  inclined  to  be  panicky,  but  quietly  takes  an- 

52 


8 18         MODERN  E  UEOPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

other  protagonist  when  the  former  one  drops  to 
the  rear.  Verily  the  new  science  of  the  Spirit 
is  demanded.  The  question  rises :  if  Philosophy 
posits  its  abstract  categories  as  the  principles  of 
things,  what  posits  Philosophy  doing  this?  Or 
what  is  the  philosophy  underlying  and  moving 
this  Philosophy?  Clearly  the  Ego  of  the  philos- 
opher is  the  secret  demiurge  who  has  been  work- 
ing this  spectacle  of  abstractions,  and  not  merely 
"  looking  on."  That  Ego  must  now  come  forth 
and  take  its  place  openly  in  the  process,  no 
longer  an  unnoticed  manipulator  behind  the 
scenes.  Then  indeed  occurs  a  grand  metamor- 
phosis of  the  whole  philosophic  spectacle,  the  like 
of  which  has  been  rarely  seen  in  the  ages.  The 
Nineteenth  Century  moves  on  with  its  marvelous 
Evolution,  which  in  the  end  cannot  help  evolv- 
ing that  which  evolves  Evolution  itself.  For 
also  underneath  its  spectacular  shifting  of  Forms 
philosophical,  physical,  historical,  lurks  that 
same  secret  demiurge  whom  our  reader  will  now 
surely  be  able  to  identify. 

Can  we  not  conceive  the  old,  time-honored 
philosopher  transforming  himself  also,  along 
with  his  science?  Can  he  not  be  brought  to  give 
forth  what  he  really  is  rather  than  something 
which  he  has  made  and  seeks  to  impose  exter- 
nally upon  his  pupil  or  disciple?  Better  than  to 
teach  the  Absolute  is  it  to  teach  every  man  to 
make  his  own  Absolute,  to  teach  not  simply 


HE  GEL'S  PHILOSOPHY.  819 

Philosophy  but  the  power  to  create  Philosophy. 
Then  the  philosopher  will  impart  not  merely 
absolute  science  but  impart  himself  creating 
absolute  science.  That  which  makes  him 
philosopher  is  surely  his  creativity,  not  so  much 
his  ready-made  doctrine.  Undoubtedly  the  latter 
has  also  to  be;  thought  must  formulate  itself, 
but  its  ultimate  doctrine  must  be  just  this  power 
of  self-formulation.  Can  Philosophy  teach  every 
man  to  be  his  own  philosopher,  and  thus  reach 
down  to  the  originative  sources  of  its  own  being 
and  impart  the  same  to  human  souls?  Every 
Ego  is  destined  ultimately  to  be  creative,  and 
hence  must  formulate  its  own  Absolute.  But 
this  is  not  all :  at  the  same  time  it  must  formu- 
late itself  as  the  formulator  of  the  Absolute  and 
thus  include  itself  in  its  own  process  with  the 
Absolute.  This,  however,  is  no  longer  Philoso- 
phy strictly,  but  Psychology  (or  Psychosiology  ) . 
The  Ego  as  creative  sees  and  formulates  its  pro- 
cess (the  Psychosis)  as  the  absolute  process 
creative  of  it  and  of  all  things  (the  Pampsycho- 
sis).  From  this  point  of  view  it  must  make  and 
restate  not  only  Philosophy  but  all  science. 


820        MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 


2.  Darvptn. 

The  general  relation  of  Hegel  to  Darwin  can 
not  be  better  illustrated  than  by  citing  some  pas- 
sages from  the  former's  Philosophic  der  Natur: 
"  We  are  to  consider  Nature  as  a  system  of  stages, 
of  which  one  necessarily  proceeds  from  the 
other;"  but  this  process  "  is  not  a  creation  of 
Nature  herself,  but  of  the  Idea  which  constitutes 
the  ground  of  Nature."  Hence  it  comes  that 
"  the  transformation  of  the  shapes  of  Nature  is 
the  work  of  the  Conception  (Begriff),  since  the 
latter's  change  constitutes  the  only  Evolution" 
(s.  32).  Thus  the  logical  Conception  is  the 
inner  moving  principle  in  Nature,  whose  unfold- 
ing is  consequently  adjusted  to  the  movement  of 
the  Logic.  Hegel  goes  on  to  say  that  "  the  rise 
of  the  more  developed  animals  out  of  the  lower 
must  be  rejected  by  the  thinker"  (Do.  s.  33). 
It  is  manifest  from  these  citations  that  Hegel 
does  not  accept  Evolution  or  the  immanent 
development  of  Nature  through  herself;  in  fact, 
he  uses  the  word  Evolution  (s.  34)  to  designate 
the  before-mentioned  ascent  of  the  lower  forms 
of  Nature  up  to  man.  The  term,  therefore,  had 
been  in  use  before  Darwin  and  Spencer,  with  the 
same  meaning  as  theirs. 

The    preceding    view   must   be  regarded    as 


DAE  WIN.  821 

one  of  Hegel's  worst  mistakes.  In  the  most 
emphatic  manner  the  next  generation  after 
him  contradicted  his  statement.  Darwin  shows 
in  Nature  an  immanent  development,  which 
refuses  to  allow  the  logical  categories  to  be 
clapped  on  externally  to  her  own  native  un- 
folding. Physical  metamorphosis  is  not  "the 
work  of  the  Conception,"  but  is  Nature's  own 
work.  It  is  manifest  that  Darwin  puts  an  end 
to  all  Philosophy  of  Nature,  in  so  far*  as  it 
imposes  its  categories  a-priori  upon  the  physi- 
cal world.  And  yet  Hegel  along  with  Dar- 
win is  an  evolutionist,  but  ne  believes  only  in 
logical  Evolution,  which  is  autocratically  to  be 
applied  both  to  Nature  and  to  Mind.  Nature 
refuses  to  be  thus  dominated  and  asserts  her  own 
inborn  right  to  Evolution  through  Darwin. 
Strictly  Hegel  is  not  consistent,  not  truly  univer- 
sal in  his  evolutionary  doctrine,  since  he  denies 
its  application  to  the  physical  world.  At  once 
Evolution,  in  order  to  evolve  itself  completely, 
must  proceed  to  deny  his  denial  and  to  transcend 
his  limit.  This  is  the  function  of  the  next  great 
epoch  of  Evolution,  the  second  stage  of  it  in  the 
total  movement  of  the  Nineteenth  Century. 

Thus,  the  second  stage  of  the  philosophic 
Norm  —  Nature  —  now  works  itself  out  inde- 
pendently, in  its  own  right,  through  its  own  evo- 
lutionary process,  affirming  itself  to  be  not  de- 
termined by  any  metaphysical  system.  Darwin- 


822         MODERN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ism  is  a  kind  of  Declaration  of  Independence  on 
the  part  of  Natural  Science.  Of  course  Darwin 
knew  nothing  of  Hegel,  but  the  time  was  work- 
ing in  both  of  these  men,  each  of  whom  had  his 
own  distinct  task  of  expressing  a  separate  stage 
of  Evolution  as  the  one  underlying  movement  of 
the  Century. 

But  we  are  to  see  that  Darwin  like  Hegel  has 
his  limit.  Evolution  has  in  the  end  to  evolve 
itself  in  order  to  be  complete.  ~  As  the  evolver  of 
Forms,  it  must  evolve  a  Form  which  evolves  it; 
if  it  cannot,  then  it  manifests  its  finitude  just  at 
this  point  of  inability  to  win  completely  itself. 
In  other  words  Evolution  cannot  in  strictness 
stop  till  it  evolves  an  Ego  which  evolves  it,  namely 
E volution o  Of  course  'Darwin  does  not  reach, 
does  not  try  to  reach  such  a  result.  Darwin  is 
an  Ego  which  turns  back  to  its  beginning  as  man- 
ifested in  organic  Forms,  and  sees  itself  unfold 
through  all  these  shapes  up  to  its  own  external 
shape  in  the  Human  Body.  Here  he  substan- 
tially stops,  even  if  he  casts  many  glances  beyond 
into  the  psychological  realm.  But  on  the  whole 
Darwin  does  not  grasp  his  Ego  evolving  itself  as 
such,  but  evolving  itself  through  organic  Forms 
of  Nature,  and  this  is  his  special  sphere.  He  is 
inclined  to  limit  his  vision  to  seeing  the  Evolution 
of  his  own  organism.  Darwin  then  does  not 
evolve  Darwin,  except  as  corporeal.  For  the 


DARWIN.  823 

evolutionist,  to  be  complete,  must  evolve  the  evo- 
lutionist evolving  Evolution. 

It  is  manifest  that  Darwin  has  deeply  re-acted 
against  the  old  metaphysical  conception  of  Nature, 
who  in  his  hands  is  made  to  evolve  herself  freely 
from  within  and  to  unfold  through  her  own  cat  - 
egories  and  not  through  those  taken  from  some 
outside  science.  This  is  a  great  deed,  certainly 
one  of  the  chief  spiritual  factors  of  the  Century. 
Nevertheless  we  are  to  see  that  Darwin  on  an- 
other side  still  belongs  to  the  philosophical  (or 
metaphysical) movement  of  the  ages.  Out  of  his 
Ego  he  projects  an  abstract  category,  like  Evolu- 
tion, and  never  brings  it  back  to  the  Ego,  identi- 
fying its  process  with  the  same.  In  this  sense 
he  is  still  philosophical,  not  psychological,  be- 
longing to  the  old  Discipline  and  not  to  the  new. 
Darwinism  is,  therefore,  still  a  Philosophy  of 
Nature  but  in  a  wider  meaning  of  the  term  than 
heretofore.  It  asserts  its  place  in  the  History  of 
Philosophy,  even  if  it  refused  to  be  determined 
by  any  foreordained  philosophic  system. 

With  this  very  brief  statement  of  Darwinism 
we  shall  have  to  stop,  though  it  deserves  a  full 
exposition  as  one  of  the  chief  spiritual  move- 
ments of  the  Nineteenth  Century.  We  can  only 
say  at  present  that  we  hope  to  return  to  this 
subject,  which  involves  a  Psychology  of  Natural 
Science,  and  to  present  our  thoughts  upon  it, 
which  have  occupied  us  many  years. 


824         MODERN  E  UR  OPE  AN  PHIL  OSOPH  Y. 


3, 

The  Evolution  of  the  Soul  in  correspondence 
with  the  Evolution  of  the  Body  has  been  strongly 
felt  to  be  a  necessary  continuation  of  the  doc- 
trine of  Darwin  who  has  sent  many  flashes  into 
this  realm  which  on  the  whole  lies  beyond  his 
own.  Just  as  man's  organism  contains  within  it 
all  the  animal  forms  through  which  it  has  passed 
in  its  ascent,  so  man's  soul  contains  the  psy- 
chical attributes  of  these  animals,  and  is  really 
built  of  them.  It  is  a  collection  of  impulses  and 
instincts  sprung  of  the  organic  life  of  the  past 
and  inherited  by  the  present.  Psychical  Evolu- 
tion is  thus  the  complement  of  organic  Evolution. 
Hence  the  great  effort  which  succeeded  Darwin's 
organic  history  of  man,  has  been  to  discover  the 
corresponding  psychical  history  of  man. 

In  this  work  two  investigators  have  distin- 
guished themselves — Spencer,  an  Englishman, 
and  Wundt,  a  German.  It  is  as  yet  an  open 
question  which  of  the  two  deserves  the  greater 
credit.  Both  have  their  warm  defenders,  but 
time  Kas  not  yet  assigned  the  palm.  Their  period 
is  too  recent;  one  died  but  a  few  months  ago, 
and  the  other  is  still  living,  though  an  old  man. 
The  Tribunal  of  the  Ages  at  the  date  of  this 
writing  (spring  of  1904)  has  not  yet  rendered  a 


PI1YSIO-PSYCHISM.  825 

decision,  and  probably  will  not  for  some  years  to 
come.  Certainly  we  have  no  power  to  give  judg- 
ment in  the  case. 

The  result  is  that  this  third  stage  in  the  philo- 
sophic movement  of  the  Nineteenth  Century  can- 
not be  personalized,  cannot  be  concentrated  in 
one  individual  philosopher,  as  has  been  always 
the  case  hitherto.  Here,  then,  is  the  single  ex- 
ception to  the  tri-personal  movement  which  we 
have  seen  to  be  in  every  Century  of  modern 
Philosophy.  The  end,  for  the  present,  at  least, 
is  dual,  illustrating  possibly  the  outcome  of 
Philosophy,  and  in  this  state  it  has  to  be  left. 
Still  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  doctrine  has  dis- 
tinctly appeared  and  made  itself  -valid  as  the 
third  stage  of  the  Century's  movement.  It  is 
commonly  known  as  physiological  or  genetic  or 
experimental  Psychology ;  its  best  epithet  would 
be  evolutionary. 

Its  chief  means  are  observation,  and  specially 
experiment.  In  the  latter  the  Ego  is  subjected 
to  manifold  influences  artificially  prepared  in 
order  to  make  it  reveal  its  past  stages  of  devel- 
opment in  gradation.  These  stages  lie  deeply 
imbedded  in  our  unconscious  life,  till  they  are 
brought  to  the  surface  by  some  external  stimu- 
lation made  ready  and  applied  for  that  purpose. 
These  are  the  psychical  phenomena  of  the  un- 
conscious Ego,  whose  science  constitutes  a  new 
Phenomenology  suggesting  Hegel's,  which  is 


826          MODEBN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  development  of  the  forms  of  the  conscious 
Ego.  Physiological  Psychology  thus  has  in  it  a 
return  to  Hegel's  Phenomenology  which  it  fills 
out  by  giving  the  antecedent  forms  of  the  uncon- 
scious Ego.  In  fact  Darwinism,  evolving  its 
line  of  organic  forms  up  to  man  as  its  phenomena, 
shows  itself  to  be  a  kind  of  Phenomenology  also, 
incorporate  in  animal  shapes,  and  so  has  its 
counterpart  in  the  inner  movement  of  the  shapes 
of  consciousness  which  unfold  in  a  line  of  ascent 
up  to  the  Absolute  in  Hegel's  work.  Thus  the 
last  stage  of  the  Century's  thought  bends  around 
(so  to  speak)  and  interlinks  with  the  first.  The 
evolutionary  Hegel  as  individual  Ego  had  as  his 
supreme  task  the  evolution  of  the  Absolute  — 
such  was  the  first  stage  of  the  Century's  thought 
whose  last  stage  is  the  Evolution  of  that  indi- 
vidual Ego,  which  constituted  the  real  starting- 
point  in  evolving  the  Absolute. 

Thus  Physio-psychism  manifests  a  strong 
reaction  against  the  old  metaphysical  Psychology 
which  imposes  its  categories  taken  from  some 
philosophical  system  upon  the  free  Ego,  though 
this  originally  made  the  system.  Herein  the 
movement  has  undoubted  validity,  even  if  it  be 
but  a  preparation  for  something  better.  As 
Darwinism  freed  the  Science  of  Nature  from  a 
Philosophy  which  determined  it  from  the  out- 
side, so  Physio-psychism  has  freed  the  Science 


PHYSIO-  PSYCHISM.  827 

of  the  Soul  (Psychology)  from  the  same  external 
domination. 

Still  this  liberation  is  by  no  means  complete. 
The  Evolution  is  still  externally  produced,  chiefly 
by  experiment ;  it  is  not  yet  inner  Evolution  of 
the  Self .  The  procedure  is  derived  from  physi- 
cal Science  and  hence  is  as  foreign  to  the  EgoV 
own  movement  as  is  the  metaphysical  procedure. 
Its  fundamental  category,  Evolution,  is  taken 
from  Darwinism.  Thus  the  Ego  has  gotten  rid 
of  one  tyrant  only  to  be  ruled  by  another.  Still 
there  is  progress.  The  Ego  of  Spencer  tracing 
its  stages  through  all  its  past  forms  is  moving 
toward  its  completeness  in  self-consciousness 
which  sees  itself  as  the  reproducer  of  its  whole 
history.  Still,  Physio-psychisin  never  fully 
grasps  its  own  act.  Wundt  makes  his  Ego  call 
up  its  former  states  by  outer  stimulation;  but 
the  true  finality  is  Wundt' s  Ego  doing  this  very 
thing,  returning  upon  its  total  past  and  so 
re-creating  itself  in  its  entire  sweep.  And  not 
this  alone,  for  there  must  also  be  the  correspond- 
ing formulation;  the  Ego  must  be  taken  up  into 
its  science  as  re-producing  that  which  produces 
it.  But  therewith  we  have  transcended  the 
limits  of  Physio-psychism.  Evolutionary  Psy- 
chology has  unfolded  not  merely  a  line  of  Forms, 
but  the  Form  of  all  Forms,  which  goes  back  to 
the  beginning  and  evolves  itself  evolving  all 
these  Forms.  Thus  Evolution  has  evolved  out 


828        MODEEN  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  itself  into  that  which  makes  it  and  becomes 
an  element  of  the  total  process  of  the  new 
Discipline.  In  this  way  what  was  implicit  in 
Physio-psychism  and  in  the  entire  Nineteenth 
Century  with  its  threefold  Evolution  has  become 
explicit  and  a  reality  in  the  start  of  a  new  epoch 
of  thought.  It  may  be  said  that  Evolution 
determined  the  last  Century,  but  the  present  is 
to  determine  Evolution. 

Moreover  we  can  now  look  back  and  see  that 
the  philosophic  Norm  with  its  three  stages  —  the 
Absolute  (God),  Nature,  and  Man  (the  Soul)  — 
have  been  evolutionary  in  each  case.  Hegel's 
chief  work  is  the  Evolution  of  the  Absolute, 
Darwin's  is  the  Evolution  of  Nature  culminating 
in  the  human  organism,  Physio-psychism  is  the 
Evolution  of  the  Soul,  as  far  as  this  science  goes. 
And  each  of  these  stages  of  the  Norm  has 
asserted  its  own  inner  independent  Evolution, 
even  if  it  did  not  and  could  not  fully  carry  out 
its  assertion.  So  we  can  say  that  the  Century 
itself  turned  philosopher  and  formulated  its 
principle  of  Evolution  according  to  the  philo- 
sophic Norm.  Really  this  is  the  end  of  the  old 
way  of  philosophizing,  in  which  the  first  stage 
of  the  Norm  (as  logical  or  metaphysical  sys- 
tem) determined  the  other  two  stages. 

The  result  is  that  the  Nineteenth  Century 
through  its  Evolution  undermines  while  following 
the  philosophic  Norm  of  Thought.  This  does 


PHYSIO-PSYCHISM.  829 

not  mean  that  it  has  destroyed  the  Universe  of 
the  Absolute  (God),  Nature,  and*  Man  (Soul), 
hut  it  has  broken  through  and  out  of  the  philo- 
sophic formulation  of  the  Universe  and  is  bringing 
to  light  another  and  more  complete  formulation 
of  the  same.  Man  is  now  the  starting-point,  the 
third  factor  of  the  old  Norm  has  become  the  first 
in  the  new  one,  humanity  is  to  have  the  primal 
stress  in  the  fresh  creation  of  the  Universe  of 
Thought.  Man  openly  determines  the  Norni 
which  determines  him,  he  is  to  re-create  the 
Absolute  which  creates  him,  or,  as  we  say  politi- 
cally he  is  to  make  the  law  which  governs  him. 
(For  a  more  extended  development  of  this  prin- 
ciple at  which  we  have  here  arrived,  see  our 
former  work,  Ancient  European  Philosophy,  p. 
29,  where  the  three  supreme  Norms  of  Thought, 
religious,  philosophical,  and  psychological,  are 
characterized.  We  would  recommend  to  the 
reader  who  wishes  to  see  the  entire  circuit  of 
the  History  of  Philosophy,  to  read  the  whole 
introduction  to  that  work,  and  to  observe  that 
the  present  conclusion  has  brought  us  back,  and 
also  forward,  to  our  starting-point.  In  such  a 
mental  act  he  will  also  pass  from  evolutionary 
Psychology  (Physio-psychism)  to  the  self- 
returning  Psychology,  which  we  may  call,  if 
the  word  Psychology  be  worn  out  or  ambiguous 
through  its  various  usages,  by  the  new  yet  sim- 
ilar name  of  Psychosiology,  or  the  science  of  the 
Psychosis.) 


Keep  this  Catalogue  for  Reference. 

Note  reduction  in  price. 

WORKS  BY  DENTON  J.  SNIDER 

PUBLISHED  BY 

SIGMA  PUBLISHING  COMPANY, 

210  PINE  STREET,  ST.  Louis,  Mo. 
I.  Commentary  on  the  Literary  Bibles,  in  9  vols. 

1.  Shakespeare's  Dramas,  3  vols. 

Tragedies  (new  edition),  .  .  $1.50 

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First  Part  (new  edition),     .         .        1.50 
Second  Part  (new  edition),        -~     1.50 

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Odyssey, 
Dante's  Inferno, 


Purgatory  and  Paradise, 


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II.  Psychology. 

1.  Psychology  and  the  Psychosis,      .          .50 

2.  The  Will  and  its  World,         .         .          .50 

3.  Social  Institutions,         .         .'       .         .50 

4.  The  State, 50 

5.  Ancient  European  Philosophy,       .        1.50 
G.  Modern  European  Philosophy,       .        1.50 

III.  Kindergarden. 

1.  Commentary  on  Froebel's  Mother 

Play-Songs,  .         .         .         .1.25 

2.  The  Psychology  of  Froebel's  Play- 

Gifts,    1.25 

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IV.  Poems  —  in  5  vols. 

1.  Homer  in  Chios,     .        v      '.         .        1.00 

2.  Delphic  Days,         .         .         .-  ,....       l.t.o 

3.  Agamemnon's  Daughter,        .        ..       1.00 

4.  Proisus  Retrorsus,          .         .         .        1.00 

5.  Johnny  Appleseed's  Rhymes,         .        1.25 

V.  Miscellaneous. 

1.  A  Walk  in  Hellas,  .         .         .1.25 

2.  The  Freeburgers  (a  novel),  .        1.25 

3.  World's  Fair  Studies,    .         .         .        1.25 
For  sale   by  A.    C.  M'Clurg  &   Co.,  Booksellers, 

Chicago,  Ills.,  to  whom  the  trade  is  referred. 

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